BETA

109 Amendments of Ville NIINISTÖ related to 2021/0341(COD)

Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) Competent authorities, their staff and members of their governance bodies should be independent of political and economic influence. Risks of conflicts of interest undermine the integrity of the Union financial system and harm the goal of an integrated banking and capital markets union. Directive 2013/36/EU should provide more detailed provisions for Member States to ensure that the competent authorities, including their staff and management, act independently and objectively. In this context, minimum requirements should be laid down to prevent conflicts of interests and set strict limits to “revolving doors”. The European Banking Authority (EBA) should issue guidelines addressed to competent authorities on the prevention of conflicts of interests, based on international best practices.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) The provision of banking services in the Union is conditional upon the credit institution’s having previous authorisation and a physical presence through a legal person or a branch in its territory. Only in that way credit institutions may be subject to effective prudential regulation and supervision that are necessary to minimise the risk of failure and, when it occurs, to manage that failure in order to prevent it from spreading in a disorderly manner and leading to the collapse of the financial system (contagion risk by e.g. a bank run or a bank failure triggered by imprudent lending). The provision of banking services in the Union without such physical presence would increase the presence and prevalence in the financial markets where credit institutions are closely involved of risk segments not subject to Union’s prudential regulation and supervision, that may eventually threaten the financial stability of the Union or of its individual Member States. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 is the latest historical precedent, which underlines how small market segments may become the source of significant threats to the financial stability of the Union and its Member States if left outside the scope of prudential regulation and supervision. Hence, it is necessary to lay down an explicit requirement in Union law that undertakings established in a third country and seeking to provide banking services in the Union should at least establish a branch in a Member State and that such branch be authorised in accordance with Union legislation, unless the undertaking wishes to provide banking services in the Union through a subsidiary. However, that requirement to establish a branch should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation of services, as in this case it is the customer that approaches the undertaking in the third country to solicit the provision of the service. Nonetheless, the exercise of such exemption shall be made in compliance with the AML/CFT rules as defined in [insert reference to AMLD].
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
(5) Concerning mergers and divisions, the Directive (EU) 2017/1132 lays down harmonised rules and procedures, in particular for cross-border mergers and divisions of limited liability companies. Therefore, the assessment procedure by the competent authorities stipulated in this directive should be complementary to the Directive (EU) 2017/1132 and should not contradict any of its provisions. In case of those cross-border mergers and divisions which fall under the scope of Directive 2017/1132, the motivated opindecision issued by the competent supervisory authority should be part of the assessment of the compliance with all relevant conditions and the proper completion of all procedures and formalities required for the pre-merger or pre-division certificate. The motivated opindecision should therefore be transferred to the designated national authority responsible for issuing the pre-merger or pre-division certificate under Directive 2017/1132.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) In order to ensure proportionality and avoid undue administrative burden, those additional powers of competent authorities should be applicable only to operations deemed material. Only operations consisting in mergers or divisions should be treated automatically as material operations, as the newly created entity can be expected to present a significantly different prudential profile from the entities initially involved in the merger or division. Also, mergers or division should not be concluded by entities undertaking them before a prior positive opinionapproval is received from the competent authorities. Other operations (including acquisition of holding and transfers of assets and liabilities), when considered material, should be assessed by the competent authorities based on a tacit approval procedure.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) In some situations (for instance when entities established in various Member States are involved), operations might require multiple notifications and assessments from different competent authorities, including from AML/CFT authorities, requiring an efficient cooperation among those authorities. It is therefore necessary to precise cooperation obligations, in particular early cross notifications, smooth exchange of information and coordination in the assessment.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) It is necessary to align provisions related to the acquisition of a qualifying holding in a credit institution with provisions on the acquisition of a qualifying holding by an institution, in case both assessments have to be undertaken for the same operation. Indeed, without proper articulation these provisions could lead to inconsistencies in the assessment undertaken by competent authorities, and ultimately the decisions taken by them. It is therefore necessary to provide for similar additional time provided to competent authorities to acknowledge receipt of the notification when the operation is considered complex).
