BETA


Events

2024/06/19
   Final act published in Official Journal
2024/05/31
   CSL - Draft final act
Documents
2024/05/31
   CSL - Final act signed
2024/05/30
   EP/CSL - Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
2024/04/24
   EP - Debate in Parliament
2024/04/24
   EP - Decision by Parliament, 1st reading
Details

The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.

The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:

Subject matter

The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.

Supervisory independence of competent authorities

Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.

Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.

The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.

Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.

Branches in the EU

The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.

Authorisation

Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.

Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies

Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.

Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.

Supervising third country branches

When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.

Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .

Management body and suitability assessment

Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.

Crypto-asset technologies

In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.

Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks

Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.

Documents
2023/12/11
   EP - Approval in committee of the text agreed at 1st reading interinstitutional negotiations
Documents
2023/12/06
   CSL - Coreper letter confirming interinstitutional agreement
2023/12/06
   EP - Text agreed during interinstitutional negotiations
Documents
2023/02/15
   EP - Committee decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations confirmed by plenary (Rule 71)
2023/02/13
   EP - Committee decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations announced in plenary (Rule 71)
2023/02/10
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading
Details

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report by Jonás FERNÁNDEZ (S&D, ES) on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.

As a reminder, the Commission’s proposal of the capital requirements directive aimed at strengthening the regulatory and supervisory landscape for banks operating in the EU by closing loopholes for third country branches, by enhancing and harmonising supervisory tools and powers in important areas and by ensuring that supervisors are sufficiently independent from economical and political influence and by incorporating environmental, social and governance related risks.

The committee responsible recommended that the European Parliament's position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure should amend the proposal as follows:

Proportionality

The amendment of Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third country branches and environmental, social and governance risks, and the amendment of Directive 2014/59/EU should be coherent with the logic of the banking union and lead to further harmonisation of the single banking market. It should always ensure proportionality of rules and aim at further reducing compliance and reporting costs, in particular for small and non-complex institutions.

Conditions for the authorisation of third country branches

Member States should require that third country undertakings establish a branch in their territory before commencing or continuing activities. New third country branches should not commence their activities in a Member State until the EBA and the third country competent authority have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’). The MoU should provide a clear cooperation framework between the competent authorities, including exchange of information in on-going supervision, crisis management and resolution.

Classification of third country branches

The report stated that Member States may apply a stricter regulatory regime to all third country branches or branches from specific third countries.

Capital endowment requirement

Member States should require that third country branches maintain at all times a minimum capital endowment that is at least equal to:

(a) for class 1 third country branches, 3% of the branch’s average liabilities as reported for the three immediately preceding annual reporting periods, subject to a minimum of EUR 10 million;

(b) for class 2 third country branches, 0.5% of the branch’s average liabilities as reported for the three immediately preceding annual reporting periods, subject to a minimum of EUR 5 million.

Joint assessment of systemic third country branches

The report stipulates that joint assessments should be performed on the third country branches of the same third country group where they are established in two or more Member States and hold assets in an aggregate amount.

Power to require establishing a subsidiary

The committee proposed that Member States should ensure that competent authorities have the power to require third country branches to apply for authorisation where: (i) the third country branch has engaged in the past or is currently engaged in the performance of certain activities with customers or counterparties in other Member States or with other third country branches or subsidiary institutions of the same group; or (ii) the third country branch meets the systemic importance indicators or poses significant financial stability risks, or the aggregate amount of assets that a third country branch or branches in the Union that belong to the same group hold on their books in the Union as reported in accordance with Sub-section 4 is equal or higher to EUR 40 billion .

Designation and powers of the competent authorities

A more proportionate and targeted framework for cooling-off periods has been imposed for staff and members of governance bodies of competent authorities, before they can take up positions in supervised institutions. More specifically, the EBA should issue guidelines by 31 December 2024 on conditions which allow competent authorities to waive, increase or decrease the cooling off periods for specific members of the management governance bodies and staff.

