Progress: Procedure completed
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | ECON | FERBER Markus ( EPP), MARQUES Margarida ( S&D) | KELLEHER Billy ( Renew), LAMBERTS Philippe ( Verts/ALE), RINALDI Antonio Maria ( ID), VAN OVERTVELDT Johan ( ECR), GUSMÃO José ( GUE/NGL) |
Committee Opinion | BUDG | VAN OVERTVELDT Johan ( ECR) | |
Committee Opinion | EMPL |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
TFEU 126-p14-a2
Legal Basis:
TFEU 126-p14-a2Events
PURPOSE: to speed up and clarify the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.
PROPOSED ACT: Council Regulation (Agreement in principle with a view to consulting the European Parliament).
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the Council adopts the act after consulting the European Parliament but without being obliged to follow its opinion.
Parliament is being consulted again on the proposal to amend Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 laying down provisions on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. The aim of the excessive deficit procedure is to prevent the occurrence of excessive government deficits and, if they do occur, to speed up their correction, with compliance with budgetary discipline being examined on the basis of the government deficit and debt criteria.
The proposed Regulation is part of a package together with the Regulation on the preventive arm of the stability and growth pact and the Directive amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union.
The main elements of the Council draft are as follows:
Excessive deficit procedure
It is foreseen that to trigger the process, the Commission would prepare a report , when the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, the headline deficit is not close to balance or in surplus and when the deviations recorded in the control account of the Member State either exceed 0.3 percentage points of GDP annually, or 0.6 percentage points of GDP cumulatively .
The Council and the Commission would make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors that affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria of the member state concerned. These include among other things, the degree of public debt challenges, the size of the deviation, the progress in the implementation of reforms and investments and, where applicable the increase of government spending on defence.
Rules relating to the excessive deficit procedure
When it decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Council should at the same time make recommendations to the Member State concerned. The Council recommendation should establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation should also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. It should also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation.
The Council proposes to maintain the rules of the excessive deficit procedure in so far as when the excessive deficit procedure is opened on the basis of the deficit criterion, the corrective net expenditure path should be consistent with a minimum annual structural adjustment of at least 0.5% of the GDP .
However, the Council also decided that the Commission may, for a transitory period in 2025, 2026 and 2027 , take into account the increase in interest payments in calculating the adjustment effort within the excessive deficit procedure.
The Council agreed that the fine in case of non-compliance would amount to up to 0.05% of GDP and accumulate every six months until effective action is taken.
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted, following a special legislative procedure (consultation), the report by Esther de LANGE (EPP, NL) and Margarida MARQUES (S&D, PT) on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.
This Regulation lays down the provisions for speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure . The objective of the excessive deficit procedure is to deter excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further prompt their correction, where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria.
The committee responsible recommended that the European Parliament approve the Commission's proposal subject to amendments.
Assessment of excessive debt
When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned .
The Commission, when drawing up a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule.
The Commission should take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the delivery and commitment by the Member State on the implementation of the investments and reforms to address the common priorities of the Union as set out in the EU Regulation on the preventive arm , the reforms and investments committed in the national plans of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds and future EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose.
Net expenditure
In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State.
According to Members, that single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure, expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds, national expenditure on co-financing of programmes funded by the Union cap with a limit of 0.25% of GDP, cyclical elements of unemployed benefit expenditure, and costs related to the borrowing of funds for the loans related to the national Recovery and Resilience Facility Plans.
By 31 December 2028 and every five years thereafter, the Commission should publish a report on the application of this Regulation.
PURPOSE: to reform the EU economic governance framework.
PROPOSED ACT: Council Regulation.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the Council adopts the act after consulting the European Parliament but without being obliged to follow its opinion.
BACKGROUND: this proposal forms part of a package and aims to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact). It is accompanied by:
- a proposal to replace Council Regulation No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact);
- a proposal to amend Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States.
