Progress: Procedure completed
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | ECON | HÖKMARK Gunnar ( PPE) | FERREIRA Elisa ( S&D), KLINZ Wolf ( ALDE), LAMBERTS Philippe ( Verts/ALE), FORD Vicky ( ECR) |
Committee Opinion | BUDG | HAUG Jutta ( S&D) | |
Committee Opinion | IMCO | ||
Committee Opinion | JURI | STOYANOV Dimitar ( NA) | Sajjad KARIM ( ECR), Jiří MAŠTÁLKA ( GUE/NGL) |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
TFEU 114-p1
Legal Basis:
TFEU 114-p1Subjects
Events
The Commission presents its report on the application and review of Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive - BRRD) and Regulation 806/2014 (Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation - SRMR).
Under the Directive and the Regulation, the Commission is required to review the application of the resolution framework and to submit a Report to the European Parliament and the Council.
The reports on the application of these legal instruments were due by June and December 2018 respectively. Due to the close links between these instruments, which jointly establish the EU resolution framework, it is appropriate to carry out the review jointly for both of them.
State of play of transposition of BRRD
The transposition deadline for the BRRD was set on 31 December 2014. Only two Member States notified complete transposition of the BRRD within that deadline so that infringement cases for non-communication against the remaining ones were opened. To date, all Member States have notified complete transposition. The Commission has verified that the BRRD is fully transposed in all Member States and has closed the respective non-communication infringement cases.
The Commission is currently verifying the correctness of national transposition measures.
State of play of the implementation of the resolution framework by resolution authorities
The implementation of BRRD is ongoing in the EU. A number of Member States have set resolution strategies and MREL targets for all the banks under their direct remit. This has allowed banks to start removing impediments to these strategies and build-up MREL resources. Since the introduction of BRRD, a number of resolution colleges have been set up aiming to agree resolution plans, resolvability assessments and MREL between home and host authorities in charge or resolving banking groups in the EU.
In the Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is carrying out the process for the preparation of resolution plans for banks under its remit. In addition, the SRB has developed guidance on critical functions and the operationalisation of bail-in and it is still working on a number of topics, in particular on operational continuity and management information systems.
With respect to Minimum Requirement of Eligible Liabilities (MREL), the SRB approach has evolved from being based on informative targets in 2016, to the inclusion in 2017 of binding requirements for the largest and most complex banks, as well as bank-specific adjustments addressing both quality and quantity of the MREL. The 2018 MREL guidance on the application by the SRB of the legislative provisions on MREL, was issued by the SRB at the end of 2018. Overall, banks are in a transitional phase and, while some banks at present still face MREL shortfalls, they are on their path towards fulfilling the objectives within the timeframes specified by SRB.
Conclusion
The Commission takes stock of the issues discussed above, which are based on the limited experience the Commission gained from the application of the resolution framework so far.
The framework has been applied only in a limited number of cases. Out of those, only one case concerned the resolution of an institution under SRMR. It is also worth noticing that a number of these cases dealt with “legacy issues” which accumulated during the financial crisis or before.
In addition, the provisions concerning the bail-in tool and the establishment of the Single Resolution Board became applicable only as of 1 January 2016. Other elements - such as resolution planning for larger and complex institutions and the provisions concerning Minimum Requirement of Eligible Liabilities (MREL) – require a phasing in to be fully implemented.
In light of this, it is premature to design and adopt legislative proposals at this stage.
The Commission will, however, continue monitoring the application of the resolution framework and further assess the issues identified above, also in light of additional elements provided by the recently launched study on the harmonisation of national insolvency laws and experience stemming from possible future application of the resolution framework.
To this end the Commission will also engage in a comprehensive discussion of the topics identified in this report with respect to BRRD/SRMR (as well as issues that may emerge from application of the resolution framework) with experts appointed by the European Parliament, Member States and all relevant stakeholders.
In this context the Commission will also take into account the interaction with policy developments in relation to deposit insurance, including the work of the High Level Group established by the Eurogroup, and the review of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive.
In accordance with Directive 2014/59/EU on establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (“BRRD”) and after consulting the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Commission has prepared this report to the European Parliament and the Council on the review of the application of Articles 13 ( Group Resolution Plan ), 18 ( Impediment to resolvability: group treatment ) and 45 (Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities - MREL) as regards EBA's power to conduct binding mediation to take account of developments in the financial sector.
Articles 13, 18 and 45 BRRD are based on the general principle that, with respect to groups decisions in the respective areas should be taken jointly by the resolution authorities concerned. All three provisions set out a period of four months during which an agreement in this respect must be reached. The three provisions establish that in absence of a joint decision any resolution authority can, at the end of the four months' period refer the matter to EBA requesting it to take a binding mediation decision. In such case, the responsibility to decide on the matter is deferred by the initially responsible resolution authority to EBA. The EBA shall take its decision within one month. The decision of EBA is then binding on the respective resolution authorities.
Assessment of the application of the EBA's power of mediation : since its establishment by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, EBA has received nine requests for mediation out of which three for binding and for six non-binding mediation. Out of such nine cases, two mediation requests have been submitted to EBA on the basis of the BRRD, which came into force on 1 January 2015.
Until now all requests for mediation proceedings (binding, non-binding) have ultimately been settled by an agreement between the parties concerned under the guidance and assistance of EBA. For this reason, so far there was no need to proceed with binding mediation to reach a decision .
Experience from these cases, albeit limited, seems to indicate that the mediation process can be an effective tool to incentivise joint decisions between competent authorities.
Based on this limited experience, challenges for the effective application of its mediation powers could be identified as follows:
limits to the participation of resolution authorities in mediation panels; lack of power for EBA to open a conciliation or a binding mediation on its own initiative; implications of the current BRRD provision on fiscal safeguards. The BRRD stipulates that EBA may exercise its binding mediation powers only if none of the resolution authorities concerned assesses that the subject matter under disagreement may in any way impinge on its Member States’ fiscal responsibilities.
Conclusions : the report concludes that mediation is a key element of the resolution process and can be very helpful in ensuring that decisions pertaining to complex issues involving groups of entities, such as the adoption of a resolution plan, the reduction of obstacles to the resolution or the definition of minimum capital requirement levels and eligible commitments, are taken in the form of joint decisions.
The Commission's proposal on the review of the functioning of the ESAs aims to address some issues.
Depending on the outcome of the legislative procedure relating to its proposals on ESAs, the Commission will study the other issues based on the experience of the general review of the BRRD which it is mandated to carry out.
PURPOSE: to harmonise the national rules for recovery and resolution of banks.
LEGISLATIVE ACT: Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council.
CONTENT: since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007-08, the absence of effective instruments for the resolution of banks has often led to the use of public funds to restore trust in even relatively small banking institutions, so as to prevent a domino effect of failing institutions from causing real damage to the economy.
The directive accordingly establishes a policy framework for managing bank failures in an orderly manner and to avoid such contagion, without resorting to taxpayers' money. It establishes a range of instruments to tackle potential bank crises at three stages: preparatory and preventative, early intervention, and resolution .
The key elements of the Directive are the following:
Recovery plans : banks will have to draw up and regularly update (at least annually) recovery plans setting out the measures they would take to restore their financial position in the event of significant deterioration. Such plans should be detailed and based on realistic assumptions applicable in a range of robust and severe scenarios, corresponding to serious situations. They should not assume access to extraordinary public financial support.
Institutions should be required to submit their plans to competent authorities for a complete assessment .
When assessing the appropriateness of the recovery plans, the competent authority shall take into consideration the appropriateness of the institution’s capital and funding structure to the level of complexity of the organisational structure and the risk profile of the institution.
The competent authorities should evaluate each recovery plan within six months of their presentation. Where the competent authority assesses that there are material deficiencies in the recovery plan, it shall notify the institution or the parent undertaking of the group of its assessment and require the institution to submit, within two months, a revised plan .
Where the competent authority does not consider the deficiencies to have been adequately addressed by the revised plan, it may direct the institution to amend the plan. It may, among other things, direct the institution to reduce the risk profile of the institution, including liquidity risk and to review the institution’s strategy and structure . The decision shall be notified in writing to the institution and subject to a right of appeal.
Resolution plans : the resolution authorities should draw up resolution plans for each bank, showing the measures they could ake if the bank was in a resolution procedure. The group resolution plans should identify measures in relation to a parent institution as well as all individual subsidiaries that are part of a group . They shall not have a disproportionate impact on any Member State and should include procedures for informing and consulting employee representatives throughout the recovery and resolution processes where appropriate.
Among the main resolution measures , resolution authorities shall have the power to take any of the following measures:
· require the institution: i) to revise any intragroup financing agreements or review the absence thereof; ii) to limit its maximum individual and aggregate exposures; iii) require the institution to divest specific assets;
· restrict or prevent the development of new or existing business lines or sale of new or existing products;
· require changes to legal or operational structures of the institution or any group entity, either directly or indirectly under its control, so as to modify its legal and operational structure.
Resolution authorities may also appoint a special manager to replace the management body of the institution under resolution.
Early intervention : in order to preserve financial stability, it is important that competent authorities are able to remedy the deterioration of an institution’s financial and economic situation before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it.
To this end, they shall be given early intervention powers, including requiring the removal of the senior management or management body of the institution. One or several temporary administrators may be appointed, whose task will be to promote solutions to address the financial situation of the institution.
Bail-in : this provision, which enters into force in January 2016, will reduce to a minimum the costs to the taxpayer of the resolution procedure of a failing bank. It will enable resolution authorities to write down or convert into equity the claims of the shareholders and creditors of banks that are failing or likely to fail.
Resolution measures may be taken in accordance with the following principles:
· the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses;
· creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims under normal insolvency proceedings;
· management body and senior management of the institution under resolution are replaced;
· natural and legal persons are made liable, under civil or criminal law;
· covered deposits are fully protected.
Resolution fund : the Directive requires member states, as a general rule, to set up ex-ante resolution funds to ensure that the resolution tools can be applied effectively. These national funds will have to reach, by 2025, a target level of at least 1% of covered deposits of all the credit institutions authorised in their country.
National resolution authorities will be able, in exceptional cases, to exclude some liabilities and use the resolution fund to absorb losses or recapitalise a bank. However, such flexibility will only be available after a minimum level of losses equal to 8% of total liabilities including own funds has been imposed on an institution's shareholders and creditors, or under special circumstances 20% of an institution's risk-weighted assets where the resolution financing arrangement has at its disposal ex-ante contributions that amount to at least 3% of covered deposits.
The contribution of the resolution fund is capped at 5% of a bank's total liabilities . In extraordinary circumstances, where this limit has been reached, and after all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits have been bailed in, the resolution authority may seek funding from alternative financing sources.
Government financial stabilisation tools : Member States may provide extraordinary public financial support through additional financial stabilisation tools, for the purpose of participating in the resolution of an institution or an entity including by intervening directly in order to avoid its winding up. Such an action shall be carried out under the leadership of the competent ministry or the government in close cooperation with the resolution authority.
The financial stabilisation tools consist of the following elements: a) public equity support tool to recapitalise an establishment; b) temporary public ownership tool .
However, the possibility of calling on alternative funding on the basis of recourse to State stabilisation tools is subject to the 8% bail-in requirement and conditional on approval by the Commission under state aid rules.
Loss absorbing capacity : to ensure that banks always have sufficient loss-absorbing capacity, the Directive provides for national resolution authorities to set minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each institution, based on its size, risk and business model.
Based on a report by the European Banking Authority (EBA), the Commission shall, if appropriate, submit by 31 December 2016, to the European Parliament and the Council a legislative proposal on the harmonised application of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities.
Review : no later than 1 June 2018, the Commission will examine the implementation of the Directive and submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council.
ENTRY INTO FORCE: 02.07.2014.
TRANSPOSITION: no later than 31.12.2014. The measures shall apply from 01.01.2015 (no later than 01.01.2016 regarding the measures relating to the bail-in instrument).
DELEGATED ACTS: the Commission can adopt delegated acts, in order to specify the criteria for defining ‘critical functions’ and ‘core business lines’ for the purposes of this Directive. The power to adopt such acts is conferred on the Commission for an unlimited period from 2 July 2014 . The European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act within a period of three months from the date of notification (this period can be extended for three months). If the European Parliament or the Council make objections, the delegated act will not enter into force.
The European Parliament adopted by 584 votes 80 with 10 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Parliament adopted its position in first reading following the ordinary legislative procedure. The amendments adopted in plenary were the result of a compromise between Parliament and Council. They amend the Commission proposal as follows:
Managing bank failures : the directive aimed for harmonisation of the rules and procedures on bank resolution. Each Member State should designate one or, exceptionally, more resolution authorities that were empowered to apply the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers.
It was specified that, when establishing and applying the requirements under the directive to an entity, resolution authorities and competent authorities should take account of the nature of its business , its shareholding structure, its legal form, its risk profile, size and legal status, its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, the scope and the complexity of its activities, its membership of an institutional protection scheme (IPS) or other cooperative mutual solidarity systems.
Recovery plans : each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision must draw up and maintain a recovery plan providing for measures to be taken by the institution to restore its financial position following a significant deterioration of the latter. The competent authorities shall review each plan within six months of submission . Where the competent authority assesses that there are material deficiencies in the recovery plan, it shall notify the institution or the parent undertaking of the group of its assessment and require the institution to submit, within two months, a revised plan demonstrating how those deficiencies or impediments are addressed.
Where the competent authority does not consider the deficiencies and impediments to have been adequately addressed by the revised plan, it may direct the institution to make specific changes to the plan.
The competent authority may, inter alia, direct the institution to reduce the risk profile of the institution, including liquidity risk or review the institution's strategy and structure .
The decision shall be notified in writing to the institution and subject to a right of appeal.
Group recovery plans shall consist of a recovery plan for the group headed by the Union parent undertaking as a whole. The assessment of the plan shall take into account the potential impact of the recovery measures on financial stability in all the Member States where the group operates.
Resolution plans: the resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the resolution authority may take where the institution meets the conditions for resolution. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where necessary and proportionate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed.
The resolution plan shall not assume any of the following : extraordinary public financial support; any central bank emergency liquidity assistance; or any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms.
Group resolution plans shall identify measures for the resolution of the Union parent undertaking and the subsidiaries that are part of the group. They should not have a disproportionate impact on any Member State . The potential impact of the measures should be taken into account in all the Member States where the group operates.
Recovery and resolution plans should include procedures for informing and consulting employee representatives throughout the recovery and resolution processes.
Powers to address or remove impediments to resolvability : where the resolution authority assesses that the measures proposed by an institution do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments in question, it shall, either directly or indirectly through the competent authority, require the institution to take alternative measures that may achieve that objective.
The following measures may be proposed:
· require the institution to revise any intragroup financing agreements or review the absence thereof, or draw up service agreements, whether intra-group or with third parties, to cover the provision of critical functions;
· require the institution to limit its maximum individual and aggregate exposures;
· require the institution to divest specific assets or to limit or cease specific existing or proposed activities;
· restrict or prevent the development of new or existing business lines or sale of new or existing products;
· require changes to legal or operational structures of the institution or any group entity, either directly or indirectly under its control.
Early intervention powers : in order to preserve financial stability, competent authorities must be able to remedy the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. To that end, competent authorities should be granted early intervention powers, including the power to require the removal of the senior management or management body of the institution, in its entirety or with regard to individuals . One or several temporary administrators may be appointed.
Resolution tools : these should minimise the costs of the resolution of a failing institution borne by the taxpayers. It should ensure that systemic institutions can be resolved without jeopardising financial stability. The bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring that shareholders and creditors of the failing institution suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of the costs arising from the failure of the institution. Accordingly, resolution action must taken in accordance with the following principles:
· the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses;
· creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims under normal insolvency proceedings;
· management body and senior management of the institution under resolution are replaced;
· natural and legal persons are made liable, subject to Member State law, under civil or criminal law for their responsibility for the failure of the institution;
· covered deposits are fully protected .
Resolution authorities may appoint a special manager who shall have the statutory duty to take all the measures necessary to promote the resolution objectives and implement resolution actions.
Government financial stabilisation tools : Member States may provide extraordinary public financial support through additional financial stabilisation tools, for the purpose of participating in the resolution of an institution, including by intervening directly in order to avoid its winding up. Such action shall be carried out under the leadership of the competent ministry or the government in close cooperation with the resolution authority.
The financial stabilisation tools shall consist of the following: (a) public equity support tool ;
(b) temporary public ownership tool .
In the very extraordinary situation of a systemic crisis, the resolution authority may seek funding from alternative financing sources through the use of government stabilisation when the following conditions are met:
· a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, has been made by shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other eligible liabilities through write down, conversion or otherwise;
· it shall be conditional on prior and final approval under the Union State aid framework.
The government financial stabilisation tools shall be used as a last resort after having assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the maximum extent practicable.
The Council discussed the proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, focusing in particular on the design of the bail-in instrument.
The Presidency concluded that to reach an agreement, a balance would have to be struck between establishing a harmonised approach to bail-in and allowing for limited national flexibility in its application. The Presidency stated its intention to re-submit the dossier to the Council at its meeting on 21 June, with the aim of reaching an agreement on the Directive.
In summarising the discussion, the Presidency noted convergence around the following points:
general agreement on a broad scope for bail-in, with a limited list of defined exclusions ; general agreement that the level of loss absorbing capacity must be adapted to match the scope of exclusions ; noting that deposits under EUR 100 000 are always fully guaranteed by the deposit guarantee schemes, there was agreement amongst most Member States that the deposit guarantee schemes should also benefit from depositor preference ; overall, considerable support for depositor preference (i.e. last category of assets to be bailed in) for deposits over EUR 100 000, with some reservations raised on giving preference to large corporate deposits .
The Presidency also recognised that some country-specific concerns should be addressed , in particular as regards euro area vs. non-euro area issues .
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK on a proposal for a directive establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.
The ECB fully supports the development of a recovery and resolution framework and the removal of obstacles to effective crisis management at financial institutions. It is of the view that the directive should be adopted rapidly . At the same time, further steps will be required to create a single resolution mechanism, one of three banking union pillars.
Accordingly, the ECB calls on the Commission to urgently present a separate proposal for an independent European Resolution Mechanism , including aspects of a common European Resolution Fund. This Fund would, as a minimum, be financed by the financial institutions. Consistency among these three pillars is crucial to the success of a financial market union. The ECB makes a number of specific observations as regards the following issues:
Definition of resolution : the proposed directive defines resolution as the restructuring of an institution in order to ensure the continuity of its essential functions.
Conditions for resolution and assessment of the need for extraordinary financial public support : the ECB is of the view that the responsibilities for determining whether an institution is failing or likely to fail should be clearly allocated to the competent authority in the interest of prompt and efficient resolution action. The determination of the circumstances in which an institution is failing or likely to fail should be based only on an assessment of the prudential situation of an institution. Thus, a particular need for State aid (criteria proposed by the Commission) should not, in itself, establish an adequate objective criterion. Instead, the circumstances underlying the granting of State aid would be comprised in the assessment of the institution’s prudential situation.
Involvement of central banks in recovery and resolution : the ECB insists on the following points:
central banks have a responsibility for macro-prudential and financial stability, as well as expertise on financial markets and should be involved in the resolution process; Member States shall ensure that, where the central bank is not itself the resolution authority, the competent authority and the resolution authority engage in an adequate exchange of information with the central bank; the proposed provisions should not in any way affect the competence of central banks to decide independently and at their full discretion on the provision of central bank liquidity to solvent credit institutions, both in standard monetary policy operations as well as emergency liquidity assistance; the proposed directive requires each Member State to include in its resolution ‘tool box’ the power to establish and operate a bridge institution and an asset management vehicle. Where a central bank acts as resolution authority, it should be clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that the central bank will in no event assume or finance any obligation of these entities; the ECB welcomes that the proposed directive provides that resolution costs should in principle be borne by shareholders and creditors and where these funds are not sufficient, by financing arrangements. However, the ECB stresses that, in line with the prohibition on monetary financing, central banks may not finance these financing arrangements.
Involvement of national designated authorities in assessment of recovery plans : to ensure that any relevant systemic concerns are taken into consideration in such reviews, including the overall impact of simultaneous implementation of recovery plans, which may lead to procyclical or herding behaviour, the ECB deems it necessary that the competent authorities make the assessments in consultation with the competent national designated authorities where they are separate entities.
Intra-group financial support : the ECB notes, however, that the implementation of these voluntary agreements in national legal systems raises complex legal issues. It considers that further reflections may be needed on whether additional provisions are warranted to ensure the legal certainty and enforceability of intra-group transactions that are approved and implemented according to these voluntary agreements.
The bail-in tool and write-down powers : the ECB supports the introduction of such a bail-in tool by the Member States from 1 January 2018 at the latest. It makes the following observations:
the bail-in mechanism should be designed to be in line with internationally agreed key attributes for effective resolution, in particular a power for the resolution authority, under a resolution regime, to bail in a wide range of liabilities in accordance with the creditor hierarchy that would apply in a liquidiation; resolution measures should be adopted in justified circumstances and accompanied with appropriate conditions to limit moral hazard bail-in powers, as a resolution tool, should be used predominantly for the resolution of institutions that have reached a point of unviability; the bail-in tool should be combined with a replacement of management and subsequent restructuring of the institution and its activities in a way that addresses the reasons for its failure; further work on bail-in, namely on the possibility of introducing a minimum requirement for a targeted level of designated bail-in instruments while still maintaining the overall scope of bail-in should be continued; the resolution authorities should have the power to write-down capital instruments before entering into resolution. With a view to the recapitalisation of institutions, the ECB recommends expressly clarifying this in the proposed directive, for the avoidance of doubt.
Financing of resolution and target size of the financing arrangements : the ECB therefore welcomes that the resolution tools and powers in the proposed directive enable authorities to put the burden of resolution financing on the shareholders and creditors. While acknowledging the benefit of additional resolution financing sources, the ECB is of the view that the ambitious proposal to set up a European system of financing arrangements will not solve important cross-border resolution issues, such as coordination and burden sharing.
The use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution financing (DGS) : the ECB welcomes that the proposed directive gives priority to the repayment of depositors covered by the DGS where a DGS is requested to use its available financial means to finance resolution as well as, at the same time, the usual function of repayments of insured depositors, and the available means are insufficient to satisfy all these requests. Against this background, the ECB advocates that legal certainty is ensured by clearly defining the role of the DGS in resolution financing, regardless of which resolution tool is chosen and how the measures are applied. From a financial stability perspective, the priority claim in respect of the covered deposits is also supported.
Further harmonisation of recovery and resolution rules : the ECB supports the development of a recovery and resolution framework also for non-bank financial institutions with systemic importance, for instance insurance companies and market infrastructures. This should be coordinated with international initiatives.
The Council had a first exchange of views on the proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.
The proposal, issued by the Commission on 6 June, is aimed at providing supervisory authorities with common tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively and to resolve any financial institution in an orderly manner in the event of insolvency, whilst minimising taxpayers' exposure to losses.
The presidency's aim is for the Council to agree a general approach by December, subsequent to which negotiations with the Parliament will start, with a view to adoption of the Directive at first reading.
PURPOSE: to establish a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.
PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and the Council.
CONTEXT: the financial crisis severely tested the ability of national and Union-level authorities to manage problems in banking institutions.
The absence of effective tools to manage institutions in crisis has too often required the use of public funds to restore trust in even relatively small institutions so as to prevent a domino effect of failing institutions from seriously damaging the real economy . Accordingly, an effective policy framework is needed to manage bank failures in an orderly way and to avoid contagion to other institutions.
The Commission published a communication in October 2010 setting out plans for a Union framework for crisis management in the financial sector. The framework would equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency.
In June 2010, the European Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on recommendations on cross-border crisis management in the banking sector. It stressed the need for a Union-wide framework to manage banks in financial distress.
At the international level, G20-Leaders have called for a review of resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws in the light of recent experience. In November 2011 in Cannes, they endorsed the core elements that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) considers to be necessary for an effective resolution regime (Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions).
Finally, in December 2010, the Council (ECOFIN) adopted conclusions calling for a Union framework for crisis prevention, management and resolution. The conclusions stress that the framework should apply in relation to banks of all sizes, improve cross-border cooperation and consist of three pillars (preparatory and preventative measures, early intervention, and resolution tools and powers).
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: The impact assessment came to the following conclusions:
· The proposed Union bank resolution framework will achieve the objectives of enhancing financial stability , reducing moral hazard, protecting depositors and critical banking services, saving public money and protecting the internal market for financial institutions;
· The social impact is expected to be positive : i) reducing the probability of a systemic banking crisis and avoiding losses in economic welfare that follow a banking crisis; and ii) minimising taxpayer exposure to losses from insolvency support to institutions.
· The costs of the framework derive from a possible increase in funding costs for institutions due to the removal of the implicit certainty of state support, and from the costs related to resolution funds. Institutions might transmit those increased cost to customers or shareholders by pushing rates on deposits lower, increasing lending rates and banking fees or reducing returns on equity. However, competition might reduce ability of institutions to pass on the costs in full.
The Commission takes the view that the potential benefits of the framework in terms of economic welfare over the long term in terms of a reduced likelihood of a systemic crisis are substantially higher than the potential cost.
LEGAL BASIS: Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
CONTENT: the proposal harmonises national laws on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms to the extent necessary to ensure that Member States have the same tools and procedures to address systemic failures. The aim of the proposed framework is to equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency.
Since the risk posed by any individual bank to financial stability cannot be fully ascertained in advance, these powers should be available to the relevant authorities in relation to any bank , regardless of its size or the scope of its activities.
To this end, the range of powers available to the relevant authorities should consist of three elements :
1) PREPARATION AND PREVENTION : Preparatory steps and plans are required to minimise the risks of potential problems:
Recovery and resolution plans : Institutions will be required to draw up recovery plans setting out arrangements and measures to enable it to take early action to restore its long term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Supervisors will assess and approve recovery plans.
Furthermore, a resolution plan, prepared by the resolution authorities in cooperation with supervisors in normal times, will set out options for resolving the institution in a range of scenarios, including systemic crisis. Such plans should include details on the application of resolution tools and ways to ensure the continuity of critical functions.
Powers to address or remove impediments to resolvability : Based on the resolution plan, the resolution authorities shall assess whether an institution or group is resolvable. If resolution authorities identify significant impediments to the resolvability of an institution or group, they may require the institution or groups to take measures in order to facilitate its resolvability.
Such measures might include: i) reducing complexity through changes to legal or operational structures in order to ensure that critical functions can be legally and economically separated from other functions; ii) drawing up service agreements to cover the provision of critical functions; iii) limiting maximum individual and aggregate exposures; iv) restricting or preventing the development of new business lines or products.
Intra-group financial support : Institutions that operate in a group structure will be able to enter into agreements to provide financial support (in the form of a loan, the provision of guarantees, or the provision of assets for use as collateral in transaction) to other entities within the group that experience financial difficulties. The agreement may be submitted for approval in advance by the shareholders' meetings of all participating entities in accordance with national law. It will authorise the management bodies to provide financial support if needed within the terms of the agreement.
2) EARLY INTERVENTION: The proposal expands the powers of supervisors to intervene at an early stage in cases where the financial situation or solvency of an institution is deteriorating. Powers of early intervention include: i) the power to request the institution to implement arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan; ii) drawing up an action program and a timetable for its implementation or requesting the management to convene, or convening directly, a shareholders' meeting , propose the agenda and the adoption of certain decisions; and iii) requesting the institution to draw up a plan for restructuring of debt with its creditors .
In addition, the supevisor would have the power to appoint a special manager for a limited period, when the solvency of an institution is deemed to be sufficiently at risk. The primary duty of a special manager is to restore the financial situation of the institution and the sound and prudent management of its business.
3) RESOLUTION : If insolvency of an institution presents a concern as regards the general public interest, a clear means is required to reorganise or wind down the bank in an orderly fashion while preserving its critical functions and limiting to the maximum extent any exposure of taxpayers to losses in insolvency (resolution).
Resolution conditions : The proposal establishes common parameters for triggering the application of resolution tools. The authorities shall be able to take an action when an institution is insolvent or very close to insolvency to the extent that if no action is taken the institution will be insolvent in the near future.
Instruments and powers of resolution : The framework sets up a number of general principles that will have to be respected by the resolution authorities. These principles refer, inter alia, to the allocation of losses and the treatment of shareholders and creditors and to the consequences that the use of the tools could have on the management of the institution.
The implementation of the resolution tools and powers is based on an assessment of the real value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is about to fail. To this end, the framework incorporates a valuation based on the principle of 'market value'. This will ensure that the losses are recognised at the moment when the institution enters into resolution.
When the trigger conditions for resolution are satisfied, resolution authorities will have the power to apply the following resolution tools:
· sale of business , enabling resolution authorities to effect a sale of the institution or the whole or part of its business on commercial terms, without requiring the consent of the shareholders or complying with procedural requirements that would otherwise apply.
· bridge institution , enabling resolution authorities to transfer all or part of the business of an institution to a publicly controlled entity. The bridge institution must be licensed in accordance with the Capital Requirements Directive and will be operated as a commercial concern within any limits prescribed by the State aids framework.
· asset separation , enabling resolution authorities to transfer impaired or problem assets to an asset management vehicle to allow them to be managed and worked out over time.
· bail-in , giving resolution authorities the power to write down the claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert debt claims to equity. The tool can be used to recapitalise an institution that is failing or about to fail.
Cross border resolution: This will be done through measures that will require enhanced cooperation between national authorities and creation of incentives for applying a group approach in all phases of preparation, recovery and resolution.
Resolution colleges will be established with clearly designated leadership and with the participation of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The EBA will facilitate cooperation of authorities and mediate if necessary.
Relations with third countries: Because many Union institutions and banking groups are active in third countries, an effective framework for resolution needs to provide for cooperation with third country authorities .
The proposal provides Union authorities with the necessary powers to support foreign resolution actions of a failed foreign bank by giving effect to transfers of its assets and liabilities that are located in or governed by the law of their jurisdiction. However, such support would only be provided if the foreign action ensured fair and equal treatment for local depositors and creditors and did not jeopardise financial stability in the Member State.
Resolution funding: the proposal establishes funding arrangements financed by institutions themselves in order to minimize taxpayer's exposure to losses from solvency support. It provides for the setting up of financing arrangements in each Member State.
The proposal lays down the rules on the contributions to the financing arrangements, and involves a mix of ex ante contributions , supplemented by ex post contributions and, where indispensable, borrowing facilities from financial institutions or the central bank. In order to ensure that some funds are available at all times, and given the pro-cyclicality associated with ex post funding, a minimum target fund level is set, to be reached through ex ante contributions in a time span of 10 years. Based on model-calculation, an optimal minimum target fund level is set at 1% of covered deposits.
The proposal also deals with the role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in the resolution framework. DGS may be called upon to contribute to resolution.
BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: EUR 2,080 millions payment to cover the operational commitment for the period 2013-2015 .
The present proposal would require EBA to (i) develop around 23 technical standards and 5 guidelines (ii) take part in resolution colleges, make decisions in case of disagreement and exercise binding mediation and (iii) provide for recognition of third country resolution proceedings according to Article 85 and conclude non-binding framework cooperation arrangements with third countries according to Article 88. The delivery of technical standards is due 12 months after the entry into force of the Directive which is estimated to be between June and December 2013. The proposal of the Commission includes long-term tasks for EBA that will require the establishment of 5 additional posts (temporary agents) as from 2014. In addition, 11 seconded national experts "SNE" are foreseen to carry out temporary tasks limited to 2014 and 2015 years.
DELEGATED ACTS: the proposal contains provisions empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
PURPOSE: to establish a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.
PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and the Council.
CONTEXT: the financial crisis severely tested the ability of national and Union-level authorities to manage problems in banking institutions.
The absence of effective tools to manage institutions in crisis has too often required the use of public funds to restore trust in even relatively small institutions so as to prevent a domino effect of failing institutions from seriously damaging the real economy . Accordingly, an effective policy framework is needed to manage bank failures in an orderly way and to avoid contagion to other institutions.
The Commission published a communication in October 2010 setting out plans for a Union framework for crisis management in the financial sector. The framework would equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency.
In June 2010, the European Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on recommendations on cross-border crisis management in the banking sector. It stressed the need for a Union-wide framework to manage banks in financial distress.
At the international level, G20-Leaders have called for a review of resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws in the light of recent experience. In November 2011 in Cannes, they endorsed the core elements that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) considers to be necessary for an effective resolution regime (Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions).
Finally, in December 2010, the Council (ECOFIN) adopted conclusions calling for a Union framework for crisis prevention, management and resolution. The conclusions stress that the framework should apply in relation to banks of all sizes, improve cross-border cooperation and consist of three pillars (preparatory and preventative measures, early intervention, and resolution tools and powers).
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: The impact assessment came to the following conclusions:
· The proposed Union bank resolution framework will achieve the objectives of enhancing financial stability , reducing moral hazard, protecting depositors and critical banking services, saving public money and protecting the internal market for financial institutions;
· The social impact is expected to be positive : i) reducing the probability of a systemic banking crisis and avoiding losses in economic welfare that follow a banking crisis; and ii) minimising taxpayer exposure to losses from insolvency support to institutions.
· The costs of the framework derive from a possible increase in funding costs for institutions due to the removal of the implicit certainty of state support, and from the costs related to resolution funds. Institutions might transmit those increased cost to customers or shareholders by pushing rates on deposits lower, increasing lending rates and banking fees or reducing returns on equity. However, competition might reduce ability of institutions to pass on the costs in full.
The Commission takes the view that the potential benefits of the framework in terms of economic welfare over the long term in terms of a reduced likelihood of a systemic crisis are substantially higher than the potential cost.
LEGAL BASIS: Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
CONTENT: the proposal harmonises national laws on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms to the extent necessary to ensure that Member States have the same tools and procedures to address systemic failures. The aim of the proposed framework is to equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency.
Since the risk posed by any individual bank to financial stability cannot be fully ascertained in advance, these powers should be available to the relevant authorities in relation to any bank , regardless of its size or the scope of its activities.
To this end, the range of powers available to the relevant authorities should consist of three elements :
1) PREPARATION AND PREVENTION : Preparatory steps and plans are required to minimise the risks of potential problems:
Recovery and resolution plans : Institutions will be required to draw up recovery plans setting out arrangements and measures to enable it to take early action to restore its long term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Supervisors will assess and approve recovery plans.
Furthermore, a resolution plan, prepared by the resolution authorities in cooperation with supervisors in normal times, will set out options for resolving the institution in a range of scenarios, including systemic crisis. Such plans should include details on the application of resolution tools and ways to ensure the continuity of critical functions.
Powers to address or remove impediments to resolvability : Based on the resolution plan, the resolution authorities shall assess whether an institution or group is resolvable. If resolution authorities identify significant impediments to the resolvability of an institution or group, they may require the institution or groups to take measures in order to facilitate its resolvability.
Such measures might include: i) reducing complexity through changes to legal or operational structures in order to ensure that critical functions can be legally and economically separated from other functions; ii) drawing up service agreements to cover the provision of critical functions; iii) limiting maximum individual and aggregate exposures; iv) restricting or preventing the development of new business lines or products.
Intra-group financial support : Institutions that operate in a group structure will be able to enter into agreements to provide financial support (in the form of a loan, the provision of guarantees, or the provision of assets for use as collateral in transaction) to other entities within the group that experience financial difficulties. The agreement may be submitted for approval in advance by the shareholders' meetings of all participating entities in accordance with national law. It will authorise the management bodies to provide financial support if needed within the terms of the agreement.
2) EARLY INTERVENTION: The proposal expands the powers of supervisors to intervene at an early stage in cases where the financial situation or solvency of an institution is deteriorating. Powers of early intervention include: i) the power to request the institution to implement arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan; ii) drawing up an action program and a timetable for its implementation or requesting the management to convene, or convening directly, a shareholders' meeting , propose the agenda and the adoption of certain decisions; and iii) requesting the institution to draw up a plan for restructuring of debt with its creditors .
In addition, the supevisor would have the power to appoint a special manager for a limited period, when the solvency of an institution is deemed to be sufficiently at risk. The primary duty of a special manager is to restore the financial situation of the institution and the sound and prudent management of its business.
3) RESOLUTION : If insolvency of an institution presents a concern as regards the general public interest, a clear means is required to reorganise or wind down the bank in an orderly fashion while preserving its critical functions and limiting to the maximum extent any exposure of taxpayers to losses in insolvency (resolution).
Resolution conditions : The proposal establishes common parameters for triggering the application of resolution tools. The authorities shall be able to take an action when an institution is insolvent or very close to insolvency to the extent that if no action is taken the institution will be insolvent in the near future.
Instruments and powers of resolution : The framework sets up a number of general principles that will have to be respected by the resolution authorities. These principles refer, inter alia, to the allocation of losses and the treatment of shareholders and creditors and to the consequences that the use of the tools could have on the management of the institution.
The implementation of the resolution tools and powers is based on an assessment of the real value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is about to fail. To this end, the framework incorporates a valuation based on the principle of 'market value'. This will ensure that the losses are recognised at the moment when the institution enters into resolution.
When the trigger conditions for resolution are satisfied, resolution authorities will have the power to apply the following resolution tools:
· sale of business , enabling resolution authorities to effect a sale of the institution or the whole or part of its business on commercial terms, without requiring the consent of the shareholders or complying with procedural requirements that would otherwise apply.
· bridge institution , enabling resolution authorities to transfer all or part of the business of an institution to a publicly controlled entity. The bridge institution must be licensed in accordance with the Capital Requirements Directive and will be operated as a commercial concern within any limits prescribed by the State aids framework.
· asset separation , enabling resolution authorities to transfer impaired or problem assets to an asset management vehicle to allow them to be managed and worked out over time.
· bail-in , giving resolution authorities the power to write down the claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert debt claims to equity. The tool can be used to recapitalise an institution that is failing or about to fail.
Cross border resolution: This will be done through measures that will require enhanced cooperation between national authorities and creation of incentives for applying a group approach in all phases of preparation, recovery and resolution.
Resolution colleges will be established with clearly designated leadership and with the participation of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The EBA will facilitate cooperation of authorities and mediate if necessary.
Relations with third countries: Because many Union institutions and banking groups are active in third countries, an effective framework for resolution needs to provide for cooperation with third country authorities .
The proposal provides Union authorities with the necessary powers to support foreign resolution actions of a failed foreign bank by giving effect to transfers of its assets and liabilities that are located in or governed by the law of their jurisdiction. However, such support would only be provided if the foreign action ensured fair and equal treatment for local depositors and creditors and did not jeopardise financial stability in the Member State.
Resolution funding: the proposal establishes funding arrangements financed by institutions themselves in order to minimize taxpayer's exposure to losses from solvency support. It provides for the setting up of financing arrangements in each Member State.
The proposal lays down the rules on the contributions to the financing arrangements, and involves a mix of ex ante contributions , supplemented by ex post contributions and, where indispensable, borrowing facilities from financial institutions or the central bank. In order to ensure that some funds are available at all times, and given the pro-cyclicality associated with ex post funding, a minimum target fund level is set, to be reached through ex ante contributions in a time span of 10 years. Based on model-calculation, an optimal minimum target fund level is set at 1% of covered deposits.
The proposal also deals with the role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in the resolution framework. DGS may be called upon to contribute to resolution.
BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: EUR 2,080 millions payment to cover the operational commitment for the period 2013-2015 .
The present proposal would require EBA to (i) develop around 23 technical standards and 5 guidelines (ii) take part in resolution colleges, make decisions in case of disagreement and exercise binding mediation and (iii) provide for recognition of third country resolution proceedings according to Article 85 and conclude non-binding framework cooperation arrangements with third countries according to Article 88. The delivery of technical standards is due 12 months after the entry into force of the Directive which is estimated to be between June and December 2013. The proposal of the Commission includes long-term tasks for EBA that will require the establishment of 5 additional posts (temporary agents) as from 2014. In addition, 11 seconded national experts "SNE" are foreseen to carry out temporary tasks limited to 2014 and 2015 years.
DELEGATED ACTS: the proposal contains provisions empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Documents
- Follow-up document: COM(2019)0213
- Follow-up document: EUR-Lex
- Follow-up document: COM(2017)0661
- Follow-up document: EUR-Lex
- For information: EUR-Lex
- For information: SWD(2017)0111
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2014)471
- Final act published in Official Journal: Directive 2014/59
- Final act published in Official Journal: OJ L 173 12.06.2014, p. 0190
- Draft final act: 00014/2014/LEX
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T7-0354/2014
- Debate in Council: 3290
- Debate in Council: 3271
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A7-0196/2013
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading: A7-0196/2013
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Debate in Council: 3238
- Committee opinion: PE502.043
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.084
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.083
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.085
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.086
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.091
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES1533/2012
- Committee opinion: PE498.085
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2013/0099
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: OJ C 039 12.02.2013, p. 0001
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Committee draft report: PE497.897
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Debate in Council: 3181
- Legislative proposal: COM(2012)0280
- Legislative proposal: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2012)0166
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2012)0167
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2012)0280
- Legislative proposal published: EUR-Lex
- Legislative proposal: COM(2012)0280 EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2012)0166
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2012)0167
- Committee draft report: PE497.897
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2013/0099 OJ C 039 12.02.2013, p. 0001
- Committee opinion: PE498.085
- Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES1533/2012
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.083
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.085
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.086
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.091
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE502.084
- Committee opinion: PE502.043
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A7-0196/2013
- Draft final act: 00014/2014/LEX
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2014)471
- For information: EUR-Lex SWD(2017)0111
- Follow-up document: COM(2017)0661 EUR-Lex
- Follow-up document: COM(2019)0213 EUR-Lex
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
- Contribution: COM(2012)0280
Activities
- Vicky FORD
- Roger HELMER
- Gunnar HÖKMARK
- Peter SIMON
- Roberta ANGELILLI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Burkhard BALZ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Pervenche BERÈS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Zuzana BRZOBOHATÁ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Nikolaos CHOUNTIS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Leonardo DOMENICI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Elisa FERREIRA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Diogo FEIO
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Jean-Paul GAUZÈS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Jürgen KLUTE
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Wolf KLINZ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Werner LANGEN
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Vladimír MAŇKA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Claudio MORGANTI
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Antigoni PAPADOPOULOU
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Jaroslav PAŠKA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Andrej PLENKOVIĆ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Anni PODIMATA
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Phil PRENDERGAST
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Mitro REPO
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Nikolaos SALAVRAKOS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Antolín SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Olle SCHMIDT
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Ivo STREJČEK
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Marianne THYSSEN
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Alejo VIDAL-QUADRAS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Nikola VULJANIĆ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Josef WEIDENHOLZER
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Corien WORTMANN-KOOL
Plenary Speeches (1)
Votes
A7-0196/2013 - Gunnar Hökmark - Résolution législative #
Amendments | Dossier |
1550 |
2012/0150(COD)
2012/11/19
BUDG
2 amendments...
Amendment 4 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 15 a (new) (15a) The expenditure of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA) relating to their tasks should be covered by levying fees on credit institutions. The amount of fee levied on a credit institution should be proportionate to the importance and risk profile of the credit institution concerned. These fees should be levied in addition to any fees paid to the Authorities in the cases specified in the relevant instruments of Union law. The overall amount of fees paid to the Authorities should not exceed their expenditure.
Amendment 5 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 15 b (new) (15b) In a transition period from national co-financing to partial financing from fees, the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA) should be fully financed from EU budget.
source: PE-500.556
2012/12/20
ECON
1308 amendments...
Amendment 1000 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point e Amendment 1001 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) the separation of the valuations under articles 30 and 66.
Amendment 1002 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1003 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1004 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the necessary powers to apply the resolution tools, according to the resolution plan where appropriate, to an institution, a financial institution or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1 that meets the applicable conditions for resolution.
Amendment 1005 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new) (d a) other resolution tools.
Amendment 1006 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 4 4. Resolution authorities may apply the asset separation tool and the bail-in tool only in conjunction with another resolution tool an in accordance with Article 31 (3) and (4).
Amendment 1007 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1008 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 7 7. Member States shall not be prevented
Amendment 1009 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 7 7. Member States shall not be prevented from conferring upon resolution authorities additional powers exercisable where an institution meets the conditions for resolution, provided that those additional powers do not pose obstacles to effective group resolution and that they are consistent with the resolution objectives and the general principles governing resolution set out in Articles 26 and 29. Member States shall introduce such additional powers only once they have notified them to the European Commission. If these measures do not constitute an obstacle to effective group resolution, the European Commission shall grant its approval within 3 months upon notification.
Amendment 1010 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 7 a (new) Using State resources for mandatory recapitalisation of an institution that meets the conditions for resolution shall be limited to exceptional circumstances and only if it fully satisfies the resolution objectives in Article 26(2)(b) and the abovementioned conditions.
Amendment 1011 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. Any additional powers may be used only where the Member State has determined the existence of a systemic crisis and one of the following conditions is met: (a) the competent ministry, in consultation with the resolution authority and competent authority, determine that the application of the resolution tools in paragraph 2 of this Article would not be likely to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability; or the competent ministry determines that the application of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest where extraordinary public support or extraordinary liquidity assistance from the central bank has previously been given to the institution.
Amendment 1012 #
Proposal for a directive Article 31 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. Member States shall ensure that resolution tools shall only be used to recapitalise, restructure, transfer or wind down an institution with the aim of maintaining systemic stability and protecting critical functions without exposing taxpayers to losses.
Amendment 1013 #
Proposal for a directive Article 32 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Where
Amendment 1014 #
Proposal for a directive Article 32 – paragraph 9 9. Transfers made by virtue of the sale of business tool which involves the transfer of some, but not all, of the assets, rights or liabilities of an institution shall be subject to the safeguards for partial property transfers specified in Chapter VI.
Amendment 1015 #
Proposal for a directive Article 32 – paragraph 10 10. For the purposes of exercising the rights to provide services or to establish itself in another Member State in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2004/39/EC, the purchaser shall be considered to be a continuation of the institution under resolution, and may continue to exercise any such right that was exercised by the institution under resolution in respect of the assets, rights or liabilities transferred
Amendment 1016 #
Proposal for a directive Article 32 – paragraph 10 a (new) 10 a. Member States shall ensure that the purchaser referred to in paragraph 1 may continue to exercise the rights of membership and access to payment, clearing and settlement systems of the institution under resolution, provided that it meets the regulatory criteria for participation in such systems.
Amendment 1017 #
Proposal for a directive Article 32 – paragraph 11 11. Shareholders
Amendment 1018 #
Proposal for a directive Article 33 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) it shall be as transparent as possible and not result in a misrepresentation, having regard to the circumstances and in particular the need to maintain financial
Amendment 1019 #
Proposal for a directive Article 33 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point f (f) it shall aim at maximising, as far as possible, the sale price for the assets and liabilities involved but it shall not misrepresent them.
Amendment 1020 #
Proposal for a directive Article 33 – paragraph 3 – point b a (new) (b a) There is full consideration given to single market requirements and steps are taken to redress any detrimental effects on competition in the longer term.
Amendment 1021 #
Proposal for a directive Article 33 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1022 #
Proposal for a directive Article 33 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1023 #
Proposal for a directive Article 33 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1024 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Except where the bail-in tool is applied for the purpose specified in point (b) of Article 37(2), for the purposes of the bridge institution tool a bridge institution shall be a legal entity that is
Amendment 1025 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Except where the bail-in tool is applied for the purpose specified in point (b) of Article 37(2), for the purposes of the bridge institution tool a bridge institution shall be a legal entity that is
Amendment 1026 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 3 3. When applying the bridge institution tool, a resolution authority shall ensure that the total value of liabilities transferred to the bridge institution does not exceed 80% of a prudent assessment of the total value of the rights and assets transferred from the institution under resolution
Amendment 1027 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 5 – point c (c) transfer rights, assets or liabilities from the bridge institution to a third party, without prejudice to the criteria established in paragraph 3.
Amendment 1028 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) After such a transfer, the total value of liabilities remaining in the bridge institution will not exceed 80% of a prudent assessment of the total value of its remaining rights and assets.
Amendment 1029 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 7 7. Transfers made by virtue of the bridge institution tool which involves the transfer of some, but not all, of the assets, rights or liabilities of an institution shall be subject to the safeguards for partial property transfers specified in Chapter
Amendment 1030 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 8 8. For the purposes of exercising the rights to provide services or to establish itself in another Member State in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2004/39/EC, a bridge institution shall be considered to be a continuation of the institution under resolution, and may continue to exercise any such right that was
Amendment 1031 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 8 a (new) 8 a. Member States shall ensure that the bridge institution may continue to exercise the rights of membership and access to payment, clearing and settlement systems of the institution under resolution, provided that it meets the regulatory criteria for participation in such systems.
Amendment 1032 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 9 9. Shareholders
Amendment 1033 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 9 9. Shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and other third parties
Amendment 1034 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 9 a (new) 9 a. By way of derogation to paragraph 1(c) and (d), the resolution authority may allow the bridge institution to operate temporarily without complying with the requirements of Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2004/39/EC. In these cases, the ability of the bridge institution to expand activities and the operational structure shall be duly limited to avoid that the derogation results in a competitive advantage. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify cases and conditions of the derogation provided for in paragraph 10. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010."
Amendment 1035 #
Proposal for a directive Article 34 – paragraph 9 a (new) 9 a. The objectives of the managers of the bridge institution shall not imply any duty or responsibility to the shareholders of the institution under resolution, and the managers shall have no liability to those shareholders arising from action taken or not taken in discharge or purported discharge of their functions unless the act or omission implies gross negligence or serious misconduct in accordance with national law.
Amendment 1036 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the contents of the bridge institution's
Amendment 1037 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the resolution authority appoints the bridge institution's board of directors, approves the
Amendment 1038 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) the resolution authority approves the strategy and risk profile of the bridge institution;
Amendment 1039 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 1040 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 1 – point c – subparagraph 1a (new) Nevertheless, for a short period of time, a bridge institution could be created and authorized without complying with the minimum capital requirements provisions of Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2004/39/EC when this is necessary to best meet the resolution objectives.
Amendment 1041 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (d a) The bridge institution must not operate in such a way as to distort competition. When establishing a bridge institution, Member States may specify restrictions on its operation in terms of: (i) market share in certain products; (ii) advertising; (iii) rates, fees and terms of business.
Amendment 1042 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) the assumption of all or substantially all of its assets, rights or liabilities by a
Amendment 1043 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 When seeking to sell the bridge institution or its assets or liabilities, Member States shall ensure that the institution or the relevant assets or liabilities are marketed openly and transparently, and that the sale
Amendment 1044 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 6 – introductory part 6. The resolution authority may extend the period referred to in paragraph 5 for
Amendment 1045 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 6 – point a (a) such extension is
Amendment 1046 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2 Any proceeds generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the bridge institutions as specified in paragraph 3 shall benefit the institution under resolution. If by virtue of unexpected events, the operation of the bridge institutions should result in losses those should be borne by the institution under resolution.
Amendment 1047 #
Proposal for a directive Article 35 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 3 Member States
Amendment 1048 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of the asset separation tool, an asset management vehicle shall be a legal entity that is
Amendment 1049 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of the asset separation tool, an asset management vehicle shall be a legal entity that is
Amendment 1050 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 8 8. Transfers between the institution under resolution and the asset management vehicle shall be subject to the safeguards for partial property transfers specified in
Amendment 1051 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 9 9. Shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution and other third parties
Amendment 1052 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 11 11. EBA shall develop
Amendment 1053 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 12 Amendment 1054 #
Proposal for a directive Article 36 – paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 1055 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions in respect of which a resolution authority has ordered a bail-in also have the option of using other suitable, similarly effective tools for recapitalisation.
Amendment 1056 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. Member States shall ensure that before resolution authorities may apply the bail-in tool
Amendment 1057 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may apply the bail-in tool
Amendment 1058 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may apply the bail-in tool
Amendment 1059 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 2 – point a Amendment 1060 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 2 – point a Amendment 1061 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 2 – point b Amendment 1062 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 1063 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may apply the bail-in tool for the purpose referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2 only if there is a realistic prospect that the application of that tool, in conjunction with measures implemented in accordance with the business reorganisation plan required by Article 47 will,
Amendment 1064 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may apply the bail-in tool
Amendment 1065 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that
Amendment 1066 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1a (new) Only after Member States have evaluated the resolution tools referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of subparagraph 2 of Article 31, and the aforementioned evaluation of each one, or of a combination of these, reveals they are insufficient to restore the viability of an institution, shall resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool for the purposes referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 37.
Amendment 1067 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1068 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1069 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1070 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1071 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. The resolution authorities shall apply bail-in after having proceeded to an evaluation of the institution that led to the conclusion that no other alternative resolution tools would be enough to achieve the resolution objectives, either when applied per se, or in conjunction.
Amendment 1072 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Where, for reasons of legal form or public-service mission, effective conversion to equity is not possible, Member States shall ensure that suitable alternative recapitalisation tools are used.
Amendment 1073 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 a (new) Amendment 1074 #
Proposal for a directive Article 37 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool as a last resort measure, in accordance with the resolution objectives specified in Article 26 (2), with a particular view on avoiding unnecessary destruction of value and on minimising losses for creditors.
Amendment 1075 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the bail- in tool
Amendment 1077 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a Amendment 1078 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) deposits
Amendment 1079 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) all deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC;
Amendment 1080 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a)
Amendment 1081 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) all deposits
Amendment 1082 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) all deposits
Amendment 1083 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC to the extent that they are covered by a DGS which is not excluded;
Amendment 1084 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b Amendment 1085 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) secured liabilities, such as all liabilities that are issued in a covered bond cover pool and related derivatives which have privileged status in the cover pool;
Amendment 1086 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) secured liabilities, such as covered bonds in a covered pool or register;
Amendment 1087 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) secured liabilities, including covered bonds as defined in Article 52(4) of Council Directive 2009/65/EEC.
Amendment 1088 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) covered bonds as defined in Article 22(4) of Council Directive 86/611/EEC,
Amendment 1089 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) liabilities that are guaranteed by an institutional protection scheme meeting the requirement of art. 108(7) CRR;
Amendment 1090 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) liabilities that are guaranteed by an institutional protection scheme meeting the requirement of Article 108(7) CRR;
Amendment 1091 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) liabilities that are guaranteed by an institutional protection scheme meeting the requirement of Art. 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC;
Amendment 1092 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1093 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1094 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1095 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1096 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1097 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1098 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d Amendment 1099 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) liabilities with an original maturity of less than
Amendment 1100 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) all other liabilities with an original maturity of less than one month;
Amendment 1101 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d)
Amendment 1102 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) liabilities of an institution subject to resolution action in accordance with Article 27(1) with an original maturity of less than one month;
Amendment 1103 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) liabilities with an original maturity of less than
Amendment 1104 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) liabilities arising from interbank money-market operations with an original maturity of less than one month;
Amendment 1105 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) interbank money-market liabilities with an original maturity of less than one month;
Amendment 1106 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) liabilities with an original maturity of
Amendment 1107 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d a (new) (d a) derivatives of all maturities;
Amendment 1108 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) derivatives that do not fall within the scope of point (d) this paragraph, until delegated acts provided for in paragraph 4 are adopted.
Amendment 1109 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) arising from positions in derivatives in case the underlying assets are held by the institution and have been excluded from bail-in;
Amendment 1110 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) liabilities issued before the date of transposition of this Directive;
Amendment 1111 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) liabilities arising from derivatives which were entered by the institution to hedge risks;
Amendment 1112 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e b (new) (e b) liabilities towards Deposit Guarantee Schemes.
Amendment 1113 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e b (new) (e b) derivatives that have been contractualised between institutions that do not have a Credit Support Annex agreement;
Amendment 1114 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e c (new) (e c) deposit guarantee schemes;
Amendment 1115 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e – point i (i) an employee, in relation to accrued salary, pension benefits or other fixed remuneration,
Amendment 1116 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e – point iii (iii) tax and social security authorities
Amendment 1117 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1118 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any part of a secured liability or a liability for which collateral has been pledged that exceeds the value of the assets, pledge, lien or collateral against which it is secured. Member States
Amendment 1119 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any part of a secured liability or a liability for which collateral has been pledged that exceeds the value of the assets, pledge, lien or collateral against which it is secured.
Amendment 1120 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Point
Amendment 1121 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Point
Amendment 1122 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new) Point (ba) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a liability that exceeds the coverage of the IPS.
Amendment 1123 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new) Point (ba) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a liability that exceeds the coverage of the IPS.
Amendment 1124 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1125 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3a (new) Point (ba) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a liability that exceeds the coverage of the IPS.
Amendment 1126 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new) Point (ba) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a liability that exceeds the coverage of the IPS.
Amendment 1127 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 2 a (new) Amendment 1128 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1129 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1130 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1131 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1132 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 3. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude liabilities from the application of the write-down and conversion powers
Amendment 1133 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 3. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude from the application of the write-down and conversion powers liabilities arising from derivatives that do not fall within the scope of point (d) of paragraph 2, if that exclusion is necessary or appropriate to achieve the objectives specified in points (a) and (b) of Article 26(2). Resolution authorities shall ensure that, without prejudice to those objectives and taking into account paragraph 4 point (b) point (ii) of this Article, derivative contracts cleared through a central counterparty shall be treated as senior to those that are not.
Amendment 1134 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 3. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude from the application of the write-down and conversion powers liabilities arising from
Amendment 1135 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 3. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude from the application of the write-down and conversion powers liabilities arising from
Amendment 1136 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 3 3. Until the implementing technical standards in paragraph 4 of this Article are adopted the following provision shall apply. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they
Amendment 1137 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1138 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1139 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1140 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1141 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4.
Amendment 1142 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. The Commission shall within five years of the entry into force of this Directive conduct a review of the feasibility of including liabilities arising from derivatives in the scope of this Article. On the basis of that review, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts adopted in accordance with Article 103 in order to specify further:
Amendment 1143 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. The bail-in toll shall not be applied to the liabilities of an institution issued before the entry into force of this directive.
Amendment 1144 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 – point a Amendment 1145 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 – point a Amendment 1146 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 – paragraph 4 – point b a (new) (b a) EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards submitted by EBA in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1147 #
Proposal for a directive Article 38 a (new) Article 38 a Restrictions on holdings of bail-in liabilities 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities prevent other credit institutions from holding bail-in tools as defined in Article 2 (49) of this Directive.
Amendment 1149 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities
Amendment 1150 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution that do not qualify as own funds under Section 1 of Chapter 2 of Title V of Directive 2006/48/EC or
Amendment 1151 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the
Amendment 1152 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) The sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities shall be determined by competent authorities after consultation with resolution authorities for each institution individually and be expressed in resolution plans provided for in Articles 9 and 11.
Amendment 1153 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the
Amendment 1154 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities
Amendment 1155 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities
Amendment 1156 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions
Amendment 1157 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions, in the light of their risk exposure, maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities
Amendment 1158 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the
Amendment 1159 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentages of
Amendment 1160 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that the institutions maintain, at all times, a
Amendment 1161 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the assessment of the criteria on how to determinate for each institution the sufficient aggregate amount referred to in the previous paragraph. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1162 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 2 – point e (e) the instruments have a
Amendment 1163 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 2 – point e (e) the instruments have a
Amendment 1164 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 2 – point e a (new) (e a) EBA shall define a separate class of eligible liabilities referred to in paragraph 1. In this case the resolution authorities will exercise the write down and conversion powers first to these liabilities. The resolution authorities will exercise the write down and conversion powers only to other liabilities in case the write down and conversion of this separate class of eligible liabilities is not sufficient to fully fulfil the requirements as defined in Article 37, paragraph 2.
Amendment 1165 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1166 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The
Amendment 1167 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The minimum aggregate amount pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be determined on the basis of at least the following criteria:
Amendment 1168 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The
Amendment 1169 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The
Amendment 1170 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The minimum aggregate amount pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be determined by the resolution authority within six months from the entry into force of this Directive on the basis of the following criteria:
Amendment 1171 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The minimum aggregate amount pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be determined
Amendment 1172 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point a a (new) (a a) the degree to which the institution holds eligible capital beyond the legal minimum requirement;
Amendment 1173 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) the size, the
Amendment 1174 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d Amendment 1175 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d Amendment 1176 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d (d) the
Amendment 1177 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d (d) the
Amendment 1178 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d (d) the
Amendment 1179 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d a (new) (d a) the membership in a risk mitigating solidarity system, which aims at the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the resolution of the European Parliament of 16 February 2012 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast).
Amendment 1180 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point e – point 1 (new) 1) if indicated by application of the criteria (a)-(e), or if application of the bail-in tool would be likely to violate the 'no creditor worse off' principle or is contrary to the overall objective of this directive, Member States may set the requirement for bail-in eligible liabilities at zero for the institutions in question.
Amendment 1181 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1a (new) Member States may specify additional criteria to which the relevant authority must have regard in determining the minimum aggregate amount.
Amendment 1182 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. No later than five years after entry into force of this Directive, systemic institutions determined in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC shall maintain an additional minimum amount of instruments that satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph 2 ("targeted bail-in instruments"). This amount shall be equal to 5% of all assets but lowered proportionately if the systemic risk buffer applicable to the institution exceeds 1%.
Amendment 1183 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution authorities shall require and verify that institutions maintain the aggregate amount provided for in paragraph 1, and take any decision pursuant to paragraph 4 in the course of developing and maintaining resolution plans.
Amendment 1184 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 1185 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6. Resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the
Amendment 1186 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6. Resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the
Amendment 1187 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6. Resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the minimum amount they have determined for each institution under their jurisdiction
Amendment 1188 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6. Resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the minimum amount they have determined for each institution under their jurisdiction. EBA shall assess the impact on institutions and report to the Commission by 1 January 2018 at the latest on the implementation of the requirement under paragraph 1. In particular EBA shall report to the Commission whether there are divergences regarding the implementation at national level of that requirement.
Amendment 1189 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6. Resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the minimum amount they have determined for each institution under their jurisdiction. EBA shall assess whether the minimum amount is deemed to be sufficient to fully absorb losses at the point of non-viability of the issuing institution and report to the Commission by 1 January 2018 at the latest
Amendment 1190 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 1191 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 6 6. Resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the minimum amount they have
Amendment 1192 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1193 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1194 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1195 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 7 7. The Commission shall, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 103, adopt measures to specify the criteria provided for in points (a) to (e) of paragraph 3 with possible references to different categories of institutions
Amendment 1196 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 7 7. The Commission shall, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 103, adopt measures to specify the criteria provided for in points (a) to (e) of paragraph 3 with possible references to different categories of institutions
Amendment 1197 #
Proposal for a directive Article 39 – paragraph 7 7. The Commission shall, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 103, adopt measures to specify the criteria provided for in points (a) to (e) of paragraph 3 with possible references to different categories of institutions
Amendment 1200 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Resolution authorities
Amendment 1201 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Resolution authorities may choose to apply the
Amendment 1202 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Resolution authorities may choose to apply the minimum requirement established in Article 39(1)
Amendment 1203 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the
Amendment 1204 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the
Amendment 1205 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the percentage referred to in Article 39(1) is calculated on the basis of the consolidated level of the eligible liabilities, the risk weighted assets and of the own funds held by the group;
Amendment 1206 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) each institution, which is a subsidiary, shall comply with the
Amendment 1207 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 2 2. When making a decision in accordance with paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall take into account the way in which the group structures its operations and in particular the extent to which funding,
Amendment 1208 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities shall take the decision to apply the minimum requirement also on a consolidated basis pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in the course of developing and maintaining resolution plans pursuant to Article 9 of this Directive. For groups subject to consolidated supervision in accordance with Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC, resolution authorities shall take the decision to apply the minimum requirement on a consolidated basis in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 12 of this Directive.