Regulatory technical standards on cooperation with authorities responsible for supervision of anti-money laundering

EBA should, after consulting the European Data Protection Board, issue regulatory technical standards on the mechanisms for cooperation and information exchange between competent authorities and:

(a) the authorities responsible for supervision of anti-money laundering in the Member State;

(b) the authorities, in the context of identifying serious breaches of anti-money laundering rules.

The EBA should issue those regulatory technical standards by 12 months from date of entry into force of this amending Directive.

Environmental, social and governance risk

The report stated that institution’s exposures to environmental, social and governance risks should be assessed also on the basis of institutions’ plans. Institutions’ governance and risk management processes with regard to environmental, social and governance risks should be brought into line with the objectives set out in those plans.

The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities should include the assessment of the institutions’ plans and targets, as well as the progress made towards addressing the environmental, social and governance risks arising from the process of adjustment towards climate neutrality by 2050, as well as towards other relevant Union policy objectives in relation to environmental, social and governance factors.

Documents
2023/01/24
   EP - Vote in committee, 1st reading
2023/01/24
   EP - Committee decision to open interinstitutional negotiations with report adopted in committee
2022/08/22
   EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2022/08/22
   EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2022/06/30
   ECB - European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report
2022/06/01
   EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2022/01/17
   EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading
2021/10/28
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
Documents
2021/10/28
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
Documents
2021/10/28
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
2021/10/28
   EC - Legislative proposal published
Details

PURPOSE: to amend Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks with a view to making the EU banking sector more resilient to potential future economic shocks.

PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.

BACKGROUND: following the major financial crisis of 2008-2009, the EU and its G20 partners in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reached the Basel IIII agreement to make banks more resilient to potential economic shocks. Thanks to the reforms already implemented, the EU banking sector entered the COVID-19 crisis on a much more resilient footing. However, while the overall level of capital in EU banks is now satisfactory on average, some of the problems that were identified in the wake of the financial crisis have not yet been addressed.

The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and a separate legislative proposal to amend the Capital Requirements Regulation in the area of resolution (the so-called ‘daisy chain’ proposal).

This package of proposals marks the final step in this reform of banking rules and faithfully implements the international Basel III agreement, while taking into account the specific features of the EU's banking sector.

CONTENT this proposal amending Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms aims to contribute to financial stability and to the steady financing of the economy in the context of the post-COVID-19 crisis recovery .

The proposal includes provisions on the following issues:

Implementation of the Basel III reform

The proposal ensures proportionality and seeks to further reduce compliance costs, particularly for smaller banks, without relaxing prudential standards.

The proposal aims to ensure that the ‘internal models’ used by banks to calculate their capital requirements do not underestimate risks, thereby ensuring that the capital needed to cover these risks is sufficient. This will make it easier to compare risk-based capital ratios between banks, restoring confidence in these ratios and in the soundness of the sector in general.

Independence of competent authorities

The proposal clarifies how Member States should ensure that the independence of competent authorities, including their staff and governance bodies, is preserved. Minimum requirements are introduced to prevent conflicts of interest, while supervisors would be in a better position to check the good repute and competence of bank managers.

Strengthened supervisory powers

For an efficient Banking Union, the convergence of supervisory practices and a sufficient degree of harmonisation of the various national rules framing the supervisory action are needed. The supervisory authorities would be better able to verify the soundness of transactions . Moreover, this proposal expands the list of supervisory powers available in the CRD to competent authorities to cover operations such as acquisitions by a credit institution of a material holding in a financial or non-financial entity, the material transfer of assets or liabilities and merger or divisions. These supervisory powers will ensure that competent authorities are notified in advance, have at their disposal all the necessary information to perform a prudential assessment of these operations, and can ultimately oppose the completion of operations detrimental to the prudential profile of the supervised entities undertaking them.

Review of the administrative sanctioning regime

To ensure a level playing field in the field of sanctioning powers, Member States are required to provide for administrative penalties, periodic penalty payments and other administrative measures in relation to breaches of national provisions transposing the CRD and the CRR. The proposal requires Member States to lay down rules on the cooperation between competent authorities and judicial authorities in cases of duplication of criminal and administrative proceedings and penalties on the same breach.

Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks

New provisions are introduced to address the significant risks that credit institutions will face due to climate change and the profound economic transformations that are needed to manage this and other ESG risks.

To this end, the proposal sets out clear requirements for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of sustainability risks within ESG risk management frameworks. Supervisors would have the power to assess these risks as part of their regular supervisory reviews, including through climate stress tests carried out by themselves and by banks.

Third country branches (TCBs)

As of 31 December 2020, there were 106 TCBs in the EU distributed across 17 Member States. At present, these branches are mainly subject to national legislation, harmonised only to a very limited extent. The proposal seeks to harmonise EU rules in this area, which will allow supervisors to better manage risks related to these entities, which have significantly increased their activity in the EU over recent years.

Reducing banks’ administrative costs

The proposal aims to centralise disclosures of prudential information with a view to increased access to prudential data and comparability across industry. The centralisation of disclosures in a single access point established by the EBA is also aimed at reducing the administrative burden for institutions, especially small and non-complex ones.

2021/10/25
   EP - FERNÁNDEZ Jonás (S&D) appointed as rapporteur in ECON

Documents

  • Draft final act: 00079/2023/LEX
  • Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
  • Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T9-0362/2024
  • Approval in committee of the text agreed at 1st reading interinstitutional negotiations: PE757.234
  • Coreper letter confirming interinstitutional agreement: GEDA/A/(2023)006587
  • Text agreed during interinstitutional negotiations: PE757.234
  • Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading: A9-0029/2023
  • Amendments tabled in committee: PE734.261
  • Amendments tabled in committee: PE735.693
  • European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2022/0016
  • European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: OJ C 248 30.06.2022, p. 0087
  • Committee draft report: PE731.819
  • Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2021)0380
  • Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2021)0320
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
  • Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2021)0321
  • Legislative proposal published: COM(2021)0663
  • Legislative proposal published: EUR-Lex
  • Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2021)0380
  • Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2021)0320
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2021)0321
  • Committee draft report: PE731.819
  • European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2022/0016 OJ C 248 30.06.2022, p. 0087
  • Amendments tabled in committee: PE734.261
  • Amendments tabled in committee: PE735.693
  • Coreper letter confirming interinstitutional agreement: GEDA/A/(2023)006587
  • Text agreed during interinstitutional negotiations: PE757.234
  • Draft final act: 00079/2023/LEX

Votes

A9-0029/2023 – Jonás Fernández – Provisional agreement – Am 2 #

2024/04/24 Outcome: +: 486, -: 56, 0: 26
DE IT ES PL NL RO FR CZ HU BE AT PT SE BG FI HR LT IE SK EL LV SI DK LU EE MT
Total
80
46
53
42
28
21
67
21
14
21
17
15
19
12
12
11
9
12
12
13
8
7
11
6
7
4
icon: PPE PPE
142

Hungary PPE

1

Slovenia PPE

3

Denmark PPE

For (1)

1

Luxembourg PPE

2

Estonia PPE

For (1)

1

Malta PPE

For (1)

1
icon: S&D S&D
110

Romania S&D

2

Czechia S&D

For (1)

1

Belgium S&D

2

Bulgaria S&D

2

Lithuania S&D

2

Slovakia S&D

For (1)

1

Greece S&D

1

Latvia S&D

2

Slovenia S&D

2

Denmark S&D

2

Luxembourg S&D

For (1)

1

Estonia S&D

2
icon: Renew Renew
90

Poland Renew

1

Hungary Renew

For (1)

1

Austria Renew

For (1)

1

Sweden Renew

2

Bulgaria Renew

2

Finland Renew

3

Croatia Renew

For (1)

1

Ireland Renew

2

Greece Renew

1

Latvia Renew

For (1)

1

Slovenia Renew

2

Luxembourg Renew

2

Estonia Renew

3
icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE
63

Italy Verts/ALE

2

Spain Verts/ALE

3

Poland Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Netherlands Verts/ALE

3

Czechia Verts/ALE

3

Belgium Verts/ALE

3

Austria Verts/ALE

3

Portugal Verts/ALE

1

Sweden Verts/ALE

3

Finland Verts/ALE

2

Lithuania Verts/ALE

2

Ireland Verts/ALE

2

Denmark Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Luxembourg Verts/ALE

For (1)