The review of the EU's economic governance framework was based on a consultation with a wide range of stakeholders. It revealed that the framework has a number of strengths, but also a series of shortcomings, in particular i) increased complexity, ii) the need to be more effective in reducing high levels of debt and building up buffers for future shocks, as well as (iii) the need to update a number of instruments and procedures to incorporate lessons learned from the response to recent economic shocks, including the interaction between reforms and investments under the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
The strong policy response to the COVID19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives.
The package including this legislative proposal aims at making the EU governance framework simpler, more transparent and effective , with greater national ownership and better enforcement, while allowing for reform and investment and reducing high public debt ratios in a realistic, gradual and sustained manner. In this way, in the context of the European Semester, the reformed framework should help build the green, digital and resilient economy of the future, while ensuring the sustainability of public finances in all Member States.
Stronger ex-post enforcement would be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that provides more leeway to Member States to set their adjustment paths.
CONTENT: the proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact - SGP) provides for a shift to a more risk-based surveillance framework that puts debt sustainability at the centre and, in order to further differentiate between Member States, takes into account their public debt challenges, while respecting a transparent and common EU framework consistent with the 3% of GDP and 60% of GDP reference values set out in Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaties
Under the proposal, the rules for the opening and closing of an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for breaches of the 3% of GDP deficit reference value would remain unchanged , with some adjustments to ensure consistency with the EDP for breaches of the debt criterion, to recognise the role of independent fiscal institutions and to clarify cases of severe economic downturn in the Union or the euro area as a whole. It is a well-established element of EU fiscal surveillance that has been effective in influencing fiscal behaviour and is well understood by policy makers and the general public, thanks to its simplicity.
The excessive deficit procedure for breaches of the debt criterion would be strengthened for both activation and abrogation. It would focus on departures by Member States with debt above 60% of GDP from the fiscal path that the Member State has committed itself to and has been endorsed by the Council under the proposed Regulation replacing the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. In case this original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Commission could propose to the Council an amended path under the EDP.
More specifically, the proposal:
- changes the operationalisation of the Treaty debt criterion, abandoning the ‘1/20th rule’ and focusing on the respect of the net expenditure path set by the Council under the proposed Regulation replacing the preventive arm of the SGP;
- removes the reference to a quantitative description of a severe economic downturn and refers instead to the proposed Regulation replacing the preventive arm of the SGP;
- streamlines the list of relevant factors to decide on the existence of an excessive deficit;
- provides that, in the event of a severe economic downturn, the Commission and the Council may decide in their assessment not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit, in line with the approach followed when the general escape clause was activated during the COVID-19 crisis;
- specifies the requirements of the corrective net expenditure path set out in a Council Recommendation, namely that the government deficit should be brought back to or maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value and that the debt ratio should be placed on a plausible downward path or kept at a prudent level;
- maintains, for the years in which the government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark;
- imposes an additional obligation on Member States to include in their report on effective action the opinion of their independent fiscal institution;
- provides that in case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, the Commission and the Council may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.
Lastly, the proposal provides that the missions undertaken by the Commission in Member States allow an exchange also with relevant stakeholders other than the national authorities, including independent fiscal institutions. It also requires the Commission to carry out dedicated surveillance missions to Member States which were given a notice by the Council and provides that, in that context and upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State concerned.
Documents
- Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T9-0312/2024
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament: T9-0312/2024
- Supplementary legislative basic document: 15876/2023
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0444/2023
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- Specific opinion: PE754.864
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.925
- Committee of the Regions: opinion: CDR0157/2023
- Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES2275/2023
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2023/0020
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: OJ C 290 18.08.2023, p. 0017
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2023)0241
- Legislative proposal published: EUR-Lex
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2023/0020 OJ C 290 18.08.2023, p. 0017
- Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES2275/2023
- Committee of the Regions: opinion: CDR0157/2023
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.925
- Specific opinion: PE754.864
- Supplementary legislative basic document: 15876/2023
- Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T9-0312/2024
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
- Contribution: COM(2023)0241
Votes
A9-0444/2023 – Markus Ferber, Margarida Marques – Commission proposal #
Amendments | Dossier |
277 |
2023/0137(CNS)
2023/10/25
ECON
277 amendments...
