[ParlTrack]

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 4

(4) The Communication of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled "An Energy Policy for Europe" highlighted the importance of completing the internal market in natural gas and of creating a level playing field for all gas companies established in the Community. The Internal Energy Market Communication ~~and the final Report on the Competition Sectoral Enquiry~~ showed that the present rules and measures do not provide the necessary framework for achieving the objective of a well functioning internal market. On the other hand, the final Report on the Competition Sectoral Enquiry and the impact assessment produced to support the third legislative package on the internal energy market provided no convincing evidence that made it possible to establish the best or only way to improve the way that market works.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 5

(5) Without effective separation of networks from activities of production and supply, there is an inherent risk of discrimination not only in the operation of the network but also in the incentives for ~~vertically integrated~~ companies to invest adequately in their networks. The main motivation for investing is the remuneration received by the operator. Should the national regulatory authority set a low level of remuneration, this would lead to a decrease in investment. On the other hand, should it set a fair and proportionate level of remuneration, ensuring that revenue covers costs and pays off such investment, it would automatically generate an increase in investment, regardless of whether the network operator belongs to an integrated group. Therefore, the primary major determining factor for investment resides in pricing regulation and in the role and powers of the national regulatory authorities, which should be reinforced in order to complete the internal market to the benefit of the consumer.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 7

(7) ~~Only t~~The removal of the inherent incentive for vertically integrated companies to discriminate against competitors as regards network access and investment can ensure effective unbundling. Ownership unbundling, which implies the network owner being appointed as the network operator and being independent from any supply and production interests, is ~~clearly the most effective and stabl~~one way to solve the inherent conflict of interest ~~and to ensure security of supply. For this reason, t~~. The European Parliament, in its Rresolution on Pprospects for the internal gas and electricity market, adopted on 10 July 2007 referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective tool to promote investments in infrastructures in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the grid for new entrants and transparency in the market. Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the same person or persons are not entitled to exercise control, including through minority blocking rights on decisions of strategic importance such as investments, over a production or supply undertaking and, at the same time, hold any interest in or exercise any right over a transmission system operator or transmission system. Conversely, , considered moreover that the application of further unbundling measures for the gas sector is not straightforward, and therefore urged the development of specific solutions to enable this sector to achieve the completion of the internal gas market, taking into account~~rol over a transmission system operator should preclude the possibility of holding any interest in or exercising any right over a supply undertaking~~ the differences between the upstream and downstream markets.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 8 a (new)

(8a) Member States that so wish may apply the provisions of this Directive relating to the effective and efficient separation of transmission systems and transmission system operators. This is effective because it helps ensure the independence of transmission system operators. It is efficient because it provides a more appropriate regulatory framework to guarantee fair competition, sufficient investment, access for new entrants and the integration of natural gas markets. It is based on a pillar of organisational measures and measures relating to the governance of transmission system operators and on a pillar of measures relating to investment, connecting new production capacities to the network and market integration through regional cooperation. It is in line with the requirements laid down by the European Council at its meeting in Brussels on 8 and 9 March 2007.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 10

(10) The setting up of system operators independent from supply and production interests should enable vertically integrated companies to maintain their ownership of network assets whilst ensuring an effective separation of interests, provided that the independent system operator performs all the functions of a network operator or efficient and effective unbundling is implemented and detailed regulation and extensive regulatory control mechanisms are put in place.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 11

(11) Where the undertaking owning a transmission system is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling ~~and, as a derogation,~~, effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems and of transmission system operators, and setting up system operators which are independent from supply and generation interests. The full effectiveness of the independent system operator solution needs to be assured by way of specific additional rules. To preserve fully the interests of the shareholders of vertically integrated companies, Member States should have the choice of implementing ownership unbundling either by direct divestiture or by splitting the shares of the integrated company into shares of the network company and shares of the remaining supply and generation business, provided that the requirements resulting from ownership unbundling are complied with.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Dominique VLASTO, Herbert REUL, Angelika NIEBLER, Paul RÜBIG, Nicole FONTAINE, Catherine TRAUTMANN, Ján HUDACKÝ

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 25

(25) In view of the creation of an internal market for electricity, Member States should foster the integration of their national markets and the cooperation of network operators at European and regional level. Regional integration initiatives are an essential intermediate step in achieving European integration of energy markets, which remains the final objective. The regional level contributes towards accelerating the integration process by making it possible for the actors concerned, particularly the Member States, the national regulatory authorities and the transmission system operators, to cooperate on specific issues.