1
icon: ECR ECR
58

Germany ECR

1

Netherlands ECR

Against (2)

Abstain (1)

5

Romania ECR

1

France ECR

Against (1)

1

Sweden ECR

3

Bulgaria ECR

2

Finland ECR

1

Croatia ECR

1

Lithuania ECR

1

Slovakia ECR

For (1)

1

Greece ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Latvia ECR

For (1)

1
icon: NI NI
32

Germany NI

For (1)

1

Spain NI

1

Netherlands NI

Against (1)

1

Romania NI

For (1)

1

France NI

3

Czechia NI

Against (1)

1

Belgium NI

For (1)

1

Croatia NI

2

Greece NI

Against (1)

3

Latvia NI

Abstain (1)

1
icon: The Left The Left
29

Czechia The Left

Against (1)

1

Belgium The Left

Against (1)

1

Portugal The Left

2

Finland The Left

For (1)

1

Ireland The Left

For (1)

4

Greece The Left

2

Denmark The Left

Against (1)

1
icon: ID ID
44

Czechia ID

Abstain (1)

1

Austria ID

Against (2)

2

Denmark ID

Against (1)

1

Estonia ID

Abstain (1)

1
AmendmentsDossier
493 2021/0341(COD)
2022/08/22 ECON 493 amendments...
source: 735.693

History

(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)