Amendment 10 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis in the short term, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private- sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition,
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 2 2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, may consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of medium term debt challenges in the Member State concerned.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of medium term debt challenges in the Member State concerned.
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned.
Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor that may lead
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new) In addition, when preparing the report, the Commission shall take into account the economic and social conditions of the Member State, in particular the progress on national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction. The report will also need to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to achieve a fair twin transition.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new) The Commission shall equally take into account as a key relevant factor progress by the Member State in addressing climate related fiscal risks and green investments needs, in line with the EU Green Deal and the Union’s climate targets.
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The Commission shall also take into account all other relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned. The key relevant factor of substantial medium term public debt challenges shall take precedence over other relevant factors. Developments in the medium- term economic position should only be considered as relevant factor if the output gap is lower than -1,5% of potential output. Developments in the medium-term budgetary positions and the evolution of the government debt position and its financing should only be considered as relevant factor if the member state concerned does not face substantial medium term public debt challenges.
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The Commission shall also take into account all other relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned. The key relevant factor of substantial medium term public debt challenges shall take precedence over other relevant factors. Developments in the medium- term economic position should only be considered as relevant factor if the output gap is lower than -1,5% of potential output. Developments in the medium-term budgetary positions and the evolution of the government debt position and its financing should only be considered as relevant factor if the member state concerned does not face substantial medium term public debt challenges.
Amendment 12 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the macroeconomic divergences and disparities in production capacities, growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The Commission shall also take into account
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new) The Commission shall take into account as a key relevant factor to prevent the opening of a EDP the delivery and commitment by the Member State on the implementation of the investments and reforms to address the common priorities of the Union as stated in the Article 12 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], but also the reforms and investments committed in the national plans of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds and future EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose.
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new) Moreover, with the aim to identify risks and difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, the European Commission shall invite social partners to offer their views on the socio- economic situation in the Member state.
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point a (a) the developments in the medium- term economic position, in particular inflation developments and cyclical developments
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], in particular if the balance of control account exceeds 2% of GPD in accordance with Article 21 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation; To safeguard the counter cyclical properties of the expenditure path, higher than anticipated economic growth, lower than expected interest expenditure, any expenditure and revenue windfalls or favourable stock-flow adjustments in the government debt ratio, relative to the forecasts underlying the net expenditure path, shall not be taken into account as relevant factors when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit based on deviations from the net expenditure path in accordance with paragraph 1a;
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation. To safeguard the counter cyclical properties of the expenditure path, higher than anticipated economic growth, lower than expected interest expenditure, any expenditure and revenue windfalls or favourable stock-flow adjustments in the government debt ratio, relative to the forecasts underlying the net expenditure path, shall not be taken into account as relevant factors when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit based on deviations from the net expenditure path in accordance with paragraph 1a;
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, whether the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, i
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 13 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained, resilience-enhancing and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b (b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c (c) the evolution of the government debt position
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c (c) the evolution of the government debt stock, but also its position and its financing, including possible ECB temporary support put in place, and the related risk factors, including in particular the debt structure, maturity structure, and the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c (c) the evolution of the government debt position and its financing, and the forecast for debt levels, considering related risk factors, in particular the maturity structure, the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c a (new) (ca) the progress in addressing national public investment gaps in alignment with the priorities of the Union as stated in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], recognising that these investments play a pivotal role in supporting the fulfilment of Union objectives and ensuring sustainable and inclusive growth and fiscal stability;
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d (d) the implementation
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d (d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union, the EU Green Deal, including those supported by NextGenerationEU, measures to be taken in case of insufficient progress towards achieving applicable targets in line with Member States reporting on the performance of their budgetary frameworks under Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union and the European Pillar of Social Rights, including those supported by NextGenerationEU, Cohesion Funds and EU investments instruments that serve the same purpose, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.
Amendment 14 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d (d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d (d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d (d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU,
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new) (da) the quality of investment expenditure in line with the common key policy priorities of the Union in line with Annex VI of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new) (da) Where applicable, temporary above average government investment in defence compared to the average over the four-year period before the plan.
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new) (da) Where applicable, temporary above average government investment in defence compared to the average over the four-year period before the plan.
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new) (da) the investments made in defence to ensure open strategic autonomy and in the green transition to achieve the climate goals;
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 The Commission shall give due and express consideration to a
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission.
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories.
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union, such as defence expenditure increased due to direct threat at the EU’s borders. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 a (new) The Commission shall, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, take into account the independent assessment of the Commission latest macroeconomic and budgetary forecast, compliance with the deficit and debt criterion together with relevant factors affecting the budgetary development in the Member State. Such assessment shall be carried out by the European Fiscal Board. The Commission shall explain in its report any differences from the European Fiscal Board's assessment.
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3a (new) 3a. After the Commission´s report referred in paragraph 3, Member State shall have the power, in the observations submitted under Art. 126(6) TFEU, may propose a rectification plan to comply with its net expenditure path.
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors,
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. The assessment will clearly specify which factors are deemed aggravating or mitigating and where relevant clearly specify the differences in the weight attributed to each relevant factor. However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government debt remains close to the reference value of 60% of GDP and the deviation from the expenditure path set out by the Council is limited - is fully met.
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. The assessment will clearly specify which factors are deemed aggravating or mitigating and where relevant clearly specify the differences in the weight attributed to each relevant factor.
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. Both the Council and the Commission shall explain in their overall assessment any differences from the European Fiscal Board's assessment.
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 5. Where Member States
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment,
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment,
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 Amendment 17 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 a (new) (6a) Government budgets can be brought in line either by spending reductions or revenue increases. As such this regulation should be neutral in the way governments seek to reduce their levels of debt and deficit, and should not prioritise cuts in public expenditures over increases in tax revenue;
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment,
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 5 5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit for the period specified by the Council in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 6 If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline.
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 6 If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 6 If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 6 If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 and 3a of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2a (1a) Article 2a is replaced by the following: Article 2a 1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion in accordance with Article 126(4) TFEU.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the European Fiscal Board shall formulate an opinion as advice to the Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Council. The opinion of the European Fiscal Board shall be made public. Within four weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion in accordance with Article 126(4) TFEU. The opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee shall be made public.
Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Within two weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the European Fiscal Board shall formulate an opinion as advice to the Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Council. The opinion of the European Fiscal Board shall be made public. Within four weeks of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion in accordance with Article 126(4) TFEU. The opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee shall be made public.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 3 Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark, in terms of the net expenditure path defined in Article 2 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value and ensures that the value of the control account is brought to zero within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP in the structural primary balance as a benchmark.
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 3 – subparagraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When
Amendment 19 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) At the same time, to ensure a transparent and common Union framework based on the reference values referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), stronger and real enforcement underpinning multilateral surveillance should be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that allows for country-specific fiscal trajectories.
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or keep it at a prudent level
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 4 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4– subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in A
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Within the deadline provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 5 Amendment 2 #
Proposal for a regulation – Amendment 20 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Within the deadline provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article, the Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances o
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EC) Np 1467/97 Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 4 (3) Article 4 is
Amendment 21 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 4 – subparagraph 1 (new) Any decision by the Council under Article 126(8) TFEU to make public its recommendations where it is established that no effective action has been taken, shall be taken immediately after the expiry of the deadline set in accordance with Article 3(4) of this Regulation.
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 4 – subparagraph 1 The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 3(5) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as, having heard most representative social partners of the Member State concerned, on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned.
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 (4) Article 5 is
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice.
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual primary structural fiscal adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark.