Amendment 1209 #
Proposal for a directive Article 40 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities shall take the decision to apply the
Amendment 1210 #
Proposal for a directive Article 41 – paragraph 2 2. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool for the purpose referred to in point (a) of Article 37(2), the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall establish the amount by which eligible liabilities need to be reduced in order to restore the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the institution under resolution and the amount that the resolution authority considers necessary to sustain sufficient market confidence in the institution and enable it to continue to comply with the conditions for authorisation and to carry on the activities for which is authorised under Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2004/39/EC. Where resolution authorities also intend to use the bridge institution tool in accordance with Article 34 or the asset separation tool in accordance with Article 36, the amount by which eligible liabilities need to be reduced shall take account a prudent estimate of the capital needs of the bridge institution and the asset management vehicle as appropriate.
Amendment 1211 #
Proposal for a directive Article 41 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Where capital has been written down in accordance with Articles 51-55 and bail-in has been applied pursuant to article 37(2)(a) and the level of write- down based on the preliminary valuation per article 30 is found to exceed requirements when assessed against the definitive valuation per article 30(5), then a write-up mechanism should be applied to reimburse creditors and then shareholders to the extent necessary.
Amendment 1212 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Member States shall ensure that, when applying the bail-in tool, resolution
Amendment 1213 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 1214 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 1215 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 1216 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The action
Amendment 1217 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1218 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 3 3. When considering which action to take in accordance with paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall have regard to the likely amount of losses relative to assets before the exercise of the bail-in tool, with a view to ensuring that the action taken in respect of shareholders is consistent with that reduction in equity value
Amendment 1219 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1220 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 5 Amendment 1221 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 5 5. EBA shall develop guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on the circumstances in which each of the actions referred to in paragraph 1 would be appropriate, having regard to the factors specified in paragraph
Amendment 1222 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 6 Amendment 1223 #
Proposal for a directive Article 42 – paragraph 6 6. The Commission, taking into account, where appropriate, the experience acquired in the application of EBA guidelines, may adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 aimed at specifying the circumstances in which each of the actions mentioned in paragraph 1 would be appropriate, having regard to the factors specified in paragraph
Amendment 1224 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) if, and only if, the writing down pursuant to point (a) is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce to zero the principal amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments that are liabilities
Amendment 1225 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) if, and only if, the writing down pursuant to point (a) is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce to zero the principal amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments that are liabilities and Tier 2 instruments in accordance with sub- section 2, in conjunction with the write down pursuant to point (a) to produce the aggregate amount;
Amendment 1226 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) if, and only if, the writing down pursuant to point (b) is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce to zero the principal amount of Tier 2 instruments in accordance with subsection 2;
Amendment 1227 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) if, and only if, the total reduction of liabilities pursuant to points (a), (b) and (ba) is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce the principal amount of subordinated debt that is not Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital to the extent required, in conjunction with the write down pursuant to points (a), (b) and (ba) to produce the aggregate amount;
Amendment 1228 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) if, and only if, the total reduction of liabilities pursuant to points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, the rest of eligible liabilities, pursuant to Article 38, that are senior debt to the extent required, in conjunction with the write down pursuant to points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph to produce the aggregate amount. At this point the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated ranks pari passu with senior debt and is liable, up to the amount of covered deposits, for the amount of losses it would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings and for the purpose of recapitalization through the exercise of conversion powers by resolution authorities for the amount that covered deposits would have had to bear if they had not been excluded from the bail- in tool.
Amendment 1229 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) if, and only if, the total reduction of liabilities pursuant to points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, the rest of eligible liabilities, pursuant to Article 38, that are senior debt to the extent required, in conjunction with
Amendment 1230 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) if, and only if, the total reduction of liabilities pursuant to points (a), (b), (ba) or (c) of this paragraph is less than the aggregate amount, authorities reduce the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, the rest of eligible liabilities, pursuant to Article 38, that are senior debt to the extent required, in conjunction with the write down pursuant to points (a), (b), (ba) or (c) of this paragraph to produce the aggregate amount.
Amendment 1231 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) if, and only if, the total reduction of liabilities pursuant to points (a), (b)
Amendment 1232 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 2 2. When applying the write down and conversion powers in compliance with points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall allocate the losses represented by the aggregate amount equally between liabilities of the same rank by reducing the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, those liabilities to the same extent pro rata to their value. Resolution authorities shall be entitled to allocate losses in a manner that does not result in the equal treatment of creditors of the same class to the extent the rationale for doing so is justifiable on the grounds of public interest or to maximise the value for the benefit of all creditors as a whole.
Amendment 1233 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 2 2. When applying the write down and conversion powers in compliance with points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall allocate the losses represented by the aggregate amount equally between liabilities of the same rank by reducing the principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in respect of, those liabilities to the same extent pro rata to their value, unless departure from equal treatment is necessary for financial stability reasons, or to minimise overall losses for the benefit of creditors as a whole.
Amendment 1234 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. Resolution authorities shall reduce the principal amount of the instrument or convert it in accordance with those terms referred to in points (b), (ba), or (c) of paragraph 1 before exercising the write- down and conversion powers to the liabilities referred to in points (d) of paragraph 1 and when those terms have not taken effect where an institution has issued instruments, other than those referred to in point (b) o
Amendment 1235 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. When deciding on whether liabilities shall be written down or be converted to equity, resolution authorities may respect the terms agreed in the issuance.
Amendment 1236 #
Proposal for a directive Article 43 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. For the purposes of this article EBA shall provide guidelines for any interpretation relating to cross-over and with interactions with CRD and CRR [Insert Regulation and Directive XX]. EBA shall also provide guidelines for a clear hierarchy of claims and for ensuring these are not excessively layered or complex.
Amendment 1237 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 Amendment 1238 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. The liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 shall be those resulting from the close out of the derivative positions concerned;
Amendment 1239 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop
Amendment 1240 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1241 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1242 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with ESMA, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying methodologies and the principles referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 on the valuation of liabilities arising from derivatives.:
Amendment 1243 #
Proposal for a directive Article 44 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1244 #
Proposal for a directive Article 45 – paragraph 3 3. The conversion rate applicable to senior liabilities, and to the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated, shall be higher than the
Amendment 1245 #
Proposal for a directive Article 45 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop
Amendment 1246 #
Proposal for a directive Article 45 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 a (new) The Commission, taking into account, where appropriate, the experience acquired in the application of EBA guidelines, shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 aimed at specifying how affected creditors may be appropriately compensated by means of the conversion rate, and the relative conversion rates that might be appropriate to reflect the priority of senior liabilities under applicable insolvency law.
Amendment 1247 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 1 Amendment 1248 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall require that, within
Amendment 1249 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 2 Amendment 1250 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 1251 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 A business reorganisation plan shall set out measures aimed at restoring the long term viability of the institution or parts of its business within a reasonable timescale
Amendment 1252 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1253 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 The business reorganisation plan shall take account, inter alia, of the current state and future prospects of the financial markets, reflecting realistic best-case and worst- case assumptions. Stress-testing shall consider a ranged of scenarios, including a combination of events of stress and a protracted global recession. Assumptions shall be compared with appropriate sector- wide benchmarks.
Amendment 1254 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1255 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1256 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 4 – point d a (new) (d a) changes to the operational systems and infrastructure within the institution
Amendment 1257 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 5 Amendment 1258 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 6 Amendment 1259 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1260 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 8 Amendment 1261 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 9 Amendment 1262 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 10 Amendment 1263 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1264 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) the minimum objectives the resolution authority should consider fulfilled pursuant to paragraph 5; and
Amendment 1265 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1266 #
Proposal for a directive Article 47 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1267 #
Proposal for a directive Article 49 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall, in appropriate cases, require institutions to maintain at all times sufficient authorised share capital so that, in the event that the resolution authority exercised the powers referred to in points (f), (g) and (h) of Article 56(1) in relation to an institution or its subsidiaries, the institution is not
Amendment 1268 #
Proposal for a directive Article 49 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall, in appropriate cases, require individual institutions to maintain at all times sufficient authorised share capital so that, in the event that the resolution authority exercised the powers referred to in points (f), (g) and (h) of Article 56(1) in relation to an institution or its subsidiaries, the institution is not be prevented from issuing sufficient new shares or instruments of ownership to ensure that the conversion of liabilities into ordinary shares or other instruments of ownership could be carried out effectively.
Amendment 1269 #
Proposal for a directive Article 49 – paragraph 3 3. Member States shall
Amendment 1270 #
Proposal for a directive Article 49 – paragraph 4 4. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the amendments to Directives 77/91/EEC, 82/891/EEC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EU set out in Title
Amendment 1271 #
Proposal for a directive Article 50 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall require institutions to include in the contractual provisions governing any eligible liability, Additional Tier 1 instrument or Tier 2 instrument that is governed by the law of a jurisdiction that is not a Member State a term by which the creditor or party to the agreement creating the liability recognises that the liability may be subject to the write down
Amendment 1272 #
Proposal for a directive Article 50 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1273 #
Proposal for a directive Article 50 a (new) Amendment 1274 #
Proposal for a directive Article 50 a (new) Amendment 1275 #
Proposal for a directive Article 51 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Resolution authorities may only apply the bail-in tool after having proceeded to an evaluation of the situation and of the institution that led to the conclusion that no other alternative resolution tools are enough to achieve the resolution objectives, either when applied per se or in conjunction. Member States shall require that before any resolution action is taken, resolution authorities exercise the write down power, in accordance with the provisions of Article 52 and without delay, in relation to relevant capital instruments issued by an institution when one or more of the following circumstances apply:
Amendment 1276 #
Proposal for a directive Article 51 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the appropriate authority determines that the institution would otherwise meet
Amendment 1277 #
Proposal for a directive Article 51 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 1278 #
Proposal for a directive Article 51 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 1279 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) the principal amount of relevant capital instruments is reduced to
Amendment 1280 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) the principal amount of relevant capital instruments is reduced to
Amendment 1281 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) the principal amount of relevant capital instruments is reduced to zero or to the extent necessary to absorb the loss;
Amendment 1282 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c (c) the reduction to zero of that principal amount is permanent. However a temporary write down should be possible for institutions not able to convert to equity if the institution is recapitalized according to art. 37(2)(a);
Amendment 1283 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c (c) the reduction
Amendment 1284 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e (e) no compensation is paid to any holder of the relevant capital instruments other than in accordance with paragraph
Amendment 1285 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) the conversion rate that determines the number of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments that are provided in respect of each relevant capital instrument complies with the principles set out in Article 45 and any guidelines developed by EBA pursuant to Article 45(
Amendment 1286 #
Proposal for a directive Article 52 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1287 #
Proposal for a directive Article 53 – paragraph 1 – introductory part Provided that
Amendment 1288 #
Proposal for a directive Article 53 – paragraph 1 – point c (c)
Amendment 1289 #
Proposal for a directive Article 55 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. When making a determination referred to in points (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Article 51(1) in the case of the resolution of an institution or of a group with cross- border activity, the appropriate authorities shall take into account the potential impact of the resolution in all the Member States where the institution or the group operate.
Amendment 1290 #
Proposal for a directive Article 56 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authorities have all the powers necessary to apply the resolution tools, according to the resolution plan where appropriate. In particular, the resolution authorities shall have the following resolution powers, which they shall be able to exercise singly or in conjunction, being the effective use of these powers subject to proper justification:
Amendment 1291 #
Proposal for a directive Article 56 – paragraph 1 – point i (i) the power to cancel debt instrument
Amendment 1292 #
Proposal for a directive Article 56 – paragraph 1 – point j Amendment 1293 #
Proposal for a directive Article 56 – paragraph 1 – point m (m) the power to amend or alter the maturity of debt instruments issued by an institution under resolution or amend the amount of interest payable under such instruments, including by suspending payment for a temporary period except for secured liabilities;
Amendment 1294 #
Proposal for a directive Article 57 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) provide for the relevant transfer to take effect free from any liability or encumbrance affecting the financial instruments, rights, assets or liabilities
Amendment 1295 #
Proposal for a directive Article 57 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 1296 #
Proposal for a directive Article 57 a (new) Amendment 1297 #
Proposal for a directive Article 58 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1298 #
Proposal for a directive Article 58 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1299 #
Proposal for a directive Article 58 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1300 #
Proposal for a directive Article 59 – paragraph 1 Amendment 1301 #
Proposal for a directive Article 59 – paragraph 6 – point c (c) the safeguards for partial transfers, as referred to in Chapter VI, in relation to assets, rights or liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 that are located in its territory or governed by the law of its territory.
Amendment 1302 #
Proposal for a directive Article 61 – paragraph 2 2. Any suspension under paragraph 1 shall not apply to: (a) eligible deposits within the meaning of Directive 94/19/EC; (b) payment and delivery obligations owed to systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, central counterparties, and central banks.
Amendment 1303 #
Proposal for a directive Article 61 – paragraph 2 2. Any suspension under paragraph 1 shall not apply to
Amendment 1304 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 2 Amendment 1305 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 3 3. A person may exercise a termination right under a financial contract before the end of the period referred to in paragraph 1 if that person receives notice from the resolution authority that the rights and liabilities covered by the netting arrangement shall not be either (a) transferred to another entity or (b) remain with the institution under resolution upon which the resolution authority will be applying the bail in tool in accordance with Article 37(2) (a).
Amendment 1306 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1307 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. Termination rights may be exercised upon expiry of the stay if there is a subsequent event of default (e.g. purchaser or bridge institution defaults), or earlier if a counterparty is notified that their contract has not been transferred or will not be kept in the bailed in institution per Article 63(3).
Amendment 1308 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the following elements for the purposes of paragraph
Amendment 1309 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1310 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1311 #
Proposal for a directive Article 63 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1312 #
Proposal for a directive Article 65 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) where resolution authorities transfer only parts of the rights, assets and liabilities of the institution,
Amendment 1313 #
Proposal for a directive Article 65 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool,
Amendment 1314 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 1 For the purposes of Article 65, Member States shall ensure that a valuation is carried out by an independent person after the partial transfers or write down or conversion has been effected. That valuation shall be distinct from the valuation carried out under Article 30
Amendment 1315 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 1 For the purposes of Article 65, Member States shall ensure that a fair and realistic valuation is carried out by an independent person after the partial transfers or write down or conversion has been effected. That valuation shall be distinct from the valuation carried out under Article 30
Amendment 1316 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) the treatment that
Amendment 1317 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) the actual treatment that
Amendment 1318 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. The valuation shall be in accordance with the provisions and the methodology laid down in Article 30(1)
Amendment 1319 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) disregard any provision of extraordinary public support and any other public financial support at supra-national level to the institution.
Amendment 1320 #
Proposal for a directive Article 66 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Member States may specify further assumptions for the purpose of the valuation.
Amendment 1321 #
Proposal for a directive Article 67 – title Safeguard for
Amendment 1322 #
Proposal for a directive Article 67 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that if the evaluation carried out under Article 66 determines that the shareholders and creditors referred to in Article 65
Amendment 1323 #
Proposal for a directive Article 68 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e (e) structured finance arrangements, including securiti
Amendment 1324 #
Proposal for a directive Article 71 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Member States shall ensure that there is appropriate protection for structured finance arrangements, including securitizations and covered bonds and other cover pool liabilities, so as to prevent either of the following:
Amendment 1325 #
Proposal for a directive Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the transfer of some, but not all, of the property, rights and liabilities which constitute or form part of a structured finance arrangement, including securitizations and covered bonds and other cover pool liabilities, to which the credit institution under resolution is a party;
Amendment 1326 #
Proposal for a directive Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the termination or modification through the use of ancillary powers of the property, rights and liabilities which constitute or form part of a structured finance arrangement, including securitizations and covered bonds and other cover pool liabilities, to which the institution under resolution is a party.
Amendment 1327 #
Proposal for a directive Article 71 a (new) Article 71 a Protection corresponding to items 1(a) and 1 (b) above shall also apply in respect of covered bond issuance arrangements.
Amendment 1328 #
Proposal for a directive Article 72 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Member States shall ensure that transfer, cancellation or modification shall not affect the operation of systems and rules of systems covered by Directive 98/26/EC, or other payment and settlement systems backed by financial associations, where a resolution authority:
Amendment 1329 #
Proposal for a directive Article 73 – paragraph 1 Where a resolution authority purports to transfer or transfers all of the property, rights and liabilities of an institution to another entity, but the transfer is or may not be effective in relation to certain property because it is outside the Union, or to certain rights or liabilities because they are under the law of a territory outside the Union, the resolution authority shall not proceed to the transfer or, if it has already ordered the transfer, that transfer shall be void, and all property, rights and liabilities covered by the relevant arrangement specified in Article 69
Amendment 1330 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall require the management body of an institution to notify the competent authority and the resolution authority where they consider that the institution is failing or likely to fail, within the meaning specified in Article 27(2).
Amendment 1331 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 2 2. Competent authorities shall inform the relevant resolution authorities of any measures they require an institution to take under Article 2
Amendment 1332 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point e a (new) (e a) where the institution is an institution as defined in Article 2(b) of Directive 98/26/EC, the Commission, the ECB, the EBA, the ESMA, the EIOPA and the operators of the systems to which it participates;
Amendment 1333 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point e a (new) (e a) where the institution is an institution as defined in Article 2(b) of Directive 98/26/EC, the Commission, the ECB, ESMA, EIOPA, EBA and the operators of the systems to which it participates.
Amendment 1334 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point e b (new) (e b) where the institution is considered systemically important, the ESRB and macro-prudential authorities.
Amendment 1335 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point e b (new) (e b) where the institution is considered systemically important, the ESRB and macro-prudential authorities.
Amendment 1336 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3 The authority or authorities responsible for that decision shall notify the institution in question. A notification pursuant to this paragraph may take the form of the public notification referred to in paragraph 6. If the notification is not made public in accordance with paragraph 6, the management body shall without any delay inform the employees and their representatives about it.
Amendment 1337 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 6 6. Where the resolution authority takes a resolution action, it shall make that action public and shall take reasonable steps to notify all known shareholders and
Amendment 1338 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 7 – introductory part 7. A resolution authority shall publish a notice specifying the terms and period of
Amendment 1339 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1340 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1341 #
Proposal for a directive Article 74 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1342 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1343 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 3 3. The notification referred to in paragraph 2 shall include a copy of any order or instrument by which the relevant powers are exercised and indicate the date from which the
Amendment 1344 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) on the website of the competent authority, if different from the resolution authority,
Amendment 1345 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) on the website of the competent
Amendment 1346 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 5 5. The resolution authority shall ensure that the documents providing proof of the instruments referred to in paragraph 4 are sent to the known shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution, if the latter's shares or instruments of ownership are not admitted to trading on a regulated market.
Amendment 1347 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 5 5. The resolution authority shall ensure that the documents providing proof of the instruments referred to in paragraph 4 are sent to the known shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution, if the latter's share or instruments of ownership are not admitted to trading on a regulated market.
Amendment 1348 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) resolution authorities
Amendment 1349 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) competent ministries; Infringement of confidentiality requirement should be subject to appeal before the court and indemnification;
Amendment 1350 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) employees or former employees of the authorities referred to in points (a), (b) and (
Amendment 1351 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) employees or former employees of the authorities referred to in points (a) and (b), as well as individuals who provide or have provided any service, directly or indirectly, permanently or occasionally, related to the discharge of those authorities' duties;
Amendment 1352 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point e (e) special managers appointed under
Amendment 1353 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new) (i a) employees or former employees of the entities referred to in points (f) to (i), as well as individuals who provide or have provided any service, directly or indirectly, permanently or occasionally, related to the exercise of those entities' activities;
Amendment 1354 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point i b (new) (i b) the management appointed by the resolution authority to a bridge institution, asset management or other resolution vehicle and the employees or former employees of these entities, as well as individuals who provide or have provided any service, directly or indirectly, permanently or occasionally, related to the exercise of those entities' activities;
Amendment 1355 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the generality of the requirements under paragraph 1, the
Amendment 1356 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the generality of the requirements under paragraph 1, the persons referred to in that paragraph shall be prohibited from divulging confidential information received during the course of their professional activities, or from a resolution authority in connection with its functions, to any person or authority unless it is in summary or collective form such that individual institutions cannot be identified or with the express and prior consent of the resolution authority.
Amendment 1357 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the generality of the requirements under paragraph 1, the persons referred to in that paragraph shall be prohibited from divulging confidential information received during the course of their professional activities, or from a resolution authority in connection with its functions, to any person or authority unless it is in summary or collective form such that individual institutions cannot be identified or with the express and prior consent of the resolution authority. This shall apply in particular to the content and details of recovery and resolution plans in accordance with Articles 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and to the results of assessments in accordance with Articles 6, 8 and 13.
Amendment 1358 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 2 - subparagraph 1a (new) This prohibition applies notwithstanding Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 and Member States shall ensure that it applies notwithstanding national legislation concerning freedom of information and access to documents.
Amendment 1359 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. Without prejudice to the generality of the requirements under paragraph 1, the persons referred to in that paragraph shall be prohibited from divulging: (a) the contents and details of recovery and resolution plans provided for in Articles 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11; (b) the results of any assessment carried out under Articles 6, 8 and 13.
Amendment 1360 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. The resolution authority shall be the single entry point for the information mentioned in the first subparagraph and shall be bound by a strict confidentiality agreement. The resolution authority shall then be responsible for ensuring that confidentiality requirements are respected.
Amendment 1361 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 3 3. The confidentiality requirements set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and
Amendment 1362 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 3 3. The confidentiality requirements set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not prevent resolution authorities, including their employees, from sharing information with other Union resolution authorities, competent authorities, central banks, EBA, or, subject to Article
Amendment 1363 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft implementing
Amendment 1364 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft implementing
Amendment 1365 #
Proposal for a directive Article 76 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1366 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The group level resolution authority, the resolution authorities of each Member State in which a subsidiary that is in the view of the home authority material for resolution purposes covered by consolidated supervision is established and EBA shall be members of the resolution college.
Amendment 1367 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The group level resolution authority, the resolution authorities of each Member State in which a subsidiary covered by consolidated supervision is established, the resolution authorities of the Member States where the group institutions have relevant branches and EBA shall be members of the resolution college.
Amendment 1368 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The public bodies participating in the colleges shall cooperate closely. The group level resolution authority shall coordinate all activities of resolution colleges and convene and chair all its meetings. The group level resolution authority shall keep all members of the college and EBA fully informed in advance of the organisation of such meetings, of the main issues to be discussed and of the activities to be considered.
Amendment 1369 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1370 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 4 4. EBA shall contribute to promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of resolution colleges in accordance with international standards. To that end, EBA may participate in particular meetings or particular activities as it deems appropriate, but it shall not have voting rights.
Amendment 1371 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 6 Amendment 1372 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 6 6. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, for the purposes of performing the tasks referred to in point (e) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 the resolution authority or authorities of each Member State in which a subsidiary is established and of each Member State where the group institutions have relevant branches shall participate at the meetings or activities of the resolution college.
Amendment 1373 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 8 8. Group level resolution authorities may not establish resolution colleges if other groups or colleges perform the same functions and carry out the same tasks specified in this Article and comply with all the conditions and procedures established in this Section. In this case all references to resolution colleges in this Directive shall also be understood as reference to those other groups or colleges. Where a Crisis Management Group for an institution has been established in line with the recommendations of the FSB, that Crisis Management Group shall be considered to be the Resolution College for that institution.
Amendment 1374 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 8 8. Group level resolution authorities may not establish resolution colleges if other groups or colleges perform the same functions and carry out the same tasks specified in this Article and comply with all the conditions and procedures established in this Section. In this case all references to resolution colleges in this Directive shall also be understood as reference to those other groups or colleges. Where a Crisis Management Group for an institution has been established in line with the recommendations of the FSB, this Crisis Management Group shall be considered to be the Resolution College for that institution.
Amendment 1375 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft regulatory standards in order to specify the operational functioning of the resolution colleges which are consistent with international standards for the performance of the tasks provided for in paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
Amendment 1376 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 1377 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft regulatory
Amendment 1378 #
Proposal for a directive Article 80 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1379 #
Proposal for a directive Article 81 – paragraph 1 1. Where a third country institution or third country parent undertaking has two or more subsidiary institutions established or two ore more relevant branches providing services in the Union, the resolution authorities of Member States where those domestic subsidiary institutions and relevant branches in the Union are established shall establish a European
Amendment 1380 #
Proposal for a directive Article 81 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Where the domestic subsidiaries are held by or the relevant branches are from a financial holding company established within the Union in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 143(3) of Directive 2006/48/EC, the European resolution college shall be chaired by the resolution authority of the Member State where the consolidating supervisor is located for the purposes of consolidated supervision under that Directive.
Amendment 1381 #
Proposal for a directive Article 82 – paragraph 2 The group resolution authorit
Amendment 1382 #
Proposal for a directive Article 82 – paragraph 2 The group resolution authorit
Amendment 1383 #
Proposal for a directive Article 82 – paragraph 2 The group resolution authorit
Amendment 1384 #
Proposal for a directive Article 82 – paragraph 2 The resolution authorities shall communicate on request of other resolution authority all relevant information. In particular, the group level resolution authority shall provide the resolution authorities in other Member States with all the relevant information in a timely manner in view of facilitating the exercise of the tasks referred to in points (b) to (h ) of the second subparagraph of Article 80(1).
Amendment 1385 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where a resolution authority decides, or is notified pursuant to Article 74(3), that an institution that is a subsidiary in a group is failing
Amendment 1386 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where a resolution authority decides, or is notified pursuant to Article 74(3), that an institution that is a subsidiary in a group is failing or likely to fail, that authority shall notify the following information without delay to the group level resolution authority and consolidating supervisor, if different, and to the resolution authorities that are members of the resolution college for the group in question:
Amendment 1387 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where a group resolution authority or a resolution authority decides, or is notified pursuant to Article 74(3), that an institution that is a subsidiary in a group is
Amendment 1388 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 1389 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 2 2. On receiving a notification under paragraph 1, the group level resolution authority
Amendment 1390 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 2 2. On receiving a notification under paragraph 1, the group level resolution authority
Amendment 1391 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 3 3. If the group level resolution authority
Amendment 1392 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 3 3. If the group level resolution authority
Amendment 1393 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 4 4. If the group level resolution authority
Amendment 1394 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 4 4. If the group level resolution authority, after consultation with the other resolution authorities in accordance with paragraph 2, assesses that the failure of the institution in question, or the resolution action or other measures notified in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1, would have a detrimental impact on the group or on affiliated institutions in other Member States, the group level resolution authority shall, no later than 24 hours after receiving the notification under paragraph 1, propose a non-binding group resolution scheme and submit it to the resolution college.
Amendment 1395 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 5 – point a (a) outline the resolution actions that
Amendment 1396 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 5 – point a a (new) (a a) The group resolution scheme shall avoid having a disproportionate impact on any Member State that is a member of the resolution college. In particular, it should have regard to the continuity of essential services, financial stability and the market share of any subsidiary in its Member State. The group resolution scheme may only deviate from this principal where necessary to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability in the Union.
Amendment 1397 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 5 – point c Amendment 1398 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 5 – point c (c) establish a financing plan. The financing plan shall take into account the group resolution plan and the principles for sharing responsibility as established in accordance with point (e) of Article 11(3).
Amendment 1399 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. Any resolution authority that is a member of the resolution college may take action in addition to the group resolution scheme if it considers that this is necessary to protect financial stability or to protect the public interest. It shall notify all members of the resolution college of any action it plans to take.
Amendment 1400 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 6 Amendment 1401 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 1402 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 6 6. If any member of the resolution college disagrees with the group resolution scheme proposed by the group level resolution authority
Amendment 1403 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1404 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 7 7. By way of derogation from Article 19 (2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and subject to the safeguards in Article 38 of that Regulation, EBA shall take a decision within 24 hours. The subsequent action or measure of the resolution authority shall be in conformity with the decision of EBA.
Amendment 1405 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 7 7.
Amendment 1406 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 8 Amendment 1407 #
Proposal for a directive Article 83 – paragraph 8 8. Where a group level resolution authority decides, or is notified pursuant to Article 74(3), that a Union parent undertaking for which it is responsible is failing or likely to fail, it shall notify the information referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this article to resolution authorities that are members of the resolution college of the group in question. The resolution actions for the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article may include a group resolution scheme drawn up and agreed in accordance with paragraph 5 and 6 of this Article.
Amendment 1408 #
Proposal for a directive Article 85 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. EBA
Amendment 1409 #
Proposal for a directive Article 86 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. EBA shall refuse, after consulting the national resolution authorities concerned, to recognise pursuant to Article 85(2) third country resolution proceedings if it considers that at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 1 (1) The financial crisis that started in 2008 has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools at Union level to effectively deal with unsound or failing credit institutions. Such tools are, in particular, needed to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimize negative repercussions by preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned. During the crisis, those challenges were a major factor that forced Member States to save credit institutions using public funds. This has fuelled a vicious cycle which is one of the main causes for the sovereign debt crisis the Member States are confronted with.
Amendment 1410 #
Proposal for a directive Article 86 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) that independent resolution action under Article 87 in relation to a domestic branch is necessary to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives. EBA may refuse, after consulting the national resolution authorities concerned, to recognise pursuant to Article 85(2) third country resolution proceedings if it considers that creditors, including in particular depositors located or payable in a Member State, would not receive equal treatment with third country creditors under the third country resolution proceedings;
Amendment 1411 #
Proposal for a directive Article 86 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) that creditors, including in particular depositors located or payable in a Member State, would not receive equ
Amendment 1412 #
Proposal for a directive Article 86 – paragraph 2 2. The Commission shall, by means of delegated acts adopted in accordance to Article 103,
Amendment 1413 #
Proposal for a directive Article 88 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the development of resolution plans in accordance with Articles 9, 11 and 12 and similar requirements under the law of the relevant third countries;
Amendment 1414 #
Proposal for a directive Article 88 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the assessment of the resolvability of such institutions
Amendment 1415 #
Proposal for a directive Article 88 – paragraph 5 – point d (d) early warning to or consultation of parties to the cooperation arrangement before taking any significant action under this Directive or relevant third country law affecting the institution
Amendment 1416 #
Proposal for a directive Article 89 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) those third country authorities are subject to requirements and standards of professional secrecy at least
Amendment 1417 #
Proposal for a directive Article 89 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. Where confidential information originates in another Member State, resolution authorities
Amendment 1418 #
Proposal for a directive Article 90 Amendment 1419 #
Proposal for a directive Article 90 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 1 (1) The financial crisis that started in 2008 has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools at Union level to effectively deal with unsound or failing credit institutions. Such tools are, in particular, needed to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimize negative repercussions by preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned.
Amendment 1420 #
Proposal for a directive Article 90 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the
Amendment 1422 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall establish a financing arrangement or arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the effective application by the resolution authority of the resolution tools and powers. The financing arrangements shall be used only in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles set out in Articles 26 and 29.
Amendment 1423 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall establish financing arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the effective application by the resolution authority of the resolution tools and powers. Institutional Protection Schemes shall be considered as financing arrangements, provided that they meet the requirements laid down in art. 80(8) of Directive 48/2006/CE. The financing arrangements shall be used only in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles set out in Articles 26 and 29.
Amendment 1424 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall establish financing arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the effective application by the resolution authority of the resolution tools and powers. Institutional Protection Schemes shall considered as financing arrangements, provided that they meet the requirements laid down in art. 80(8) of Directive 48/2006/CE. The financing arrangements shall be used only in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles set out in Articles 26 and 29.
Amendment 1425 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall establish financing arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the effective application by the resolution authority of the resolution tools and powers. The financing arrangements shall be used only in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles set out in Articles 26 and 29 and be completely separate and independent from deposit guarantee schemes.
Amendment 1426 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall establish financing arrangements for the purpose of enabling each national Deposit Guarantee Scheme under Directive 94/19/EC, for all the institutions authorised in the territory of the Member State, the capability to ensuring the effective application by the resolution authority of the resolution tools and powers. The financing arrangements shall be used only in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles set out in Articles 26 and 29.
Amendment 1427 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Institutional Protection Schemes shall be considered as financing arrangements, provided that they meet the requirements laid down in art. 80(8) of Directive 48/2006/CE.
Amendment 1428 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the financing arrangements have access to adequate financial resources.
Amendment 1429 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 – introductory part 3. For the purpose provided for in paragraph 2, financing arrangements
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 1 (1) The financial crisis that started in 200
Amendment 1430 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Member States may exempt institutions from the payment of a contribution to the financing arrangement if they are publicly owned and have a guarantee from a Member State or a subsidiary national level of a Member State.
Amendment 1431 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Member States may exempt public institutions from contributing to the resolution financing arrangement if they are owned by the state or other administrative authorities and have concluded explicit guarantee agreements or similar liability instruments which are made available by the state or other administrative authorities and which fulfil a public task laid down by law.
Amendment 1432 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. For the purpose provided for in paragraph 2, financing arrangements shall in particular have: (a) the power to raise ex post extraordinary contributions as specified in Article 95, and (b) the power to contract borrowings and other forms of support as specified in Article 96.
Amendment 1433 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3 a. Member States may exclude publicly owned entities that have explicit guarantee arrangements or comparable liability instruments provided by regional or central governments and that fulfil specific tasks of public interest, from the contribution to the resolution fund.
Amendment 1434 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the power to raise the level of ex ante contributions as specified in Article 94 with a view to reaching the target level specified in Article 93;
Amendment 1435 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 – point b Amendment 1436 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 – point b Amendment 1437 #
Proposal for a directive Article 91 – paragraph 3 – point c Amendment 1439 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part The financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91 may be used by the resolution authority only to the extent necessary to ensure the effective application of when applying the resolution tools, for the following purposes:
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 2 (2) Union financial markets are highly
Amendment 1440 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part The financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91 may be used by the resolution authority
Amendment 1441 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) to guarantee the assets
Amendment 1442 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) to make contributions and provide capital to a bridge institution and an asset management vehicle;
Amendment 1443 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e (e) to take any combination of the actions referred to in points (a) to (
Amendment 1444 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) (f) to recapitalize the institution.
Amendment 1445 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) pay any compensation due to shareholders and creditors according to Article 67 of this Directive.
Amendment 1446 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The financing arrangements may be used to take the actions referred to in points (a) to (e) also with respect to the purchaser in the context of the sale of business tool.
Amendment 1447 #
Proposal for a directive Article 92 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that any losses, costs or other expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools shall be first borne by the shareholders and, if resources from the shareholders are exhausted, the creditors of the institution under resolution. Only if the resources from shareholders and creditors are exhausted, the losses, costs or other expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools shall be borne by the financing arrangements.
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 3 (3) There is currently no harmonisation of the procedures for resolving credit institutions at Union level. Some Member States apply to credit institutions the same procedures that they apply to other insolvent enterprises, which in certain cases have been adapted for credit institutions. There are considerable substantial and procedural differences between the laws, regulations and administrative provisions which govern credit institutions’ insolvency in the Member States. In addition, the financial crisis has exposed that general corporate insolvency procedures may not always be appropriate for credit institutions as they may not always ensure sufficient speed of intervention, the continuation of the
Amendment 1450 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all the credit institutions authorised in their territory which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
Amendment 1451 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least
Amendment 1452 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least
Amendment 1453 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in
Amendment 1454 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than
Amendment 1455 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 1
Amendment 1456 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than
Amendment 1457 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least 1.5% of the amount of deposits of all the credit institutions authorised in their territory which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
Amendment 1458 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1459 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Member States may extend the initial period of time for a maximum of four years in case the financing arrangements make cumulated disbursements superior to 0.5% of
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 4 (4) A regime is, therefore, needed to provide authorities with
Amendment 1460 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Member States may extend the initial period of time for a maximum of four years in case the financing arrangements make cumulated disbursements superior to
Amendment 1461 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Member States may extend the initial period of time for a maximum of four years in case the financing arrangements make cumulated disbursements superior to 0.5% of covered deposits. Member States may ad hoc levy additional contributions if they deem necessary for the stability of the financial system.
Amendment 1462 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1463 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 3 3. If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in paragraph 2, contributions raised in accordance with Article 94 shall resume until the target level is reached. Where the available financial means amount to less than half of the target level, the annual contributions shall not be less than 0.25% of
Amendment 1464 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 3 3. If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in paragraph 2, contributions raised in accordance with Article 94 shall resume until the target level is reached. Where the available financial means
Amendment 1465 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 3 3. If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in paragraph 2, contributions raised in accordance with Article 94 shall resume until the target level is reached. Where the available financial means amount to less than half of the target level, the annual contributions shall not be less than 0.
Amendment 1466 #
Proposal for a directive Article 93 – paragraph 3 a (new) Amendment 1468 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 1469 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 1 1. In order to reach the target level specified in Article 93, Member States shall ensure that ex-ante contributions are raised at least annually from the institutions authorised in their territory.
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 4 (4) A regime is, therefore, needed to provide authorities with the tools to intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing credit institution so as to ensure the continuity of the credit institution’s essential financial and economic functions, while minimizing the impact of an institution’s failure on the
Amendment 1470 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a Amendment 1471 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a Amendment 1472 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a (a)
Amendment 1473 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a (a)
Amendment 1474 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a (a)
Amendment 1475 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a (a)
Amendment 1476 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b Amendment 1477 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b Amendment 1478 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b Amendment 1479 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b (b)
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 5 (5) Some Member States have already enacted legislative changes that introduce mechanisms to resolve failing credit institutions; others have indicated their intention to introduce such mechanisms if they are not adopted at Union level.
Amendment 1480 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b (b)
Amendment 1481 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) the contributions calculated under (a)
Amendment 1482 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) the contributions
Amendment 1483 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) the contributions calculated under (a) and (b) shall be adjusted in proportion to the risk profile of institutions,
Amendment 1484 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) the contributions calculated under (a)
Amendment 1485 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new) (c a) the annual contributions applied in the Member States which aim at mitigating the costs of resolution for the public are accountable to the contributions of this Directive.
Amendment 1486 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 3 3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 93 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in the first
Amendment 1487 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 3 3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 93 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in the first paragraph of Article 92. The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed
Amendment 1488 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 3 3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 93 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in the first paragraph of Article 92. The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed
Amendment 1489 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 3 3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 93 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in the first paragraph of Article 92. The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 6 (6) Those obstacles should be eliminated and rules should be adopted in order to ensure that
Amendment 1490 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 5 5. The amounts raised in accordance with this Article shall only be used for the purposes specified in Article 92 of this Directive
Amendment 1491 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 5 5. The amounts raised in accordance with this Article shall only be used for the purposes specified in Article 92 of this Directive, and
Amendment 1492 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 5 5. The amounts raised in accordance with this Article shall only be used for the purposes specified in Article 92 of this Directive
Amendment 1493 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1494 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1495 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – introductory part 7. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 in order specify the notion of adjusting contributions in proportion to the risk profile of institutions as referred to in paragraph 2 (c) of this Article, taking into account the
Amendment 1496 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – introductory part 7. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 in order specify the notion of adjusting contributions in proportion to the risk profile of institutions as referred to in paragraph 2 (c) of this Article, taking into account the
Amendment 1497 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point a Amendment 1498 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point a Amendment 1499 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point a a (new) (a a) the existence of a risk mitigating cooperative solidarity system, which ensures the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the DGS Directive;
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 8 a (new) (8a) To ensure consistency in the regulatory framework, central counterparties as defined in the Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR) and central securities depositories as defined in the Regulation (EU) No XXXX/20XX (CSDR) should be covered by a separate legislative initiative establishing a recovery and resolution framework for these institutions, which should be proposed by the European Commission as soon as possible.
Amendment 1500 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point a a (new) (a a) the existence of a risk mitigating cooperative solidarity system, which ensures the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the DGS Directive;
Amendment 1501 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point b Amendment 1502 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point b Amendment 1503 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point b (b) the stability and variety of the company's sources of funding and unencumbered highly liquid assets;
Amendment 1504 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point b a (new) (b a) the existence of a risk mitigating solidarity system, which aims at the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the resolution of the European Parliament of 16 February 2012 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast);
Amendment 1505 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point c Amendment 1506 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point c Amendment 1507 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point d Amendment 1508 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point d Amendment 1509 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point d Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 10 (10) National Authorities should take into account the risk, size, shareholding structure and interconnectedness of an institution in the context of recovery and resolution plans and when using the different tools at their disposal, making sure that the regime is applied in an appropriate way.
Amendment 1510 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point e Amendment 1511 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point e Amendment 1512 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point e (e) the extent to which the institution has previously benefited from
Amendment 1513 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point f Amendment 1514 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point f Amendment 1515 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point f (f) the complexity of the structure of the institution and the resolvability of the institution,
Amendment 1516 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g Amendment 1517 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g Amendment 1518 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g (g) its systemic importance for the market in question, its opacity and its interconnectedness.
Amendment 1519 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g a (new) (g a) business models and balance-sheet structures of institutions, and
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 10 (10) National Authorities should take into account the
Amendment 1520 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g a (new) (g a) the existence of a risk mitigating cooperative solidarity system, which ensures the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the DGS Directive;
Amendment 1521 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g a (new) (ga) membership of a guarantee scheme in accordance with Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 1522 #
Proposal for a directive Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point g b (new) (g b) institutions' risk-taking behaviour.
Amendment 1523 #
Proposal for a directive Article 95 Amendment 1524 #
Proposal for a directive Article 95 Amendment 1526 #
Proposal for a directive Article 95 – paragraph 1 1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, Member States shall ensure that extraordinary ex post contributions are raised from the institutions authorised in their territory, in order to cover the additional amounts. These extraordinary contributions shall be allocated between institutions in accordance with the rules set out in Article 94(2). However, such contributions shall not exceed an annual affordability threshold for contributions set by the financing arrangement.
Amendment 1527 #
Proposal for a directive Article 95 – paragraph 1 1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, Member States shall ensure that extraordinary ex post contributions not exceeding 0.25% of covered deposits per calendar year are raised from the institutions authorised in their territory, in order to cover the additional amounts. These extraordinary contributions shall be allocated between institutions in accordance with the rules set out in Article 94(2). However, such contributions shall not exceed an annual affordability threshold for contributions set by the financing arrangement. The credit institution may entirely or partially be exempted from the obligation referred to in the second subparagraph if this would jeopardise the settlement of claims of other creditors against it. Such exemption shall not be granted for a longer period than 6 months but may be renewed on request of the credit institution.
Amendment 1528 #
Proposal for a directive Article 95 – paragraph 1 1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, Member States shall ensure that extraordinary ex post contributions are raised from the institutions authorised in their territory
Amendment 1529 #
Proposal for a directive Article 96 Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 10 (10) National Authorities should take into account the risk, size and interconnectedness of an institution in the context of recovery and resolution plans and when using the different tools at their disposal, making sure that the regime is
Amendment 1530 #
Proposal for a directive Article 96 – paragraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are enabled to contract borrowings or other forms of support from financial institutions, the central bank, or other third parties, in the event that the amounts raised in accordance with Article 94 are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, and
Amendment 1531 #
Proposal for a directive Article 96 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new) Article 96 should not limit the ability of national financing arrangements to secure state guarantees, subject to that these guarantees are paid for by the arrangement through an actuarial fee.
Amendment 1532 #
Proposal for a directive Article 96 – paragraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are enabled to contract borrowings or other forms of support from financial institutions,
Amendment 1538 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – title Ban on borrowing between financing arrangements
Amendment 1539 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – title Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 10 (10) National Authorities should take into account the risk, size, legal status, nature, scope and complexity of business activity, and interconnectedness of an institution in the context of recovery and resolution plans and when using the different tools at their disposal, making sure that the regime is applied in an appropriate way.
Amendment 1540 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 1 1. Member States
Amendment 1541 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction shall have the right to
Amendment 1542 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction shall
Amendment 1543 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction shall have the
Amendment 1544 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. These loans should be made from all other financing arrangements within the union, in proportion to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC, of all the credit institutions authorised in the corresponding territory.
Amendment 1545 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 Amendment 1546 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 1547 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States
Amendment 1548 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are
Amendment 1549 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 10 (10) National Authorities should take into account the risk, size
Amendment 1550 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction
Amendment 1551 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are obliged to lend to other financing arrangements within the Union in the circumstances specified under paragraph 1 and in the conditions specified in paragraph 1a.
Amendment 1552 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction
Amendment 1553 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction
Amendment 1554 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1555 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1556 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not be
Amendment 1557 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not
Amendment 1558 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not
Amendment 1559 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not be obliged to lend to another national financing arrangement in those circonstances when the resolution authority of the Member State of the financing arrangement considers that it would not have sufficient funds to finance any foreseeable resolution in the near future. In such a case, the resolution authority of the Member State concerned shall provide in writing the reasons for its refusal to lend to the requesting resolution authority and the Commission. The Commission may take a decision to the effect that the reasons provided are do not justify the refusal to lend in which case the resolution authority of the Member State concerned shall be bound to lend the amount requested. In any case they should not be obliged to lend more than half of the funds that the national financing arrangement has available at the moment when the borrowing request is formalised.
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 10 (10)
Amendment 1560 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall
Amendment 1561 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not be obliged to lend to another national financing arrangement
Amendment 1562 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not
Amendment 1563 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. For the purpose of paragraph 1 Member States shall require National resolution funds to obtain for a special purpose banking licence in accordance with Directive [CRD] 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 1564 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. 1. The following conditions must be satisfied in the event of voluntary lending: (a) the borrowing financing arrangement shall not, pursuant to this Article, repay loans at this time to other financing arrangements; (b) the borrowing financing arrangement shall inform the relevant authorities and the European Banking Authority (EBA) of the amount requested; (c) the borrowing financing arrangement shall repay the loan at the latest after five years, including by way of annual instalments, interest being due only at the time of repayment; (d) the interest rate set shall be at least equivalent to the marginal lending facility rate of the European Central Bank during the credit period; (e) the borrowing financing arrangement shall inform the EBA of the initial interest rate and of the duration of the loan. 2. The EBA shall confirm that the requirements referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 have been met. Member States shall ensure that the contributions levied by the borrowing financing arrangement are sufficient to reimburse the amount borrowed and to re-establish the target level as soon as possible. Financing arrangements which must repay a loan to other financing arrangements pursuant to this Article shall not provide loans to other financing arrangements.
Amendment 1565 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1566 #
Proposal for a directive Article 97 – paragraph 3 3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 in order to specify the additional conditions that have to be met in order for a financing arrangement to be able to borrow from other financing arrangements
Amendment 1569 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 1 Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 (11) In order to ensure the required speed of action, to guarantee independence from economic actors and to avoid conflicts of interest, Member States should appoint public administrative authorities to perform the functions and tasks in relation to resolution pursuant to this Directive.
Amendment 1570 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 2 Amendment 1571 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the group level resolution authority, in consultation to the resolution authorities of the institutions that are part of the group, shall establish,
Amendment 1572 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the group level resolution authority, in consultation to the resolution authorities of the institutions that are part of the group, shall establish, if necessary before taking any resolution action, a financing plan
Amendment 1573 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 2 2. For the purpose
Amendment 1574 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the group level resolution authority, in consultation to the resolution authorities of the institutions that are part of the group, shall establish,
Amendment 1575 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 3 Amendment 1576 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a Amendment 1577 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b Amendment 1578 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 1579 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The financing plan shall be part of the group resolution scheme as specified in Article 83. The financing plan
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 (11) In order to ensure the required speed of action, to guarantee independence from economic actors and to avoid conflicts of interest, Member States should appoint public administrative authorities endowed with administrative and financial independence to perform the functions and tasks in relation to resolution pursuant to this Directive. Member States should ensure that appropriate resources are allocated to those resolution authorities. The designation of public authorities should not exclude
Amendment 1580 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The financing plan shall be part of the group resolution scheme as specified in Article 83. The financing plan shall establish the contribution from each
Amendment 1581 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 4 Amendment 1582 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 4 4. Provided that the requirements under paragraph 2 of this article and Article 83 are fulfilled, Member States
Amendment 1583 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 5 Amendment 1584 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 5 Amendment 1585 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 6 Amendment 1586 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that each national financing arrangement under its
Amendment 1587 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1588 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 7 7. Member States shall ensure that any proceeds or benefits, net of resolution costs, that arise from the use of the financing arrangements shall benefit all national financing arrangements in accordance to their contribution to the financing of the resolution as established in paragraph 2.
Amendment 1589 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 8 Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 (11) In order to ensure the required speed of action, to guarantee independence from economic actors and to avoid conflicts of interest, Member States should appoint public administrative authorities to perform the functions and tasks in relation to resolution pursuant to this Directive. Member States should ensure that appropriate resources are allocated to those resolution authorities. The designation of public authorities should not exclude delegation under the responsibility of the
Amendment 1590 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 8 Amendment 1591 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 8 – point a Amendment 1592 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 8 – point b Amendment 1593 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 8 – point c Amendment 1594 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 – paragraph 8 – point d Amendment 1595 #
Proposal for a directive Article 98 a (new) Article 98 a European Resolution Fund Member States shall design their financial arrangements envisaging their possible future merge, partial or total, into a European Resolution Fund.
Amendment 1598 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action, and provided that this action ensures that depositors continue having access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated is liable, up to the amount of covered deposits, for the amount of losses covered deposits would have had to bear if they had not been excluded from the bail- in tool, however not exceeding the amount of losses that it would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
Amendment 1599 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action, and provided that this action ensures that depositors continue having access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated is liable, up to the amount of covered deposits, for the amount of losses covered deposits would have had to bear if they had not been excluded from the bail- in tool, however not exceeding the amount that it would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up under
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 a (new) (11a) However, in order to safeguard legal certainty and avoid contradictory responsibilities and conflicts of interest, it is important to distinguish, in terms of function and organisation, between the roles and tasks of competent authorities responsible for financial supervision and those of resolution authorities. It should therefore be possible for Member States, in the context of this Directive, to entrust resolution authority tasks to national authorities responsible for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms only where a strict functional and organisational distinction is in place between resolution and supervisory tasks. Member States should, however, ensure close cooperation between the national authorities responsible for prudential supervision and resolution.
Amendment 1600 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action, and provided that this action ensures that depositors continue having access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated is liable, up to the amount of covered deposits, for the amount of losses that it would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings and for the purpose of recapitalization through the exercise of conversion powers by resolution authorities for the amount that covered deposits would have had to bear if they had not been excluded from the bail- in tool.
Amendment 1601 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, where
Amendment 1602 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action, and provided that this action ensures that depositors continue having access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated is liable, up to the amount of covered deposits, for the amount of losses that it would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with article 13.4.
Amendment 1603 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action, and provided that this action ensures that depositors continue having access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated is liable, up to the amount of covered deposits, for the amount of losses covered deposits would have had to bear if they had not been excluded from the bail- in tool, however not exceeding the amount of losses that it would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
Amendment 1604 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 2 Amendment 1605 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that, under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings and Article 43 of this Directive, the deposit guarantee schemes rank pari passu with unsecured non- preferred claims.
Amendment 1606 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that, under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings,
Amendment 1607 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that, under
Amendment 1608 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 2 2. Unless Member States
Amendment 1609 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 3 3. Member States shall ensure that the determination of the amount by which the deposit guarantee scheme is liable in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article complies with the conditions established in Article 30 (2) and Article 29 (1)(f).
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 11 a (new) (11a) However, in order to safeguard legal certainty and avoid contradictory responsibilities and conflicts of interest, it is important to distinguish the roles and tasks of competent authorities responsible for financial supervision and of resolution authorities. Therefore, Member States should not be able to designate the national authorities responsible for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms as resolution authorities under this Directive. Member States should, however, ensure close cooperation between the national authorities responsible for prudential supervision and resolution. In the same rationale there should be a clear separation of responsibilities within EBA for resolution purposes.
Amendment 1610 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 3 3. Member States shall ensure that the determination of the amount by which the deposit guarantee scheme
Amendment 1611 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 3 3. Member States shall ensure that the determination of the amount by which the deposit guarantee scheme is liable in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article complies with the conditions established in Article 30 (2) and Article 29 (1)(f).
Amendment 1612 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 4 4. The contribution from the deposit guarantee scheme for the purpose of paragraph 1
Amendment 1613 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 4 4. The contribution from the deposit guarantee scheme for the purpose of paragraph 1 shall be
Amendment 1614 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 4 4. The contribution from the deposit guarantee scheme for the purpose of paragraph 1
Amendment 1615 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 5 Amendment 1616 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 5 Amendment 1617 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 5 5. Member States
Amendment 1618 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 6 Amendment 1619 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 12 (12) In light of the consequences that the failure of a credit institution or an investment firm may have on the financial system and the economy of a Member State as well as the possible need to use public funds to resolve a crisis, the Ministries of Finance or other relevant ministries and other stakeholders in the Member States should be closely involved, at an early stage, in the process of crisis management and resolution.
Amendment 1620 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme has arrangements in place to ensure that, following a contribution made by the deposit guarantee scheme under paragraph
Amendment 1621 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme has arrangements in place to ensure that, following a contribution made by the deposit guarantee scheme under paragraph
Amendment 1622 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that
Amendment 1623 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1624 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1625 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1626 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 7 Amendment 1627 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 8 Amendment 1628 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 1629 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 12 (12) In light of the consequences that the failure of a credit institution or an investment firm may have on the financial system and the economy of a Member State as well as the possible need to use public funds to resolve a crisis, the Ministries of Finance or other relevant ministries in the Member States should be timely and closely involved, at an early stage, in the process of crisis management and resolution. National Parliaments should be informed on a confidential basis whenever an institution is deemed irresolvable. The European Parliament should be informed on a confidential basis whenever a group is deemed irresolvable.
Amendment 1630 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 1631 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 If the deposit guarantee scheme is, at the same time, requested to use its available financial means for the
Amendment 1632 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 If the deposit guarantee scheme is, at the same time, requested to use its available financial means for the purposes specified in Article 92 or for the purpose of the first
Amendment 1633 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 – paragraph 9 Amendment 1634 #
Proposal for a directive Article 99 a (new) Article 99 a Prohibition of the use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of resolution Member States shall ensure that deposit guarantee schemes are not used to finance any resolution action.
Amendment 1635 #
Proposal for a directive Article 100 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. EBA shall periodically report to the Commission whether there are injustified divergences regarding the implementation at national level of that requirement referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 1636 #
Proposal for a directive Article 100 – paragraph 3 3. The competence to exercise the sanctioning powers foreseen in this Directive shall be attributed to resolution authorities or to competent authorities, depending on the breach. Resolution authorities and competent authorities shall be given all investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions. In the exercise of their sanctioning powers, resolution authorities and competent authorities shall cooperate
Amendment 1637 #
Proposal for a directive Article 101 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) an entity fails to notify an intention to provide group financial support to its competent authorities in breach of Article 2
Amendment 1638 #
Proposal for a directive Article 101 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the management of an institution fails to notify the competent authority when the institution is failing or likely to fail in breach of Article 7
Amendment 1639 #
Proposal for a directive Article 101 – paragraph 2 – point c Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 13 (13) Effective resolution of institutions or groups operating across the Union requires cooperation among competent authorities and resolution authorities within supervisory and resolution colleges in all the stages covered by this Directive, from the preparation of recovery and resolution plans to the actual resolution of an institution.
Amendment 1640 #
Proposal for a directive Article 101 – paragraph 2 – point d Amendment 1641 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 – paragraph 3 3. The delegation of powers referred to in Articles 2, 4, 28, 37, 39, 43
Amendment 1642 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 – paragraph 3 3. The delegation of powers referred to in Articles 2, 4,
Amendment 1643 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 – paragraph 5 5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 2, 4, 28, 37, 39, 43
Amendment 1644 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 – paragraph 5 5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 2, 4,
Amendment 1645 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 – paragraph 5 5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 2, 4, 28, 37, 39, 43, 86, 94, 97 and 98 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of t
Amendment 1646 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5 a. The commission shall not adopt delegated acts where the scrutiny time of the parliament is reduced through recess to less than five months including the extension.
Amendment 1647 #
Proposal for a directive Article 103 a (new) Article 103 a Further provisions for draft regulatory technical standards 1. Notwithstanding any time limit provided for the submission of draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission, phasing of submissions shall be agreed covering buckets due at 12, 18 and 24 months. 2. The Commission shall not adopt regulatory technical standards in a manner that through recess reduces the scrutiny time of the Parliament to less than 2 months including the extension.
Amendment 1648 #
Proposal for a directive Article 113 – paragraph 1 EBA shall create a permanent internal committee pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 for the purpose of preparing the EBA decisions and draft regulatory technical standards and draft implementing technical standards provided for in this Directive. That internal committee shall be
Amendment 1649 #
Proposal for a directive Article 113 – paragraph 1 EBA shall create a permanent internal committee pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 for the purpose of preparing the EBA decisions provided for in this Directive, which must conform to the framework established by Regulation N° 1093/2010, in particular in accordance with Article 38.1 of that Regulation, the EBA shall ensure that no decision impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States. That internal committee shall be at least composed of the resolution authorities referred to in Article 3 of this Directive.
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 13 a (new) (13a) In order to ensure a uniform and consistent approach for determining the criteria triggering the resolution of an institution, the European Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU.
Amendment 1650 #
Proposal for a directive Article 113 – paragraph 1 a (new) For the purpose of this directive EBA shall ensure a full effective organisational separation between the resolution committee and other functions referred to in Regulation No 1093/2010. The resolution committee shall promote the development and coordination of recovery and resolution plans, develop methods for the resolution of failing financial institutions and an assessment of the need for appropriate financing instruments, in accordance with Articles 21 to 26. Any other decisions, tasks as well as the adoption of draft regulatory technical standards and draft implementing technical standards referred to in this directive shall be delegated to the resolution committee in accordance with article 41 of Regulation No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1651 #
Proposal for a directive Article 113 a (new) Article 113 a Cooperation with EBA Cooperation with EBA The competent authorities shall cooperate with the EBA for the purposes of this Directive in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The competent authorities shall, without delay, provide EBA with all the information necessary to carry out its duties in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1652 #
Proposal for a directive Article 113 b (new) Article 113 b Staff and resources of EBA By ..., EBA shall assess the staffing and resources needs arising from the assumption of its powers and duties in accordance with this Directive and submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
Amendment 1653 #
Proposal for a directive Article 114 – paragraph -1a (new) -1. By 1 January 2015 to the latest, the Commission shall review the procedures for resolving credit institutions and assess the need in particular to set up an Single Resolution Authority matching the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
Amendment 1654 #
Proposal for a directive Article 114 – paragraph 1 – point -a (new) (-a) the necessity to set up an autonomous EU resolution authority;
Amendment 1655 #
Proposal for a directive Article 114 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new) (b a) regarding the appropriateness of imposing limits to the amount of liabilities as defined in Article 2 (62) of this Directive that can be held by other financial institutions;
Amendment 1656 #
Proposal for a directive Article 114 – paragraph 1 a (new) By 31 December 2013, the Commission shall put forward a proposal for the creation of a European Resolution Authority and of a European Resolution Fund.
Amendment 1657 #
Proposal for a directive Article 114 a (new) Article 114 a EBA review In line with the review of Article 81 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 required by 2nd January 2014 and in view of the variations that may be applied by competent authorities in supervisory procedures, the EBA shall in addition to monitoring where specifically referenced in this Directive establish benchmarking portfolios and techniques to enable assessment of convergence of supervisory practices.
Amendment 1658 #
Proposal for a directive Article 115 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Institutions shall submit their recovery plans to competent authorities and resolution authorities shall draw up resolution plans, according to Articles 6(1) and 9(1), in six months from the date of the entry into force of the regulatory technical standards referred in Articles 4a, 13(3) and 14(8).
Amendment 1659 #
Proposal for a directive Article 115 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. Member States shall ensure that all institutions implement the appropriate recovery and resolution plans at least two years after entry into force of this directive. Institutions which have not done so shall be required to hold additional CET1 capital of 5%.
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 13 a (new) (13a) In the resolution of institutions or groups operating across the Union, the decisions taken should preserve financial stability and minimise economic and social effects in the Member States where the institution or group operates.
Amendment 1660 #
Proposal for a directive Article 115 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall adopt and publish by 31 December 2014 at the latest the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive.
Amendment 1661 #
Proposal for a directive Article 115 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions. Member States shall apply those provisions from 1 January 2015.
Amendment 1662 #
Proposal for a directive Article 115 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 1663 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) a summary of the material changes to the institution since the most recently filed
Amendment 1664 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 (3) a communication and and EBA- harmonized disclosure plan outlining how the firm intends to manage any potentially negative market reactions;
Amendment 1665 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 (6) a detailed description of any material impediment to the effective and timely execution of the plan, including consideration of impact on the rest of the group, customers and counterparties. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of of "material changes". EBA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive;
Amendment 1666 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 Amendment 1667 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 (8) a detailed description of the processes for determining the effectiveness and viability value and marketability of the
Amendment 1668 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 (8) a detailed description of the processes for determining the value and marketability
Amendment 1669 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) (9 a) a general assessment of the effects that the implementation of the plan would have on the employees of the institution;
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 14 (14) In order to ensure uniform and consistent approach in the area covered by this Directive, EBA should also be empowered to adopt guidelines, and elaborate regulatory and technical standards to be endorsed by the Commission by means of delegated acts
Amendment 1670 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) (9 a) the aggregate amount of capital instruments issued by the institution that are subject to write-down or conversion to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments upon the occurrence of a market-based trigger before the institution reaches the point of non-viability.
Amendment 1671 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new) (9 b) a description of the procedures to be used for informing and consulting with employees and their representatives throughout the recovery phase;
Amendment 1672 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Amendment 1673 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 (15) arrangements and measures necessary to maintain continuous access to financial markets infrastructures, and where it is possible, portability of clients positions;
Amendment 1674 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Amendment 1675 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 a (new) (19 a) EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of the terms "material changes" referred to in paragraph 2, and of "material impediment" referred to in paragraph 6. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1676 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17 a (new) (17 a) a description of the arrangements that the institution has in place for informing and consulting with employees and their representatives, including, where applicable, collective agreements in force;
Amendment 1677 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 2 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Amendment 1678 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 2 – paragraph 1 – point 21 Amendment 1679 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new) (3 a) The extent to which there are adequate arrangements in place for informing and consulting with employees and their representatives throughout a resolution process;
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 16 (16) It is essential that all institutions prepare and regularly update recovery plans that set out measures to be taken by those institutions under different circumstances or scenarios. Such plans should be detailed and based on realistic assumptions applicable in a range of robust and severe scenarios. The requirement to prepare a recovery plan should, however, be applied proportionately, reflecting the systemic importance of the institution
Amendment 1680 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10 (10) The extent to which the institution or the group has tested its management information systems under stress scenarios defined by the resolution authority. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards on stress scenarios. EBA shall submit those regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1681 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10 (10) The extent to which the institution or the group has tested its management information systems under stress scenarios defined by the resolution authority. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards on stress scenarios. EBA shall submit those regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 1682 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 19 Amendment 1683 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Amendment 1684 #
Proposal for a directive Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 23 (23) The arrangements and means through which resolution could be facilitated in the cases of groups that have
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 16 a (new) (16a) Recovery plans shall provide for measures to be taken by the management of the institution when the competent authority adopts measures of early intervention.
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 16 b (new) (16b) In case of group recovery plans, the potential impact of the recovery measures in all the Member States where the group operates shall be specifically taken into account in the drawing up of the plans.