events/12
date
2024-06-19T00:00:00
type
Final act published in Official Journal
procedure/final
title
Directive 2024/1619
url
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=32024L1619
procedure/stage_reached
Old
Procedure completed, awaiting publication in Official Journal
New
Procedure completed
docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
docs
title: 00079/2023/LEX
type
Draft final act
body
CSL
docs/9
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
events/10
date
2024-05-30T00:00:00
type
Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
body
EP/CSL
events/11
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
type
Final act signed
body
CSL
procedure/stage_reached
Old
Awaiting Council's 1st reading position
New
Procedure completed, awaiting publication in Official Journal
docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
docs
title: 00079/2023/LEX
type
Draft final act
body
CSL
docs/9
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
events/10
date
2024-05-30T00:00:00
type
Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
body
EP/CSL
events/11
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
type
Final act signed
body
CSL
procedure/stage_reached
Old
Awaiting Council's 1st reading position
New
Procedure completed, awaiting publication in Official Journal
docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
docs
title: 00079/2023/LEX
type
Draft final act
body
CSL
docs/9
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
events/10
date
2024-05-30T00:00:00
type
Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
body
EP/CSL
events/11
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
type
Final act signed
body
CSL
procedure/stage_reached
Old
Awaiting Council's 1st reading position
New
Procedure completed, awaiting publication in Official Journal
docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
docs
title: 00079/2023/LEX
type
Draft final act
body
CSL
docs/9
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
events/10
date
2024-05-30T00:00:00
type
Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
body
EP/CSL
events/11
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
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Final act signed
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CSL
procedure/stage_reached
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Awaiting Council's 1st reading position
New
Procedure completed, awaiting publication in Official Journal
docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
docs
title: 00079/2023/LEX
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Draft final act
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CSL
docs/9
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
events/10
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
type
Final act signed
body
CSL
docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
docs
title: 00079/2023/LEX
type
Draft final act
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CSL
docs/9
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
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url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
events/10
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
type
Final act signed
body
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docs/9
date
2024-05-31T00:00:00
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docs/9
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2024-04-24T00:00:00
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url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0362_EN.html title: T9-0362/2024
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events/9/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 486 votes to 56, with 26 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • The European Parliament’s position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
  • Subject matter
  • The purpose of the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU in connection with supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks is to further the harmonisation of the banking supervisory framework and, ultimately, deepen the internal market for banking. Competent authorities should seek to ensure that the supervisory framework is applied to institutions, as defined in that Directive, in a proportionate manner and, in particular, they should aim to reduce compliance and reporting costs for small and non-complex institutions, with a view to an average reduction in reporting costs of 10% to 20%.
  • Supervisory independence of competent authorities
  • Member States should provide for the necessary arrangements to ensure that competent authorities, including their members of staff and the members of their governance bodies, can exercise their supervisory powers independently and objectively , without seeking or taking instructions from supervised institutions, from any body of the Union or any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. The governance bodies of competent authorities should be functionally independent of other public and private bodies.
  • Member States should ensure that no member of a competent authority’s governance body remains in office for more than 14 years. Member States should ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body are appointed on the basis of published criteria that are objective and transparent and that those members can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. The reasons for dismissal should be made public unless the member of the competent authority’s governance body concerned objects to the publication.
  • The cooling-off period should start from the date on which direct involvement in the supervision of the entities ceased. Members of their staff and members of their governance bodies should not have access to confidential or sensitive information relating to these entities during the cooling-off period. In addition, they should be required to submit a declaration of interest.
  • Where a member of staff or a member of a competent authority’s governance body owns, at the time of being hired or appointed or at any time thereafter, financial instruments that may give rise to conflicts of interest, the competent authority should have the power to require on a case-by-case basis that those instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable timeframe.
  • Branches in the EU
  • The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should not apply to cases of reverse solicitation, i.e. where a client or counterparty approaches an undertaking established in a third country on its own exclusive initiative for the provision of banking services, including their continuation, or banking services closely related to those initially solicited. The requirement to establish a branch in the EU should also not apply to interbank transactions or interdealer transactions.
  • Authorisation
  • Competent authorities should have the necessary power to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where such a credit institution has been determined as failing or likely to fail, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action would prevent a failure of such a credit institution within a reasonable timeframe and a resolution action is not necessary in the public interest.
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies
  • Financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are parent undertakings of banking groups should remain subject to the identification and approval mechanism introduced by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council. That mechanism enables competent authorities to bring certain financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies under the direct scope of their supervision and of their supervisory powers to ensure compliance on a consolidated basis.