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
(20) WBy way of derogation and only where the legal system of the Member State does not allow the administrative penalties provided for in this Directive, the rules on administrative penalties may be applied in such a manner that the penalty is initiated by the competent authority and imposed by judicial authorities. Therefore, it is necessary that those Member States still ensure that the application of the rules and penalties has an effect equivalent to the administrative penalties imposed by the competent authorities. When imposing such penalties, judicial authorities should take into account the recommendation by the competent authority initiating the penalty. The penalties imposed should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
(22) The regulation of branches established by undertakings in a third country to provide banking services in a Member State is subject to national law and only harmonised to a very limited extent by Directive 2013/36/EU. While third country branches have a significant and increasing presence in Union banking markets, they are currently subject only to very high level information requirements, but not to any Union-level prudential standards or supervisory cooperation arrangements. The complete absence of a common prudential framework leads to third country branches’ being subject to disparate national requirements of varying level of prudence and reach. Furthermore, competent authorities lack comprehensive information and the necessary supervisory tools to properly monitor the specific risks created by third country groups operating in one or various Member States through both branches and subsidiaries There are currently no integrated supervisory arrangements in relation to them and the competent authority responsible for the supervision of each branch of a third country group is not obliged to exchanging information with the competent authorities supervising the other branches and subsidiaries of the same group. Such fragmented regulatory landscape creates risks to the financial stability and market integrity of the Union which should be properly addressed through a harmonised framework on third country branches. Such a framework should comprise minimum common requirements on authorisation, prudential standards, internal governance, supervision and reporting. This set of requirements should build on those that Member States already apply to third countries branches in their territories and should take into account similar or equivalent requirements that third countries apply to foreign branches, with the aim of ensuring consistency between Member States and aligning the Union third country branches framework with the prevailing international practices in this field. Third country branches should therefore not be allowed to operate within the Union until a Memorandum of Understanding has been concluded between the competent authorities of the Member States where the branch is established and the third country competent authorities.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 25
(25) Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require on a case-by- case basis that third country branches apply for authorisation in accordance with Title III, Chapter 1 of Directive 2013/36/EU, at a minimum where those branches hold more than EUR 40 000 000 000 in their book or where those branches engage in activities with counterparts in other Member States in contravention of the internal market rules or where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established. Moreover, competent authorities should be required to periodically assess whether third country branches holding assets on their books in an amount equal to or higher than EUR 30 000 000 000 have systemic importance. All the third country branches that belong to the same third country group established in one Member State or across the Union should be jointly subject to such periodic assessment. That assessment should examine, in accordance with specific criteria, whether those branches pose an analogous level of risk to the financial stability of the Union or its Member States as institutions defined as “systemically important” under Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation EU No 575/2013. Where competent authorities conclude that the third country branches are systemically important, they should impose requirements on those branches that are appropriate to mitigate the risks to financial stability. For those purposes, competent authorities should be able to require the third country branches to apply for authoritisation as subsidiary institutions under Directive 2013/36/EU in order to continue conducting banking activities in the Member State or across the Union. Moreover, competent authorities should be able to impose other requirements, in particular an obligation to restructure the third country branches’ assets or activities in the Union so that those branches stop being systemic, or a requirement to comply with additional capital, liquidity, reporting or disclosure requirements, where that would be sufficient to address the risks to financial stability. Competent authorities should have the possibility not to impose any of those requirements on third country branches assessed as systemic only where the competent authorities can justify that the risks that those branches pose to the financial stability and market integrity of the Union and the Member States would not significantly increase in the absence of such requirements for a period not exceeding one year.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
(34) To maintain adequate resilience to the negative impacts of ESG factors, institutions established in the Union need to be able to systematically identify, measure and manage ESG risks, and their supervisors need to assess the risks at the level of the individual institution as well as at the systemic level, giving priority to environmental factors and progressing to the other sustainability factors as the methodologies and tools for the assessment evolve. Institutions should assess the alignment of their portfolios with the ambition of the Union to become climate- neutral by 2050 as well as avert environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. Institutions should set out specific plans to address the risks arising, in the short, medium and long term, from the misalignment of their business model and strategy with relevant policy objectives of the Union, included in the Paris Agreement, the Fit for 55 package52 [and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework]. Institutions should be required to have robust governance arrangements and internal processes for the management of ESG risks and to have in place strategies approved by their management bodies that take into consideration not only the current but also the forward-looking impact of ESG factors. The collective knowledge and awareness of ESG factors by the management body and institutions’ internal capital allocation to address ESG risks will also be key to drive the change within each and single institution. The specificities of ESG risks as well as their relative novelty means that understandings, measurements and management practices can differ significantly across institutions. To ensure convergence across the Union and a uniform understanding of ESG risks, appropriate definitions and minimum standards for the assessment of those risks should be provided in prudential regulation. To achieve this objective, definitions are laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the EBA is empowered to specify a minimum set of reference methodologies for the assessment of the impact of ESG risks on the financial stability of institutions, giving priority to the impact of environmental factors. Since the forward-looking nature of ESG risks means that scenario analysis and stress testing, together with plans for addressing those risks, are particularly informative assessment tools, EBA should be also empowered, in coordination with EFRAG, to develop uniform criteria for the content of the plans to address those risks and for the setting of scenarios and applying the stress testing methods. EBA should elaborate its scenarios on the basis of scientific evidence and taking into account the work conducted by other relevant public authorities and international fora, such as the Network for Greening the Financial System. Environment-related risks, including risks stemming from environmental degradation and biodiversity loss, and climate-related risks in particular should take priority in light of their urgency and the particular relevance of scenario analysis and stress testing for their assessment. __________________ 52 Communication of the Commission COM(2021)568 final, 14.07.2021, comprising the following Commission proposals: COM(2021)562 final, COM(2021)561 final, COM(2021)564 final, COM(2021)563 final, COM(2021)556 final, COM(2021)559 final, COM(2021)558 final, COM(2021)557 final, COM(2021)554 final, COM(2021)555 final, COM(2021)552 final.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
(36) The provisions in Article 133 of Directive 2013/36/EU on the systemic risk buffer framework may already be used to address various kinds of systemic risks, including risks related to climate change. To the extent that the relevant competent or designated authorities, as applicable, consider that risks related to climate change have the potential to have serious negative consequences for the financial system and the real economy in Member States, they should introduce a systemic risk buffer rate for those riskswhich may also be applied to a certain sets or subsets of exposures, for instance those subject to physical and transition risks related to climate change where they consider the introduction of such rate effective and proportionate to mitigate those risks.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 38 a (new)
(38 a) The lack of diversity in the management body could lead to 'groupthink' phenomenon. This phenomenon is at the roots of ineffective decisions and systematic bias. Therefore, diversity should be one of the criteria for the composition of the management body. To facilitate independent opinions and critical challenges, the management body should be sufficiently diverse as regards age, gender, geographical provenance and educational and professional background to present a variety of views and experiences. Gender balance is of particular importance to ensure adequate representation of the population. Institutions shall set target and define measures to balance genders in the management body.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 43
(43) Upon becoming bound by the output floor laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the nominal amount of an institution’s aAdditional own funds requirement set by the institution’s competent authority in accordance with Article 104(1), point (a), of Directive 2013/36/EU to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage should not immediateautomatically increase as a resultby the institution becoming bound by the output floor laid down in Regulation EU No 575/2013, all else being equal. Furthermore, in such case, the competent authority should review the institution’s additional own funds requirement and assess, in particular, whether and to what extent such requirement captures model riskrisks of excessive variability or lack of comparability of risk weights from the use of internal models by the institution. Where that is the case, the institution’s additional own funds requirement should be regarded as overlapping with the risks captured by the output floor in the own funds requirement of the institution and, consequently, the competent authority should reduce that requirement to the extent necessary to remove any such overlap for as long as the institution remains bound by the output floor.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
(44) Similarly, upon becoming bound by the output floor, the nominal amount of an institution’s CET1 capital required under the systemic risk buffer should not increase where there has been no increase in the macroprudential or systemic risks associated with the institution. In such cases, the institution’s competent or designated authority, as applicable, should review the calibration of the systemic risk buffer rates and make sure that they remain appropriate and do not double-count the risks that are already covered by virtue of the fact that the institution is bound by the output floor. More in generalAs a rule, competent and designated authorities, as applicable, should not impose systemic risk buffer requirements for risks which are already fully covered by the output floor.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 45
(45) Furthermore, when an institution designated as an ‘other systemically important institution’ becomes bound by the output floor, its competent or designated authority, as applicable, should review the calibration of the institution’s O-SII buffer requirement and make sure that it remains appropriate.deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point g
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 68
(68) ‘periodic penalty payments’ means daily penalties, aimed at ending ongoing breaches and compelling legal or natural person to return to compliance with their obligations under this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, or obligations arising from a decision issued by the competent authority ;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of preserving the independence of competent authorities in the exercise of their powers, Member States shall provide all the necessary arrangements to ensure that those competent authorities, including are legally distinct from, and functionally independent of, other public and private bodies, and that their staff and members of their governance bodies, can act independently and objectively, without seeking or taking instructions, or being subject to influence from supervised institutions, from any government of a Member State or body of the Union or from any other public or private body. These arrangements shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the competent authorities as stemming from being part of the European system of financial supervision as stemming from Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010*1, the Single Supervisory Mechanism as stemming from Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013*2 and Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014*3, for the Single Resolution Board as stemming from stemming from Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014*4.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 – point a
(a) trading or owning financial instruments issued by or referenced to the institutions supervised by the competent authorities, their direct or indirect parent undertakings, subsidiaries or affiliates;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 – point b – point i a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(i a) institutions that are direct competitors of institutions referred to in point (i), over at least 6 preceding months from the date when taking up any new role; Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 5 a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101Member States shall lay down appropriate rules, including regarding the access to confidential or sensitive data, for the staff and members of governance bodies for their resignation period when they plan to join one of the firms referred to in the third subparagraph, point (b). Member States shall require staff and members of governance bodies to declare their financial interests prior to taking up any position in competent authorities. Member States shall require staff and members of governance bodies to sit back for any supervisory activity or decision that might create a conflict of interest. Prior to the appointment of a staff member, competent authorities shall assess whether there may be a conflict of interests resulting from the candidate’s previous occupational activities or their close personal relationship to members of the Management Board of supervised institutions. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities publish their objectives, are accountable for the discharge of their duties in relation to those objectives and are subject to financial control, without compromising their independence. Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 18 – g a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(3a) in Article 18, the following point is added: (g a) commit a serious breach of the anti money laundering and counter terrorist financing rules as laid down in [insert reference to AMLD ]; Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b – point ii
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 21a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
‘Where the approval or the exemption from approval of a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 takes place concurrently with the assessment referred to in Article 22 and8, Article 22 or Article 27a, the competent authority for the purposes of that Article shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the consolidating supervisor and, where different, the competent authority in the Member State where the financial holding company or mixed financial holding company is established. In that case, tThe assessment period referred to in Article 22(3), second subparagraph, and Article 27a(6) shall be suspended for a period exceeding 20 working day until the procedure set out in this Article is complete.’;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 21c – paragraph 2
2. Where a retail client, an eligible counterparty or a professional client within the meaning of Sections I and II of Annex II to Directive 2014/65/EU established or situated in the Union approaches an undertaking established in a third country at its own exclusive initiative for the provision of any service or activity referred to in Article 47(1), the requirement laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to the provision to that person of the relevant service or activity, including a relationship specifically related to the provision of that service or activity. Without prejudice to intragroup relationships, where a third country undertaking, including through an entity acting on its behalf or having close links with such third-country undertaking or any other person acting on behalf of such undertaking, solicits clients or potential clients in the Union, it shall not be deemed to be a service provided at the own exclusive initiative of the client.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101)(6 a) in Article 23(1), the following subparagraph is added: ‘For the purposes of assessing the criterion laid down in paragraph 1, point (e) of this Article, competent authorities shall consult the authorities competent for the supervision of the obliged entities in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849.’ Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(6 b) In article 23(2), the following sub- paragraph is added: ‘For the purpose of this paragraph and with regard to the criterion laid down in paragraph 1, point (e) of this Article, an objection in writing by the authorities competent for the supervision of the obliged entities in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 shall constitute reasonable grounds for opposition. In any event, competent authorities shall be able to object to the acquisition when the proposed acquirer is located in a country on the EU list of third-countries with strategic deficiencies or compliance weaknesses in their AML/CFT regime or in a country subject to EU restrictive measures.’ Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27b (new)
In any event, competent authorities shall be able to object to the acquisition when the proposed acquirer is located in a country on the EU list of third-countries with strategic deficiencies or compliance weaknesses in their AML/CFT regime or in a country subject to EU restrictive measures
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27c – paragraph 2
2. The competent authorities shall seek to coordinate their assessments and ensure the consistency of their decisions. To this end, the decision by the competent authority of the acquirer shall indicate any views or reservations made by the other competent authority that has authorised the credit institution controlled by the parent undertaking in which the acquisition is proposedies.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27f – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) transfers of non-performing assets, or of assets for the purpose of being included in a cover pool, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/2162 of the European Parliament and of the Council*7, or to be securitised, shall not be taken into account for calculating the percentage in point (a);deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27g – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. In any event, competent authorities shall be able to object to the intended operation when the credit institution’s counterparty is located in a country on the EU list of third-countries with strategic deficiencies or compliance weaknesses in their AML/CFT regime or in a country subject to EU restrictive measures
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
The list referred to in the previous sub- paragraph shall not prevent competent authorities to ask for additional information that are necessary to ensure that the intended operation complies with the criteria defined in paragraph 1.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
For the purpose of the first sub- paragraph, the ECB shall considered as the competent authority to be notified and in charge the assessment when the entities resulting from the proposed operation would meet on a consolidated bases any of the following conditions: (a) the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion; (b) GDP of the participating Member State of establishment exceeds 20%, unless the total value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion.deleted the ratio of its total assets over the
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
For the purpose of the first sub- paragraph, in case the proposed operation consists in a division, the competent authority in charge of the supervision of the entity carrying out the proposed operation shall be the competent authority to be notified and in charge of the assessment.deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 5
5. The proposed operations shall not be completed before the issuance of a positive opinionapproval by the competent authorities.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
6. The competent authorities shall, within two working days from the completion of their assessment, issue in writing a motivated positive or negative opindecision to the financial stakeholders. Subject to national law, an appropriate statement of the reasons for the opindecision may be made accessible to the public at the request of the financial stakeholders. This shall not prevent a Member State from allowing the competent authority to publish such information in the absence of a request by the financial stakeholder.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2
The financial stakeholders shall transmit the motivated opindecision issued by their competent authorities under the first subparagraph to the authorities in charge, under the national law, of the scrutiny of the proposed operation.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 7
7. When the proposed operation involves only financial stakeholders from the same group, and the competent authorities do not oppose the proposed operation within the assessment period in writing, the opinproposed operation shall be deemed to be positiapproved.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27k – paragraph 8
8. The positive opinionapproval issued by the competent authority may be limited in time.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27l – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
3. The competent authorities may issue a negative opinionoppose to the proposed operation only if the criteria set out in paragraph 1 are not met or where the information provided by the financial stakeholder is incomplete despite a request made in accordance with Article 27k.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/65/EU
Article 27l – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
With regard to the criterion laid down in paragraph 1, point (f), an objection in writing by the authorities competent for the supervision of the undertakings in line with Directive (EU) 2015/849 shall constitute a reasonable ground for negative opinion.the competent authorities’ opposition to the proposed operation negative opinion. In any event, competent authorities shall be able to object to the proposed operation when one of the entity part of the operation is located in a country on the EU list of third-countries with strategic deficiencies or compliance weaknesses in their AML/CFT regime or in a country subject to EU restrictive measures
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27m – paragraph 3
3. The competent authorities shall seek to coordinate their assessments, ensure the consistency of their opindecisions, and shall indicate in their opindecisions any views or reservations made by the competent authority supervising other financial stakeholders.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 27n – paragraph 1
Member States shall require that, where the financial stakeholders fail to provide prior notification of the proposed operation in accordance with Article 27k(1) or have carried out the proposed operation as referred to that Article without prior positive opinionapproval by the competent authorities, the competent authorities shall take appropriate measures. Such measures may consist in injunctions, periodic penalty payments, penalties, subject to Articles 65 to 72, against members of the management body and managers of the financial stakeholders or of the entity resulting from the proposed operation.;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48a – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall classify third country branches which are not “qualifying third country branches, as class 1 where those branches meet any of the following conditions:
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48a – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the total value of the assets booked or originated by the third country branch in the Member State is equal to or higher than EUR 5 billion, as reported for the immediately preceding annual reporting period in accordance with Section II, Sub- section 4;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48a – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the third country branch is not a qualifying third country branch in accordance with Article 48b.deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48a – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall classify third country branches which are not “qualifying third country branches” and that do not meet any of the conditions laid out in paragraph 1 as class 2.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48c – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Third country branches must not commence their activities in a Member State until the competent authorities of that Member State and the third country competent authority have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU shall provide a clear cooperation framework between the competent authorities, including exchange of information in on-going supervision, crisis management and resolution.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48e – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) for class 1 third country branches, 14% of the branch’s average liabilities as reported for the three immediately preceding annual reporting periods in accordance with Sub-section 4, subject to a minimum of EUR 10 million;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
(b) for class 2 third country branches, 1% of the branch’s average liabilities as reported for the three immediately preceding annual reporting periods in accordance with Sub-section 4, subject to a minimum of EUR 5 million.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48f – paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities may waive the liquidity requirement laid down in this Article for qualifying third country branches.deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48i – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall require third country branches to maintain a registry book enabling those branches to track and keep a comprehensive and precise record of all the assets and liabilities originated by and associated with the activities of the third country branch in the Member State and to manage those assets and liabilities autonomously within the branch. The registry book shall provide sufficient information on the risks generated by the third country branch and on how they are managed.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48j – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the third country branch meets the systemic importance indicators referred to in Article 131(3) andor poses a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or the Member State where it is established., or;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48j – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) the aggregate amount of assets that a third country branch or branches in the Union that belong to the same group hold on their books in the Union as reported in accordance with Sub-section 4 is equal or higher to 40 billion euros.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48k – paragraph 1
1. The third country branch or branches in the Union that belong to the same third country group shall be subject to the assessment laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article where the aggregate amount of assets that they hold on their books in the Union as reported in accordance with Sub-section 4 is equal to or higher than EUR 30 billion, either: (a) on average for the immediately preceding three annual reporting periods; or (b) in absolute terms for at least three annual reporting periods during the immediately preceding five annual reporting periods.deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48k – paragraph 2
2. Competent authorities shall assess whether the third country branches referred to in paragraph 1 have systemic importance for the Union and for the Member States where they are stablished. For those purposes, competent authorities shall assess whether those third country branches meet the indicators of systemic importance referred to in Article 48j(4) and Article 131(3).
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48k – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3
For the purposes of point (a), the assets held or originated in both the third country branches and the assets held in subsidiary institutions of the third country group shall be included in the calculation.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
(a) the assets and liabilities held on their books in accordance with Article 48i or originated by the third country branch, with a breakdown that singles out:
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48l – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. The competent authorities of third country branches shall share with the competent authorities of the EU subsidiaries of the same third country group the information obtained in accordance with this Article.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 48p – paragraph 2 – point g a (new)
(g a) suspend the authorisation granted in accordance with article 48c and prohibit engaging in new business.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 319 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) carrying out any of the activities referred to in Article 4(1), point (1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, meeting at least one of the thresholds indicated in that Article without being authorised as a credit institution.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
(i) in the case of a legal person, periodic penalty payments of up to 510 % of the average daily turnover which, in the case of an ongoing breach, the legal person shall be obliged to pay per day of infringement until compliance with an obligation is restored, and which. The periodic penalty payment may be imposed for a period of up to six months from the date stipulated in the decision requiring the termination of a breach and imposing the periodic penalty payment;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 66 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii
(ii) in the case of a natural person, periodic penalty payments of up to EUR 500 000 which, in the case of an ongoing breach, the natural person shall be obliged to pay per day of infringement until compliance with an obligation is restored, and which. The periodic penalty payment may be imposed for a period up to six months from the date stipulated in the decision requiring the termination of a breach and imposing the periodic penalty payment;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 67 – paragraph 2 – point b – point i
(i) in the case of a legal person, periodic penalty payments of up to 510 % of the average daily turnover which, in the case of an ongoing infringement, the legal person shall be obliged to pay per day of infringement until compliance with an obligation is restored, and which. The periodic penalty payment may be imposed for a period of up to six months from the date stipulated in the decision requiring the termination of a breach and imposing the periodic penalty payment. The average daily turnover referred to in this paragraph shall be the total annual net turnover divided by 365.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 74 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management, including by taking into account environmental, social and governance performance .
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 76 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Member States shall ensure that the management body develops specific plans and science-based quantifiable targets to monitor and address the risks arising in the short, medium and long-term from the misalignment of the business model and, strategy and activities of the institutions, with the relevant Union policy objectives or broader transition trends towards a sustainable economy in relation to environmental, social and governance factors.;, including:
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 76 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
(a) to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, as set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021, or broader transition trends towards a sustainable economy in relation to environmental, social and governance factors; (b) to halt biodiversity loss, achieve the goals of the UN Convention of Biological Diversity, and to align with the restoration objectives of the [nature restoration law 2022/0195 (COD)].
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 76 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 b (new)
The plans referred to in the previous sub- paragraph shall at least include all the following elements: (i) a comprehensive strategy and operational actions to reach the objectives of the climate law [Regulation (EU) 2021/1119] and Paris agreement and to protect and restore biodiversity; (ii) a comprehensive decarbonation strategy, with decarbonation strategies declined at sectoral level; (iii) intermediate quantifiable targets and milestones with horizons of 5 and 10 years, declined at sectoral level and reviewed at least every 5 years up to 2050; (iv) sectoral targets, based on European and national transition plans The targets and measures included in the transition plans shall take into account the latest reports and measures prescribed by the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. The transitional plans shall adopt an holistic approach and cover all banks activities and clients. The transition plans shall not grant a predominant role to carbon compensation
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point b a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 76 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
(ba) in paragraph 4, subparagraph 2 is replaced by the following: ‘The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee, shall determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the frequency of the information on risk which it is to receive. In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee shall, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02013L0036-20150101including those resulting from the current, short, medium and long-term impacts of environmental, social and governance factors, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings. Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 76 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
5. Member States shall, in accordance with the proportionality requirement laid down in Article 7(2) of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC*11, ensure that institutions have internal control functions independent from the operational functions and which shall have sufficient authority, stature, resources and direct access to the management body.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 352 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point c a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 76 – paragraph 5 a (new)
(ca) the following paragraph is added: '5a. In order to specify the content and format of the transition plans referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, and based on the technical advice from the EBA and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 145. The Commission shall, at least every three years after its first date of application, review any delegated act adopted pursuant to this Article, based on the technical advice of the EFRAG, and where necessary shall amend such delegated act to take into account relevant developments, including with regard to international standards.'
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 87 a – paragraph 2
2. The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate to the scale, nature and complexity of the environmental, social and governance risks of the business model and scope of the institution’s activities, and consider short, medium and a long-term horizon of at least 10 years.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 87 a – paragraph 3
3. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions test their resilience to long- term negative impacts of environmental, social and governance factors, both under baseline and adverse scenarios within a given timeframe, starting with climate- related factors. For the testing, competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include a number of environmental, and social and governance scenarios reflecting potential impacts of environmental and social changes and associated public policies on the long-term business environment. Competent authorities shall ensure that for the testing, institutions use credible scenarios, based on the scenarios elaborated by international organisations.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 359 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 87 a – paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities shall assess and monitor developments of institutions’ practices concerning their environmental, social and governance strategy and risk management, including the plans to be prepared in accordance with Article 76, as well as the progress made and the riskstowards achieving the targets set in accordance with the transition plans referred to in that Article in order to adapt their business models to the relevant policy objectives of the Union or broader transition trends towards a sustainable economy, taking into account sustainability related product offering, transition finance policies, related loan origination policies, and environmental, social and governance related targets and limits. Where relevant, for the assessment referred to in the previous sub-paragraph, Competent authorities may cooperate with authorities or public bodies in charge of climate change and environmental supervision.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 87 a – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the content of plans to be prepared in accordance with Article 76, which shall include specific timelines and intermediate quantifiable targets and milestones, in order to address the risks from misalignment of the business model and strategy of institutions with the relevant policy objectives of the Union, or broader transition trends towards a sustainable economy in relation to environmental, social and governance factors;deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 392 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 – paragraph 4
4. The management body shall possess collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to adequately understand the institution's activities, as well as the associated risks it is exposed to, in the short, medium and long term, taking into account the environmental, social and governance factors. The overall composition of the management body shall be sufficiently diversified to reflect an adequately broad range of experience and perspectives.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 – paragraph 9
9. The entities shall devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body, including on environmental, social and governance risks and on emerging risks such as cyber-security.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 – paragraph 10
10. Member States or competent authorities shall require entities and their respective nomination committees, where established, to engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members topromote diversity and gender-balance in the management body and for. To that purpose to, institutions shall put in place a policy promoting diversity in the management body., including setting a target for the minimum representation of the underrepresented gender. This policy shall also include concrete measures to balance genders
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 414 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
However, where it is strictly necessary to replace a member of the management body immediately, the entities may assess theconduct a lighter suitability assessment of such replacement members after they have taken up their positionsbefore they have taken up their positions. A complete assessment shall be performed once the replacement members have taken up their positions. EBA shall issue guidelines specifying the minimum elements to be included in the lighter assessment and providing guidance under which circumstances a replacement could be considered as necessary and urgent. The entities shall be able to duly justify such immediate replacement.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 431 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
3. Competent authorities shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the application and the documentation required in accordance with paragraph 2 within two working days.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities shall complete the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 within 860 working days (‘assessment period’) as from the date of the written acknowledgement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 448 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 b – paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities that request from the entities additional information or documentation, including interviews or hearings, may extend the assessment period for a maximum of 420 working days. However, the assessment period shall not exceed 1280 working days. Request for additional information or documentation shall be made in writing and shall be specific. The entities shall acknowledge receipt of request for additional information or documentation within two working days and provide the requested additional information or documentation within 10 working days as of the date of the written acknowledgement of the request from competent authorities. Failure by entities to provide requested information within this deadline result in the procedure being closed without any further assessment by the competent authority. The closure of the procedure shall be without prejudice to the possibility for the entity to submit a new application.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 b – paragraph 6
6. Competent authorities shall not reassess the suitability of members of the management body when their mandate is renewed, unless relevant information that is known to competent authorities has changed and such change may affect the suitability of the member concerned.deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 c – paragraph 2
2. Where the entities conclude, based on the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, that the person does not fulfil the requirements set out in that paragraph, they shall not appoint that person as a key function holder. The entities shall take all measures necessary to ensure the appropriate functioning of that position, including removing the key function holder if that person ceases to comply with the suitability criteria.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
3. Competent authorities shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the application and the documentation required in accordance with paragraph 2 within two working days.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 490 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 91 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities shall assess the suitability of the heads of internal control functions and chief financial officer within 860 working days (‘assessment period’) as from the date of the written acknowledgement referred to in the first subparagraph.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 494 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
4. Competent authorities that request from the entities referred to paragraph 1 additional information or documentation, including interviews or hearings, may extend the assessment period for maximum 420 working days. However, the assessment period shall not exceed 1280 working days. Request for additional information or documentation shall be made in writing and shall be specific. The entities referred to paragraph 1 shall acknowledge receipt of request for additional information or documentation within two working days and provide the requested additional information or documentation within 10 working days as of the date of the written acknowledgement of the request from competent authorities. Failure by entities to provide requested information within this deadline results in the procedure being closed without any further assessment by the competent authority. The closure of the procedure shall be without prejudice to the possibility for the entity to submit a new application.
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 505 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point -a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 94 – paragraph 1 – point a
(-a) in paragraph 1, point (a) is replaced by the following: ‘(a) where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101, including ESG related criteria, are taken into account’ Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 517 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 98 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(22a) in Article 98 (1), the following point is added: ‘(ia) the extent to which the institutions have put in place appropriate policies and operational actions, as well as progress made in achieving the targets and milestones defined in the transition plans referred to in Article 76‘
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 98 – paragraph 1 – point i b (new)
(22a) in Article 98(1), the following point is added: (ib) the exposure to the non-bank financial intermediaries sector, as defined in Article 4(1) point 154 of the [insert reference to CRR] and the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the institution to mitigate the risks emerging from such counterparties.’