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 17 (17) Where an institution does not present an adequate recovery plan, supervisors should be empowered to require that institution to take any measure necessary to redress the deficiencies of the plan, including making assessment of possible changes to its business model or to its funding strategy. That requirement may affect the freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The limitation of that fundamental right is however necessary to meet the objectives of financial stability and for protecting depositors and creditors. More specifically, such a limitation is necessary in order to strengthen the business of institutions and avoid that institutions grow excessively or take excessive risks without being able to tackle setbacks and losses and to restore their capital base. The limitation is also proportionate as only preventative action can ensure that adequate precautions are taken and therefore complies with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 17 (17) Where an institution does not present an adequate recovery plan, supervisors should be empowered to require that institution to take any measure necessary to redress the deficiencies of the plan, including making changes to its business
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 17 (17) Where an institution does not present an adequate recovery plan, supervisors should be empowered to require that institution to take any measure necessary to redress the deficiencies of the plan, including making changes to its business model, structure or to its funding strategy. That requirement may affect the freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The limitation of that fundamental right is however necessary to meet the objectives of financial stability and for protecting depositors and creditors. More
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 (18) Resolution planning is an essential component of effective resolution. Authorities should have all the information necessary in order to plan how the essential functions of an institution or of a cross- border group may be isolated from the rest of the business and transferred in order to ensure the preservation and continuance of essential functions. The requirement to prepare a resolution plan should, however, be simplified, reflecting the systemic importance of the institution
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 (18) Resolution planning is an essential component of effective resolution. Authorities should have all the information necessary in order to plan how the essential functions of an institution or of a cross- border group may be isolated from the rest of the business and transferred in order to ensure the preservation and continuance of essential functions. The requirement to prepare a resolution plan should, however, be simplified, reflecting the systemic importance of the institution or group, or even waived, if the failure of a particular institution, due to the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, is deemed to not have a detrimental effect on financial markets, on other institutions or on funding conditions. Resolution plans shall, where applicable, respect existing collective agreements as well as national and European legal provisions on the involvement of trade unions and workers’ representatives in company restructuring processes.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 (18) Resolution planning is an essential component of effective resolution. Authorities should have all the information necessary in order to plan how the essential functions of an institution or of a cross-
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 a (new) (18a) Due to the privileged knowledge by the institution on its own functioning and any problems arising from it, resolution plans shall be drawn by resolution authorities in close cooperation with the institutions.
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 a (new) (18a) Financial institutions vary greatly in their structural complexity, especially when operating in multiple jurisdictions. There is also great variance in business risk given the diversity of business lines and the variety of European business models. It would therefore be appropriate for competent authorities to be able to take the individual specifications of the institution into account when assessing the capital and funding structure of the individual institution.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 b (new) (18b) The resolution plans shall be revised or updated whenever needed; for that purpose, the institutions and the competent authorities shall communicate immediately to the resolution authorities any change that imposes a revision or update of the resolution plan.
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 c (new) (18c) In case of group resolution plans, the potential impact of the resolution measures in all the Member States where the group operates shall be specifically taken into account in the drawing up of the plans. The resolution authorities of the Member States where the group operates shall be involved in the drawing up of the plan.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 19 (19)
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 19 (19) Resolution authorities should have the power to require changes to the structure and organization of institutions or groups in order to remove practical impediments to the application of resolution tools and ensure the resolvability of the entities concerned. Due to the potentially systemic nature of all institutions, it is crucial in order to maintain financial stability that authorities have the possibility to resolve any institution. In order to respect the right to conduct business laid down by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the authorities’ discretion should be limited to what is necessary in order to simplify the structure and operations of the institution solely to improve its resolvability. In addition, any measure imposed for such purposes should be consistent with Union law. Measures should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on ground of nationality, and be justified by the overriding reason of being conducted in the public interest in financial stability. To determine whether an action was taken in the general public
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 (21) Recovery and resolution plans should not assume access to extraordinary public financial support or expose taxpayers to the risk of loss. Creditor protection should be an integral part of these plans. Access to liquidity facilities provided by central banks, including emergency liquidity facilities, should not be considered as extraordinary public financial support provided that the institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision, and such liquidity provision is not part of a larger aid package; that the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in function of its quality and market value, that the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary; and that the
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 (21) Recovery and resolution plans should not assume access to extraordinary public financial support or expose taxpayers to the risk of loss.
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 a (new) (21a) The primary recovery and resolution plans for groups of institutions and cross border institutions shall be made on group level and where appropriate include subsections for one or more institutions that are part of the group. The recovery and resolution plans should take into account the financial, technical and business structure of the relevant group. If individual recovery and resolution plans for institutions that are a part of a group are prepared these shall be consistent with and part of the group plans.
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 a (new) (21a) Recovery and resolution plans should include procedures for informing and consulting with employees and their representatives throughout the recovery and resolution processes. Where applicable, collective agreements, or other arrangements provided for by social partners, should be respected in this regard.
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 a (new) (21a) Regarding the sensitiveness of the information contained in them, the recovery and the resolution plans are confidential.
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 b (new) (21b) The competent authorities shall transmit the recovery plans and any changes thereto to the relevant resolution authorities, and the latter shall transmit the resolution plans and any changes thereto to the former, in order to permanently keep every relevant authority fully informed.
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 21 c (new) (21c) Considering the essentiality of the drawing up of recovery and resolution plans to the application of the framework established by this Directive, institutions shall submit their recovery plans to competent authorities and resolution authorities shall draw up resolution plans in six months from the date of the entry into force of the regulatory technical standards that EBA will develop on the content of those plans, notwithstanding the transposition date being only 31 December 2014.
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 22 (22) The provision of financial support from one entity of a cross-border group to another entity of the same group is currently restricted by a number of provisions laid down by national laws. Those provisions are designed to protect the creditors and shareholders of each entity. Those provisions, however, do not take into account the interdependency of the entities of the same group or the group interest. At the international level, only in certain legal systems has the concept of group interest been developed through jurisprudence or legal rules. That concept takes into account, beside the interest of each individual group entity, the indirect interest that each entity in a group has in the prosperity of the group as a whole.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 23 (23) In order to preserve financial stability, it is important that competent authorities be able to remedy the deterioration of an institution’s financial and economic situation before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. To this end, competent authorities should be granted early intervention powers, including the power to replace the management body of an institution with
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 23 (23) In order to preserve financial stability, it is important that competent authorities be able to remedy the deterioration of an institution’s financial and economic situation before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. To this end, competent authorities should be granted early intervention powers,
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 23 a (new) (23a) The appointment of a special manager has proven an efficient early intervention tool in many Member States. It should be seen as a tool among others that competent authorities may use where deemed necessary, in particular in relation to small and medium-size institutions.
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 24 (24) The resolution framework should provide for timely entry into resolution before a financial institution is balance- sheet insolvent and before all equity has been fully wiped out. Resolution should be initiated when a firm is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable and other measures have proved insufficient to prevent failure. The fact that an institution does not meet the requirements for authorization should not justify per-se the entry into resolution, especially if the institution is still or likely to be still viable. An institution should be considered as failing or likely to fail when it is or is to be in breach of the capital requirements for continuing authorisation because it has incurred or is likely to incur in losses that are to deplete all or substantially all of its own funds, when the assets of the institution are or are to be less than its liabilities, when the institution is or is to be unable to pay its obligations as they fall due
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 24 (24) The resolution framework should provide for timely entry into resolution before a financial institution is balance- sheet insolvent and before all equity has been fully wiped out. Resolution should be initiated when a firm is no longer viable or likely to be no longer viable and other measures have proved insufficient to prevent failure. The fact that an institution does not meet the requirements for authorization should not justify per-se the entry into resolution, especially if the institution is still or likely to be still viable. An institution should be considered as
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 24 (24) The resolution framework should provide for timely entry into resolution
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 24 a (new) (24a) In case of resolution of an institution or of a group with cross-border activity, the determination by the resolution authority that the institution is failing or likely to fail as well as any resolution action shall take into account the potential impact of the resolution in all the Member States where the institution or the group operate.
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 26 (26) Where an institution is failing or likely to fail, national authorities should have at their disposal a minimum harmonised set of resolution tools and powers. Their exercise should be subject to common conditions, objectives, and general principles. Once the resolution authority has taken the decision to put the institution under resolution, normal insolvency proceedings should be excluded. Member States should be able to confer onto the resolution authorities powers and tools in addition to those conferred onto them under this Directive. The use of these additional tools and powers, however, should comply with the resolution principles and objectives as set out in this Directive. In particular, the use of such
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 28 a (new) (28a) In order to ensure uniform application and implementation of the recovery and resolution powers provided for in this Directive, EBA should have a leading role at Union level.
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 (29) When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers that have been involved in decisions leading to the imminent threat of failure of the credit institution or investment firm are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised,
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 (29) When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner. Resolution authorities should consistently take the employee perspective into account and should ensure that no resolution action has an unnecessarily negative impact on employees. When the use of the resolution tools involves the granting of State aid, interventions should have to
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 (29) When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, according to the resolution plan where appropriate and subject to proper justification, resolution authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner. When the use of the resolution tools involves the granting of State aid, interventions should have to be assessed in accordance with the relevant State aid provisions. State aid may be involved, inter alia, where resolution funds
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 (29) When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner. Resolution authorities may depart from the general principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors within the same class where it is justified by reasons of public interest and in particular in order to underpin financial stability. When the use of the resolution tools involves the granting of State aid, interventions should have to be assessed in accordance with the relevant State aid provisions. State aid may be involved, inter alia, where resolution funds or deposit guarantee funds intervene to assist in the resolution of failing institutions.
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 (29) When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 a (new) (29a) When applying resolution tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should inform and consult with the employees and their representatives. Where applicable, collective agreements, or other arrangements provided for by social partners, should be respected in this regard.
Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 29 b (new) (29b) Where practised, employee representation in the management body should, by adding a key perspective and genuine knowledge of internal structures, be seen as a positive factor in processes aimed at putting unsound or failing institutions back on a sustainable path. Therefore, the use of early intervention measures, as well as the application of resolution tools and the exercise of resolution powers, should be without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in company boards as provided for by national legislation or practice.
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 30 (30) The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should be in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail, and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. The specifics of public sector entities owned by regional or central governments with explicit guarantee arrangements or comparable liability instruments provided by these governments should be considered. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilizing the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to ensure
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 30 (30) The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should be in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail, and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. Consequently, the resolution tools are not applicable to credit institutions in public ownership covered by a letter of guarantee from a Member State or a subsidiary level of public authority in a Member State. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilizing the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to ensure the rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party sufficient to restore the full viability of the
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 34 (34) Rapid and coordinated action is necessary to sustain market confidence and minimise contagion. Once an institution is deemed to be failing or likely to fail, resolution authorities should not delay in taking appropriate and coordinated action. The circumstances under which the failure of an institution
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 35 (35) The resolution tools should be applied before any public sector injection of capital or equivalent extraordinary public financial support to an institution. This, however, should not impede the use, for the purpose of financing resolution, of funds from the deposit guarantee schemes
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 35 (35) The resolution tools should be applied before any public sector injection of capital or equivalent extraordinary public financial support to an institution. This, however, should not impede the use, for the purpose of financing resolution, of funds from the
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 35 (35) The resolution tools should
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 35 a (new) (35a) In accordance with this reasoning, and knowing that public intervention in systemic crises might be the only way to restore market confidence and stability and prevent further value destruction, it is important not to exclude public intervention from the future management of banking crises; however, it should always be the last resort.
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 44 (44) An effective resolution regime should
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 44 a (new) (44a) Member States should be required to take note that the bail-in procedure is not equally appropriate for credit institutions of every legal form.
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 44 a (new) (44a) Member States shall consider that the bail-in tool is not adequate for all legal forms of institutions to the same degree. This should be under consideration when applying the bail-in tool.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 45 (45) In order to ensure that resolution authorities have the necessary flexibility to allocate losses to creditors in a range of circumstances, it is appropriate that those authorities be able to apply the bail-in tool both where the objective is to resolve the failing institution as a going concern if there is a realistic prospect that the institution viability may be restored, and where systemically important services are transferred to a bridge institution and the residual part of the institution ceases to operate and is wound down. However, the resolution authorities should only use the bail-in tool when the evaluation of the use of the other resolution tools reveals they are insufficient to restore the viability of the institution.
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 46 (46) Where the bail-in tool is applied with the objective of restoring the capital of the failing institution to enable it to continue to operate as a going concern, the resolution through bail-in should always be accompanied by
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 46 a (new) (46a) The resolution authorities shall only apply the bail-in tool after the completion of a thorough evaluation of the institution that led to the conclusion that, no other alternative resolution tools would be enough to achieve the resolution objectives, either when applied per se, or in conjunction.
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 46 a (new) (46a) In the exercise of powers to effect a conversion to equity under the bail-in tool, attention should be paid to the legal form of the institution concerned because the conversion of claims or debt instruments to equity may not be appropriate, as for example in the case of shares in cooperatives.
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 47 (47) It is not appropriate to apply the bail- in tool to claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or otherwise guaranteed. However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective and achieves its objectives, it is desirable that it can be applied to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible.
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 47 (47) It is not appropriate to apply the bail- in tool to claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or otherwise guaranteed. However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective and achieves its objectives, it is desirable that it can be applied to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to exclude certain kinds of unsecured liability from the scope of application of the bail-in tool. For reasons of public policy and effective resolution, the bail-in tool should not apply
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 47 a (new) (47a) Considering the risks of contagion, liabilities arising from interbank money- market operations with an original maturity of less than one month and from derivatives which were entered by the institution to hedge risks are also excluded from bail-in.
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 48 (48)
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 48 a (new) (48a) Additionally, the credits of deposit guarantee schemes are also not susceptible to bail-in, and in case of insolvency proceedings the claims of depositors and of deposit guarantee schemes which were subrogated to the claims of depositors by virtue of payments made to depositors up to the amount of their guaranteed deposits under the scheme are granted a preferential claim so as to have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors in the event of insolvency of the credit institution.
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 49 (49) In general, resolution authorities should apply the bail-in tool in a way that respects the
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 50 Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 50 (50) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool it is appropriate to establish that
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 50 (50) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool it is appropriate to establish that the institutions should have at all times an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2006/49/EC excluding covered bonds as defined in article 52(4) of Council Directive 2009/65/EEC. Resolution authorities should also be able to require that this percentage is totally or partially composed of own funds and subordinated debt.
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 50 (50) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool it is appropriate to establish that the institutions should have at all times an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2006/49/EC. It is essential that the basis to which the percentage is applied is not itself subject to institutions’ own internal models and corresponds to simple, auditable balance sheet quantities. Resolution authorities should also be able to require that this percentage is totally or partially composed of own funds and subordinated debt and to vary the percentage applied to each institution according to its risk profile.
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 51 (51) Member States should ensure that Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments fully absorb losses at the point of non-viability of the issuing institution.
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 51 a (new) (51a) Member States should ensure that credit institutions do not hold liabilities issued by other credit institutions eligible for write-down under the bail-in tool in order to prevent any contagion effects as a result of a triggering event. Furthermore, the Commission should consider legislative proposals on the imposition of limits on the amount of liabilities eligible for bail-in that can be held by other types of financial institutions.
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 52 (52) The bail-in tool, maintaining the institution as a going concern, should maximise the value of the creditors’ claims, improve market certainty and reassure counterparties. In order to reassure investors and market counterparties and to minimise its impact it is necessary to allow not to apply the bail-in tool until 1 January 201
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 52 a (new) (52a) Resolution authorities should be able to make only partial use of the bail-in tool, or not to apply it, where an assessment of the potential impact on the stability of the financial system in the Member States concerned and in the rest of the Union demonstrates that its use would be contrary to the overall economic and financial interests of the Member State or the Union as a whole.
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 54 (54) It is not necessary to prescribe the exact means through which the resolution authorities should intervene in the insolvent institution. The resolution authorities should have the choice between taking control through a direct intervention in the institution or through executive order. They should decide according to the resolution plan and to the circumstances of the case. It does not appear necessary for efficient cooperation between Member States to impose a single model at this stage.
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 63 a (new) (63a) This Directive should provide a framework for the group resolution authorities and the other relevant resolution authorities to develop a group approach to resolution. Failing a coherent group approach to resolution, nationalisation of banking groups by legal entity that may be imposed by resolution authorities would put the integrity of internal market at risk, and may incentivise Member States to bail out banking groups and legal entities.
Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 67 (67) Cooperation should take place both with regard to subsidiaries of Union or third country groups and with regard to branches of Union or third country institutions. Subsidiaries of third country groups are enterprises established in the Union and therefore are fully subject to Union law, including the resolution tools provided for in this Directive. It is however necessary that Member States maintain the right to apply the resolution tools also to branches of institutions having their head office in third countries, when the recognition and application of third country proceedings related to a branch would endanger the financial stability in the Union or when Union depositors would not receive equal treatment with third country depositors. For this reasons, EBA should have the right, after consulting the national resolution authorities, to refuse recognition of third country proceedings with regard to Union branches of third countries institutions. If such unequal treatment of depositors is mandated by the banking, resolution or insolvency laws of the third country, Member States should have the right also to impose a prior subsidiarisation requirement on such branches.
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 68 (68) There are circumstances when the effectiveness of the resolution tools applied may depend on the availability of short- term funding for the institution or a bridge institution, the provision of guarantees to potential purchasers, or the provision of capital to the bridge institution. Notwithstanding the role of central banks in providing liquidity to the financial system even in times of stress, it is important that Member States use
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 68 (68) There are circumstances when the effectiveness of the resolution tools applied may depend on the availability of short- term funding for the institution or a bridge institution, the provision of guarantees to potential purchasers, or the provision of capital to the bridge institution. Notwithstanding the role of central banks in providing liquidity to the financial system even in times of stress, it is important that Member States set up financing arrangements to avoid that the funds needed for such purposes come from
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 69 (69) As a principle, contributions to the deposit guarantee schemes should be collected from the industry prior to and independently of any operation of resolution. When prior funding is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 69 (69)
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 70 Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 70 (70) In order to reach a critical mass and to avoid pro-cyclical effects which would arise if
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 70 (70) In order to reach a critical mass and to avoid pro-cyclical effects which would arise if financing arrangements had to rely solely on ex post contributions in a systemic crisis, it is indispensable that the ex-ante available financial means of the national financing arrangements amount to a certain target level. Furthermore, the national financing arrangements should have the power to raise the level of ex- ante contributions.
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 71 (71) In order to ensure a fair calculation of contributions to the deposit guarantee schemes and provide incentives to operate under a less risky model, contributions to national
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 71 Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 71 (71) In order to ensure a fair calculation of contributions and provide incentives to operate under a less risky model, contributions to national financing arrangements should take account of the degree of credit, liquidity and market risks incurred by credit institutions.
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 72 (72) Ensuring effective resolution of failing financial institutions within the Union is an essential element in the completion of the internal market. The failure of such institutions has an effect not only on the financial stability of the markets where it directly operates but also on the whole Union financial market. With the completion of the internal market in financial services the interplay between the different national financial systems is reinforced. Institutions operate outside their Member State of establishment and are interrelated to each other through the interbank and other markets which, in essence are pan-European. Ensuring effective financing of the resolution of those institutions at equal conditions across Member States is in the best interest of the Member States in which they operate but also of all the Member States in general as a means to ensure equal conditions of competition and improve the functioning of the single Union financial market.
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 73 Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 73 (73) In order to build up the resilience of the European System of Financing Arrangements, and in line with the objective requiring that financing should come primarily from the industry rather than from public budgets, national arrangements should be able to borrow from each other on a voluntary basis in case of need.
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 73 (73) In order to build up the resilience of the European System of Financing
Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 74 (74) While financing arrangements are set up at national level, they should be mutualised in the context of group resolution.
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 74 a (new) (74a) Member States should design their financial arrangements envisaging their possible future merger, partial or total, into a European Resolution Fund.
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 75 Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 75 Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 77 Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 82 (82) When preparing and drawing up delegated acts, the Commission should ensure the early and on-going transmission of information on relevant documents to the European Parliament and the Council.
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 83 (83) The European Parliament and the Council should have t
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 83 (83) The European Parliament and the Council should have t
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 96 (96) In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of Member States and the
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a directive Title I SCOPE, DEFINITIONS
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. This Directive lays down rules and procedures relating to the recovery and resolution of the following:
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) credit institutions
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) The competent authorities shall ensure when establishing and applying the requirements under this Directive and when using the different tools at their disposal to take account of risk, size, legal status interconnectedness, the nature, the scope and the complexity of the activities of institutions and membership to an IPS as according to Art. 80(8) CRD or other cooperative mutual solidarity systems as according to Art. 80(7) CRD and Art. 3 CRD.
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 (new) Credit institutions in public ownership covered by a letter of guarantee from a Member State or a subsidiary level of public authority in a Member State shall be excluded from the scope of this Directive.
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) Public special credit institutions owned by regional or central governments and/or provided with explicit guarantee arrangements or comparable liability instruments by these governments shall be exempted from the regulatory scope of this Directive.
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) The following institutions shall be excluded from the scope of the Directive: (a) bridging institutions; (b) development banks.
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) For the purposes of resolving disputes between competent authorities in cross- border situations Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 shall apply throughout this Directive.
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) In accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, this Directive shall apply exclusively to all those institutions specified in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of paragraph (1) whose total assets, on the level of the individual firm or on the consolidated level of the group, within the meaning of Article 137(5) of the proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements [COM(2011)0452], are greater than or equal to EUR 70 billion.
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) 2. Institutions the failure of which, because of their structure, type of activity, limited size, risk profile, limited interconnectedness with other institutions or the financial system generally, or because they are part of an institutional protection scheme as referred to in Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, would not have a negative impact on financial stability in the event of either an institution-specific crisis or a systemic financial crisis shall be excluded from the scope of the Directive as specified in paragraph 1.
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a directive Article 1 a (new) Article 1 a The competent authorities shall ensure when establishing and applying the requirements under this Directive and when using the different tools at their disposal to take account of risk, size, legal status interconnectedness, the nature, the scope and the complexity of the activities of institutions and membership to an IPS and other cooperative solidarity systems as according to Art. 80(8) CRD and Art. 3 CRD.
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) ‘resolution’ means the restructuring of an institution in order to ensure the continuity of its essential functions, preserve financial stability and restore the viability of all or part of that institution. The resolution phase is formally declared by the resolution authorities when conditions are met;
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) ‘resolution’ means the restructuring of an institution in order to ensure the continuity of its essential functions
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) ‘resolution’ means the restructuring of an institution in order to ensure the continuity of its essential functions, preserve financial stability and restore the viability of all or part of that institution; The resolution phase is formally declared by the resolution authority when conditions are met;
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) (1a) ‘early intervention’ means any action taken by a competent authority or any preventive and supportive measures taken by the DGS or by the IPS in consultation with a competent authority before the resolution phase is formally declared.
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) (1a) ‘early intervention’ means any action taken by a competent authority or by the DGS or by the IPS in consultation with a competent authority before the resolution phase is formally declared.
Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4 Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new) (7a) ‘IPS’ means an Institutional Protection Scheme meeting the requirements laid down in art. 80(8) of Directive 48/2006/CE.
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new) (7a) ‘IPS’ means an Institutional Protection Scheme meeting the requirements laid down in art. 80(8) of Directive 48/2006/CE.
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 8 Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12 Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 13 Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 14 Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 19 (19) ‘resolution’ power
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 23 (23) ‘institution’ means a credit institution
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 24 a (new) (24a) ‘management body’ means the body or bodies of an institution, appointed in accordance with national law, that is empowered to set the institution’s strategy, objectives and overall direction, and which oversees and monitors management decision-making. This shall include persons who effectively direct the business of the institution;
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 24 b (new) (24b) ‘senior management’ means those individuals who exercise executive functions within an institution and who are responsible and accountable to the management body for the day-to-day management of the institution;
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 26 (26) ‘extraordinary public financial support’ means State Aid within the meaning of Article 107 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or any other public financial support at supra-national level, that is provided in order to preserve or restore the viability, liquidity or solvency of an institution;
Amendment 296 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 26 a (new) (26a) ‘systemic crisis’ means a disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy.
Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 36 – point a Amendment 298 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 41 (41) ‘debt instruments’ referred to in points (d), (i), (l) and (m) of Article 56(1) means
Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 63 a (new) (63a) ‘eligible deposits’: deposits within the meaning of Directive 94/19/EC that are not covered by Article 7(2) of Directive 94/19/EC;
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 70 (70) ‘relevant parent institution’ means a parent institution in a Member State, a Union parent institution
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 73 (73) ‘termination right’ means a right to terminate a contract on an event of default as defined in or for the purposes of the contract, and includes any related right to accelerate
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 74 (74) ‘institution under resolution’ means an institution
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 76 (76) ‘Union parent undertaking’ means a Union parent institution
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 83 a (new) (83a) ‘Excessive speculation’ means positions held by any person, including any group or class of persons, which do not objectively reduce risks directly related to that person’s commercial activities and in which the counterparty is not reducing risks directly related to its commercial activities.
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 83 a (new) (83a) ‘early intervention’ means any action taken by a competent authority, or any preventive and supportive measures taken by the DGS where allowed or by the IPS in consultation with a competent authority before a resolution phase is formally declared.
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 83 b (new) (83b) ‘Early intervention’ means any action taken by a competent authority, or any preventive and supportive measures taken by the IPS in consultation with a competent authority before a resolution phase is formally declared.
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph 3 Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member State
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one
Amendment 312 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one
Amendment 313 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one
Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 1. Each Member States shall designate one or more resolution authorities that are empowered to apply the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers having regard to the national legal system.
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 2 2. Resolution authorities shall be public administrative authorities endowed with administrative and financial independence.
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities may be the competent authorities for supervision for the purposes of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities, provided that Member States adopt rules and arrangements necessary to avoid conflicts of interest between the functions of supervision pursuant to Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC or the other functions of the relevant authority and the functions of resolution authorities pursuant to this Directive, including rules regarding professional secrecy. In particular, Member States shall ensure that, within the competent authorities, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities there is a separation between the resolution function and the supervisory or other functions of the relevant authority. The resolution function shall pursue only the objectives defined in this Directive.
Amendment 319 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities may be the competent authorities for supervision for the purposes of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities, provided that Member States adopt
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities may be the competent authorities for supervision for the purposes of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities, provided that Member States adopt
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities may be the competent authorities for supervision for the purposes of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities, provided that Member States adopt rules and arrangements necessary to avoid conflicts of interest between the functions of supervision pursuant to Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC or the other functions of the relevant authority and the functions of resolution authorities pursuant to this Directive. In particular, Member States shall ensure that, within the competent authorities, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities there is a separation between the resolution function and the supervisory or other functions of the relevant authority and that there are different decision taking bodies for the supervision functions and for the resolution functions.
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution authorities
Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 4 Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 4 Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Where the designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the competent ministry in a Member State, Member States may require that any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive shall be taken in consultation with the competent ministry where they would be likely to have implications for public funds.
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Where the designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the competent ministry in a Member State, any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive shall be taken in consultation with the competent ministry. However, if such decision may lead to systemic or national implications and/or if it arises out of a systemic international crisis, than the competent ministry shall have the ultimate decision making regarding any decision of the designated authority.
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Where the designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the competent ministry in a Member State, any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive
Amendment 329 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Where the designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the competent ministry in a Member State, any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive shall be
Amendment 330 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5 5. Where the designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the competent ministry in a Member State,
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5a (new) 5a. Where the resolution authority designated in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the central bank, any decision of the resolution authority pursuant to this Directive shall be communicated to the central bank without delay.
Amendment 332 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Where the resolution designated in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the central bank, any decision of the resolution authority pursuant to this directive shall be communicated to the central bank without delay.
Amendment 333 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that the authorities designated in accordance paragraph 1 have the expertise, resources and operational capacity to apply resolution measures, and are able to exercise their powers with the speed and flexibility that are necessary to achieve the resolution objectives. Member States may provide for the authorities referred to in paragraph 1 to transfer specific tasks to recognised deposit guarantee schemes, where such schemes have the mechanisms necessary for early intervention within the meaning of Title III and for resolution within the meaning of Title IV.
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 6 6. Member States shall ensure that the authorit
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. EBA should develop the required standards of expertise, resources and operational capacity and monitor the implementation of this paragraph also through periodical peer reviews. If needed, EBA shall require the designated authorities to take all measures necessary to ensure full compliance with such standards.
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 7 Amendment 337 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 7 Amendment 338 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 7 Amendment 339 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 7 Amendment 340 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 7 Amendment 341 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 7 Amendment 342 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 8 8. Member States shall inform European Banking Authority (EBA) of the national authority
Amendment 343 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 8 8. Member States shall inform European Banking Authority (EBA) of the national authority
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 8 8. Member States shall inform European Banking Authority (EBA) of the national authority
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 8 8. Member States shall inform European Banking Authority (EBA) of the national authority
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority and its staff are protected against liability arising from action taken or not taken in discharge or purported discharge of its functions unless the act or omission implies negligence or misconduct that justifies indemnity in accordance with national law.
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive shall be taken in consultation with the European Banking Authority.
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 a (new) Article 3 a Cooperation 1. Where the resolution authority and the competent authority pursuant to Directive 2006/48/EC are separate entities, Member States shall require that they cooperate closely in the preparation, planning and application of resolution decisions. 2. Where the institution exercises any investment services or activities as defined in Article 4(1)(2) of Directive 2004/39/EC, the competent authority and the resolution authority shall consult the competent authority as defined in Article 4(1)(22) of that Directive on any early intervention measure and on any resolution action before it is taken and, where the consultation is not possible, keep the competent authority as defined in Article 4(1)(22) of that Directive informed.
Amendment 349 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 a (new) Article 3 a Decisions taken by the resolution authorities and by the EBA throughout this Directive shall preserve the financial stability, and minimize adverse economic and social effects, in the Member Sates where a cross-border banking group operates.
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a directive Article 3 b (new) Article 3 b Institutions with cross-border activity Decisions taken by competent authorities, resolution authorities and the EBA throughout this Directive shall take into account the potential impact of the decision in all the Member States where the institution or the group operate and preserve financial stability and minimise economic and social effects in those Member States.
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the nature of its business, its shareholding structure, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, or on the real economy, Member States shall ensure that competent and resolution authorities determine the extent to which the following apply to institutions:
Amendment 352 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the nature of its business, its size, its membership of a joint liability scheme or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, Member States shall ensure that competent and resolution authorities determine the extent to which the following apply to institutions:
Amendment 353 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the nature of its business, its size, its legal form, its complexity or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, Member States shall
Amendment 354 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the legal model of the institution, the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, having also regard to the existence of IPS for those institutions which participate in them, Member States shall ensure that competent and resolution authorities determine the extent to which the following apply to institutions:
Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the legal model of the institution, the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, having also regard to the existence of IPS for those institutions which participate in them, Member States shall ensure that competent and resolution authorities determine the extent to which the following apply to institutions:
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, Member States shall ensure that competent and resolution authorities determine the
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the legal structure of the institution, the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, membership of an IPS as according to Article 80(8) CRD or other cooperative solidarity systems as according to Article 3 CRD. Member States shall ensure that competent and resolution authorities determine the extent to which the following apply to institutions:
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the institution could have, due to the nature of its business, its size or its interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions,
Amendment 359 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a (a)
Amendment 360 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) the frequency with which institutions shall update their recovery and resolution plans provided for in Articles 5, 7, 9 and 11;
Amendment 361 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) the requirement to draft recovery and resolution plans under articles 5 and 9 and the assessment of resolvability under Article 13.
Amendment 362 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) The obligation to draw up and maintain a recovery plan is not necessary for those institutions for which the failure, due to its reduced size or limited interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, would not have both in the case of an idiosyncratic event or at time of broader financial instability or system wide events, an adverse effect on financial stability including through contagion to other institutions. Competent authorities can define triggers after whose occurrence even the aforementioned institutions have to draw up a recovery plan.
Amendment 363 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) The obligation to draw up and maintain a recovery plan is not necessary for those institutions for which the failure, due to its reduced size or limited interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial system in general, would not have both in the case of an idiosyncratic event or at time of broader financial instability or system wide events, an adverse effect on financial stability including through contagion to other institutions. Competent authorities can define triggers after which occurrence even the aforementioned institutions have to draw up a recovery plan.
