BETA

40 Amendments of Manon AUBRY related to 2023/0137(CNS)

Amendment 1 #
Proposal for a regulation
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) The set goals of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Moreover, evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 b (new)
(3b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 c (new)
(3c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt- to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programmes failed to accomplish its own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) At the same time, to ensure a transparent and common Union framework based on the reference values referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), stronger enforcement underpinning multilateral surveillance should be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that allows for country-specific fiscal trajectories.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for breaches of the deficit reference value of 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) (‘deficit-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 is a well-established element of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework that has been effective in influencing fiscal policy in the Member States. towards budgetary cuts, structural under-investment in public services and public infrastructures, reforms undermining social protection and rights.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorWhen social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, which includes a severe occur, or an economic downturn in the Member State concerned, the excess of a primary deficit should be considered exceptional.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) Moreover, in case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, and following the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in case of relevant investments in public services, public infrastructures, social protection, climate action and environmental protection, the Commission and the Council mayshould decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States tocan deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council underreference trajectory they set that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a keyll relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEUs on equal footing. Besides the sustainability of public debt, the Commission is toshould take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the ithe progress on the national targets on empleoymentation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership,, skills and poverty reduction and the implementation of investment. In order to increase national ownership, national parliaments, representatives of workers' associations and the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors. __________________ 24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned that a significant part of Member States' debt is illegitimate and originates from policies promoted by the EU economic governance such as tax cuts and exemptions that result in lower fiscal revenues; that Member States' debt would be lower if it was not for the obligation imposed on them to borrow money from private banks instead of directly from the ECB, resulting in higher costs of debt servicing. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission is to take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the implementation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership, the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors. __________________ 24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDP.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. Ishould have a pluralistic and multidisciplinary board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations, in order to truly enhance national ownership, the role of. Moreover, when requested by the Member State concerned, such independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union should be responsible to produce the forecasts and the impact assessments needed to the budgetary practices.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) Clear conditions should be laid down for abrogation of excessive deficit procedures. Abrogation should require the deficit to remain credibly below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 and, for a debt-based EDP, that the Member State demonstrates compliance with the net expenditure path under the EDP.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) The fines provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU should not provide for a minimum amount but they should accumulate until effective action is taken, in order to constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices given to Member States under an EDP in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union25 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission26 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCGhe package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by Member States being the ones deciding on their fiscal choices and requiring its parliamentary approval. __________________ 25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. This Regulation lays down the provisions for speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficitthe replacement of the excessive deficit procedure by a social imbalance procedure and an excessive greenhouse gases emissions procedure. Additionally, it creates the possibility for Member States to implement unilateral anti-dumping measures in order to remedy insufficient improvements from a Member State towards its social or ecological targets following the opening a social imbalance procedure or an excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedure. The objective of the excessive deficitsocial imbalance procedure is to deter excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further prompt their correction, where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examineddeviation from commitments and targets laid down in Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm] aimed at the fulfilment of economic and social rights, that risks jeopardizing individual well-being and social cohesion at national level and have spillover effects on other Member States. The objective of the excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedures is to deter excessive deviation from the fulfilment of national commitments and targets such as defined in the National Energy and Climate Plans that risk jeopardizing the achievement of EU climate goals. The objective onf the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria. anti-dumping measures is to give the possibility to Member States to compensate for the disadvantages that may occur from the fact that one Member State does not meet its country-specific social and ecological targets.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Failure of a Member State to reach its minimum targets regarding the fulfilment of economic and social rights may trigger a Social Imbalance Procedure, by which the Member State is required to carry out additional investments and reforms in line with these objectives, and which allows other Member States to take protective measures against social dumping in case insufficient progress is made by the Member State under procedure. Failure of a Member state to reach its minimum targets regarding its National Energy Climate Plans may trigger an excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedure, by which the Member state will be required to carry out additional investments and reforms in line with these objectives, and which allows other Member States to enforce protective measures against ecological dumping in case insufficient progress is made by the Member State under procedure. The Social Imbalance Procedure and the excessive greenhouse gas emissions procedure shall be triggered only after a vote of the European Parliament.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a
1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, mayshall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severen economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the CouncilMember State concerned establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]paragraph 1.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, mayshall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn, relevant investments in public services, public infrastructures, social protection, climate action and environmental protection, as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule, on an equal footing, all relevant factors as indicated in that Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of the sustainability of the primary deficit and public debt criteria of the Member State concerned.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
TAdditionally, when preparing the report the Commission shall also take into account all other relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concernedthe economic and social circumstances of the Member State in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041. Moreover, the report needs to also take into account progresses toward the common priorities as referred to in Annex VI of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any oll ther factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteriathe sustainability of primary deficit and public debt and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its nationsubmitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall independent fiscal instituclude the opinion on relevant factors, but also the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, on relevant factorsf the: (i) national parliament of the state concerned; (ii) representatives of workers' associations; (iii) national independent fiscal institution.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment period.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5
5. Within the deadline provided for in 5. paragraph 4 of this Article, tThe Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include: (i) the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side consistent with the Council’s recommendation, as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. (ii) an analysis on the impact that such measures may have in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041 (iii) an analysis on the progresses toward the common priorities of which in Annex VI of the Regulation [preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition. The report shall also include the opinion of the national parliament and the independent fiscal institution of the Member State concerned on the adequacy of the measures taken and envisaged with respect to the targets. The Member State shall make the report public.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 6
6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 6
(5) in Article 6, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. whether effective action has been taken in response to its notice made in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.; ’deleted The Council, when considering
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8
(6) Article 8 is replaced by the following: ‘ Article 8 1. Article 126(11) TFEU to intensify sanctions shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 2. Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate some or all of its decisions shall be taken as soon as possible and in any event no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 3. taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commisdeleted Any Council decision iundicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.; ’er Any Council decision under A Council decision shall only be
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) where the Member State concerned acts in compliance with recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEUemploys active economic and fiscal measures to address its fiscal situation, taking under consideration the public recommendations made by the Commission and the Council;
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. Where action by a participating Member State is not being implemented or, in the Council's view, is proving to be inadequate, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 3
3. Where actual data pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 indicate that an excessive deficit has not been corrected by a participating Member State within the time limits specified either in recommendations issued under Article 126(7) TFEU or notices issued under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions, for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions.; During such dialogue, the Commission shall invite representatives of workers' associations to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 2
2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a dedicated surveillance mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the surveillance mission.;Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State.
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,05% of GDP for a 6- month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 2
2. In each 6-month period following that in which a fine is imposed, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. In this semi-annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) TFEU, to intensify the sanctions, unless the participating Member State concerned has complied with the Council’s notice.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3
3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 14
1. In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate the sanctions referred to in Article 126(11), first and second indent, TFEU depending on the significance of the progress made by the participating Member State concerned in correcting the excessive deficit.deleted
2023/10/25
Committee: ECON