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in A
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU
Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU
Amendment 23 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.’;
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, taking into due account the relevant factors referred in Article 2(3), on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances o
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation No 1467/97 Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 6 Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 6 – paragraph 1 1. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 8 Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 8 – paragraph 3 3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit has been brought
Amendment 24 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 8 – paragraph 3 3. A Council decision shall
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 8 – paragraph 3 3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission and the Member State indicate that the deficit has been brought
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 8 – paragraph 3 3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current and the next year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) where the Member State concerned acts
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point ba (new) (ba) where the participating Member State returns to its original net expenditure path as assessed in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation EU [on the preventive arm];
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10 – paragraph 1 Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10 – paragraph 1a (new) 1a. In case an excessive deficit procedure has been opened, the European Fiscal Board shall elaborate an annual report assessing the implementation of action taken, as well as, the potential existence of a severe economic downturn in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. In this report, the European Fiscal Board shall give an opinion on whether sanctions under Article 12 should be imposed or if any other decision should be taken. The report shall be submitted to the Commission and shall be made public.
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10 – paragraph 2 Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10 – paragraph 3 Amendment 25 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 1 1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 1 1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions
Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 1 1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 1a (new) 1a. The European Parliament shall be informed in accordance with Article 26a and Article 29 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 2 2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b a (new) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 3 Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b a (new) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 10a – paragraph 4 (ba) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 4. The Commission shall report to the Council on the outcome of the mission referred to in paragraph 2 and may decide to make its findings public. The European Parliament shall be informed in accordance with Article 26a and Article 29 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) (9a) Article 11 is replaced by the following: "Article 11 1. Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine
Amendment 26 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for breaches of the deficit reference value of 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) (‘deficit-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 is a well-established element of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework that has been effective in influencing fiscal policy in the Member States
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) (9a) Article 11 is replaced by the following: "Article 11 "Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU. A strong track record of commitments and implementation rate of reforms and investments approved under the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State, as well on its Partnership Agreement for the Cohesion Funds, should be taken into account for the Commission to halt its proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments of these two instruments as stated in Article 10(1) of the RRF regulation and Article 19(7), respectively. "
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 1 Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 1 1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,05% of GDP as a general rule for a 6-
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 1 1. The amount of the fine shall as a general rule amount to up to 0,05% of GDP for a 6-
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 1 1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,0
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 2 Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 3 Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 3 Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 3 Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 12 – paragraph 3 3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,
Amendment 27 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 14 Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 15 Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 17 (12) Article
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 16 (11a) Article 16 is replaced by the following: 'Article 16 The fines referred to in Article 12 shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 17a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a (a) the effectiveness of this Regulation, in particular in reducing excessive deficits;
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 a (new) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 17 c (new) (14a) The following Article 17c is inserted: 'Article 17c Exercise of the delegation The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 3 shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of one year from [Please insert the date of entry into force of this Council Regulation.] Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 3 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of one month of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by one month at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.’;
Amendment 28 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) To strengthen the EDP for breaches of the debt criterion of 60 % of GDP (‘debt-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 the focus should be on
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11)
Amendment 3 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entails compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. All this framework curtails the sovereignty of Member States.
