Progress: Procedure completed
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | ECON | HÜBNER Danuta Maria ( PPE) | DELVAUX Mady ( S&D), LOONES Sander ( ECR), TREMOSA I BALCELLS Ramon ( ALDE), GIEGOLD Sven ( Verts/ALE), VALLI Marco ( EFDD) |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 54
Legal Basis:
RoP 54Events
The European Parliament adopted by 504 votes to 153 with 28 abstentions, a resolution on Banking Union - Annual Report 2016.
The establishment of the Banking Union (BU) is an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, further efforts are needed, as the Banking Union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a fiscal backstop and a third pillar on deposit insurance.
Supervision of non-performing loans : Members expressed concern at the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs), as, according to ECB data, by April 2016 banks in the euro area held EUR 1014 billion in such loans .
While welcoming the efforts already being made to reduce the level of NPLs in some Member States, Parliament called on the Commission to assist Member States in, among others, the establishment of dedicated asset management companies (or “bad banks”) and enhanced supervision. It reiterated, in this context, the importance of the ability to sell off NPLs in order to free up capital , which is especially important for bank lending to SMEs.
Members welcomed the Commission’s proposal on insolvency and restructuring and called on Member States, pending its adoption, to improve their relevant legislation, and more generally their legal framework concerning the restructuring of debt, and to implement necessary sustainable structural reforms aimed at economic recovery in order to tackle NPLs.
Risks associated with sovereign debt : the resolution stressed that an appropriate prudential treatment of sovereign debt might create incentives for banks to better manage their sovereign exposures. The European framework should enable market discipline in delivering sustainable policies and providing high- quality and liquid assets for the financial sector and safe liabilities for governments.
Access to finance : Members stressed that reliable access to finance and the sound allocation of capital in Europe's bank-based financing model depend heavily on robust balance sheets and proper capitalisation, the restoration of which after the financial crises was not and is not uniformly assured across the Union, thus hampering economic growth. They stated that the European banking sector plays a key role in financing the European economy and that this is supported by a strong supervision system. They welcomed, therefore, the intention of the Commission to maintain the SME Supporting Factor in the upcoming revision of CRD/ CRR and to extend it beyond its current threshold.
Systemically important banks : Parliament notes the risks stemming from “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions. It is committed to working swiftly on the legislative proposals for the implementation in the Union of measures designed to reduce risk that have been approved at the international level (particularly total loss-absorbing capacity, central clearing of derivatives, and capital and leverage ratio add-on for globally systemic banks). It welcomed efforts to pursue improvements to the stress-testing framework.
Representation in the BCBS : Members stressed the importance of the role of the Commission, the ECB and the EBA in terms of engaging in the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and providing Parliament and the Council with transparent and comprehensive updates on the state of play of the BCBS discussions. According to Members, the EU should work on having an appropriate representation in the BCBS, notably for the euro area. The BCBS and other fora should help promote a level playing field at the global level by mitigating - rather than exacerbating - the differences between jurisdictions.
National Systemic Risk Boards : while welcoming the establishment of National Systemic Risk Boards, Members stressed that the establishment of the Banking Union reinforces the need to strengthen macro-prudential policy at the European level in order to properly address potential cross-border spill-over of systemic risk. The Commission is urged to propose a coherent and effective macro-prudential supervision in its overall review of the macro-prudential framework in 2017. Members highlighted the need to reduce the institutional complexity and lengthy process in the interaction between ESRB, ECB/ Single Supervisory Mechanism ( SSM ) and national authorities, and between competent and designated national authorities, in the field of macro-prudential supervision.
Parliament also highlighted that the outcome of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU requires an assessment of the whole European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), including the voting modalities inside the ESAs, in particular of the double majority mechanism provided under the EBA regulation. It stressed that possible negotiations following the referendum should not lead to an unlevelled playing field between EU and non-EU financial institutions, and should not be used to promote deregulation in the financial sector.
Resolution : Parliament recalls the need to adhere to state aid rules when dealing with future banking crises. The exception of extraordinary public support must be both precautionary and temporary in nature and cannot be used to offset losses that an institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future. It calls for the definition of efficient procedures between the SRB and the Commission for decision-making in the event of a resolution.
Furthermore, the Commission needs to assess whether the SRB and the national resolution authorities are equipped with sufficient early intervention powers and sufficient early intervention instruments to prevent disruptive outflows of banks’ capital and loss-absorbing capacity during a crisis.
Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) : Parliament notes the Commission proposals introducing into Pillar 1 a minimum total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) for global systemically important banks, in line with international standards.
Members stressed that proper attention should be paid, in calibrating and/or phasing in new MREL requirements, to the need to create a market for MREL-eligible liabilities. They recalled the importance of maintaining discretion for the resolution authority when setting MREL, and of making sure that banks hold sufficient subordinated and bail-inable debt.
Deposit insurance : Parliament reiterated its call for a third pillar in order to complete the Banking Union. It stated that the protection of deposits is a common concern for all EU citizens. The role of the Commission is to guarantee a level playing field in this area across the EU and that it should avoid any fragmentation within the internal market.
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the own-initiative report by Danuta Maria HÜBNER (EPP, PL) on Banking Union - Annual Report 2016.
The establishment of the Banking Union (BU) is an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, further efforts are needed as the Banking Union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a fiscal backstop and a third pillar on deposit insurance.
Supervision of non-performing loans : Members expressed concern at the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs), as, according to ECB data, by April 2016 banks in the euro area held EUR 1014 billion in such loans . It is crucial to reduce this level. While welcoming the efforts already being made to reduce the level of NPLs in some Member States, the Commission is called upon to assist Member States in, among other things, the establishment of dedicated asset management companies (or “bad banks”) and enhanced supervision. They reiterated, in this context, the importance of the ability to sell off NPLs in order to free up capital , which is especially important for bank lending to SMEs. They welcomed the Commission’s proposal on insolvency and restructuring including early restructuring and second chance, in the framework of the CMU and called on Member States, pending its adoption and in order to complement it, to improve their relevant legislation, especially with regard to the length of recovery procedures, the functioning of judicial systems, and more generally their legal framework concerning the restructuring of debt, and to implement necessary sustainable structural reforms aimed at economic recovery in order to tackle NPLs.
Access to finance : Members stressed that reliable access to finance and the sound allocation of capital in Europe's bank-based financing model depend heavily on robust balance sheets and proper capitalisation, the restoration of which after the financial crises was not and is not uniformly assured across the Union, thus hampering economic growth. The report stated that the European banking sector plays a key role in financing the European economy and that this is supported by a strong supervision system. They welcomed, therefore, the intention of the Commission to maintain the SME Supporting Factor in the upcoming revision of CRD/ CRR and to extend it beyond its current threshold.
Representation in the BCBS : Members stressed the importance of the role of the Commission, the ECB and the EBA in terms of engaging in the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and providing Parliament and the Council with transparent and comprehensive updates on the state of play of the BCBS discussions. According to Members, the EU should work on having an appropriate representation in the BCBS, notably for the euro area. The BCBS and other fora should help promote a level playing field at the global level by mitigating - rather than exacerbating - the differences between jurisdictions.
Bank structural reform : the report underlined the need to introduce a bank structural reform, including the reversal of the burden of proof, to end the problem of very large institutions being too big to fail.
National Systemic Risk Boards : while welcoming the establishment of National Systemic Risk Boards, Members stressed that the establishment of the Banking Union reinforces the need to strengthen macro-prudential policy at the European level in order to properly address potential cross-border spill-overs of systemic risk. The Commission is urged to propose a coherent and effective macro-prudential supervision in its overall review of the macro-prudential framework in 2017. Members highlighted the need to reduce the institutional complexity and lengthy process in the interaction between ESRB, ECB/ Single Supervisory Mechanism ( SSM ) and national authorities, and between competent and designated national authorities, in the field of macro-prudential supervision.
They also highlighted that the outcome of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU requires an assessment of the whole European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), including the voting modalities inside the ESAs, in particular of the double majority mechanism provided under the EBA regulation. They stressed that possible negotiations following the referendum should not lead to an unlevel playing field between EU and non-EU financial institutions, and should not be used to promote deregulation in the financial sector.
Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) : Members stressed that proper attention should be paid, in calibrating and/or phasing in new MREL requirements, to the need to create a market for MREL-eligible liabilities. They highlighted the importance of maintaining discretion for the resolution authority when setting MREL, and of making sure that banks hold sufficient subordinated and bail-inable debt.
Members suggested the adoption on legislation with the purpose of clarifying the responsibilities and powers of, respectively, resolution authorities and competent authorities, concerning early intervention measures to be taken in cases of breaches of MREL requirements.
Deposit insurance : Members reiterated their call for a third pillar in order to complete the Banking Union. They stated that the protection of deposits is a common concern for all EU citizens. The role of the Commission is to guarantee a level playing field in this area across the EU and that it should avoid any fragmentation within the internal market.
Documents
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2017)358
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament: T8-0041/2017
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Committee report tabled for plenary: A8-0019/2017
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE595.751
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE595.752
- Debate in Council: 3506
- Debate in Council: 3495
- Committee draft report: PE589.459
- Debate in Council: 3488
- Committee draft report: PE589.459
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE595.751
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE595.752
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2017)358
Activities
- Valdis DOMBROVSKIS
Plenary Speeches (2)
- 2016/11/22 Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 (debate)
- 2016/11/22 Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 (debate)
- Ioan Mircea PAŞCU
Plenary Speeches (2)
- Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS
Plenary Speeches (2)
- Marco VALLI
Plenary Speeches (2)
- Burkhard BALZ
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Pervenche BERÈS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Nicola CAPUTO
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Mady DELVAUX
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Sander LOONES
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Notis MARIAS
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Bernard MONOT
Plenary Speeches (1)
- Stanisław OŻÓG
Plenary Speeches (1)
Votes
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 9 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 5 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 6 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 10 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 3 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 7 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 8 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 4 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Am 2 #
A8-0019/2017 - Danuta Maria Hübner - Résolution #
Amendments | Dossier |
437 |
2016/2247(INI)
2016/12/20
ECON
437 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 5 Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved at the Union and national level; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Insists on the full organisational separation of all staff providing services needed to enable the ECB to conduct an independent monetary policy; calls on the ECB to have an annual audit carried out by external experts to verify that it is meeting the legal requirement concerning the organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions and to publish the relevant reports immediately;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes that according to ECB data, by April 2016 banks in the euro area held EUR 1 014 billion in non-performing loans; notes that the decline of the industrial sector in Italy and Greece has been a major contributing factor to the growth in NPLs in these states; considers that the austerity policies enforced by the Troika in the memorandum countries, and through the Stability and Growth Pact, have exacerbated the NPL problem;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Is concerned by the lingering instability of the banking landscape in Europe, inter alia underlined by the 2016 IMF Global Financial Stability Report that states that Europe would even under a cyclical recovery retain a high share of weak and challenged banks; reiterates the call by the IMF for fundamental changes in both bank business models and system structure to ensure a healthy European banking system;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Expresses concern at the statement by the European Court of Auditors2a that the European Central Bank does not have enough qualified staff to guarantee a high level of on-the-spot inspections as part of its supervisory activity; calls on the ECB to address this problem immediately and work towards achieving high quality in its on-the-spot assessments; _________________ 2aSpecial Report 29/2016: Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes the low profitability of a number of institutions in the euro area; considers that low profitability remains an important concern for the stability of the financial and banking sector; considers that resolute actions should be taken to strengthen the profitability of those institutions, while acknowledging the impact of the overall economic environment in that regard;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 a (new) - having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 29/2016 on the Single Supervisory Mechanism1a; _________________ 1a Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocu ments/SR16_29/SR_SSM_EN.pdf
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Underlines that the completion of the Banking Union requires further convergence on many fields; in this light, recalls the importance to draw up a Single Rule-book on insolvency and criminal law, coupled with strong convergence on tax issues;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Encourages all Member States that have not yet adopted the euro to take all necessary steps to do so, or to join the BU, in order to progressively align the BU with the entire internal market;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Notes the high level of Level 3 assets on many jurisdictions; calls for a quantitative stress-test on this issue and for a stable reduction of this kind of asset;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Considers that the lack of profitability in the European banking sector is caused by demand-side problems in addition to the stock of NPLs and the interest rate environment; notes that general economic stagnation and the record-high levels of liquid assets held by non-financial corporations in the euro area (in part due to decades of wage compression), which reduce reliance on and demand for loans by corporations, are significant factors in the chronically low level of bank profitability; considers that this situation requires an end to austerity policies and an urgent and substantial EU infrastructure investment programme that invests new funds into the real economy;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Expresses concern at the European Court of Auditors’ reservations3a with regard to the lack of organisational separation between supervisory functions and monetary policy at the ECB and the resulting potential for conflicts of interest; calls on the ECB to take immediate steps to bring about a clear separation between supervisory functions and monetary policy in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest; _________________ 3aSpecial Report 29/2016: Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Calls on the SSM to regularly update the European Parliament about the information exchange which takes place between staff carrying out monetary policy and supervisory functions in accordance with the European Central Bank decision of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. Considers that the BU should be underpinned by a risk-free asset issued by the Union and/or the euro area;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 c (new) 1c. Notes that the establishment – under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – of the SSM is giving rise to legal uncertainty as the unsustainable legal basis of SSM measures makes them vulnerable to legal challenges and the financial institutions which are being supervised are themselves aware of this;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 a (new) - having regard to the EBA report of July 2016 on the dynamics and drivers of non-performing exposures in the EU banking sector,
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that - as the Greek haircut has shown - there are risks associated with sovereign debt
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are considerable risks associated with sovereign debt
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are massive risks associated with sovereign debt;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes,
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes,
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are many risks associated with sovereign debt;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 a (new) - having regard to the ECA Special Report on the Single Supervisory Mechanism of 18 November 2016,
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that government bonds play a critical role as a source of high-quality, liquid collateral and that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on both the financial and the public sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are substantial risks associated with sovereign debt;
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be needed; underlines the importance that the Basel agreement to be reached in January be fully complied with;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Recalls the importance of avoiding within the new Basel framework that higher capital requirements unduly constrain the lending capacity of banks to the real economy, as long as the imbalances in the euro area remain unsolved;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Points out that the current supervisory framework is strongly biased towards addressing the credit risk and totally ignores the exposure in risky financial derivatives associated with trading activities, thereby promoting the wrong business model;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; notes that banks' average risk-weighted assets per unit of assets has almost halved, falling from over 70% in 1993 to below 40% at end 2011; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; welcomes the Commission proposal for a binding leverage ratio of a minimum of 3% but is concerned about deviations from internationally agreed standards by allowing institutions to reduce the exposure measure by the initial margin received from clients for derivatives cleared through qualifying CCPs; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in an overall significant increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs; stresses however that the additional pillar 1 capital buffer which could result from the new international regulatory standards may be justified in the case of systemic banks; welcomes the work of BCBS to limit the use of internal models for operational risk and lending to corporates, other financial institutions, specialised finance and equities banks since a more risk-sensitive but mandatory standard approach is required to ensure respect of the "same risks, same rules" principle; welcomes in particular the proposal for improved risk floors in the case of commercial and other real estate lending; calls on financial supervisors to allow new internal models only if they do not lead to significantly lower risk weights; calls on the Commission to require financial institutions to disclose the differences between their internal models and the standardised approach; calls on the Commission to introduce the possibility of institution-specific multipliers for different portfolios if the risk so warrants;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 b (new) - having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures of March 2015,
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs; calls on the Commission to ensure European specificities are considered when transposing these new international standards in this area;
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models and to re-establish the credibility of internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Considers it essential for depositors, investors and supervisors to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Acknowledges that EU rules on remuneration for credit institutions and investment firms are generally effective in curbing excessive risk-taking behaviour and short-termism; notes, however, an overall shift from variable to fixed remuneration and recommends, therefore, compulsory disclosure of a manager-to- worker-pay ratio; is concerned that euro- area banks weakened their capital bases by paying substantial dividends sometimes exceeding the level of retained earnings throughout the crisis years, according to the Bank for International Settlements; calls, therefore, on the relevant supervisors to urge banks to retain profits to increase their own funds and thus improving resilience of the whole financial system; welcomes the latest Commission proposals to exclude small and non-complex institutions as well as staff with low levels of variable remuneration from the deferral and pay- out in instruments requirements;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 c (new) - having regard to the approval by the ECB Governing Council on 4 October 2016 on principles increasing transparency in developing ECB regulations on European statistics and taking into account the transparency practices of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission,