2008/04/07
Committee: ITRE

Herbert REUL, Nikolaos VAKALIS, Vladimir URUTCHEV, Nicole FONTAINE, Angelika NIEBLER, Ján HUDACKÝ, Dominique VLASTO, Werner LANGEN, Paul RÜBIG

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3

Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 5b

1. Member States shall cooperate among themselves for the purpose of integrating their national markets at least at the regional level. In particular, Member States shall promote the cooperation of network operators at a regional level, and foster the consistency of their legal and regulatory framework. ~~The geographical~~2. When the cooperation between several Member States at a regional level encounters significant difficulties, following the joint request of these Member States, the Commission may designate, in agreaement with all Member States covncerned by, a regional coo~~perations shall be in line with the definition of geographical areas by the Commission in accordance with Article 2h(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005.~~ rdinator. 3. The regional coordinator shall promote at regional level the cooperation of national regulatory authorities and other competent public authorities, network operators, gas exchanges, grid users and market parties. In particular, the regional coordinator shall : (a) promote new efficient investments in interconnections. To this end, the regional coordinator shall assist transmission system operators in drawing up their regional interconnection plan and shall contribute to the coordination of their investments decisions and, where appropriate, of their open season procedure; (b) promote the efficient and safe use of the networks. To this end, the regional coordinator shall contribute to the coordination between transmission system operators, national regulatory authorities and other competent national public authorities in drawing up their common allocation and common safeguard mechanisms; (c) submit an annual report to the Commission and Member States concerned on the progress achieved in the region and on any difficulty or obstacle that may hinder such progress.

2008/04/10
Committee: ITRE

Nikolaos VAKALIS, Vladimir URUTCHEV, Nicole FONTAINE, Angelika NIEBLER, Ján HUDACKÝ, Dominique VLASTO, Werner LANGEN, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 4

Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 7 – paragraph –1 (new)

"–1. In order to ensure the independence of transmission system operators, Member States shall ensure that, as from [date of transposition plus one year], vertically integrated undertakings must comply with the provisions of Article 7(1)(a) to (d) or Article 9 or Article 9b."

2008/04/10
Committee: ITRE

Nikolaos VAKALIS, Vladimir URUTCHEV, Nicole FONTAINE, Angelika NIEBLER, Ján HUDACKÝ, Dominique VLASTO, Werner LANGEN, Herbert REUL, Paul RÜBIG

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 c (new)

Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 8 – paragraphs 4 a to 4 h (new)

(6c) In Article 8, the following paragraphs shall be added: "4a. Transmission system operators shall draw up a 10-year network development plan at least every two years. They shall take efficient measures to guarantee system adequacy and security of supply. 4b. The 10-year network development plan shall in particular: a) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructures that ought to be built over the next ten years; b) contain all the investments already decided upon and identify new investments for which an implementation decision has to be taken in the next three years. 4c. In order to draw up this 10-year network development plan, each transmission system operator shall make a hypothesis about the evolution of generation, consumption and exchanges with other countries, and shall take into account regional and European-wide existing network investment plans. Transmission system operator shall submit in due time the draft of this plan to the competent national body. 4d. The competent national body shall consult the draft with all relevant network users in an open and transparent way, and may publish the result of such consultation, in particular possible investment need. 4e. The competent national body shall examine whether the draft 10-year network development plan covers all investment needs identified during the consultation. The competent national body may require the transmission system operator to amend this plan. 4f. The competent national body within the meaning of paragraphs 4c, 4d and 4e, may be the national regulatory authority, any other competent national public authority or a network development trustee established by transmission system operators. In the latter case, transmission system operators shall submit the drafts of their statutes, a list of their members and their rules of procedure to the competent national public authority for its approval. 4g. If the transmission system operator fails to implement a specific investment listed in the 10-year network development plan within the subsequent three years, Members States shall ensure that the national regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority has the necessary powers to take one of the following measures: a) to request, by all legal means, the transmission system operator to fulfil its investment obligations using its financial capacities, or, b) to invite independent investors to tender for the necessary investment in a transmission system and at the same time may oblige the transmission system operator: – to agree to financing by any third party, – to agree to building by any third party or to build the respective new assets and – to operate the respective new asset. The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the national regulatory authority or any other competent national authority. In both cases, tariff regulation shall allow for revenues that cover the costs of such investments. 4h. The competent national public authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the investment plan.

2008/04/10
Committee: ITRE

Herbert REUL, Nikolaos VAKALIS, Vladimir URUTCHEV, Nicole FONTAINE, Angelika NIEBLER, Ján HUDACKÝ, Dominique VLASTO, Werner LANGEN, Paul RÜBIG

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 d (new)

Directive 2003/55/EC
Article 8 a (new)