  • Under specific circumstances, competent authorities should have the discretion to exempt from approval a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company set up for the purpose of holding participations in undertakings.
  • Supervising third country branches
  • When authorising and supervising third-country branches, competent authorities should be able to exercise their supervisory functions effectively. To that end they need to have access to all the necessary information on the third-country branch’s head undertaking from the supervisory authorities of the relevant third country and be able to effectively coordinate their supervisory activities with those of the third country’s supervisory authorities. Before a third-country branch commences its activities in a Member State, competent authorities should endeavour to conclude an agreement with the supervisory authority of the third country concerned to enable cooperation and information exchange.
  • Competent authorities should have an explicit power to require, on a case-by-case basis, that third-country branches apply for authorisation, at a minimum where those branches engage in activities with clients or counterparties in other Member States in breach of the internal market rules, where they pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the Union or of the Member State where they are established or where the aggregate amount of the assets of all third-country branches in the Union which belong to the same third-country group is equal to or greater than EUR 40 billion or the amount of the third-country branch’s assets in the Member State where it is established is equal to or greater than EUR 10 billion .
  • Management body and suitability assessment
  • Institutions, and financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that have been granted approval, should have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute, act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The entities should ensure that members of the management body fulfil at all times the criteria and requirements and should assess the suitability of members of the management body taking into account supervisory expectations, before they take up their position and periodically, as laid down in applicable laws and regulations, guidelines and internal suitability policies.
  • Crypto-asset technologies
  • In particular, in their risk management activities, institutions should consider the crypto-asset technology risks, general information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber risks, legal risks, money laundering and terrorist financing risks and valuation risks. Competent authorities should be able to take the necessary supervisory actions where the institutions’ risk management practices are deemed insufficient.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • Competent authorities should ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems in place as part of their governance arrangements to identify, measure, manage and monitor ESG risks in the short, medium and long term.
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  • The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report by Jonás FERNÁNDEZ (S&D, ES) on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks, and amending Directive 2014/59/EU.
  • As a reminder, the Commission’s proposal of the capital requirements directive aimed at strengthening the regulatory and supervisory landscape for banks operating in the EU by closing loopholes for third country branches, by enhancing and harmonising supervisory tools and powers in important areas and by ensuring that supervisors are sufficiently independent from economical and political influence and by incorporating environmental, social and governance related risks.
  • The committee responsible recommended that the European Parliament's position adopted at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure should amend the proposal as follows:
  • Proportionality
  • The amendment of Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third country branches and environmental, social and governance risks, and the amendment of Directive 2014/59/EU should be coherent with the logic of the banking union and lead to further harmonisation of the single banking market. It should always ensure proportionality of rules and aim at further reducing compliance and reporting costs, in particular for small and non-complex institutions.
  • Conditions for the authorisation of third country branches
  • Member States should require that third country undertakings establish a branch in their territory before commencing or continuing activities. New third country branches should not commence their activities in a Member State until the EBA and the third country competent authority have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’). The MoU should provide a clear cooperation framework between the competent authorities, including exchange of information in on-going supervision, crisis management and resolution.
  • Classification of third country branches
  • The report stated that Member States may apply a stricter regulatory regime to all third country branches or branches from specific third countries.
  • Capital endowment requirement
  • Member States should require that third country branches maintain at all times a minimum capital endowment that is at least equal to:
  • (a) for class 1 third country branches, 3% of the branch’s average liabilities as reported for the three immediately preceding annual reporting periods, subject to a minimum of EUR 10 million;
  • (b) for class 2 third country branches, 0.5% of the branch’s average liabilities as reported for the three immediately preceding annual reporting periods, subject to a minimum of EUR 5 million.
  • Joint assessment of systemic third country branches
  • The report stipulates that joint assessments should be performed on the third country branches of the same third country group where they are established in two or more Member States and hold assets in an aggregate amount.
  • Power to require establishing a subsidiary
  • The committee proposed that Member States should ensure that competent authorities have the power to require third country branches to apply for authorisation where: (i) the third country branch has engaged in the past or is currently engaged in the performance of certain activities with customers or counterparties in other Member States or with other third country branches or subsidiary institutions of the same group; or (ii) the third country branch meets the systemic importance indicators or poses significant financial stability risks, or the aggregate amount of assets that a third country branch or branches in the Union that belong to the same group hold on their books in the Union as reported in accordance with Sub-section 4 is equal or higher to EUR 40 billion .
  • Designation and powers of the competent authorities
  • A more proportionate and targeted framework for cooling-off periods has been imposed for staff and members of governance bodies of competent authorities, before they can take up positions in supervised institutions. More specifically, the EBA should issue guidelines by 31 December 2024 on conditions which allow competent authorities to waive, increase or decrease the cooling off periods for specific members of the management governance bodies and staff.