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Stresses that reliable access to finance and the sound allocation of capital in Europe's bank-based financing model depends heavily on robust balance sheets and proper capitalisation, the restoration of which after the financial crises was not and is not uniformly assured across the Union, thus hampering economic growth;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Underlines that the European banking sector plays a key role in financing the European economy and this is supported by a strong supervision system; therefore welcomes the intention of the Commission to maintain the SME Supporting Factor in the upcoming revision of CRD/CRR and to extend it beyond its current threshold;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Recalls the importance of avoiding discrimination between EU and international banks, contrary to some of the proposals drafted by the Basel Committee for its revised capital and liquidity requirements framework;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Underlines the importance of introducing the use of the Standardized Model Approach in order to put an end to the attitude of banks to manipulate risk- weighted assets and capital requirements;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. Highlights that a proper implementation of MiFID II is crucial to tackle the problem of mis-selling to retail investors; urges the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) to fulfil their investor protection objectives through strong contributions to detect mis-selling practices; stresses that reducing mis-selling and ensuring effective consumer protection is key to strengthen retail investors' trust in the banking sector and the Single Market and to foster prudence in the financial sector;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; stresses the importance of the role of the Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority to engage in the work of the BCBS and provide the European Parliament and the Council with transparent and comprehensive updates on the status of the development of the BCBS discussions; considers that the EU should work on having an appropriate representation in the BCBS and notably for the euro area; calls for a stronger visibility of this role during ECOFIN meetings, as well as enhanced accountability towards the ECON Committee in the European Parliament with a regular de-brief by EU representatives party to the discussions;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; underlines that this guidance should however be critically assessed, in particular when international fora are lacking democratic legitimacy and public oversight; points to the risks of a rapidly growing shadow banking sector as shown in the 2016 EU Shadow Banking Monitor; insists that any action on the regulation of the banking sector must be accompanied by appropriate regulation of the shadow banking sector; calls, therefore, for coordinated action in order to ensure fair competition and financial stability; reiterates its call to strengthening the supervisory scrutiny on level 3 financial assets, including derivatives;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; stresses that the proposals made by international bodies should be translated into European law in some form, with due account being taken of the specific characteristics of the European banking sector;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 13 a (new) - having regard to the EBA Report of 3 August 2016 on the Leverage Ratio requirements under Article 511 of the CRR (EBA-Op-2016-13),
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; recalls the importance of committing to the conclusions of the work of those international fora;
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation with regard to the regulation and supervision of large, internationally active banks;
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Points out that
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Insists on the importance of adequate representation of the European Union in international financial institutions and the need to coordinate positions, as stressed in its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the EU role in the framework of international financial, monetary and regulatory institutions and bodies;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Stresses that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards in particular should not be enacted wholesale into European law without taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Calls on the Commission to duly take into account the proportionality principle and the existence of different banking models when assessing the impact of future legislation implementing internationally agreed standards;
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Underlines the need for a comprehensive view of the cumulative impact of the different changes in the regulatory environment, whether they concern supervision, loss absorption, resolution or accounting standards;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Underlines the need to introduce a Bank Structural Reform, including the reversal of the burden of proof, to end the problem of very large institutions being too big to fail;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 13 a (new) - having regard to the EBA report of August 2016 on the Leverage Ratio requirements under Article 511 of the CRR,
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; notes that in Regulation (EU) 2016/45 of the European Central Bank of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law, the ECB provides for a common approach for the treatment of all transitional arrangements; calls for a harmonisation of phase-in periods of capital deductions among Member States, in particular with regard to the deduction of deferred tax assets and holdings in insurance subsidiaries for banks subject to supplementary supervision under the Financial Conglomerates Directive (Directive 2002/87/EC); is concerned by the recognition of "Badwill" stemming from a bargain purchase under IFRS 3 as equity for prudential purposes; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing the most significant ones and asks for a wise transposition of the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) in the EU context if some European specificities will prove to deserve specific treatments;
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5.