Amendment 364 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b (b)
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new) Member States shall make sure that competent and resolution authorities take into account the structure, business activity, size and interconnectedness of the institution when applying measures and instruments set out in this Directive.
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new) The Member States’ competent and resolution authorities shall establish the scope of recovery and resolution plans as well as the details of information to be required in relation to size, structure, risk profile, type of activity, interconnectedness with other financial institutions and the financial system generally and nature and extent of cross- border activity, and shall review these requirements regularly.
Amendment 367 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new) The Member States’ competent and resolution authorities shall, when implementing the requirements of the Directive and the measures and instruments provided for therein, take particular account of structure, type of activity, size, risk, interconnectedness with other institutions and membership of an institutional protection scheme within the meaning of Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 368 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new) Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010[c1] .
Amendment 369 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. In applying provisions set out by in this Directive not referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authorities and resolution authorities of the Member States shall take into account the structure, business model, size, risk, interconnectedness as well as membership of an institutional protection scheme as referred to Article 80 (8) of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 370 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) Amendment 371 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall provide that if competent authorities and, where relevant, resolution authorities consider that the failure of a specific institution due to, among other things, its size, its business model or its interconnectedness to other institutions, or to the financial system in general, will not have a negative effect on financial markets, other institutions or on funding conditions, either of the following requirements may be waived: i. the requirement for an institution to maintain recovery plans provided for in article 5(1) and the requirement to maintain a resolution plan in article 9(1), or ii. the requirement to update recovery and resolution plans at least annually provided for in Article 5(2) and the requirement to review the resolution plan at least annually provided for in Article 9(3). Following a change to the legal or organisational structure, business or financial situations of the institutions referred to in the first subparagraph, the competent authority and, where relevant, resolution authorities shall assess the continued relevance of the waivers provided for above.
Amendment 372 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall ensure that the competent national authorities and resolution authorities, when establishing the criteria referred to in paragraph 1, take account of the structure of joint schemes and of whether institutions are members of protection schemes within the meaning of Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Institutions the failure of which, because of their structure, type of activity, limited size, risk profile, limited interconnectedness with other institutions or the financial system generally, or because they are part of an institutional protection scheme within the meaning of Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, would not have a negative impact, via contagion, on financial stability in the event of either an institution-specific crisis or a systemic financial crisis shall be excluded from the obligation to draw up recovery plans.
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The authorities and, where applicable, resolution authorities, in their decision on simplified obligations, may also waive the requirement that an institution draw up recovery and resolution plans and/or review and update such plans annually.
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 376 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 2 2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 in order to specify the criteria referred to in paragraphs 1 and 1a, for assessing, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 1a, the impact of an institution failure on financial markets, on other institutions and on funding conditions.
Amendment 377 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 378 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3 Amendment 379 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Competent and resolution authorities shall inform EBA of the way they have applied the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 to institutions in their jurisdiction. EBA shall report to the Commission
Amendment 380 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The contents of the plans referred to in Articles 5, 7, 9 and 11 shall not be revealed to anyone, including the institution’s shareholders, with the exception of the competent authorities, resolution authorities, and the persons involved in their preparation and approval.
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The plans referred to in Articles 5, 7, 9 and 11 of this Directive are confidential and shall not be revealed to anyone except to the competent authorities and the resolution authorities according to this Directive.
Amendment 382 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 a (new) Article 4 a Scenarios to be used when drawing up recovery and resolution plans EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying scenarios to be used for the purposes of Article 5(5) and 9(2). EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 383 #
Proposal for a directive Article 4 a (new) Amendment 620 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, assess the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 621 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, assess the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. An institution or group shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying the different resolution tools and powers to the institution and group without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for the financial systems, including in circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the institution is situated, having regard to the economy or financial stability in that same or other Member State or the Union and with a view to ensure the continuity of critical functions carried out by the institution or group
Amendment 622 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in order to draw up the resolution plans referred to in Section 3 of Chapter I of the present Title and in consultation with competent authorities, assess the extent to which institutions and groups are
Amendment 623 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities and the EBA, assess the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. An institution or group
Amendment 624 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, assess the extent to which institutions and groups are resolvable without the assumption of extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. An institution or group shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying the different resolution tools and powers to the institution and group w
Amendment 625 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, assess the extent to which institutions
Amendment 626 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. A group shall be deemed resolvable if the detailed ex ante principles for responsibility sharing as referred to in article 11.3(e) are assessed as being sufficient and appropriate by the group level resolution authority.
Amendment 627 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The Resolution Authority shall inform the Competent Authorities, SSM and EBA, about its findings.
Amendment 628 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The resolution authorities shall inform within two weeks their respective National Parliament of the cases where institutions under their assessment are not deemed to be resolvable. This information shall be treated as confidential.
Amendment 629 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. EBA shall inform within two weeks the European Parliament of the cases where groups are not deemed to be resolvable. This information shall be treated as confidential.
Amendment 630 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 3 Amendment 631 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 3 3. EBA, in consultation with ESRB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the
Amendment 632 #
Proposal for a directive Article 13 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Competent authorities will not be authorised to request entities to address any of the matters specified in Section C of the Annex until the Commission has adopted the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 633 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that when, pursuant to an assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 13, a resolution authority, in consultation with the competent authority and the institution, determines that there are potential substantive impediments to the resolvability of an institution, the resolution authority shall notify in writing that determination to the institution.
Amendment 634 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that when, pursuant to an assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 13, a resolution authority determines that there are
Amendment 635 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The periods, respectively of six and eight months, referred to in Articles 9(1) and 12(4) are suspended since the notification referred to in the previous paragraph until the effective removal of any impediments to resolvability.
Amendment 636 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 2 2. Within four months of the date of receipt of a notification made in accordance with paragraph 1, the institution shall propose to the
Amendment 637 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 2 2. Within four months of the date of receipt of a notification made in accordance with paragraph 1, the institution shall propose to the resolution authority measures to address or remove the substantive impediments identified in the notification. The resolution authority, in consultation with the competent authorities, shall assess whether those measures effectively address or remove the substantive impediments in question.
Amendment 638 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the resolution authority assesses that the measures proposed by an institution in accordance with paragraph 2 do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments in question, it shall, in consultation with the competent
Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the resolution authority assesses that the measures proposed by an institution in accordance with paragraph 2 do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments in question, it shall, where necessary and proportionate, subject to paragraph 5 and in consultation with the competent
Amendment 640 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the resolution authority assesses that the measures proposed by an institution in accordance with paragraph 2 do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments in question, it shall, where necessary and proportionate, subject to paragraph 5 and in consultation with the competent authorities, identify alternative measures that may achieve that objective, and notify in writing those measures to the institution.
Amendment 641 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the resolution authority assesses that the measures proposed by an institution in accordance with paragraph 2 do not effectively reduce or remove the impediments in question, it shall, where necessary and proportionate and in consultation with the competent authorities, identify alternative measures that may achieve that objective, and notify in writing those measures to the institution.
Amendment 642 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 3. Where the
Amendment 643 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new) In identifying alternative measures, the resolution authority shall demonstrate how the measures proposed by the institution were not able to remove the impediment to resolution and how the alternative measures proposed are proportionate in removing impediments to resolution, and how other less intrusive measures are not sufficient.
Amendment 644 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority, in consultation with the competent authority, draws up a Code of Conduct on the assessment of resolvability which includes the principles and criteria on the resolution authority's measures to proceed to a removal of impediments to resolvability.
Amendment 645 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards for specifying the content of the Code of Conduct referred to in the previous paragraph. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 646 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. For the purposes of paragraph 3,
Amendment 647 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point b Amendment 648 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) requiring the institution to limit its maximum individual and aggregate exposures in accordance with Regulation EU [.../...CRR];
Amendment 649 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) requiring the institution to limit its maximum individual and aggregate exposures on both a risk weighted or unweighted basis;
Amendment 650 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) requiring the institution
Amendment 651 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point c (c) imposing specific or regular additional information requirements relevant for resolution purposes;
Amendment 652 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point d Amendment 653 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point d (d) requiring the institution to divest specific assets or simplify its hedging strategies;
Amendment 654 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point d (d) requiring the institution to
Amendment 655 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point e Amendment 656 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point e (e) requiring the institution to
Amendment 657 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point f Amendment 658 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point f Amendment 659 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point g Amendment 660 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point g (g) requiring changes to legal or operational structures of the institution
Amendment 661 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point g (g) requiring changes to legal or operational structures of the institution, including where appropriate the structural separation of proprietary trading activities from relationship banking activities, so
Amendment 662 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point g (g) requiring
Amendment 663 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point h Amendment 664 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point h Amendment 665 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point h Amendment 666 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point h (h) requiring a parent undertaking to set up a parent financial holding company or operational company in a Member State or a Union parent financial holding company or operational company;
Amendment 667 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point i Amendment 668 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point i Amendment 669 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point i Amendment 670 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point i Amendment 671 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point i a (new) (ia) requiring an institution to take steps to meet the minimum requirement for eligible liabilities parent undertaking, or a company referred to in point c and d of Article 1 to issue the debt instruments or loans referred to in Article 39.2
Amendment 672 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point j Amendment 673 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 4 – point j a (new) (ja) requiring changes to the detailed ex ante principles for responsibility sharing referred to in paragraph 11.3(e)
Amendment 674 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution authorities shall not base a determination in accordance with paragraph 1 on impediments resulting from factors beyond the control of the institution, including: (a) the operational and financial capacity of the resolution authority and resolution fund; (b) impediments which are as a result of compliance with Union of national legislation or regulations; (c) the absence of agreements pursuant to Article 11 or agreements pursuant to Article 88 with relevant third country authorities.
Amendment 675 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution authorities shall not base a determination in accordance with paragraph 1 on impediments resulting from factors beyond the control of the institution, including: (a) the operational and financial capacity of the resolution authority and resolution financing arrangements; (b) impediments which exist or arise as a result of compliance with Union or national legislation or regulations; (c) the absence of agreements pursuant to Article 11 or agreements pursuant to Article 88 with relevant third country authorities.
Amendment 676 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 5 5. Resolution authorities shall not base a determination in accordance with paragraph 1 on impediments resulting from factors beyond the control of the institution, including: (a) the operational and financial capacity of the resolution authority
Amendment 677 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 6 – introductory part 6. A notification within the Code of Conduct on the Assessment of Resolvability made pursuant to paragraph 1 or 3 shall meet the following requirements:
Amendment 678 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Member States shall ensure that institutions that are affected by measures decided by resolution authorities accordingly to this Article have appropriate rights of appeal of those decisions, namely the right of judicial review.
Amendment 679 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 7. Before indentifying any measure referred to in paragraph 3, resolution authorities shall duly consider the potential effect of those measures on the particular institution, on the stability of the financial system in other Member States and Union as a whole.
Amendment 680 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 7. Before i
Amendment 681 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 7. Before indentifying any measure referred to in paragraph 3 as necessary and proportionate, resolution authorities shall duly consider the potential effect of those measures on the s
Amendment 682 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 7. Before indentifying any measure referred to in paragraph 3, resolution authorities shall duly consider the potential effect of those measures on the stability of the financial system in other Member States. EBA, in consultation with the ESRB, may issue guidelines concerning financial stability interactions with other Member States.
Amendment 683 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Member States shall ensure that institutions that are affected by the taking of measures by a resolution authority under this article have adequate rights of appeal and review, including judicial review, concerning such decision
Amendment 684 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Member States shall ensure that institutions affected by measures taken by a resolution authority pursuant to this article have adequate opportunities for appealing against, and seeking review of, this decision.
Amendment 685 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Member States shall ensure that: (a) institutions that are affected by the taking of measures by a resolution authority under this article have adequate rights of appeal and review, including judicial review, concerning such decision; (b) necessary legislative measures are taken to remove impediments which exist or arise as a result of compliance with Union or national legislation or regulations.
Amendment 686 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 687 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft
Amendment 688 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft
Amendment 689 #
Proposal for a directive Article 14 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 690 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the
Amendment 691 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in
Amendment 692 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and of the Member States where institutions have relevant branches, in consultation with the relevant competent authorities, shall consult each other within the resolution college and shall take all reasonable steps to reach a joint decision in regards to the application of measures identified in accordance with Article 14(3).
Amendment 693 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in consultation with the relevant competent authorities and the EBA, shall consult each other within the resolution college and shall take all reasonable steps to reach a joint decision in regards to the application of measures identified in accordance with Article 14(3).
Amendment 694 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. The group level resolution authorities
Amendment 695 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in consultation with the relevant competent authorities, shall consult each other within the resolution college and shall take all reasonable steps to reach a joint decision in regards to the application of measures identified in accordance with Article 14(3) as well as whether the detailed ex ante principles for the sharing of responsibility as referred to in 11.3(e) are deemed as not being sufficient or appropriate.
Amendment 696 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and to the resolution authorities of the
Amendment 697 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority,
Amendment 698 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and to the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, which will provide it to the subsidiaries under their supervision, and of the Member States where institutions have relevant branches. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the competent authorities, and shall analyse the substantive impediments to the effective application of the resolution tools and the exercising of the resolution powers in relation to the group. The report shall also recommend any measures that, in the authorities' view, are necessary or appropriate to remove those impediments.
Amendment 699 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and to the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the competent authorities, and shall analyse the substantive impediments to the effective application of the resolution tools and the exercising of the resolution powers in relation to the group. The report shall
Amendment 700 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and to the resolution
Amendment 701 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision
Amendment 702 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 2 2. The group level resolution authority
Amendment 703 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 4 4. The group level resolution authority shall communicate any measure proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision to the consolidating supervisor, EBA and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and of the Member States where institutions have relevant branches. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and of the Member States where institutions have relevant branches, in consultation with the
Amendment 704 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 4 4. The group level resolution authority shall communicate any measure proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision to the consolidating supervisor, EBA and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in consultation with the competent authorities and the EBA, shall do everything within their power to reach a joint decision within the resolution college regarding the identification of the material impediments, and if necessary, the assessment of the measures proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and the measures required by the authorities in order to
Amendment 705 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 4 4. The group level resolution authority shall communicate any measure proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision to the consolidating supervisor, EBA
Amendment 706 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 707 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 708 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 EBA may on
Amendment 709 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 EBA
Amendment 710 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 In the absence of a joint decision within four months from the date of submission of the report referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2, the group level resolution authority
Amendment 711 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 In the absence of a joint decision within four months from the date of submission of the report referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2, the group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor, shall make its own decision on the appropriate measures to be taken in accordance with Article 14(3) in relation to the group as a whole.
Amendment 712 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 In the absence of a joint decision within four months from the date of submission of
Amendment 713 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 In the absence of a joint decision between resolution authorities within four months from the date of submission of the report referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2,
Amendment 714 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 715 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 716 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 The decision shall be set out in a
Amendment 717 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 The decision shall be set out in a
Amendment 718 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 The decision shall be set out in a document containing a full reasoning and shall take into account the views and reservations of the other resolution authorities expressed during the four months period.
Amendment 719 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 720 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 721 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3 The decision referred to in the first subparagraph shall be
Amendment 722 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 723 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 3 a (new) The decision of the group level resolution authority shall take account of the need for resolution to be planned or coordinated by the resolution authorities concerned, and of the potential impact on the stability of the financial system in the Member States concerned. EBA may upon request assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19(1) second subparagraph of Regulation No (EC) 1093/2010.
Amendment 724 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4 Amendment 725 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4 Amendment 726 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4 Amendment 727 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4 Amendment 728 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 4 Where, at the end of the four-month period, any of the resolution authorities concerned has referred the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the group level resolution authority shall defer its decision and await any decision that EBA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation. EBA shall take its decision within one month and the four-month period shall be deemed the conciliation period within the meaning of that Regulation. The subsequent decision of the group level resolution authority shall be in conformity with the decision of EBA and set out in a Code of Conduct on the Assessment of Resolvability. The matter shall not be referred to EBA after the end of the four month period or after a joint decision has been reached.
Amendment 729 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards describing the content and standard form of the Code of Conduct on the Assessment of Resolvability which establishes (among others) the principles, criteria, management's right to challenge and deadlines on the authorities' measures to proceed to a removal of impediments to resolvability. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the draft implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 730 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 a (new) Amendment 731 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 b (new) 6b. The resolution authority of each Member State where a subsidiary is located may propose additional action in relation to a subsidiary in their Member State if it considers it necessary to ensure continuity of critical functions or to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, and provided that it does not interfere with the actions to be taken according to the group resolution authority in respect of the group as a whole. It must provide its proposal to the consolidating supervisor, group resolution authority and members of the resolution college. Within two months, these authorities may raise any concerns or objections. In the absence of any objections, the resolution authority may take the proposed action. Where the group resolution authority or other member of the college has raised an objection, the resolution authority must duly consider those objections and concerns and may then make a decision. The decision shall be set out in a reasoned document and shall take into account any objection of the other competent authorities and resolution authorities expressed during the four-month period. It shall give reasons for rejecting any proposals of the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and an assessment of the expected impact of its decision on the economy and financial stability in the Member State of the authorities where concerns have been raised.
Amendment 732 #
Proposal for a directive Article 15 – paragraph 6 c (new) Amendment 734 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in a Member State, or a Union parent institution, or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1 and its subsidiaries in another Member States or third countries that are institutions or financial institutions covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking, may enter into an agreement to provide financial support to any other party to the agreement that experiences financial difficulties, provided that the conditions laid down in this chapter are satisfied.
Amendment 735 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in a Member State, or a Union parent institution, or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1and its subsidiaries that are institutions or financial institutions covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking, may enter into a
Amendment 736 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. In order to overcome potential legal impediments to providing financial support within a group of institutions, Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in a Member State, or a Union parent institution, or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1and its subsidiaries that are institutions or financial institutions covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking, may enter into an agreement to provide financial support to any other party to the agreement that experiences financial difficulties, provided that the conditions laid down in this chapter are satisfied. The provisions in this chapter shall not restrict the operation of centralised funding within a group of institutions in normal circumstances.
Amendment 737 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in a Member State, or a Union parent institution, or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1and its subsidiaries that are institutions or financial institutions covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking,
Amendment 738 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. In order to overcome potential legal impediments to provide financial support within a group of institutions, Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in a Member State, or a Union parent institution, or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1and its subsidiaries that are institutions or financial institutions covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking, may enter into an agreement to provide financial support to any other party to the agreement that experiences financial difficulties, provided that the conditions laid down in this chapter are satisfied. The provisions in this Chapter shall not restrict the operation of centralised funding within a group of institutions in normal circumstances.
Amendment 739 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) A group financial support agreement shall not constitute a prerequisite: (a) to provide group financial support to any group entity that experiences financial difficulties if the institution decides to do so, on a case-by-case basis and according to the group policies if it does not represent a risk for the whole group. (b) to operate in a Member State or third country, even if requested by their competent authorities.
Amendment 740 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 are optional between institutions of the group, and, in case of existence, they should be kept strictly confidential, having the institutions the right to decide whether it is of their interest to participate in these arrangements.
Amendment 741 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Where in accordance with the terms of the agreement, a subsidiary agrees to provide financial support to the parent undertaking so that the parent undertaking in turn can provide this financial support to another subsidiary that experiences financial difficulties, the agreement shall include a reciprocal agreement by the subsidiary that experiences financial difficulties to provide financial support to the parent undertaking to reimburse the original subsidiary that provided the financial support.
Amendment 742 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 5 5. The agreement may only be concluded if, at the time the proposed agreement is made, in the opinion of the
Amendment 743 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. The conditions in this Article are without prejudice to, and shall not affect, the entry into and the maintenance of intra-group agreements in the normal course of business where such agreements are lawful under the national law of a Member State.
Amendment 744 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Financial transactions that are part of the group's day-to-day business operations are excluded from the group financial support framework.
Amendment 745 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. The large exposure limits provided in article 384 of EU Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms do not apply to intra-group financial support transactions that are put in place in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Member States shall remove any legal and practical impediment to the performance of such transactions.
Amendment 746 #
Proposal for a directive Article 16 – paragraph 6 b (new) 6b. Financial transactions that are not part of the Group's day-to-day business operations are excluded from the group financial support framework.
Amendment 748 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – title Review of proposed agreement by
Amendment 749 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 1 1. The parent undertakings and institutions which are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC shall submit to the consolidating supervisor an application for authorisation of any
Amendment 750 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 2 Amendment 751 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 4 4. The competent authorities shall do everything within their power to reach a joint decision, which will take into account the potential impact of the execution of the agreement in all the Member States where the group operates, on whether the terms of the proposed agreement are consistent with the conditions for financial support set out in Article 19 within four months from the date of receipt of the application by the consolidating supervisor. The joint decision shall be set out in a document containing the fully reasoned decision, which shall be provided to the applicant by the consolidating supervisor.
Amendment 752 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new) After reaching a joint decision by all interested competent authorities, the consolidating supervisor shall grant the authorisation if the terms of the proposed agreement are consistent with the conditions for financial support set out in Article 19.
Amendment 753 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 5 5. In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within
Amendment 754 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 5 5. In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within four months, the consolidating supervisor
Amendment 755 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 5 5. In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities
Amendment 756 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 5 5. In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within four months, the consolidating supervisor shall
Amendment 757 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 6 Amendment 758 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 6 Amendment 759 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 6 6. If, at the end of the
Amendment 760 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 6 6. If
Amendment 761 #
Proposal for a directive Article 17 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Member States shall remove any legal and practical impediment to intra-group financial support transactions that are put in place in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
Amendment 764 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 1 1. Member States
Amendment 765 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 1 1. Member States
Amendment 766 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 1 1. Member States m
Amendment 767 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 1 1. Member States may require that any proposed agreement that has been authorised by the competent authorities be submitted for approval to the shareholders meeting of every group entity that proposes to enter into the agreement. In this case, the agreement shall be valid only in respect of those parties whose shareholders' meeting has approved the agreement and after the new authorisation referred to in the next subparagraph. If the agreement that has been authorised by the competent authority is not approved by the shareholders meetings of every group entity which was entering into that agreement, the institutions referred to in Article 17(1) shall submit to the consolidating supervisor an application for authorisation of the agreement as duly amended. Subparagraphs 1 and 2 of this paragraph shall apply to the new agreement. Where competent authorities assess that the fact that the initially proposed agreement was not approved by the shareholders meetings of every group entity which was entering into that agreement deems the introduction of changes to the agreement that the institutions have not introduced, the consolidating supervisor shall require the applicant to submit, within two months, a revised proposed agreement for new authorisation. Subparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this paragraph shall apply to the new application and the new agreement.
Amendment 768 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 2 Amendment 769 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 770 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The group support agreement must be submitted for approval to the shareholders meeting of every group entity that proposed to enter into the agreement on an annual basis. The agreement shall be valid only in respect of those parties whose shareholders' meeting approve the agreement.
Amendment 771 #
Proposal for a directive Article 18 a (new) Article 18a Transmission of the group financial support agreements to resolution authorities Competent authorities shall transmit to the relevant resolution authorities the group financial support agreements they authorised and any changes thereto.
Amendment 773 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Financial support
Amendment 774 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Financial support pursuant to Article 16 may only be provided in accordance with a group financial support agreement if the following conditions are met:
Amendment 775 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the provision of financial support has the objective of preserving or restoring the financial stability of the group as a whole or any of the entities of the group;
Amendment 776 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 777 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new) (fa) The prudential rules on capital consumption and large exposures apply both for the lender of financial support and the recipient.
Amendment 778 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft
Amendment 779 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft
Amendment 780 #
Proposal for a directive Article 19 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the
Amendment 781 #
Proposal for a directive Article 20 Amendment 782 #
Proposal for a directive Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) how the financial support preserves or restores the financial stability of the group as a whole or any of the entities of the group;
Amendment 783 #
Proposal for a directive Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) that the financial support will not distort the single market.
Amendment 784 #
Proposal for a directive Article 20 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) Member states shall ensure their national laws did not prevent or impede the establishment and maintenance of intra-group support arrangements.
Amendment 785 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 Amendment 786 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 787 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 2 Amendment 788 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 3 Amendment 789 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 3 3. The competent authority shall immediately inform EBA, the consolidating supervisor and the competent authorities participating in the colleges of supervisors identified in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC, of its decision to prohibit or restrict the financial support.
Amendment 790 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 4 Amendment 791 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 4 Amendment 792 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 4 Amendment 793 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. Where the consolidating supervisor or the competent authority responsible for the entity receiving support has objections regarding the decision to prohibit or restrict the financial support, they may, within two days, refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation 1093/2010. In that case, EBA may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it by that Article. By way of derogation from the time limit provided for by Article 39, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1093/2010, EBA shall take any decision in accordance with Article 19(3) of Regulation 1093/2010 within
Amendment 794 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 5 Amendment 795 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. The decision to provide financial support which is not prohibited or restricted by the competent authority and the competent authority's decisions to prohibit or restrict the financial support shall be transmitted by competent authorities to the relevant resolution authorities.
Amendment 796 #
Proposal for a directive Article 21 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Member States shall ensure that rules under their insolvency regimes or special resolution regimes do not hinder the legal certainty and enforceability of intra-group transactions approved and put in place in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
Amendment 798 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 799 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that institutions that have entered into a group financial support agreement pursuant to Article 16 to make public a
Amendment 800 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall ensure that institutions that have entered into a group financial support agreement pursuant to Article 16
Amendment 801 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 802 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 – paragraph 4 Amendment 803 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 – paragraph 5 Amendment 804 #
Proposal for a directive Article 22 a (new) Amendment 805 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution
Amendment 806 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution does not meet or is likely to breach the
Amendment 807 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1.
Amendment 808 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution
Amendment 809 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where a competent authority judges that an institution does not meet or is likely to breach the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities
Amendment 810 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution does not meet
Amendment 811 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution does not meet or is likely to breach the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC, and in particular CET1 including any systemic or SIFI buffers and liquidity requirements, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities,
Amendment 812 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution does not meet or is likely to breach
Amendment 813 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an institution does not meet or is likely to breach the
Amendment 814 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) require the management of the institution to implement one or more of the arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan, or to update such recovery plan when the circumstances that led to the Early Intervention are different from the assumptions set out in the initial recovery plan;
Amendment 815 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) require recapitalization; (ab) suspend dividends distribution; (ac) restrict assets growth; (ad) dispose of assets; (ae) impose reorganization measures; (af) impose liquidation when the institution fails to restore adequate capitalization;
Amendment 816 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) upon verification of different assumptions, require the management of the
Amendment 817 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) where necessary beyond the content of the recovery plan, require the management of the institution to examine the situation, identify measures to overcome any problems identified and draw up an action program to overcome those problems and a timetable for its implementation;
Amendment 818 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) require the management of the institution to convene, or if the management fails to comply with this requirement convene directly, the shareholders meeting of the institution, propose the agenda and the adoption of certain decisions
Amendment 819 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) require the management of the institution to provide minutes of the management board meetings;
Amendment 820 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new) (cb) participate in meetings of the management board of the institution;
Amendment 821 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) re
Amendment 822 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) require the management of the institution to remove and replace one or more board members or managing directors if these persons are found unfit to perform their duties pursuant to Article 11 of Directive 2006/48/EC, or in cases of fraud or proven bad management;
Amendment 823 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) require the management of the institution to remove and replace one or more board members or managing
Amendment 824 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 825 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e (e) require the management of the institution to draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors to use if strictly necessary as the bank approaches the point of resolution;
Amendment 826 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e (e) require the management of the institution to draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors, according to the recovery plan;
Amendment 827 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point f Amendment 828 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point f Amendment 829 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point f (f) acquire, including through on-site inspections, all the information necessary to update the resolution plan in order to prepare for the eventual resolution of the institution, including carrying out an evaluation of the assets and liabilities of the institution
Amendment 830 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point g Amendment 831 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point g Amendment 832 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point g Amendment 833 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Member States must endow national resolution authorities with the same administrative resolution powers.
Amendment 834 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority draws up a Code of Conduct on the assessment whether if the institution is likely to breach the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 835 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. If the institution is in breach of the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC and there is no reasonable prospect that early intervention measures or alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent the institution meeting the conditions for resolution, and the conditions in paragraph 1 are met, the resolution authority shall have the power to: (a) acquire, including through on-site inspections, all the information necessary in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution, including carrying out an evaluation of the assets and liabilities of the institution; (b) contact potential purchasers in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution, subject to the conditions laid down in article 33(2) and the confidentiality provisions laid down in Article 76.
Amendment 836 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards for specifying the content of the Code of Conduct referred to in the previous paragraph. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 837 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 Amendment 838 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft
Amendment 839 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft implementing
Amendment 840 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft
Amendment 841 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 EBA shall submit those draft implementing
Amendment 842 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 843 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the
Amendment 844 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new) The application of measure (d) in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in company boards as provided for by national legislation or practice.
Amendment 845 #
Proposal for a directive Article 23 a (new) Article 23a In accordance with Article 6(2) of Directive 2003/6/EC, competent authorities may delay public disclosure of the application of early intervention measures pursuant to this article that would otherwise be required in accordance with Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/6/EC, where they consider it necessary and proportionate to ensure the effectiveness of the recovery plan and early intervention measures. Member States shall ensure that similar delays can be applied to any disclosures required under relevant listing rules.
Amendment 848 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 1 1. Where there is a significant or foreseeable imminent significant deterioration in the financial situation of an institution or where there are serious violations of law, regulations or bylaws or serious administrative irregularities,
Amendment 849 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 1 1. Where there is a significant deterioration in the financial situation of an institution or where there are serious violations of law, regulations or bylaws or serious administrative irregularities, and other measures
Amendment 850 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 1 1. Where there is a significant deterioration in the financial situation of an institution or where there are serious violations of law, regulations or bylaws or serious administrative irregularities, and other measures taken in accordance with Article 23 are not sufficient to reverse that deterioration, in such terms that, if no action is taken, the resolution authority would in the near future have to determine, according to Article 27, that the institution is failing or likely to fail, Member States shall ensure that competent authorities may, in consultation with resolution authorities, appoint a special manager to replace the management of the institution. Competent authorities shall make public the appointment of a special manager. Member States shall further ensure that the special manager has the qualifications, ability and knowledge
Amendment 851 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 1 1. Where there is a significant deterioration in the financial situation of an institution or where there are serious violations of law, regulations or bylaws or serious administrative irregularities, and other measures
Amendment 852 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The functions of the general meeting shall be suspended by effect of the appointment of a special manager except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.
Amendment 853 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The functions of the general meeting shall be suspended by effect of the appointment of a special manager except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.
Amendment 854 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 2 2. The special manager shall have all the powers of the management of the institution under the statutes of the institution and under national law, including the power to exercise all the administrative functions of the management of the institution. However, the special manager may
Amendment 855 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The special manager shall: (1) Conduct a fair valuation of the company under the terms of Article 24a; (2) Elaborate a report on the institution's situation based on the valuation conducted under the terms of Article 24a where it: i. updates the institution's financial situation; ii. grants an opinion regarding the institution's future viability; iii. recommends the restructuring of the institution or its entering into resolution; (3) Submit both options to the competent authorities, for approval; (4) Upon a decision of restructuring, the special manager shall draw up a restructuring plan that may include, among other measures, the voluntary renegotiation of debt with some or all of its creditors; (5) Gather information and take the necessary steps in order to prepare the institution for Resolution, if that is to be the case; (6) Contact potential purchasers in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 33(2) and the confidentiality provisions laid down in Article 77.
Amendment 856 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 4 4. Competent authorities may
Amendment 857 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. The special manager shall inform and consult with employees and their representatives. Where applicable, collective agreements, or other arrangements provided for by social partners, shall be respected in this regard.