  • Regulatory technical standards on cooperation with authorities responsible for supervision of anti-money laundering
  • EBA should, after consulting the European Data Protection Board, issue regulatory technical standards on the mechanisms for cooperation and information exchange between competent authorities and:
  • (a) the authorities responsible for supervision of anti-money laundering in the Member State;
  • (b) the authorities, in the context of identifying serious breaches of anti-money laundering rules.
  • The EBA should issue those regulatory technical standards by 12 months from date of entry into force of this amending Directive.
  • Environmental, social and governance risk
  • The report stated that institution’s exposures to environmental, social and governance risks should be assessed also on the basis of institutions’ plans. Institutions’ governance and risk management processes with regard to environmental, social and governance risks should be brought into line with the objectives set out in those plans.
  • The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities should include the assessment of the institutions’ plans and targets, as well as the progress made towards addressing the environmental, social and governance risks arising from the process of adjustment towards climate neutrality by 2050, as well as towards other relevant Union policy objectives in relation to environmental, social and governance factors.
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  • PURPOSE: to amend Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks with a view to making the EU banking sector more resilient to potential future economic shocks.
  • PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.
  • ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
  • BACKGROUND: following the major financial crisis of 2008-2009, the EU and its G20 partners in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reached the Basel IIII agreement to make banks more resilient to potential economic shocks. Thanks to the reforms already implemented, the EU banking sector entered the COVID-19 crisis on a much more resilient footing. However, while the overall level of capital in EU banks is now satisfactory on average, some of the problems that were identified in the wake of the financial crisis have not yet been addressed.
  • The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and a separate legislative proposal to amend the Capital Requirements Regulation in the area of resolution (the so-called ‘daisy chain’ proposal).
  • This package of proposals marks the final step in this reform of banking rules and faithfully implements the international Basel III agreement, while taking into account the specific features of the EU's banking sector.
  • CONTENT this proposal amending Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms aims to contribute to financial stability and to the steady financing of the economy in the context of the post-COVID-19 crisis recovery .
  • The proposal includes provisions on the following issues:
  • Implementation of the Basel III reform
  • The proposal ensures proportionality and seeks to further reduce compliance costs, particularly for smaller banks, without relaxing prudential standards.
  • The proposal aims to ensure that the ‘internal models’ used by banks to calculate their capital requirements do not underestimate risks, thereby ensuring that the capital needed to cover these risks is sufficient. This will make it easier to compare risk-based capital ratios between banks, restoring confidence in these ratios and in the soundness of the sector in general.
  • Independence of competent authorities
  • The proposal clarifies how Member States should ensure that the independence of competent authorities, including their staff and governance bodies, is preserved. Minimum requirements are introduced to prevent conflicts of interest, while supervisors would be in a better position to check the good repute and competence of bank managers.
  • Strengthened supervisory powers
  • For an efficient Banking Union, the convergence of supervisory practices and a sufficient degree of harmonisation of the various national rules framing the supervisory action are needed. The supervisory authorities would be better able to verify the soundness of transactions . Moreover, this proposal expands the list of supervisory powers available in the CRD to competent authorities to cover operations such as acquisitions by a credit institution of a material holding in a financial or non-financial entity, the material transfer of assets or liabilities and merger or divisions. These supervisory powers will ensure that competent authorities are notified in advance, have at their disposal all the necessary information to perform a prudential assessment of these operations, and can ultimately oppose the completion of operations detrimental to the prudential profile of the supervised entities undertaking them.
  • Review of the administrative sanctioning regime
  • To ensure a level playing field in the field of sanctioning powers, Member States are required to provide for administrative penalties, periodic penalty payments and other administrative measures in relation to breaches of national provisions transposing the CRD and the CRR. The proposal requires Member States to lay down rules on the cooperation between competent authorities and judicial authorities in cases of duplication of criminal and administrative proceedings and penalties on the same breach.
  • Environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks
  • New provisions are introduced to address the significant risks that credit institutions will face due to climate change and the profound economic transformations that are needed to manage this and other ESG risks.
  • To this end, the proposal sets out clear requirements for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of sustainability risks within ESG risk management frameworks. Supervisors would have the power to assess these risks as part of their regular supervisory reviews, including through climate stress tests carried out by themselves and by banks.
  • Third country branches (TCBs)
  • As of 31 December 2020, there were 106 TCBs in the EU distributed across 17 Member States. At present, these branches are mainly subject to national legislation, harmonised only to a very limited extent. The proposal seeks to harmonise EU rules in this area, which will allow supervisors to better manage risks related to these entities, which have significantly increased their activity in the EU over recent years.
  • Reducing banks’ administrative costs
  • The proposal aims to centralise disclosures of prudential information with a view to increased access to prudential data and comparability across industry. The centralisation of disclosures in a single access point established by the EBA is also aimed at reducing the administrative burden for institutions, especially small and non-complex ones.
procedure/Legislative priorities
  • title: Joint Declaration 2021 url: https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/thematicnote.do?id=2066000&l=en
procedure/title
Old
Capital Requirements Directive: supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks
New
Amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive
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  • name: FERNÁNDEZ Jonás date: 2021-10-25T00:00:00 group: Group of Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats abbr: S&D
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ZANNI Marco
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Identity and Democracy
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ID