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 525 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25 – point a – point ii a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104 – paragraph 1 – point m a (new)
(iia) the following point ma is added: (ma) require the reinforcement of the climate and biodiversity targets set out in the transition plans referred to in Article 76 and of the measures and actions to make progress toward achieving the objectives set in the transition plans’;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 530 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 26 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 104 a – paragraphs 6 and 7
(b) the following paragraphs 6 and 7 are added: ‘6. bound by the output floor, the following shall apply: (a) own funds required by the institution’s competent authority in accordance with Article 104(1), point (a), to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage shall not increase as a result of thedeleted Where an institutions’ becoming bound by the output floor; (b) authority shall, without undue delay, and no later than by the end date of the next review and evaluation process, review the additional own funds it required from the institution in accordance with Article 104(1), point (a), and remove any parts thereof that would double-count the risks that are already fully covered by the fact that the institution is bound by the output floor. For the purposes of this Article and Articles 131 and 133 of this Directive, an institution shall be considered as bound by the output floor when the institution’s total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3), point (a), of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 exceeds its un-floored total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(4) of that Regulation. 7. as long as an institution is bound by the output floes the nominal amount of additional the institution’s competent For, the institution’s competent authority shall not impose an additional own funds requirement that would double-count the risks that are already fully covered by the fact that the institution is bound by the output floor.;purposes of paragraph 2,
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 547 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 – point a
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 131 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
(a) in paragraph 5, the following subparagraph is added: Where an O-SII becomes bound by the output floor, its competent or designated authority, as applicable, shall review the institutions O-SII buffer requirement to make sure that its calibration remains appropriate.;deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 550 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 – point c
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 131 – paragraph 15 – subparagraph 1
(c) in paragraph 15, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: Where the sum of the systemic risk buffer rate as calculated for the purposes of paragraph 10, 11 or 12 of Article 133 and the O-SII buffer rate or the G-SII buffer rate to which the same institution is subject to would be higher than 5 %, the procedure set out in paragraph 5a of this Article shall apply. For the purposes of this paragraph, where the decision to set a systemic risk buffer, O-SII buffer or G- SII buffer results in a decrease or no change from any of the previously set rates, the procedure set out in paragraph 5a of this Article shall not apply.;deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 551 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point a
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 133 – paragraph 1
1. Each Member State shall ensure that it is possible to set a systemic risk buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital for the financial sector or one or more subsets of that sector on all or a subset of exposures as referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article, in order to prevent and mitigate macroprudential or systemic risks not covered by Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and by Articles 130 and 131 of this Directive, including the risks emanating from climate change and biodiversity loss in the meaning of a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a specific Member State.;
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 552 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 133 – paragraph 2 a
(b) the following paragraph 2a is inserted: 2a. Where an institution is bound by the output floor, both of the following shall apply: (a) required to have in accordance with the first subparagraph shall be capped by the following amount: null where: ET = the un-floored total risk exposure amount of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013’; Ei = the un-floored risk exposure amount of the institution for the subset of exposures i calculated in accordance with Article 92(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; rT, ri = rT and ri as defined in the first subparagraph. (b) the competent or designated authority, as applicable, shall review without undue delay the calibration of the systemic risk buffer rate or rates, as applicable, to ensure they remain appropriate and do not double-count the risks that are already covered by the fact that the institution is bound by the output floor. The calculation in point (a) shall apply until the designated authority has completed the revision set out in point (b) and has published a new decision on the calibration of the systemic risk buffer rate or rates in accordance with the procedure set out in this Article. As of that moment, the cap in point (a) shall no longer apply.;deleted the amount of CET1 capital it is
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 555 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point b
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 133 – paragraph 2 a
2a. Where an institution is bound by the output floor, both of the following shall apply: (a) required to have in accordance with the first subparagraph shall be capped by the following amount: null where: ET = the un-floored total risk exposure amount of the institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013’; Ei = the un-floored risk exposure amount of the institution for the subset of exposures i calculated in accordance with Article 92(4) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; rT, ri = rT and ri as defined in the first subparagraph. (b) the competent or designated authority, as applicable, shall review without undue delay the calibration of the systemic risk buffer rate or rates, as applicable, to ensure they remain appropriate and do not double-count the risks that are already covered by the fact that the institution is bound by the output floor. The calculation in point (a) shall apply until the designated authority has completed the revision set out in point (b) and has published a new decision on the calibration of the systemic risk buffer rate or rates in accordance with the procedure set out in this Article. As of that moment, the cap in point (a) shall no longer apply.;deleted the amount of CET1 capital it is fd
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 557 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point c
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 133 – paragraph 8 – point c
(c) in paragraph 8, point (c) is replaced by the following: (c) the systemic risk buffer is not to be used to address any of the following: (i) risks that are covered by Articles 130 and 131; (ii) risks that are fully covered by the calculation set out in Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.;deleted
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 561 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point d
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 133 – paragraph 9 – point g
(d) in paragraph 9, the following point (g) is added: (g) Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 affectsdeleted how the calibrculation of the systemic risk buffer rate or rates, as applicable, that the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, intends to impose.;set out in
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 562 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 – paragraph 1
1. An(31a) in Article 141 paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: Competent authorities shall prohibit any institution that meets the 1. combined buffer requirement shall noto make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital to an extent that would decrease its Common Equity Tier 1 capital to a level where the combined buffer requirement is no longer met. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(This amendment applies throughout the text) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 563 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 b (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 – paragraph 2