Amendment 858 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 6 Amendment 859 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 – paragraph 7 Amendment 860 #
Proposal for a directive Article 24 a (new) Amendment 861 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – title Coordination of early intervention measures
Amendment 862 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – title Coordination of early intervention measures
Amendment 863 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 1 1. Where the conditions for the imposition of requirements under Article 23 of this Directive
Amendment 864 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 1 1. Where the conditions for the imposition of requirements under Article 23 of this Directive
Amendment 865 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 1 1. Where the conditions for the imposition of requirements under Article 23 of this Directive or the appointment of a special manager in accordance with Article 24 of this Directive are met in relation to a parent undertaking or an institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to
Amendment 866 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The consolidating supervisor and the other relevant competent authorities shall consider whether it is necessary to take measures in accordance with Article 23
Amendment 867 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The consolidating supervisor and the other relevant competent authorities shall consider whether it is necessary to take measures in accordance with Article 23
Amendment 868 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 The assessment shall take the form of a joint decision of the consolidating supervisor and the other relevant competent authorities, which will take into account the potential impact of the measure in all the Member States where the group operates. The joint decision shall be reached within five days from the date of the notification referred to in paragraph 1. The joint decision shall be reasoned and set out in a document, which shall be provided by the consolidating supervisor to the parent undertaking or institution that is subject to consolidated supervision.
Amendment 869 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 The assessment shall take the form of a joint decision of the consolidating supervisor, the EBA and the other relevant competent authorities. The joint decision shall be reached within five days from the date of the notification referred to in
Amendment 870 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 3 Amendment 871 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 3 3. EBA may on its own initiative assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article
Amendment 872 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 3 3. EBA may on its own initiative assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The advice given by EBA is not binding.
Amendment 873 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 3 3. EBA
Amendment 874 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 3 3. EBA may
Amendment 875 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Before taking their own decisions in accordance with paragraph 4, the competent authorities shall consult EBA. The decision shall consider the advice of EBA and explain any significant deviation from that advice.
Amendment 876 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 877 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 878 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 6 Amendment 879 #
Proposal for a directive Article 25 – paragraph 6 Amendment 880 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The resolution objectives referred to in paragraph 1 are the following, with decreasing significance:
Amendment 881 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to ensure the continuity of critical functions where these cannot be taken over by another institution without incurring unacceptable cost to public funds;
Amendment 882 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to
Amendment 883 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to
Amendment 884 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to ensure the continuity of critical functions and, as far as possible, continuity of counterparty positions;
Amendment 885 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including by preventing contagion, and maintaining market discipline, while protecting public funds and limiting or avoiding unnecessary destruction of value;
Amendment 886 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) to avoid
Amendment 887 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) to
Amendment 888 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability of each Member State and the European Union as a whole, including by preventing contagion, and maintaining market discipline;
Amendment 889 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) to protect
Amendment 890 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point d (d)
Amendment 891 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to
Amendment 892 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to avoid unnecessary destruction of value and to
Amendment 893 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point e (e) to protect depositors
Amendment 894 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point e (e) to
Amendment 895 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point e a (new) (ea) to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;
Amendment 896 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point f Amendment 897 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point f a (new) (fa) to prevent excessive speculation as defined in Article 2;
Amendment 898 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 899 #
Proposal for a directive Article 26 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to different provisions of this Directive,
Amendment 900 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 Amendment 901 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines that the institution is failing or likely to fail
Amendment 902 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall ensure that, in the case of resolution measures, the proportionality principle and the particularities of the legal form taken by a credit institution are strictly respected.
Amendment 903 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Resolution authorities shall also take resolution actions if the authorisation has been withdrawn according to Article 18 of Directive [CRD IV] and a resolution action is necessary in the public interest pursuant to paragraph 2.
Amendment 904 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The previous adoption of an early intervention measure according to Article 23 is not a condition to take a resolution action.
Amendment 905 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. By derogation from paragraph 1 resolution authorities may take action in cases where the institution has: (a) engaged in excessive speculation as defined in Article 2; (b) acted against the general public interest.
Amendment 906 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines that the institution is
Amendment 907 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines on the basis of objective and predefined criteria that the institution is failing or likely to fail;
Amendment 908 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the
Amendment 909 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the competent authority
Amendment 910 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the competent authority
Amendment 911 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action, other than a resolution action taken by the resolution authorities in respect of the institution, would prevent the failure of the institution within reasonable timeframe;
Amendment 912 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) Resolution authorities shall also take resolution actions if the authorisation has been withdrawn according to Article 18 of the Directive (CRD IV) and a resolution action is necessary in the public interest pursuant to paragraph 2.
Amendment 913 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) Resolution authorities shall provide guidance on the way in which they will judge trigger conditions, which they shall make public and communicate to EBA.
Amendment 914 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 Amendment 915 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1,
Amendment 916 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) the institution is in breach or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be in breach, in the near future, of the objective and predefined criteria for fulfilling its capital requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its own funds;
Amendment 917 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a (a) the institution is in breach or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be in breach, in the near future, of the
Amendment 918 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) the
Amendment 919 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c Amendment 920 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c (c) the
Amendment 921 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c (c) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be, in the near future, unable to pay its obligations on an ongoing basis as they fall due;
Amendment 922 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c (c) the institution is or
Amendment 923 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d – introductory part (d) the institution requires extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 924 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d – point i Amendment 925 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d – point ii Amendment 926 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 927 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Member States shall ensure that resolution tools pursuant to Article 31(2) are used only in accordance with the Member-State law applicable to the institution concerned. This shall apply, in particular, to institutions which have been set up in a form governed by public law and fulfil a public task assigned to them by law, and to institutions organised on a cooperative footing.
Amendment 928 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority draws a Code of Conduct on the assessment of if the institution is failing or likely to fail.
Amendment 929 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Member States shall ensure that institutions may be resolved only in accordance with the Member-State law applicable to the institution concerned by means of the application of the tools referred to in Article 31(2). This shall apply, in particular, to institutions which have been set up in a form governed by public law or fulfil a public task assigned to them by law, and to institutions organised on a cooperative footing.
Amendment 930 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards for specifying the content of the Code of Conduct referred to in the previous paragraph. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 931 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 4 Amendment 932 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 4 Amendment 933 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 4 4. EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to promote the convergence of supervisory and resolution practices regarding the interpretation of the different circumstances when an institution shall be considered as failing or likely to fail. EBA shall develop these guidelines at the latest by the date provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 115(1) of this Directive. These guidelines shall be made public and shall cover criteria for judging trigger points and use of resolution tools. EBA shall monitor compliance with these guidelines for the purposes of the review in Article 114a.
Amendment 934 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 5 Amendment 935 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 5 Amendment 936 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 5 Amendment 937 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 5 5. The Commission, taking into account, where appropriate, the experience
Amendment 938 #
Proposal for a directive Article 27 – paragraph 5 5. The Commission, taking into account, where appropriate, the experience acquired in the application of EBA guidelines,
Amendment 940 #
Proposal for a directive Article 28 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may take a resolution action in relation to a financial institution or firm referred to in point (b) of Article 1, when the conditions specified in Article 27(1)
Amendment 941 #
Proposal for a directive Article 28 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities shall take a resolution action in relation to a company referred to in points (c) or (d) of Article 1, when the conditions specified in Article 27(1) are met with regard to both the company referred to in points (c) or (d) of Article 1 and with regard to one or more subsidiaries which are institutions, provided that any group financial support agreements foreseen in Chapter III of Title II or any other possible form of group financial support is able to cease the conditions specified in Article 27(1) with regard to the company referred to in points (c) or (d) of Article 1.
Amendment 942 #
Proposal for a directive Article 28 – paragraph 4 4. Subject to paragraph 3 and by way of derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, notwithstanding the fact that a company referred to in point(c) or (d) of Article 1 may not meet the conditions established in Article 27 (1) resolution authorities may take resolution action with regards to a company referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article 1 when one or more of the subsidiaries which are institutions comply with the conditions established in Article 27 (1), (2) and (3) and their assets and liabilities represent the majority of the assets and liabilities of the group and action with regard to the company referred to in points
Amendment 943 #
Proposal for a directive Article 28 – paragraph 4 4. Subject to paragraph 3 and by way of derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, notwithstanding the fact that a company referred to in point(c) or (d) of Article 1 may not meet the conditions established in Article 27 (1) resolution authorities may take resolution action with regards to a company referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article 1 when one or more of the subsidiaries which are institutions comply with the conditions established in Article 27 (1), (2) and (3) and action with regard to the company referred to in points (c) or (d) of Article 1 is necessary for the resolution of one or more subsidiaries which are institutions or for the resolution of the group as a whole. This should only be done in preference to specific action with regard to the subsidiary where the failure threatens the group as a whole or the insolvency law of the Member State requires that groups be treated as a whole.
Amendment 944 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the
Amendment 945 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) the shareholders of the institution under resolution bear first losses;
Amendment 946 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) senior managers of the institution under resolution bear losses, both as shareholders and creditors;
Amendment 947 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims pursuant to Article 43 of this Directive;
Amendment 948 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) creditors of the institution under resolution, excluding depositors, bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims pursuant to this Directive;
Amendment 949 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims pursuant to Article 43 this Directive;
Amendment 950 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) creditors of the institution under resolution bear losses only after complet
Amendment 951 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 952 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) senior management of the institution under resolution is replaced subject to Member State law, by an administrator appointed by the resolution authority;
Amendment 953 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) senior management of the institution under resolution is replaced and a monitoring trustee is appointed by the creditors to control the application of the resolution tool and the management of the institution under resolution;
Amendment 954 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) senior management (as a whole or particular representatives) of the institution
Amendment 955 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 956 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) senior managers of the institution under resolution
Amendment 957 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) senior managers of the institution under resolution are subject to a temporary ban regarding the exercise of senior responsibility on another institution for up to 20 years or bear losses that are commensurate under civil or criminal law with their individual responsibility for the failure of the institution;
Amendment 958 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point f (f) no creditor incurs greater losses than those that would be incurred if the institution would have been wound down under normal insolvency proceedings.
Amendment 959 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new) (fa) claims of depositors are adequately protected.
Amendment 960 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new) (fa) claims of depositors with deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC are adequately protected on insolvency of the credit institution. In the case of third country claims of depositors due account shall be taken of reciprocal treatment of EU depositors.
Amendment 961 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new) (fa) claims of depositors with deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC are adequately protected on insolvency of the credit institution.
Amendment 962 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall ensure that resolution tools are applied proportionally and in accordance with the legal form of the credit institution concerned.
Amendment 963 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. In order to give effect to paragraph (1)(fa)new, Member States shall ensure that: (i) claims of depositors with deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC are granted a preferential claim so as to have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors in the event of insolvency of the credit institution; (ii) the depositor guarantee scheme subrogating to the rights of depositors with deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC is granted a preferential claim corresponding to the higher priority ranking than depositors pursuant to point (i), but only so far as concerns payments made to depositors up to the amount of their guaranteed deposits under the scheme.
Amendment 964 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. For the purposes of paragraph 1(fa), Member States shall ensure that the claims of depositors are granted a preferential claim so as to have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors in the event of insolvency of the credit institution.
Amendment 965 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Member States shall ensure that when Deposit Guarantee Schemes are subrogated to the claims of depositors by virtue of payments made to depositors up to the amount of their guaranteed deposits under the scheme, the preferential claim as established in the previous paragraph is also applicable.
Amendment 966 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 1 c (new) 1c. Member States shall require that, where an institution meets the conditions for resolution and the resolution authority decides to apply a resolution tool foreseen in Chapter III of this Title to that institution, before any resolution action is taken resolution authorities exercise the write down power in accordance with the provisions of Articles 51 and 52 in relation to relevant capital instruments issued by an institution without delay.
Amendment 967 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 2 Amendment 968 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 969 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. In order to give effect to paragraph 1(g), Member States shall ensure that: (i) claims of depositors with deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC are granted a preferential claim so as to have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors in the event of insolvency of the credit institution; (ii) the depositor guarantee scheme subrogating to the rights of depositors with deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC is granted a preferential claim corresponding to the higher priority ranking than depositors pursuant to point (i), but only so far as concerns payments made to depositors up to the amount of their guaranteed deposits under the scheme.
Amendment 970 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. When applying the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers, resolution authorities shall inform and consult with the employees and their representatives. Where applicable, collective agreements, or other arrangements provided for by social partners, shall be respected in this regard.
Amendment 971 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Extraordinary public financial support will not be considered before the tools referred to in Paragraph 1 are implemented to their full extent.
Amendment 972 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 – paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. When resolution authorities apply resolution tools and exercise resolution powers, this shall be done without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in company boards as provided for by national legislation or practice.
Amendment 973 #
Proposal for a directive Article 29 a (new) Article 29a Special management 1. Member States shall ensure that in the resolution of an institution competent authorities may appoint a special manager to replace the management of the institution. Competent authorities shall make public the appointment of a special manager. Member States shall further ensure that the special manager has the qualifications, ability and knowledge required to carry out his or her functions. 2. The special manager shall have all the powers of the management of the institution under the statutes of the institution and under national law, including the power to exercise all the administrative functions of the management of the institution. However, the special manager may only exercise the power to convene the general meeting of the shareholders of the institution and to set the agenda with the prior consent of the competent authority. 3. The special manager shall have the statutory duty to take all the measures necessary and to promote solutions in order to redress the financial situation of the institution and restore the sound and prudent management of its business and organization. Where necessary, that duty shall override any other duty of management in accordance with the statutes of the institution or national law, insofar as they are inconsistent. Those solutions may include an increase of capital, reorganisation of the ownership structure of the institution or takeovers by institutions that are financially and organisationally sound. 4. Competent authorities may set limits to the action of a special manager or require that certain acts of the special manager be subject to the competent authority's prior consent. The competent authorities may remove the special manager at any time. 5. Member States shall require that a special manager draw up reports for the appointing competent authority on the economic and financial situation of the institution and on the acts performed in the conduct of his duties, at regular intervals set by the competent authority and at the beginning and the end of its mandate. 6. Subject to the provisions in paragraphs 1 to 5 the appointment of the special manager shall not prejudice the rights of the shareholders or owners provided for in accordance Union or national company law.
Amendment 975 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 976 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 1 1. Before taking resolution action and in particular, for the purposes of Articles 31, 34, 36, 41, 42 and 65, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution is carried out
Amendment 977 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 1 1. Before taking resolution action and in particular, for the purposes of Articles
Amendment 978 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 1 1. Before taking resolution action and in particular, for the purposes of Articles 31, 34, 36, 41
Amendment 979 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 1 1. Before taking resolution action and in particular, for the purposes of Articles 31, 34, 36, 41, 42 and 65, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets
Amendment 980 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. For the purpose of paragraph 1 resolution authorities shall ensure that the institutions provide, at least annually or more frequently if deemed appropriate by the resolution authority, an estimation of the long term economic value of its assets on the basis of a discount rate established by the resolution authority for the portfolio of assets as a whole;
Amendment 981 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to
Amendment 982 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to assess the
Amendment 983 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to
Amendment 984 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to assess the market value of the assets
Amendment 985 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to assess the market value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is failing or is likely to fail so that any
Amendment 986 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. The resolution plans referred to in article 9 and 11 shall include provisions for the ex post compensation whenever the realised value of the assets referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 and the valuation on the basis of which the assets are transferred in accordance with provisions of article 34 to 36 differ.
Amendment 987 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) the list of outstanding on balance sheet and off balance sheet liabilities shown in the books and records of the institution, with an indication of the respective credits and priority level under the applicable insolvency law;
Amendment 988 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 3 – point d (d) the
Amendment 989 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 4 Amendment 990 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 4 4. The valuation shall indicate the subdivision of the creditors in classes in accordance with their priority level under the applicable insolvency law and an estimate of the treatment that each class
Amendment 991 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 5 Amendment 992 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 5 5. Where due to the urgency in the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to comply with the requirements laid down in paragraphs 3 and 4, the valuation either by an independent person or by a resolution authority shall be carried out in compliance with the requirements laid down in paragraph 2. That valuation shall be considered as provisional until the resolution authority
Amendment 993 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 5 5. Where due to the urgency in the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to comply with the requirements laid down in paragraphs 3 and 4, the valuation either by an independent person or by a resolution authority shall be carried out in compliance with the requirements laid down in paragraph 2. That valuation shall be considered as provisional until the resolution authority has carried out a valuation that complies with all the requirements under this article. That definitive valuation
Amendment 994 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 6 Amendment 995 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part EBA shall develop
Amendment 996 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part EBA shall develop draft regulatory
Amendment 997 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point c Amendment 998 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point c (c) the methodology for assessing the
Amendment 999 #
Proposal for a directive Article 30 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 1 – point d source: PE-502.083
2013/01/11
ECON
236 amendments...
Amendment 384 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 385 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. The host competent authority may request a specific recovery plan to be drawn up for the subsidiary in that Member State if the operations of the institution’s subsidiary constitute a significant share of that Member State's financial system. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 386 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures to be taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. The host competent authority may request a specific recovery plan to be drawn up for the subsidiary in that Member State if the operations of the institution's subsidiary constitute a significant share of that Member State's financial system. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 387 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution which is not part of a joint liability scheme draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 389 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group over which supervision on a consolidated basis is exercised pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 3, Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC or part of a cooperative solidarity system according to Article 80 (8) of Directive 2006/48/EC draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 392 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Member States shall ensure that IPSs draw up and maintain a recovery plan for the whole network to the benefice to which they operate. Competent authorities shall refer to IPS for institutions that participate to them.
Amendment 393 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the Member States can, where an institution is a member of a protection scheme as set out in Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, arrange for the recovery plan, setting out the measures to be taken by the institution’s management or the protection scheme to restore the institution’s financial situation in the event of its significant deterioration, to be drawn up and maintained by the protection scheme.
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Institutions which are part of an intra group financial support a arrangements as referred to Article 16 of this directive are exempted to draw up recovery plans at individual level.
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans at least
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans at least annually or after change to the legal or organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation, which could have a material effect on, or necessitates a change to the recovery plan.
Amendment 397 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the
Amendment 398 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans at least
Amendment 399 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. Recovery plans shall not assume any access to or receipt of extraordinary public financial support but shall include, where applicable, an analysis of how and when a
Amendment 401 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. Recovery plans shall
Amendment 402 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. Recovery plans shall not assume any access to or receipt of extraordinary public financial support but shall include
Amendment 403 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. Recovery plans shall not assume any access to or receipt of extraordinary public financial support but shall include, where applicable, an analysis of how and when an institution may apply for the use of central bank facilities
Amendment 404 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Recovery plans shall provide for measures to be taken by the management of the institution when the competent authority adopts measures of early intervention according to Article 22.
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as a wide range of recovery options. Competent authorities shall ensure that
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as a wide range of recovery options. Competent authorities shall ensure that
Amendment 407 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that
Amendment 408 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as a wide range of recovery options.
Amendment 409 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as a wide range of
Amendment 410 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate
Amendment 411 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as a wide range of recovery options. Competent authorities shall ensure that firms test their recovery plans against a range of scenarios of financial distress, varying in their severity including system wide events, legal-entity specific stress and group-wide stress as well as scenarios for both slow moving and fast moving financial crises. They shall also cover as a minimum the following stress scenarios: (a) significant capital and liquidity impacts; (b) severe losses through a rogue trader or fraud and consequent regulatory fines; (c) rating downgrades; (d) currency rates; (e) GDP growth rates; (f) loss of goodwill or reputational damage; (g) significant deposit withdrawal or runoff; (h) collapse of global financial markets; (i) exodus of talent and institutional understanding of all positions.
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. The competent authorities may waive the requirement of this Article where they deem that the arrangements for an institution whose parent undertaking or institution is established in another Member State and subject to consolidated supervision are appropriately addressed in the group recovery plan prepared in accordance with Article 7.
Amendment 413 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 Amendment 414 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 Amendment 415 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 416 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying the
Amendment 417 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 With the aim of harmonizing, the EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying the range of scenarios to be included in recovery plans and used for the purposes of paragraph 5 of this Article in accordance with Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 418 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying the range of scenarios to be used for the purposes of paragraph 1 and 5 of this Article in accordance with Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 as well as the circumstances under which complementary plans at the level of host member States as referred to in paragraph 1 are appropriate.
Amendment 419 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying the minimum range of scenarios
Amendment 420 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify what changes to the legal or organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation could have a material effect on, or necessitates a change to the recovery plan as referred to in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 421 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. The resolution college, provided it is composed by the competent authorities of the countries where the group entity mainly operates, shall determine which institutions are deemed "significant" within a group.
Amendment 422 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of "material effect" referred to in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 7 c (new) 7c. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria by which institutions may be required to update their recovery plans more frequently as referred to in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 424 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 7 d (new) 7d. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of "significant deterioration" in paragraph 1 that triggers a timely implementation of recovery actions as referred to in paragraph 5. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 425 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall require institutions to submit recovery plans to the competent authorities for review within not more than six months from the date of the entry into force of the regulatory technical standards referred to in Articles 4a and 5(7).
Amendment 426 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall require institutions
Amendment 427 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The competent authorities shall, within not more than three months from the submission, review those plans and assess the extent to which each plan satisfies the requirements set out in Article 5 and the following criteria:
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The competent authorities – in the case of significant branches, in consultation with the competent authority of the host Member State – shall review those plans and assess the extent to which each plan satisfies the requirements set out in Article 5 and the following criteria:
Amendment 429 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) the implementation of the arrangements proposed in the plan would be likely to restore the viability and financial soundness of the institution, taking into account the preparatory measures that the institution has
Amendment 430 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) the plan or specific options could be implemented effectively in situations of financial stress and without causing any significant adverse effect on the financial system
Amendment 431 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) the plan or specific options could be implemented effectively in situations of financial stress and
Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) the plan or specific options could be implemented quickly and effectively in situations of financial stress and without causing any significant adverse effect on the financial system, including in the event that other institutions implemented recovery plans within the same time period.
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. When assessing the appropriateness of the recovery plans, the competent authority should take into consideration the appropriateness of the institution's capital and funding structure to the level of complexity of the organisational structure and the risk profile of the institution.
Amendment 434 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. Where competent authorities assess that there are deficiencies in the recovery plan, or
Amendment 435 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. Where competent authorities assess that there are deficiencies in the recovery plan, or potential impediments to its implementation, they shall notify the institution of their assessment and require the institution to submit, within
Amendment 436 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. Where competent authorities assess that there are material deficiencies in the recovery plan, or potential material impediments to its implementation, they shall notify the institution of their assessment and require the institution to submit, within
Amendment 437 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. Where competent authorities assess that there are deficiencies in the recovery plan, or potential impediments to its implementation, they shall notify the
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. Where competent authorities assess that there are deficiencies in the recovery plan, or potential impediments to its implementation, they shall notify the institution of their assessment and require the institution to submit, within three months, a revised plan demonstrating how those deficiencies or impediments have been addressed. Before requiring an institution to submit a revised recovery plan, the competent authority shall give the institution the opportunity to state its opinion.
Amendment 439 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery plan, or if the competent authority determines that the revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery plan, or if the competent authority determines that the revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the deficiencies or potential impediments identified in its original assessment, the competent authorities shall require the institution to take any measure it considers necessary to ensure that the deficiencies or impediments are removed. In addition to the measures that may be required in accordance with Article 136 of Directive 2006/48/EC, the competent authorities may, in particular, require the institution to take
Amendment 441 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery plan, or if the competent authority determines that the revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the deficiencies or potential impediments identified in its original assessment, the competent authorities shall require the institution to take any measure it considers necessary and proportionate to ensure that the deficiencies or impediments are removed
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point a Amendment 443 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) facilitate the reduction of the risk and liquidity profile of the institution;
Amendment 444 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point b Amendment 445 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point c Amendment 446 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point c (c) make changes to the firm strategy, for example the legal separation of certain particularly risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within the banking group;
Amendment 447 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point c (c) make changes to the firm
Amendment 448 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point d Amendment 449 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point d (d)
Amendment 450 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point e Amendment 451 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – point e (e)
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 (new) Failure to take action to make appropriate remedy shall require the institution to hold additional CET1 capital of 5%.
Amendment 453 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 4 a (new) Amendment 454 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the
Amendment 455 #
Proposal for a directive Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Member States shall ensure that institutions that are affected by the taking of measures by a competent authority under paragraph (4) above have adequate rights of appeal and review, including judicial review, concerning such decisions.
Amendment 456 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1
Amendment 457 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1, as well as, where relevant and on a voluntary basis, a recovery plan for
Amendment 458 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1, as well as a recovery plan for each significant institution that is part of the group.
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions or joint liability schemes that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive
Amendment 460 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 3, 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC, or by a cooperative solidarity system according to Articles 3 and 80 (8) of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1, as well as a recovery plan for each institution that is part of the group.
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1, as well as a recovery plan for
Amendment 462 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1, as well as a recovery plan for
Amendment 463 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article
Amendment 465 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group and for subsidiaries included into consolidated supervision, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1
Amendment 466 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery
Amendment 467 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that parent undertakings or institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC draw up and submit to the consolidating supervisor a group recovery plan that includes a recovery plan for the whole group, including for the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1
Amendment 468 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 2 2. The consolidating supervisor shall
Amendment 469 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 2 2. The consolidating supervisor
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 2 2. The consolidating supervisor shall transmit the group recovery plans to the relevant competent authorities participating in the colleges of supervisors referred to in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC and to EBA.
Amendment 471 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 2 2. The consolidating supervisor shall transmit the group recovery plans to the relevant competent authorities referred to in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC, to the competent authorities of the host Member State in the case of significant branches and to EBA.
Amendment 472 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 2 2. The consolidating supervisor shall
Amendment 473 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 The group recovery plan shall aim to achieve the stabilisation of
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The group recovery plan shall include arrangements to ensure the coordination and consistency of measures to be taken at the level of the parent undertaking or relevant institution subject to consolidated supervision, and at the level of the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1 as well as measures to be taken at the level of individual
Amendment 475 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The group recovery plan shall include arrangements to ensure the coordination and consistency of measures to be taken at the level of the parent undertaking or relevant institution subject to consolidated supervision, and at the level of the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1
Amendment 476 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 The group recovery plan shall include arrangements to ensure the coordination
Amendment 477 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new) The potential impact of the recovery measures in all the Member States where the group operates shall be specifically taken into account in the drawing up of the group recovery plan.
Amendment 478 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 4. The group recovery plan shall include for the whole group
Amendment 480 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 4. The group recovery plan shall include for the whole group and for each of its significant entities the elements and arrangements provided in Article 5. It shall also include, where applicable, arrangements for possible intra-group financial support adopted in accordance with any agreement for group financial support that has been concluded in accordance with
Amendment 481 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 4. The group recovery plan shall include for the whole group
Amendment 482 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 4. The group recovery plan shall include for the whole group
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 4. The group recovery plan shall include for the whole group and for
Amendment 484 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 4 4. The group recovery plan shall include for the whole group and for each of its relevant entities the elements and arrangements provided in Article 5. It shall also include, where applicable, arrangements for possible intra-group financial support adopted in accordance with any agreement for group financial support that has been concluded in accordance with Article 16.
Amendment 485 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 The consolidating supervisor shall ensure that the parent undertaking or the institution subject to consolidated supervision referred to in paragraph 1 provide a range of recovery options setting out actions to address those scenarios provided for in
Amendment 486 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 For each of the scenarios, the group recovery plan shall identify whether there are obstacles to the implementation of recovery measures within the group
Amendment 487 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 6 6. The management body of the parent undertaking or institution subject to
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 6 6. The management body of significant individual entities and the management body of the parent undertaking
Amendment 489 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 6 6. The management body of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision referred to in paragraph 1 and the management body of
Amendment 490 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 6 6. The management body of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision referred to in paragraph 1
Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a directive Article 7 – paragraph 6 a (new) Amendment 492 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 The consolidating supervisor shall review the group recovery plan, including the recovery plans for significant individual institutions that are part of the group, and assess the extent to which it satisfies the requirements and criteria set out in Articles 6 and 7. That assessment shall be made in accordance with the procedure established in Article 6 and the provisions of this Article.
Amendment 493 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 The consolidating supervisor together with the competent authorities shall review the group recovery plan, including the recovery plans for individual institutions that are part of the group, and assess the extent to which it satisfies the requirements and criteria set out in Articles 6 and 7. That assessment shall be made in accordance with the procedure established in Article 6 and the provisions of this Article
Amendment 494 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The consolidating supervisor shall carry out the review and assessment of the group recovery plan, including the recovery plans for significant individual institutions that are part of the group, in consultation and cooperation with the competent authorities referred to in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC. The review and assessment in accordance with Article 6(2) of this Directive of the group recovery plan and, if necessary, the request to
Amendment 495 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The consolidating supervisor shall carry out the review and assessment of the group recovery plan, including the recovery plans for individual institutions that are part of the group, in consultation and cooperation with the competent authorities participating in the colleges of supervisors referred to in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC. The review and assessment in accordance with Article 6(2) of this Directive of the group recovery plan and, if necessary, the request to take measures in accordance with Article 6(4) of this Directive shall take the form of joint decisions by the authorities participating in the colleges of supervisors referred to in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC, which will take into account the potential impact of the recovery measures in all the Member States where the group operates.
Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The consolidating supervisor together with the competent authorities shall carry out the review and assessment of the group recovery plan, including the recovery plans for individual institutions that are part of the group, in consultation and cooperation with the competent authorities referred to in Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC. The review and assessment in accordance with Article 6(2) of this Directive of the
Amendment 497 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The competent authorities shall endeavour to reach the joint decision within a period of
Amendment 498 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The competent authorities shall endeavour to reach the joint decision within a period of four months from the date of the transmission by the consolidating supervisor of the group recovery plan according to Article 7(2).
Amendment 499 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within
Amendment 500 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within four months, the consolidating supervisor shall make its own decision on the review and assessment of the group recovery plan or on the
Amendment 501 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of a joint decision
Amendment 502 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within four months, the consolidating supervisor
Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within four months,
Amendment 504 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of a joint decision between the competent authorities within four months
Amendment 505 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new) The decision of the consolidating supervisor shall take account of the potential impact on the stability of the financial system in the Member States concerned.
Amendment 506 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 507 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 508 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 EBA may
Amendment 509 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 EBA may
Amendment 510 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 3 Amendment 511 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 3 Amendment 512 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 3 3. Any competent authority that disagrees with the assessment of the group recovery plan or any action that the parent undertaking or institution would be required to take as a result of that assessment in accordance with Article 6(2) and (4) of this Directive, may refer the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The matter may not be referred to EBA after the end of the
Amendment 513 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 3 3. A
Amendment 514 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 4 Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 4 4. EBA shall take its decision within one month, and the
Amendment 516 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 517 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 5 Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 – paragraph 5 Amendment 519 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 a (new) Article 8a Transmission of the recovery plans to the resolution authorities 1. The competent authority shall transmit the recovery plans and any changes thereto to the relevant resolution authorities. 2. Group recovery plans shall be transmitted according to the previous paragraph by the consolidating supervisor.
Amendment 520 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 a (new) Article 8a For the purpose of Articles 5 to 8, competent authorities shall ensure that each recovery plan includes a trigger framework established by the institution which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan will or may be taken. The triggers may be expressed by reference to qualitative and quantitative indicators relating to the institution's financial strength and must be forward looking and capable of being monitored easily. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions put in place appropriate arrangements for the regular monitoring of the indicators. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, an institution may take action under its recovery plan where the relevant trigger has not been met, but where the management of the institution considers it appropriate due to the circumstances.
Amendment 521 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 a (new) Article 8a For the purpose of Articles 5 to 8, competent authorities shall ensure that without prejudice to article 5.1 each recovery plan includes a trigger framework established by the institution which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan may be taken. The triggers may be expressed by reference to qualitative and quantitative indicators relating to the institution's financial strength and must be forward looking and capable of being monitored easily. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions put in place appropriate arrangements for the regular monitoring of the indicators. An institution may take action under its recovery plan where the relevant trigger has not been met, but where the management of the institution considers it appropriate due to the circumstances.