Amendment 30 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances o
Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Moreover, in case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, and following the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in case of relevant investments in public services, public infrastructures, social protection, climate action and environmental protection, the Commission and the Council
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm],
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States to deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council under that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances o
Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States to deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council under that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of
Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor
Amendment 4 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) The economic governance framework of the Union, which comprises an elaborate system of policy coordination and surveillance of Member States’ economic policies, has
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) To keep track of actual and planned annual deviations from the net expenditure path as set out in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission should set up a control account for each Member State summing those deviations over time. The information in the control account should be the basis of enforcement actions, in particular of a report pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU following a deviation from the net expenditure path. At the same time, the degree of ambition of the net expenditure path in the national medium- term fiscal-structural plan referred to in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] should be considered when deciding on the opening of a debt-based EDP.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16)
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly and sustainable downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 a (new) (16a) For those years where deficit is expected to remain above the reference value, the net expenditure path should be consistent with an effective yearly reduction of 0.5% of the Member State GDP on average. The Commission will set an annual minimum adjustment figure for each Member State, and those figures will fall within a range of 0.2% to 0.8% of GDP as a benchmark. When deciding the exact figure for each Member State each year, the Commission will take into account the economic growth of the Union as a whole and of that Member State, together with the past adjustments and future projected adjustments of the Member State during the correction period. That way, deficit reduction will oscillate below or above a 0.5% target in order to avoid procyclicality, while compliance with the wider deficit reduction objective is preserved as there is an obligation to have an effective deficit reduction of 0.5% of GDP per year on average. During periods of high economic growth, the annual minimum adjustment should be set by the Commission above 0.5%, and the opposite should happen in times of economic contraction. When conducting the calculations and assessments to set the annual minimum adjustment figure, the Commission will also take into account deficit reduction in the previous years of the period and the remaining deficit reduction needed to ensure a reduction of 0.5% of GDP on average by the end of the correction period. Therefore, when providing the minimum adjustment figure for a given year, the Commission will also present the estimates for the annual minimum adjustment figure during the remaining years of the correction period. The Commission should incorporate into its assessment a worst-case scenario where an economic downturn persists until the end of the period and assess its likelihood, in order to avoid any potential backloading
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17)
Amendment 5 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the SGP21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) Independent fiscal institutions
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. In order to enhance national ownership, the role of independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20)
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 a (new) (21a) A strong track record of commitments and implementation rate of reforms and investments approved under the Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Member State, as well on its Partnership Agreement for the Cohesion Funds, should be taken into account for the Commission to halt its proposal to the Council to suspend all or part of the commitments or payments of these two instruments as stated in Article 10(1) and Article 19(7) of the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation , respectively.
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. T
Amendment 6 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 a (new) (3a) The set goals of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Moreover, evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States.
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 1 1. This Regulation lays down the provisions for
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new) (aa) 'reference trajectory' means the trajectory for the primary balance each Member State shall present, as set in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of tax revenue, interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means
Amendment 7 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 b (new) (3b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means all government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (b) ‘net expenditure’ means all government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c (c)
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) ‘nationally financed net expenditure path’ means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure real growth of a Member State as set by the Council in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new) (da) 'corrective net expenditure path' means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure as requested by the Council under Articles 3 and 5 of this Regulation following a decision on the existence of excessive deficit and defined in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] ;
Amendment 8 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 c (new) (3c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt- to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programmes failed to accomplish its own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point e Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances o
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, or where Member States implement, within a defined timeframe, justifiable and strategically significant investments addressing the common priorities of the Union as outlined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], and adhering to the reforms and investments outlined in national plans, including those of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Funds, and future EU investment instruments designed to serve similar purposes in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission and the Member State indicates that the deficit
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions referred to in the first subparagraph.
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission, after gathering the opinion of the relevant national independent fiscal institution, indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances referred
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a 1a.
Amendment 9 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a 1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a 1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a 1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path and the control account does not exceed the threshold set in Article 21 of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a 1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a 1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path. A Member State is considered not to respect its net expenditure path if a significant deviation in accordance with [OJ: please insert respective Article from preventive arm] exists.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path. A Member State is considered not to respect its net expenditure path if a significant deviation in accordance with Article XX of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] exists.
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 1a a (new) 1aa. The European Fiscal Board shall elaborate an annual report assessing Member States having a government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value or public debt above the 60% of GDP reference value. In this report, the European Fiscal Board shall evaluate, in particular, whether the excessive deficit can be considered exceptional and temporary according to paragraph 1, whether a severe economic downturn referred to in paragraph 2 might exist, as well as, all the factors included in paragraph 3. The European Fiscal Board shall also include, in its annual report, an opinion on whether an excessive deficit procedure should be opened for a particular Member State. The report shall be submitted to the Commission and shall be made public.
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 2 2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 2 2. The Commission and the Council,
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 Article 2 – paragraph 2 2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, may consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
source: 754.925
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