(6d) The following Article shall be inserted: "Article 8a Effective and efficient unbundling of transmission systems I. Assets, equipment, staff and identity 1. Transmission system operators shall be equipped with all human, physical and financial resources of the vertically integrated undertaking necessary for the regular business of gas transmission, in particular: (i) transmission system operators shall own assets necessary for the regular business of gas transmission; (ii) transmission system operators shall employ the staff necessary for the regular business of gas transmission; (iii) the sharing of the staff and the provision of services between branches of a vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply shall be limited to cases where there is no possibility of discrimination and shall be subject to approval by national regulatory authorities in order to exclude competition concerns and conflicts of interest; (iv) appropriate financial resources for future investment projects shall be made available in due time. 2. The activities deemed necessary for the regular business of gas transmission mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include at least the following: – representation of the transmission system operator and contacts with third parties and national regulatory authorities, – granting and managing third party access to the network, – collection of access charges, congestion rents and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism, in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, – operation, maintenance and development of the transmission system, – investment planning ensuring the long- term ability of the system to meet reasonable demand and guaranteeing security of supply, – legal services, – accountancy and IT services. 3. Transmission system operators shall have the legal form of a joint-stock company. 4. The transmission system operator shall have its own corporate identity, significantly different from the vertically integrated undertaking, with separate branding, communication and premises. 5. Transmission system operators' accounts shall be audited by an auditor other than the person auditing the vertically integrated undertaking and all its affiliated companies. II. Independence of the transmission system operator's management, chief executive officer / executive board 6. Decisions on the appointment and on any early termination of the employment of the chief executive officer or members of the executive board of the transmission system operator and decisions on the conclusion or early termination of the employment contracts with these persons shall be notified to the national regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. These decisions and agreements may become binding only if, within a period of 3 weeks following the notification, the regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority has not used its right of veto. A veto may be used if an appointment and the conclusion of the relevant agreement poses serious doubts as to the professional independence of the nominated chief executive officer or a member of the executive board; in the case of early terminations of employment and of respective agreements with these persons, the right of veto may be used only if serious doubts exist regarding the basis and justification of such termination. 7. Right of appeal to the national regulatory authority or another competent national public authority or to a court shall be guaranteed to the management of the transmission system operator in the event of early terminations of their employment. 8. After termination of employment in the transmission system operator, the chief executive officers / members of the executive board shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply for a period of not less than 3 years. 9. The chief executive officer / members of the executive board shall not hold any interest in or receive any compensation from any undertaking of the vertically integrated company other than the transmission system operator. Remuneration of the chief executive officer / members of the executive board shall in no part depend on activities of the vertically integrated undertaking other than those of the transmission system operator. 10. The chief executive officer or the members of the executive board of the transmission system operator may not be responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of any other branch of the vertically integrated undertaking. 11. Without prejudice to the provisions above, the transmission system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets, regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 24c, in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the transmission system operator and to set global limits on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines, that do not exceed the terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument. III. Supervisory board / Board of directors 12. Chairmen of the supervisory board/board of directors of the transmission system operator shall not participate in any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation or supply. 13. The supervisory boards / boards of directors of transmission system operators shall also include independent members, appointed for a term of at least 5 years. Appointment of the members of the supervisory board / board of directors shall be notified to the national regulatory authority/ or any other competent national public authority and become binding under the conditions described in paragraph 6. 14. For the purpose of paragraph 13, a member of the supervisory board / board of directors of a transmission system operator shall be deemed independent if he/she does not participate in any business with, or is no other relationship with the vertically integrated undertaking, its controlling shareholders or the management of either, that would create a conflict of interest, in particular: (a) has not been an employee of any branch of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of generation and supply in five years prior to the appointment as a member of the supervisory board / board of directors; (b) does not hold any interest in, and does not receive any compensation from, the vertically integrated undertaking or any of its affiliates except the transmission system operator; (c) does not have any relevant business relationship with any branch of the vertically integrated company performing functions of energy supply during his/her appointment as a member of the supervisory board / board of directors; (d) is not a member of the executive board of a company in which the vertically integrated undertaking appoints members of the supervisory board / board of directors. IV. Compliance officer 15. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators establish and implement a compliance programme which sets out measures to be taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme shall also set out the specific obligations of employees of the transmission system operators to meet this objective. The programme shall be subject to the approval of the national regulatory authority or any other competent national public authority. Compliance of the program shall be independently monitored by the compliance officer. The national regulatory authority shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of inappropriate implementation of the compliance program by the transmission system operator. 16. The chief executive officer / executive board of the transmission system operator shall appoint a person or a body in a function of a compliance officer who shall be responsible for: (i) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; (ii) preparing an annual report, setting out the measures to be taken in order to implement the compliance programme and submitting it to the national regulatory authority; (iii) issuing recommendations regarding the compliance programme and its implementation. 17. The independence of the compliance officer shall be guaranteed in particular by the terms of the relevant employment contract. 18. The compliance officer shall have the opportunity to regularly address the supervisory board/board of directors of the transmission system operator, of the vertically integrated undertaking and the national regulatory authorities. 19. The compliance officer shall attend all meetings of the supervisory board / board of directors of the transmission system operator that address the following areas: (i) conditions for access and connection to the system, including the collection of access charges, congestion rents, and payments under the inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism in compliance with Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; (ii) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission grid system, including interconnection and connection investments; (iii) energy purchases in order to cover energy losses. 20. During these meetings, the compliance officer shall prevent information about generators or suppliers activities which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a discriminatory manner to the supervisory board/board of directors. 21. The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant books, records and offices of the transmission system operator and to all the necessary information for the fulfilment of the tasks. The compliance officer shall be nominated and removed by the chief executive officer / executive board only after prior approval by the national regulatory authority."

2008/04/10
Committee: ITRE

11 Amendments of Ján HUDACKÝ related to 2007/0196(COD)

ParlTrack - 2011-2024