Amendment 522 #
Proposal for a directive Article 8 a (new) Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, shall draw up a resolution plan for each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC. The resolution plan shall be disclosed to the institution concerned and provide for the resolution actions which the resolution and competent authorities may take where the institution meets the conditions for resolution.
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, shall draw up a resolution plan for each institution
Amendment 525 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities and in open dialogue with entities, shall draw up a resolution plan for each significant institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the resolution and competent authorities may take where the institution meets the conditions for resolution.
Amendment 526 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, shall draw up a resolution plan for each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC or of a joint liability scheme. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the resolution and competent authorities may take where the institution meets the conditions for resolution. A recovery scheme need not be drawn up in the case of institutions whose failure would not have a destabilising effect on other institutions or on the financial system as a whole.
Amendment 527 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities,
Amendment 528 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities
Amendment 529 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, shall draw up a resolution plan for each institution
Amendment 530 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall identify any impediments to resolvability and, where appropriate, exercise the preventive powers to remove those impediments, according to Chapter II of the present Title.
Amendment 531 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Institutions which are part of an intra group financial support arrangements as referred to Article 16 of this directive are exempted to draw up resolution plans at individual level.
Amendment 532 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall, in conjunction with the relevant authorities and with the protection scheme, draw up a recovery plan for each institution which is a member of a protection scheme as set out in Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC. The resolution plan shall, after consultation with the protection system in accordance with Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, provide for the resolution actions which the resolution and competent authorities may take where the institution meets the conditions for resolution and the protection system has not taken any appropriate resolution measures.
Amendment 533 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 2 2. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 534 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 2 2. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support or any other public financial support at supra-national level besides the use of the financing
Amendment 535 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 2 2. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. The recovery and resolution committee shall provide the resolution authorities with all the necessary information to enable them to identify, assess and regularly update the scenarios most likely to cause their business model to become non-viable or to fail.
Amendment 536 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution plans shall be reviewed, and where appropriate updated, at least
Amendment 537 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 3 3. Resolution plans shall be reviewed, and where appropriate updated, at least annually and after any material changes to the legal or organisational structure of the institution or to its business or its financial situation that could have a material effect on the effectiveness of the plan. All material changes shall be notified to the competent authority.
Amendment 538 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 (new) For the purpose of the revision or update of the resolution plans according to the previous subparagraph, the institutions and the competent authorities shall communicate immediately to the resolution authorities any change that imposes a revision or update of the resolution plan.
Amendment 539 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The competent authorities may derogate from the requirement of this Article where they deem that the arrangements for an institution whose parent undertaking or institution is established in another Member State and subject to consolidated supervision are appropriately addressed in the group resolution plan prepared in accordance with Article 11.
Amendment 540 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. The resolution plan shall set out options for applying the resolution tools and resolution powers, especially those referred to in Title IV, to the institution. It shall include:
Amendment 541 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point c (c) a demonstration of
Amendment 542 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point i (i) an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed without
Amendment 543 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point i a (new) (ia) an estimation under the scenarios referred to in paragraph 5 subparagraph 1 and funding strategies referred to in point (i) of the expected cost of resolution;
Amendment 544 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point j (j) a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales;
Amendment 545 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point k (k) a description of critical interdependencies and operational functions;
Amendment 546 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point m (m) a description on options for preserving access to payments and clearing services and other infrastructures and, where it is possible, indicate portability of clients positions;
Amendment 547 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point m a (new) (ma) a description of the procedures to be used for informing and consulting with employees and their representatives in the process of carrying out the plan;
Amendment 548 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point m a (new) (ma) an analysis of the impact of the plan on the employees of the institution and a description of envisaged measures for establishing procedures to consult with staff during the resolution process, taking into account national systems for dialogue with social partners where applicable;
Amendment 549 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 4 – point n a (new) (na) and where applicable any opinion expressed by the institution in relation to the resolution plan;
Amendment 550 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 Amendment 551 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with the ESRB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying
Amendment 552 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with the ESRB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying a minimum range of scenarios for the event of failure for the purposes of paragraph 2.
Amendment 553 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 EBA, in consultation with the ESRB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the detailed content of resolution plans, a range of scenarios for the event of failure for the purposes of paragraph 2 as well as the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 and paragraph 1 of article 11.
Amendment 554 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of "material changes" referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4b, and of "material effect" referred to in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 555 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards describing the templates and standard forms for the arrangements for ensuring that the information required pursuant to Article 11 is up to date and at the disposal of the resolution authorities at all times. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the draft technical implementing standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 556 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 – paragraph 5 a (new) Amendment 557 #
Proposal for a directive Article 9 a (new) Article 9a Resolution plans for Institutional Protection Schemes 1. For the purposes of Article 9, Resolution Authorities may draw up simplified resolution plans for individual institutions which are part of an institutional protection scheme referred to in Article 80(8) of Directive 2006/48/EC, where they have drawn up resolution plans for the institutional protection scheme as a group of interconnected and interdependent institutions as a whole. 2. Where resolution authorities draw up resolution plans for the institutional protection scheme as a group of interconnected and interdependent institutions as a whole they shall follow the same principle as those for group resolution plans as provided for in Article 11 and 12, and, where appropriate, take account of the specificities of the scheme and system of cross guarantees. In particular they shall assess the impact on the other members of the institutional protection scheme should one or more members face resolution by a resolution authority. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further specify the requirements for the resolution plan in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. 5. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 558 #
Proposal for a directive Article 10 – title Information for the purpose of resolution plans and cooperation from the institution
Amendment 559 #
Proposal for a directive Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards on standard forms, templates and procedures for such provision of information under paragraphs 1 and 2.
Amendment 560 #
Proposal for a directive Article 10 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to require institutions all the cooperation necessary to draw up resolution plans.
Amendment 561 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans.
Amendment 562 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans. Group resolution plans shall include both a plan for resolution at the level of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC and the resolution plans for the individual significant subsidiary institutions drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of this Directive. The group resolution plans shall also include plans for the resolution of the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1 and plans for the resolution of institutions with branches in other Member States in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2001/24/EC.
Amendment 563 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans.
Amendment 564 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that
Amendment 565 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans. Group resolution plans shall include both a plan for resolution at the level of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 125 and
Amendment 566 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans
Amendment 567 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities in consultation with the relevant competent authorities and in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 12, draw up group resolution plans. Group resolution plans shall include both a plan for resolution at the level of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC and the resolution plans for the individual subsidiary institutions drawn up in accordance with Article
Amendment 568 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans. Group resolution plans shall include both a plan for resolution at the level of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC and where relevant the resolution plans for the individual subsidiary institutions drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of this Directive. The group resolution plans shall also include plans for the resolution of the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1 and plans for the resolution of institutions with branches in other Member States in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2001/24/EC. The resolution plans at the group level may be complemented with plans at the level of subsidiaries in host Member States if deemed appropriate by the host resolution authority and in particular if the operations of the institution's subsidiary constitute a significant share of that Member State's financial system.
Amendment 569 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans. Group resolution plans shall include both a plan for resolution at the level of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC and the resolution plans for the individual subsidiary institutions drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of this Directive. The group resolution plans shall also include plans for the resolution of
Amendment 570 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) set out the resolution actions to be taken with regards to the group as a whole or part of the group, including individual subsidiaries, both through resolution actions in respect to the companies referred to in Article 1(
Amendment 571 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) set out the resolution actions to be taken with regards to the group as a whole or part of the group, including individual significant subsidiaries, both through resolution actions in respect to the companies referred to in Article 1(d), the parent undertaking and significant subsidiary institutions and through coordinated resolution actions in respect of significant subsidiary institutions, in those scenarios provided for in Article 9(2);
Amendment 572 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) set out the resolution actions to be taken with regards to the group as a whole or part of the group, including individual subsidiaries, both through resolution actions in respect to the companies referred to in Article 1(d), the parent undertaking and subsidiary institutions and through coordinated resolution actions in respect of subsidiary institutions,
Amendment 573 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) set out the resolution actions to be taken with regards
Amendment 574 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) examine the extent to which the resolution tools and powers could be applied and exercised in a coordinated way to group entities located in the Union, including measures to facilitate the purchase by a third party of the group
Amendment 575 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) where a group includes significant entities incorporated in third countries, identify arrangements for cooperation and coordination with the relevant authorities of those third countries;
Amendment 576 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) where a group includes entities incorporated in third countries, identify arrangements for cooperation and coordination with the relevant authorities of those third countries and the implications for resolution within the EU. In general there should be reciprocity in arrangements;
Amendment 577 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point d (d) identify measures, including the legal and economic separation of particular functions or business lines such as proprietary trading activities, that are necessary to facilitate group resolution when the conditions for resolution are met;
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point d a (new) (da) set out any additional national measures, not outlined in this directive, which the group resolution authority intends to apply to the resolution of the group.
Amendment 579 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e Amendment 580 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e (e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where appropriate, set out principles for sharing responsibility, on an equitable basis, for that financing between sources of funding in different Member States. The plan shall not assume extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria and shall take into account, in particular, the economic impact of the resolution in the Member States affected and the distribution of the supervisory powers between the different competent authorities.
Amendment 581 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e (e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where appropriate, set out principles for sharing responsibility for that financing between sources of funding in different Member States. The plan shall not assume extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria and shall take into account, in particular, the economic impact of the resolution in the Member States affected
Amendment 582 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e (e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and
Amendment 583 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e (e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where appropriate, set out principles for sharing responsibility for that financing between sources of funding in different Member States. The plan shall not assume extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria and shall take into account,
Amendment 584 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e (e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed
Amendment 585 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The potential impact of the resolution in all the Member States where the group operates shall be specifically taken into account in the drawing up of the group resolution plan.
Amendment 586 #
Proposal for a directive Article 11 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The group resolution plan shall not have a disproportionate impact on any Member State. In particular, it shall have regard to the continuity of essential services, financial stability and the market share of any subsidiary in its Member State. The group resolution plan may only deviate from this principle where necessary to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability in the Union.
Amendment 587 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Parent undertakings and institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC shall submit the information required in accordance with Article 11 of this Directive to the group
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The group level resolution authority
Amendment 589 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 The group level resolution authority shall
Amendment 590 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that group level resolution authorities, acting jointly with the resolution authorities referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, in resolution colleges and in consultation with the relevant competent authorities, draw up and maintain group resolution plans. Group level resolution authorities may, at their discretion, involve in the drawing up and maintenance of group resolution plans third country resolution authorities of jurisdictions in which the group has established significant subsidiaries or financial holding companies or significant branches as referred to in Article 42a of Directive 2006/48/EC.
Amendment 591 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that group level resolution authorities, acting jointly with the resolution authorities referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, in resolution colleges and
Amendment 592 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 593 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The group resolution plan shall take the form of a joint decision of the group level resolution authority and the other relevant resolution authorities. The resolution authorities shall make a joint decision within a period of
Amendment 594 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The group resolution plan shall take the form of a joint decision of the group level resolution authority and the other relevant resolution authorities, which will take into account the potential impact of the resolution in all the Member States where the group operates. The resolution authorities shall make a joint decision within a period of
Amendment 595 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The group resolution plan shall take the form of a joint decision of the group level resolution authority, the EBA and the other relevant resolution authorities. The resolution authorities shall make a joint decision within a period of four months from the date of the transmission by the group level resolution authority of the information referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1.
Amendment 596 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 The group resolution plan shall take the form of a joint decision of the group level resolution authority and the
Amendment 597 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of such a joint decision between the resolution authorities within
Amendment 598 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of such a joint decision between the resolution authorities within four months, the group
Amendment 599 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of such a joint decision between the resolution authorities within four months, the group level resolution authority
Amendment 600 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of such a joint decision between the resolution authorities within
Amendment 601 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of such a joint decision between the resolution authorities within four months, the group level resolution authority
Amendment 602 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 In the absence of such a joint decision between the resolution authorities within four months,
Amendment 603 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 604 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 605 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 EBA may on
Amendment 606 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 EBA
Amendment 607 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 EBA may on its own initiative assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, in particular where the use of a national resolution tool not set out in this directive may present an obstacle to effective group resolution.
Amendment 608 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3 EBA may upon
Amendment 609 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 5 Amendment 610 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 5 5. A resolution authority that disagrees
Amendment 611 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 5 5. A resolution authority that disagrees with any element of the group resolution plan may refer the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The matter may not be referred to EBA after the end of the
Amendment 612 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 5 5. A
Amendment 613 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 6 Amendment 614 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 6 6. EBA shall take a decision within one month, and the
Amendment 615 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 6 6. EBA shall take a decision within one month, and the
Amendment 616 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 617 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 7 Amendment 618 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 – paragraph 7 Amendment 619 #
Proposal for a directive Article 12 a (new) Article 12a Transmission of the resolution plans to the competent authorities 1. The resolution authority shall transmit the resolution plans and any changes thereto to the relevant competent authorities. 2. Group resolution plans shall be transmitted according to the previous paragraph by the group level resolution authority.
source: PE-502.084
2013/02/05
JURI
4 amendments...
Amendment 10 #
Proposal for a directive Article 75 – paragraph 5 5. The resolution authority shall ensure that the documents providing proof of the instruments referred to in paragraph 4 are sent in good time to the known shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution.
Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a directive Article 78 – paragraph 2 – point b Amendment 8 #
Proposal for a directive Recital 18 (18) Resolution planning is an essential component of effective resolution. Authorities should have all the information necessary in order to plan how the essential functions of an institution or of a cross- border group may be isolated from the rest of the business and transferred in order to ensure the preservation and continuance of essential functions. The requirement to prepare a resolution plan should, however, be
Amendment 9 #
Proposal for a directive Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans at least annually or after change to the legal or organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation, which could have a material effect on, or necessitates a change to the recovery plan. Competent authorities may require institutions to update their recovery plans more frequently should this be necessary for the stability of the financial markets.
source: PE-504.339
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History
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COM(2012)0280 |
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Legislative proposal published |
activities/0/docs/0/url |
Old
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SWD(2012)0167 |
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Document attached to the procedure |
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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2012:0167:FIN:EN:PDF
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Legislative proposal |
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2014-02-03T00:00:00 |
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PURPOSE: to establish a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and the Council. CONTEXT: the financial crisis severely tested the ability of national and Union-level authorities to manage problems in banking institutions. The absence of effective tools to manage institutions in crisis has too often required the use of public funds to restore trust in even relatively small institutions so as to prevent a domino effect of failing institutions from seriously damaging the real economy. Accordingly, an effective policy framework is needed to manage bank failures in an orderly way and to avoid contagion to other institutions. The Commission published a communication in October 2010 setting out plans for a Union framework for crisis management in the financial sector. The framework would equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency. In June 2010, the European Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on recommendations on cross-border crisis management in the banking sector. It stressed the need for a Union-wide framework to manage banks in financial distress. At the international level, G20-Leaders have called for a review of resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws in the light of recent experience. In November 2011 in Cannes, they endorsed the core elements that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) considers to be necessary for an effective resolution regime (Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions). Finally, in December 2010, the Council (ECOFIN) adopted conclusions calling for a Union framework for crisis prevention, management and resolution. The conclusions stress that the framework should apply in relation to banks of all sizes, improve cross-border cooperation and consist of three pillars (preparatory and preventative measures, early intervention, and resolution tools and powers). IMPACT ASSESSMENT: The impact assessment came to the following conclusions: · The proposed Union bank resolution framework will achieve the objectives of enhancing financial stability, reducing moral hazard, protecting depositors and critical banking services, saving public money and protecting the internal market for financial institutions; · The social impact is expected to be positive: i) reducing the probability of a systemic banking crisis and avoiding losses in economic welfare that follow a banking crisis; and ii) minimising taxpayer exposure to losses from insolvency support to institutions. · The costs of the framework derive from a possible increase in funding costs for institutions due to the removal of the implicit certainty of state support, and from the costs related to resolution funds. Institutions might transmit those increased cost to customers or shareholders by pushing rates on deposits lower, increasing lending rates and banking fees or reducing returns on equity. However, competition might reduce ability of institutions to pass on the costs in full. The Commission takes the view that the potential benefits of the framework in terms of economic welfare over the long term in terms of a reduced likelihood of a systemic crisis are substantially higher than the potential cost. LEGAL BASIS: Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). CONTENT: the proposal harmonises national laws on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms to the extent necessary to ensure that Member States have the same tools and procedures to address systemic failures. The aim of the proposed framework is to equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency. Since the risk posed by any individual bank to financial stability cannot be fully ascertained in advance, these powers should be available to the relevant authorities in relation to any bank, regardless of its size or the scope of its activities. To this end, the range of powers available to the relevant authorities should consist of three elements: 1) PREPARATION AND PREVENTION: Preparatory steps and plans are required to minimise the risks of potential problems: Recovery and resolution plans: Institutions will be required to draw up recovery plans setting out arrangements and measures to enable it to take early action to restore its long term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Supervisors will assess and approve recovery plans. Furthermore, a resolution plan, prepared by the resolution authorities in cooperation with supervisors in normal times, will set out options for resolving the institution in a range of scenarios, including systemic crisis. Such plans should include details on the application of resolution tools and ways to ensure the continuity of critical functions. Powers to address or remove impediments to resolvability: Based on the resolution plan, the resolution authorities shall assess whether an institution or group is resolvable. If resolution authorities identify significant impediments to the resolvability of an institution or group, they may require the institution or groups to take measures in order to facilitate its resolvability. Such measures might include: i) reducing complexity through changes to legal or operational structures in order to ensure that critical functions can be legally and economically separated from other functions; ii) drawing up service agreements to cover the provision of critical functions; iii) limiting maximum individual and aggregate exposures; iv) restricting or preventing the development of new business lines or products. Intra-group financial support: Institutions that operate in a group structure will be able to enter into agreements to provide financial support (in the form of a loan, the provision of guarantees, or the provision of assets for use as collateral in transaction) to other entities within the group that experience financial difficulties. The agreement may be submitted for approval in advance by the shareholders' meetings of all participating entities in accordance with national law. It will authorise the management bodies to provide financial support if needed within the terms of the agreement. 2) EARLY INTERVENTION: The proposal expands the powers of supervisors to intervene at an early stage in cases where the financial situation or solvency of an institution is deteriorating. Powers of early intervention include: i) the power to request the institution to implement arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan; ii) drawing up an action program and a timetable for its implementation or requesting the management to convene, or convening directly, a shareholders' meeting, propose the agenda and the adoption of certain decisions; and iii) requesting the institution to draw up a plan for restructuring of debt with its creditors. In addition, the supevisor would have the power to appoint a special manager for a limited period, when the solvency of an institution is deemed to be sufficiently at risk. The primary duty of a special manager is to restore the financial situation of the institution and the sound and prudent management of its business. 3) RESOLUTION: If insolvency of an institution presents a concern as regards the general public interest, a clear means is required to reorganise or wind down the bank in an orderly fashion while preserving its critical functions and limiting to the maximum extent any exposure of taxpayers to losses in insolvency (resolution). Resolution conditions: The proposal establishes common parameters for triggering the application of resolution tools. The authorities shall be able to take an action when an institution is insolvent or very close to insolvency to the extent that if no action is taken the institution will be insolvent in the near future. Instruments and powers of resolution: The framework sets up a number of general principles that will have to be respected by the resolution authorities. These principles refer, inter alia, to the allocation of losses and the treatment of shareholders and creditors and to the consequences that the use of the tools could have on the management of the institution. The implementation of the resolution tools and powers is based on an assessment of the real value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is about to fail. To this end, the framework incorporates a valuation based on the principle of 'market value'. This will ensure that the losses are recognised at the moment when the institution enters into resolution. When the trigger conditions for resolution are satisfied, resolution authorities will have the power to apply the following resolution tools: · sale of business, enabling resolution authorities to effect a sale of the institution or the whole or part of its business on commercial terms, without requiring the consent of the shareholders or complying with procedural requirements that would otherwise apply. · bridge institution, enabling resolution authorities to transfer all or part of the business of an institution to a publicly controlled entity. The bridge institution must be licensed in accordance with the Capital Requirements Directive and will be operated as a commercial concern within any limits prescribed by the State aids framework. · asset separation, enabling resolution authorities to transfer impaired or problem assets to an asset management vehicle to allow them to be managed and worked out over time. · bail-in, giving resolution authorities the power to write down the claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert debt claims to equity. The tool can be used to recapitalise an institution that is failing or about to fail. Cross border resolution: This will be done through measures that will require enhanced cooperation between national authorities and creation of incentives for applying a group approach in all phases of preparation, recovery and resolution. Resolution colleges will be established with clearly designated leadership and with the participation of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The EBA will facilitate cooperation of authorities and mediate if necessary. Relations with third countries: Because many Union institutions and banking groups are active in third countries, an effective framework for resolution needs to provide for cooperation with third country authorities. The proposal provides Union authorities with the necessary powers to support foreign resolution actions of a failed foreign bank by giving effect to transfers of its assets and liabilities that are located in or governed by the law of their jurisdiction. However, such support would only be provided if the foreign action ensured fair and equal treatment for local depositors and creditors and did not jeopardise financial stability in the Member State. Resolution funding: the proposal establishes funding arrangements financed by institutions themselves in order to minimize taxpayer's exposure to losses from solvency support. It provides for the setting up of financing arrangements in each Member State. The proposal lays down the rules on the contributions to the financing arrangements, and involves a mix of ex ante contributions, supplemented by ex post contributions and, where indispensable, borrowing facilities from financial institutions or the central bank. In order to ensure that some funds are available at all times, and given the pro-cyclicality associated with ex post funding, a minimum target fund level is set, to be reached through ex ante contributions in a time span of 10 years. Based on model-calculation, an optimal minimum target fund level is set at 1% of covered deposits. The proposal also deals with the role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in the resolution framework. DGS may be called upon to contribute to resolution. BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: EUR 2,080 millions payment to cover the operational commitment for the period 2013-2015. The present proposal would require EBA to (i) develop around 23 technical standards and 5 guidelines (ii) take part in resolution colleges, make decisions in case of disagreement and exercise binding mediation and (iii) provide for recognition of third country resolution proceedings according to Article 85 and conclude non-binding framework cooperation arrangements with third countries according to Article 88. The delivery of technical standards is due 12 months after the entry into force of the Directive which is estimated to be between June and December 2013. The proposal of the Commission includes long-term tasks for EBA that will require the establishment of 5 additional posts (temporary agents) as from 2014. In addition, 11 seconded national experts "SNE" are foreseen to carry out temporary tasks limited to 2014 and 2015 years. DELEGATED ACTS: the proposal contains provisions empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. New
PURPOSE: to establish a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and the Council. CONTEXT: the financial crisis severely tested the ability of national and Union-level authorities to manage problems in banking institutions. The absence of effective tools to manage institutions in crisis has too often required the use of public funds to restore trust in even relatively small institutions so as to prevent a domino effect of failing institutions from seriously damaging the real economy. Accordingly, an effective policy framework is needed to manage bank failures in an orderly way and to avoid contagion to other institutions. The Commission published a communication in October 2010 setting out plans for a Union framework for crisis management in the financial sector. The framework would equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency. In June 2010, the European Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on recommendations on cross-border crisis management in the banking sector. It stressed the need for a Union-wide framework to manage banks in financial distress. At the international level, G20-Leaders have called for a review of resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws in the light of recent experience. In November 2011 in Cannes, they endorsed the core elements that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) considers to be necessary for an effective resolution regime (Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions). Finally, in December 2010, the Council (ECOFIN) adopted conclusions calling for a Union framework for crisis prevention, management and resolution. The conclusions stress that the framework should apply in relation to banks of all sizes, improve cross-border cooperation and consist of three pillars (preparatory and preventative measures, early intervention, and resolution tools and powers). IMPACT ASSESSMENT: The impact assessment came to the following conclusions: · The proposed Union bank resolution framework will achieve the objectives of enhancing financial stability, reducing moral hazard, protecting depositors and critical banking services, saving public money and protecting the internal market for financial institutions; · The social impact is expected to be positive: i) reducing the probability of a systemic banking crisis and avoiding losses in economic welfare that follow a banking crisis; and ii) minimising taxpayer exposure to losses from insolvency support to institutions. · The costs of the framework derive from a possible increase in funding costs for institutions due to the removal of the implicit certainty of state support, and from the costs related to resolution funds. Institutions might transmit those increased cost to customers or shareholders by pushing rates on deposits lower, increasing lending rates and banking fees or reducing returns on equity. However, competition might reduce ability of institutions to pass on the costs in full. The Commission takes the view that the potential benefits of the framework in terms of economic welfare over the long term in terms of a reduced likelihood of a systemic crisis are substantially higher than the potential cost. LEGAL BASIS: Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). CONTENT: the proposal harmonises national laws on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms to the extent necessary to ensure that Member States have the same tools and procedures to address systemic failures. The aim of the proposed framework is to equip authorities with common and effective tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively, safeguarding financial stability and minimising taxpayer exposure to losses in insolvency. Since the risk posed by any individual bank to financial stability cannot be fully ascertained in advance, these powers should be available to the relevant authorities in relation to any bank, regardless of its size or the scope of its activities. To this end, the range of powers available to the relevant authorities should consist of three elements: 1) PREPARATION AND PREVENTION: Preparatory steps and plans are required to minimise the risks of potential problems: Recovery and resolution plans: Institutions will be required to draw up recovery plans setting out arrangements and measures to enable it to take early action to restore its long term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Supervisors will assess and approve recovery plans. Furthermore, a resolution plan, prepared by the resolution authorities in cooperation with supervisors in normal times, will set out options for resolving the institution in a range of scenarios, including systemic crisis. Such plans should include details on the application of resolution tools and ways to ensure the continuity of critical functions. Powers to address or remove impediments to resolvability: Based on the resolution plan, the resolution authorities shall assess whether an institution or group is resolvable. If resolution authorities identify significant impediments to the resolvability of an institution or group, they may require the institution or groups to take measures in order to facilitate its resolvability. Such measures might include: i) reducing complexity through changes to legal or operational structures in order to ensure that critical functions can be legally and economically separated from other functions; ii) drawing up service agreements to cover the provision of critical functions; iii) limiting maximum individual and aggregate exposures; iv) restricting or preventing the development of new business lines or products. Intra-group financial support: Institutions that operate in a group structure will be able to enter into agreements to provide financial support (in the form of a loan, the provision of guarantees, or the provision of assets for use as collateral in transaction) to other entities within the group that experience financial difficulties. The agreement may be submitted for approval in advance by the shareholders' meetings of all participating entities in accordance with national law. It will authorise the management bodies to provide financial support if needed within the terms of the agreement. 2) EARLY INTERVENTION: The proposal expands the powers of supervisors to intervene at an early stage in cases where the financial situation or solvency of an institution is deteriorating. Powers of early intervention include: i) the power to request the institution to implement arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan; ii) drawing up an action program and a timetable for its implementation or requesting the management to convene, or convening directly, a shareholders' meeting, propose the agenda and the adoption of certain decisions; and iii) requesting the institution to draw up a plan for restructuring of debt with its creditors. In addition, the supevisor would have the power to appoint a special manager for a limited period, when the solvency of an institution is deemed to be sufficiently at risk. The primary duty of a special manager is to restore the financial situation of the institution and the sound and prudent management of its business. 3) RESOLUTION: If insolvency of an institution presents a concern as regards the general public interest, a clear means is required to reorganise or wind down the bank in an orderly fashion while preserving its critical functions and limiting to the maximum extent any exposure of taxpayers to losses in insolvency (resolution). Resolution conditions: The proposal establishes common parameters for triggering the application of resolution tools. The authorities shall be able to take an action when an institution is insolvent or very close to insolvency to the extent that if no action is taken the institution will be insolvent in the near future. Instruments and powers of resolution: The framework sets up a number of general principles that will have to be respected by the resolution authorities. These principles refer, inter alia, to the allocation of losses and the treatment of shareholders and creditors and to the consequences that the use of the tools could have on the management of the institution. The implementation of the resolution tools and powers is based on an assessment of the real value of the assets and liabilities of the institution that is about to fail. To this end, the framework incorporates a valuation based on the principle of 'market value'. This will ensure that the losses are recognised at the moment when the institution enters into resolution. When the trigger conditions for resolution are satisfied, resolution authorities will have the power to apply the following resolution tools: · sale of business, enabling resolution authorities to effect a sale of the institution or the whole or part of its business on commercial terms, without requiring the consent of the shareholders or complying with procedural requirements that would otherwise apply. · bridge institution, enabling resolution authorities to transfer all or part of the business of an institution to a publicly controlled entity. The bridge institution must be licensed in accordance with the Capital Requirements Directive and will be operated as a commercial concern within any limits prescribed by the State aids framework. · asset separation, enabling resolution authorities to transfer impaired or problem assets to an asset management vehicle to allow them to be managed and worked out over time. · bail-in, giving resolution authorities the power to write down the claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert debt claims to equity. The tool can be used to recapitalise an institution that is failing or about to fail. Cross border resolution: This will be done through measures that will require enhanced cooperation between national authorities and creation of incentives for applying a group approach in all phases of preparation, recovery and resolution. Resolution colleges will be established with clearly designated leadership and with the participation of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The EBA will facilitate cooperation of authorities and mediate if necessary. Relations with third countries: Because many Union institutions and banking groups are active in third countries, an effective framework for resolution needs to provide for cooperation with third country authorities. The proposal provides Union authorities with the necessary powers to support foreign resolution actions of a failed foreign bank by giving effect to transfers of its assets and liabilities that are located in or governed by the law of their jurisdiction. However, such support would only be provided if the foreign action ensured fair and equal treatment for local depositors and creditors and did not jeopardise financial stability in the Member State. Resolution funding: the proposal establishes funding arrangements financed by institutions themselves in order to minimize taxpayer's exposure to losses from solvency support. It provides for the setting up of financing arrangements in each Member State. The proposal lays down the rules on the contributions to the financing arrangements, and involves a mix of ex ante contributions, supplemented by ex post contributions and, where indispensable, borrowing facilities from financial institutions or the central bank. In order to ensure that some funds are available at all times, and given the pro-cyclicality associated with ex post funding, a minimum target fund level is set, to be reached through ex ante contributions in a time span of 10 years. Based on model-calculation, an optimal minimum target fund level is set at 1% of covered deposits. The proposal also deals with the role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in the resolution framework. DGS may be called upon to contribute to resolution. BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: EUR 2,080 millions payment to cover the operational commitment for the period 2013-2015. The present proposal would require EBA to (i) develop around 23 technical standards and 5 guidelines (ii) take part in resolution colleges, make decisions in case of disagreement and exercise binding mediation and (iii) provide for recognition of third country resolution proceedings according to Article 85 and conclude non-binding framework cooperation arrangements with third countries according to Article 88. The delivery of technical standards is due 12 months after the entry into force of the Directive which is estimated to be between June and December 2013. The proposal of the Commission includes long-term tasks for EBA that will require the establishment of 5 additional posts (temporary agents) as from 2014. In addition, 11 seconded national experts "SNE" are foreseen to carry out temporary tasks limited to 2014 and 2015 years. DELEGATED ACTS: the proposal contains provisions empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
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The Council had a first exchange of views on the proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The proposal, issued by the Commission on 6 June, is aimed at providing supervisory authorities with common tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively and to resolve any financial institution in an orderly manner in the event of insolvency, whilst minimising taxpayers' exposure to losses. The presidency's aim is for the Council to agree a general approach by December, subsequent to which negotiations with the Parliament will start, with a view to adoption of the Directive at first reading. New
The Council had a first exchange of views on the proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The proposal, issued by the Commission on 6 June, is aimed at providing supervisory authorities with common tools and powers to tackle bank crises pre-emptively and to resolve any financial institution in an orderly manner in the event of insolvency, whilst minimising taxpayers' exposure to losses. The presidency's aim is for the Council to agree a general approach by December, subsequent to which negotiations with the Parliament will start, with a view to adoption of the Directive at first reading. |
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