2. A(31b) in Article 141 paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "2. Competent authorities shall require an institution that fails to meet the combined buffer requirement shallto calculate the maximum distributable amount (MDA) in accordance with paragraph 4 and shallto notify the competent authority thereof. Where the first subparagraph applies, competent authorities shall prohibit the institution shall notfrom undertakeing any of the following actions before it has calculated the MDA: (a) make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital; (b) create an obligation to pay variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits or pay variable remuneration if the obligation to pay was created at a time when the institution failed to meet the combined buffer requirement; or (c) make payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101). (This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 564 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 c (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 – paragraph 3
3. Where(31c) in Article 141 paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: "3. In addition to at least one of the measures referred to in Article 104 of this Directive, competent authorities shall prohibit an institution that fails to meet or exceed its combined buffer requirement, it shall not to distribute more than the MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 through any action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legAny distribution linked to the MDA calculated in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be subject to the authorisation by the competent authority of the capital- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-2022010servation plan referred to in Article 142 (This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 565 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 d (new)
4. Institutions shall(31d) in Article 141 paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. Competent authorities shall require institutions to calculate the MDA by multiplying the sum calculated in accordance with paragraph 5 by the factor determined in accordance with paragraph 6. The MDA shall be reduced by any amount resulting from any of the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 566 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 e (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 – paragraph 8
8. the combined buffer requirement and intends to distribute any of its distributable profits or undertake an action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2, it shall notify the competent authority and provide the following information: (a) by the institution, subdivided as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (b) the amount of its interim and year- end profits; (c) the MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4; (d) it intends to allocate between the following: (i) (ii) (iii) payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, (iv) remuneration or discretionary pension benefits, whether by creation of a new obligation to pay, or payment pursuant to an obligation to pay created at a time when the institution failed to meet its combined buffer requirements. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(31e) in Article 141 paragraph 8 is deleted. Where an institution fails to meet the amount of capital maintained Common Equity Tier 1 capital, Additional Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital; the amount of distributable profits dividend payments, share buybacks, the payment of variable Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 567 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 f (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 b – paragraph 1
1. A(31f) in Article 141b paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "1. Competent authorities shall prohibit an institution that meets the leverage ratio buffer requirement pursuant to Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 shall notfrom makeing a distribution in connection with Tier 1 capital to an extent that would decrease its Tier 1 capital to a level where the leverage ratio buffer requirement is no longer met https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101. " (This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 568 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 g (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 b – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
2. A(31g) in Article 141b (2), subparagraph 1 is replaced by the following: "2. Competent authorities shall require an institution that fails to meet the leverage ratio buffer requirement shallto calculate the leverage ratio related maximum distributable amount (L-MDA) in accordance with paragraph 4 and shallto notify the competent authority thereof. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 569 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 h (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 b – paragraph 3
3. Where(31h) in Article 141b paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: "3. In addition to at least one of the measures under Article 104, competent authorities shall prohibit an institution that fails to meet or exceed its leverage ratio buffer requirement, it shall not to distribute more than the L-MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 through any action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legAny distribution linked to the L-MDA calculated in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be subject to the authorisation by the competent authority of the capital- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101servation plan referred to in Article 142. (This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 570 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 i (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 b – paragraph 4
4. Institutions shall(31i) in Article 141b paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. Competent authorities shall require institutions to calculate the L- MDA by multiplying the sum calculated in accordance with paragraph 5 by the factor determined in accordance with paragraph 6. The L-MDA shall be reduced by any amount resulting from any of the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 571 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 j (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 b – paragraph 8
8. Where an institution fails to meet the leverage ratio buffer requirement and intends to distribute any of its distributable profits or undertake an action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of this Article, it shall notify the competent authority and provide the information listed in Article 141(8), with the exception of point (a)(iii) thereof, and the L-MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(31j) Article 141b paragraph 8 is deleted. deleted (This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 572 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 142 a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(32a) the following article is inserted: Article 142a Restrictions in times of crisis 1. Without prejudice to Articles 141 and 141b, competent authorities shall have the powers to temporarily suspend variable remunerations or discretionary pension benefits, shares buy-back operations and distributions or interest payments by all credit institution to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the institution. 2. Such temporary suspension powers shall be imposed on credit institutions whenever the Commission determines by means of an implementing act that the single market is experiencing a serious economic disturbance. The Commission shall also determine that the single market is experiencing a serious economic disturbance whenever the Council has adopted a Decision determining the existence of an emergency situation that may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole of the financial system in the Union pursuant toArticle18 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The implementing act shall specify the length of such temporary suspensions that shall not exceed 12 months unless the serious economic disturbance lasts more than 12 months in which case the Commission shall extend the length of the temporary suspensions. 3. The Commission shall act upon a formal opinion issued by the European Systemic Risk Board and indicating that the Union’s financial markets are facing a systemic risk that warrants the extraordinary measures of this Article. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council ahead of adopting the implementing act referred to in paragraph 3. Whenever the Commission determines that there is a serious economic disturbance in the single market, competent authorities shall require the credit institution to present an action plan within three months specifying internal measures and triggers to restore the soundness of an institution in accordance with the provisions of Article104 of Directive2013/36/EU. The action plan shall also provide a roadmap and a strategy to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to Directive 2013/36/EU and to this Directive and define a deadline for its implementation. Competent authorities shall review and approve such actions plans. 4. The power to adopt an implementing act referred to in paragraph 2 is conferred on the Commission acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 147(2). (This amendment applies throughout the text.) Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32 a (new)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013L0036-20220101(32a) in Article 145, the following point is added: ‘(ia) content and format of the transition plans referred to in Article 76 to ensure a consistent application of this Directive.’ Or. en
2022/08/22
Committee: ECON