13 Amendments of Lara WOLTERS related to 2020/2133(INI)
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities, or in which the performance of official duties is prompted by private-capacity interests; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an contextual and evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Is of the opinion that the examination of Commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention, commitment and sense of responsibility; insists that the declaration of the President-elect of the European Commission should also be examined;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates are often essentialin its current form are often essential and that it should be possible to systematically verify whether information is complete, accurate and up-to-date;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources, tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information as well as ask for complementary information where necessary;
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the examination of and the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de- politicisedof Commissioner-designates should be technical and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience;
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Underlines the need to review and align relevant EU legislation and codes of conduct, including with a view to laying down strict rules and requiring full transparency on the employment or the projects taken up by high-ranking EU officials after leaving public office and on any side activities held by Members of the European Parliament;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Stresses the need to learn from best practices in Member States; underlines in this light that in some Member States elected representatives are required to refrain from voting on issues in which they have a personal interest, and that these instances can occur in the European Parliament as well, for instance with Members who have farmland voting on direct income support under the CAP; asks MEPs in these cases to refrain from voting;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination or election of experts by each EU institution;
Amendment 50 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest of Commissioner-designates after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; insists that the body should also have the investigative powers to detect relevant conflicts of interests prior to, during and after public office or employment of all Union institutions, bodies,offices, and agencies; suggests the EU ethics body to be competent on declarations of interest, declarations of assets, conflicts of interest, gifts and lobby transparency rules;
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Upholds that the ethics body should be able to take on concerns by stakeholders, including by whistle- blowers;
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7 b. Questions the recent approval by the European Commission of former Commissioner Oettinger’s employment by the international consulting firm Kekst CNC, a consultancy firm whose biggest EU-lobbying client is Philip Morris International, the tenth post- Commissioner position of Mr. Oettinger which has been approved for in less than a year;
Amendment 60 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with the broaderpower to enforce attenuation measures, as well as bans and sanctions while exercising its task of examining conflicts of interest within the EU institutions and agencies in general, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand, and a compliance and enforcement role on the other. ; suggests the new EU ethics body could replace existing ethics committees within EU institutions, to support a coherent implementation of the respective rules aiming for the strongest ethical standards;
Amendment 68 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Recalls that the Parliament may withdraw confidence from an individual Member of the Commission, after which the President of the Commission shall either require the resignation of that Member or explain his/her refusal to do so before Parliament in the following part-session, in line with point 5 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement of November 20th 2010.