BETA

20 Amendments of Danuta Maria HÜBNER related to 2016/2247(INI)

Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 22 a (new)
- having regard to the final EBA report on the implementation and design of the MREL framework of 14 December 2016,
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLswelcomes the publication of the Commission's proposal on a minimum EU insolvency framework; pending its adoption and as a complement to it, calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs; also highlights the importance of creating a well-functioning primary and secondary market for NPLs as part of the solution to this problem;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal modelsin this respect the work undertaken by the EBA to harmonise key assumptions and parameters the divergence of which has been identified as one of the main drivers of variability and encourages its continuation; also welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models in order to ensure that they focus on the areas where they deliver added value, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements, nor have a disproportionate impact on some jurisdictions, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Underlines the need for a comprehensive view of the cumulative impact of the different changes in the regulatory environment, whether they concern supervision, loss absorption, resolution or accounting standards;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing the most significant onesis pleased with the opportunity offered by the currently discussed amendments to the CRR to close or restrict the use of some of them at the level of the whole Union and urges to fully exploit this opportunity;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls the need to clarifyWelcomes the clarification of the objectives of Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements proposed in the amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive; is of the view that the use of capital guidance is a relevant way forward in order to balance financial stability concerns with flexibility needthe need to leave scope for supervisory judgement and case-by-case analyses;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Stresses the risks stemming from the holding of level 3 assets and in particular from the difficulty of their valuation; calls for a progressive reduction of the holdings of these assets; calls on the SSM to make this issue one of its supervisory priorities and to organise, jointly with the EBA, a quantitative stress test on it;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the ‘Considers that the Commission proposal to transpose the TLAC standard is a good opportunity for the co-legislators to agree on measures that will address the so-called "too-big-to-fail" issue still needs to be addressand complement those already implemented;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Takes note of the report of the European Court of Auditors on the functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism; takes the view that, while more involvement of the central level could improve the independence of supervision indeed, the use of staff from the competent authority of one Member State to supervise an institution from another Member State is already an effective way of addressing the risk of supervisory forbearance; believes that, while the separation of monetary and supervisory policy is a central principle, it should not preclude cost savings enabled by the sharing of services, provided such services are non-critical in terms of policy making and proper guarantees are established;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 275 #
9a. Takes note of the double role of the Board members, who are at the same time members of an executive body with decision-making roles and senior managers accountable in that capacity to the Chair of the Board, and considers that an evaluation of this structure should be undertaken before the end of the current mandate;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk-weighted assets and of avoiding cliff effects between the different categories of banks that would be subject to resolution; welcomes in this respect the proposed amendments to the CRR and the better alignment of both standards they bring; stresses that proper attention should be paid, in calibrating and/or phasing-in MREL requirements, to the need of creating a market for MREL-eligible liabilities; highlights the importance of maintaining discretion for the resolution authority when setting MREL;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Draws attenWelcomes the clarification toin the importance of clarifying in legislationproposal for BRRD amendments of the stacking order between MREL-eligible CET1 and capital buffers, as well as the additional flexibility offered by the introduction of the MREL guidance;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Invites the Commission to assess, in the light of experience and within the framework of the review of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, whether the SRB and the national resolution authorities are equipped with sufficient early intervention powers and sufficient early intervention instruments to prevent disruptive outflows of banks' capital and loss-absorbing capacity during a crisis;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective and to provide certainty to cross-border investors; welcomes therefore the Commission's proposal to go further in the harmonisation of this hierarchy; notes that better harmonisation of the regular insolvency regime and of its hierarchy of claims will also be essential, both, in the case of banks, to avoid discrepancies with the bank resolution regime, and, in the case of companies, to provide additional clarity and certainty to cross-border investors and contribute to addressing the issue of NPLs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Notes the range of legal options available to ensure the subordination of TLAC-eligible debt; points out that none is preferred by the FSB; is of the view that the approach adopted should first and foremost strike a balance between flexibility and, legal certainty and the ability of the market to absorb any new class of debt;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Warns that the BRRD requirement of contractual recognition for bail-in powers on liabilities governed by non-EU legislation proves cumbersome to implement; calls for clarification of the type of liabilities to which such requirement applieswelcomes the right for competent authorities to waive this requirement introduced by the proposed amendments to the BRRD; considers this approach the right one as it allows for flexibility and for a case-by- case assessment of the liabilities concerned;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Points out that swift and effective exchange of information between supervision and resolution authorities is paramount in order to ensure smooth crisis management; welcomes the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the ECB and the SRM in respect of cooperation and information exchange; recommends that the attendance of the ECB as a permanent observer at the SRB Plenary and Executive Sessions be made fully reciprocal by allowing a representative of the SRB to attend the Supervisory Board of the ECB as a permanent observer;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 340 #
17a. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRB and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by step;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 417 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Fiscal backstopdeleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 422 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by step;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON