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14 Amendments of Andreas SCHWAB related to 2012/0150(COD)

Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11 a (new)
(11a) However, in order to safeguard legal certainty and avoid contradictory responsibilities and conflicts of interest, it is important to distinguish, in terms of function and organisation, between the roles and tasks of competent authorities responsible for financial supervision and those of resolution authorities. It should therefore be possible for Member States, in the context of this Directive, to entrust resolution authority tasks to national authorities responsible for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms only where a strict functional and organisational distinction is in place between resolution and supervisory tasks. Member States should, however, ensure close cooperation between the national authorities responsible for prudential supervision and resolution.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 35 a (new)
(35a) In accordance with this reasoning, and knowing that public intervention in systemic crises might be the only way to restore market confidence and stability and prevent further value destruction, it is important not to exclude public intervention from the future management of banking crises; however, it should always be the last resort.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. This Directive lays down rules and procedures relating to the recovery and resolution of the following:
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new)
2. Institutions the failure of which, because of their structure, type of activity, limited size, risk profile, limited interconnectedness with other institutions or the financial system generally, or because they are part of an institutional protection scheme as referred to in Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, would not have a negative impact on financial stability in the event of either an institution-specific crisis or a systemic financial crisis shall be excluded from the scope of the Directive as specified in paragraph 1.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 367 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)
The Member States’ competent and resolution authorities shall, when implementing the requirements of the Directive and the measures and instruments provided for therein, take particular account of structure, type of activity, size, risk, interconnectedness with other institutions and membership of an institutional protection scheme within the meaning of Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Institutions the failure of which, because of their structure, type of activity, limited size, risk profile, limited interconnectedness with other institutions or the financial system generally, or because they are part of an institutional protection scheme within the meaning of Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, would not have a negative impact, via contagion, on financial stability in the event of either an institution-specific crisis or a systemic financial crisis shall be excluded from the obligation to draw up recovery plans.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 399 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans at least annuallyevery two years or after change to the legal or organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation, which could have a material effect on, or necessitates a change to the recovery plan. Competent authorities may require institutions to update their recovery plans more frequently.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 883 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) to ensure the continuity of criticaltemporarily maintain market- relevant functions;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 929 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Member States shall ensure that institutions may be resolved only in accordance with the Member-State law applicable to the institution concerned by means of the application of the tools referred to in Article 31(2). This shall apply, in particular, to institutions which have been set up in a form governed by public law or fulfil a public task assigned to them by law, and to institutions organised on a cooperative footing.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1274 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 50 a (new)
Article 50a General principles of government financial stabilisation tools 1. In order to give effect to the government financial stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure that their competent ministries have the resolution powers specified in Articles 56 to 63. 2. In times of systemic crisis Member States shall have the possibility, without prejudice to the use of other resolution tools, as a last resort and in accordance with State aid rules, to participate in the resolution of a credit institution or investment firm or to intervene directly in order to avoid its winding up through certain financial stabilisation tools, with a view to avoid contagion effects and maintaining financial stability in the Member State as well as in the Union as a whole. Such action shall be carried out in close cooperation between the competent ministry and the resolution authority. 3. A Member State may determine the existence of a systemic crisis for the purpose of this Directive. 4. The Commission may, after consulting the ESRB, question the Member State's assessment of the systemic crisis precondition. 5. When applying the government financial stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure that competent ministries and the resolution authority apply the tools only if all the conditions in Article 27(1) are met, capital has been written down in accordance with Article 51 and either of the following conditions is also met: (a) the competent ministry and the resolution authority, in consultation with the central bank and the competent authority, determine that the application of other resolution tools would not suffice to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability; (b) the competent ministry and the resolution authority determine that the application of other resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where extraordinary public support as well as extraordinary liquidity assistance from the central bank has previously been given to the institution. 6. The financial stabilisation tools shall consist of the following: (a) a guarantee tool as referred to in Article 50b; (b) an equity support tool as referred to in Article 50c; (c) a temporary public ownership tool as referred to in Article 50d.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1328 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall ensure that transfer, cancellation or modification shall not affect the operation of systems and rules of systems covered by Directive 98/26/EC, or other payment and settlement systems backed by financial associations, where a resolution authority:
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1471 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) if a Member State has availed itself of the option provided for in Article 99(5) of this Directive to use the funds of Deposit Guarantee Scheme for the purposes of Article 92 of this Directive, the contribution from each institution shall be pro-rata to the amount of its liabilities excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC, of all the institutions authorised in the territory of the Member State.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1480 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) if a Member Statthe contribution from each institution shall be levied on the hbas not availed itself of the option provided for in Article 99(5) to use the funds of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme for the purposes of Article 92, the contribution from each institution shall be pro-rata to the total amount of its liabilities, excluding own fundsis of its total relevant equity and liabilities. These are calculated by subtracting the own funds and the debts to clients together with the total relevant off-balance-sheet derivatives from the total equity and liabilities. If the amount of the total relevant equity and liabilities is between EUR 300 million and EUR 10 billion, it shall be multiplied by 0.0002. If the amount of the total relevant equity and liabilities is between EUR 10 billion and EUR 100 billion, it shall be multiplied by 0.0003. If the amount of the total relevant equity and liabilities is in excess of EUR 100 billion, with respect to the total liabili shall be multiplied by 0.0004. The total relevant derivatives, excluding own funds, of all the institutions authorised in the territory of the Member State are calculated from the nominal volume of the off-balance- sheet futures and are multiplied by 0.000003. The amounts derived from the above multiplication operations are added together. The latest year-end accounts shall be crucial in calculating the contribution for the year.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1494 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 7
7. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 in order specify the notion of adjusting contributions in proportion to the risk profile of institutions as referred to in paragraph 2 (c) of this Article, taking into account the following: (a) the risk exposure of the institution, including the importance of its trading activities, its off-balance sheet exposures and its degree of leverage; (b) the stability and variety of the company's sources of funding; (c) the financial condition of the institution; (d) the probability that the institution enters into resolution; (e) the extent to which the institution has previously benefited from State support; (f) the complexity of the structure of the institution and the resolvability of the institution, and (g) its systemic importance for the market in question.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON