71 Amendments of Martin SCHIRDEWAN related to 2023/0137(CNS)
Amendment 1 #
Proposal for a regulation
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–
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
Amendment 3 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entails compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. All this framework curtails the sovereignty of Member States.
Amendment 4 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) The economic governance framework of the Union, which comprises an elaborate system of policy coordination and surveillance of Member States’ economic policies, has guidfailed Member States in achieving their economic and fiscal policy objectives. Since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the framework has helped achievefailed in promoting macroeconomic convergence, safeguard sound public finances and address macroeconomic imbalancesas well complying with the goals for public debt and government deficit. Together with a common monetary policy and a common currency in the euro area, the framework has createdfailed in creating the conditions for economic stability, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and higher employment for citizens of the Union.
Amendment 5 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the SGP21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainabl. Such framework failed in promoting full employment, sustainable and inclusive growth, and employmentoverall macroeconomic convergence between Member States. __________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 21 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1).
Amendment 6 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) The set goals of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Moreover, evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.
Amendment 7 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 b (new)
Recital 3 b (new)
(3b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.
Amendment 8 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 c (new)
Recital 3 c (new)
(3c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt- to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programmes failed to accomplish its own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.
Amendment 9 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
Amendment 12 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the macroeconomic divergences and disparities in production capacities, growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come. __________________ 22 The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, requiring significant public investment to reduce the negative socio-economic impacts of climate change on the EU and its Member States, including negative impacts on growth and fiscal sustainability.
Amendment 14 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable growthfull employment and the achievement of the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectoricountry-specific challenges. Moreover, it should allow for true ownership and democratic scrutiny of such choices.
Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
Amendment 20 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
Amendment 25 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
Amendment 27 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorWhen social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, which includes a severe occur, or an economic downturn in the Member State concerned, the excess of a primary deficit should be considered exceptional.
Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States tocan deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council underreference trajectory they set that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a keyll relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEUs on equal footing. Besides the sustainability of public debt, the Commission is toshould take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the ithe progress on the national targets on empleoymentation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership,, skills and poverty reduction and the implementation of investment. In order to increase national ownership, national parliaments, representatives of workers' associations and the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors. __________________ 24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) TWhe corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDPn a Member State, in dialogue with the Commission and the Council, defines primary deficit as excessive, it should present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth- enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome it.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) For Member States under an EDP, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, should continue to be able to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit where it establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in the case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of an individual Member State and provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. Such extension should require that the overall size of the shock exceeds a normal range, for example costs of natural disasters should be anticipated within bandwidths.
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
Recital 18
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. Ishould have a pluralistic and multidisciplinary board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations, in order to truly enhance national ownership, the role of. Moreover, when requested by the Member State concerned, such independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union should be responsible to produce the forecasts and the impact assessments needed to the budgetary practices.
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
Recital 20
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union25 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission26 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCGhe package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by Member States being the ones deciding on their fiscal choices and requiring its parliamentary approval. __________________ 25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) 'reference trajectory' means the trajectory for the primary balance each Member State shall present, as set in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point e
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point e
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1
Article 2 – paragraph 1
The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the CouncilMember State concerned has established the existence of a severen economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned,significant social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the CommissionMember State indicate that the deficit will fallorient towards below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
1a. WThen it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path Member State shall present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth-enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome such excessive primary deficit.
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, mayshall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severen economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the CouncilMember State concerned establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]paragraph 1.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule, on an equal footing, all relevant factors as indicated in that Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of the sustainability of the primary deficit and public debt criteria of the Member State concerned.
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point a
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point a
(a) the developments in the medium- term economic position, in particular inflation developments and cyclical developments compared to the assumptions underlying the net expenditure path;
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b
(b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation;
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c
(c) the evolution of the government debt stock, but also its position and its financing, including possible ECB temporary support put in place, and the related risk factors, including in particular the debt structure, maturity structure, and the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d
(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any oll ther factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteriathe sustainability of primary deficit and public debt and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its nationsubmitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall independent fiscal instituclude the opinion on relevant factors, but also the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, on relevant factorsf the: (i) national parliament of the state concerned; (ii) representatives of workers' associations; (iii) national independent fiscal institution.
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5
Article 2 – paragraph 5
5. Where Member States are alloweddecides to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a wholereference trajectory in accordance with paragraph 1 pursuant to Article 24 and Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, mayshall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 6
Article 2 – paragraph 6
If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadlinthe deadline agreed with the Member State for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, tThose relevant factors shall notalso be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 3
Article 3 – paragraph 3
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendaMember State shall agree with the Commission and the Council on a maximum deadline for effective action, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmarko be taken and for the correction of the excessive deficit.
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5
Article 3 – paragraph 5
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 6
Article 3 – paragraph 6
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 4
Article 4
(3) Article 4 is replaced by the following:deleted
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5
Article 5
(4) Article 5 is amended as follows:deleted
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 6
Article 6
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8
Article 8
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) where the Member State concerned acts in compliance with recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEUemploys active economic and fiscal measures to address its fiscal situation, taking under consideration the public recommendations made by the Commission and the Council;
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 1
Article 10a – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions, for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions.; During such dialogue, the Commission shall invite representatives of workers' associations to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 2
Article 10a – paragraph 2
2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a dedicated surveillance mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the surveillance mission.;Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State.
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1
Article 12 – paragraph 1
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 2
Article 12 – paragraph 2
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3
Article 12 – paragraph 3
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 14
Article 14
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 15
Article 15
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2