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union;
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing the most significant ones, addressing existing barriers and segmentations;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 14 a (new) - having regard to its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the EU role in the framework of international financial, monetary and regulatory institutions and bodies (2015/2060(INI)),
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that national options and discretions
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Highlights that possible negotiations following the United Kingdom's 23 June 2016 referendum shall not be used to promote deregulation in the financial sector; emphasises that equivalence advice by the European Supervisory Authorities and equivalence decisions by the European Commission should aim at ensuring a level playing field in financial services to foster fair competition between the EU and non-EU financial institutions and to strengthen diversity and the development of European financial services providers;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Stresses that there has been a natural learning phenomenon for all the members of the Supervisory Board since the creation of the SSM to deal with a variety of different business models and entities of different sizes, which needs to be supported and accelerated;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Notes relevant differences between jurisdictions and inside the European Union, such as different implementation of the IFRS accounting standards; calls for a strong convergence on the basis of a complete adoption of full IFRS in the banking sector;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Recalls the necessity to ensure a level playing field at the European level but believes that supervision and resolution are better managed at the national level;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 b (new) 5b. Welcomes the latest Commission proposal introducing a binding Net Stable Funding Ratio but is concerned about deviations from internationally agreed standards by opting for a lower cushion to protect against potential losses stemming from uncollateralized gross derivatives liabilities;
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives of Pillar 2
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls th
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives of Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements; is of the view that the use of capital guidance is a relevant way forward in order to balance financial stability concerns with flexibility needs; encourages the ECB to clarify the criteria that underline the Pillar 2 guidance; recalls that this guidance does not constrain the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA), therefore it should not be disclosed;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 14 a (new) - having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2016 on the finalization of Basel III,
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives of Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements; is of the view that the use of capital guidance is a relevant way forward in order to balance financial stability concerns with flexibility needs; underlines however that this should not result in a demonstrable reduction of Pillar 2 requirements;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives of Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements; is of the view that the use of capital guidance
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Reiterates the need to ensure higher transparency on the full set of supervisory practices and in particular in the SREP cycle; asks the ECB to publish performance indicators and metrics to demonstrate supervisory effectiveness and to enhance its external accountability; reiterates its call for more transparency with regard to Pillar 2 decisions and justifications; calls on the ECB to publish Joint Supervisory Standards;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Stresses the risks stemming from the holding of level 3 assets and in particular from the difficulty of their valuation; calls for a progressive reduction of the holdings of these assets; calls on the SSM to make this issue one of its supervisory priorities and to organise, jointly with the EBA, a quantitative stress test on it;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Recalls the necessity to find a proportional methodology in order to assess the real financial risk associated with the investment banking model without unfairly penalizing commercial banks that really provide financing to the real economy;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) - having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2016 on 'Stocktaking and challenges of the EU Financial Services Regulation: impact and the way forward towards a more efficient and effective EU framework for Financial Regulation and a Capital Markets Union',
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 20 a (new) - having regard to Report of the European Commission on an assessment of the remuneration rules under Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, of 28 July 2016,
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7.
Amendment 203 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue still needs to be addressed; notes, self- critically, that its own efforts in recent years have been fruitless and that time has been wasted; considers that market- oriented activity is inconceivable if market actors cannot fail; urges, therefore, that the banking system must finally be organised in a market-oriented manner;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 21 a (new) - having regard to the BIS Working Paper No 558 of April 2016 on 'Why bank capital matters for monetary policy,
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Welcomes the remarks by the Chair of the SSM's Supervisory Board calling for more prudent treatment of sovereign bonds with regard to capital requirements and the introduction of limits for large exposures;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Underlines that competition in the banking sector is decreasing due to the continued process of concentration since the crisis;
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. Believes that centralisation and concentration of the banking systems could be detrimental to economic growth in many European regions, particularly in case of a new banking or economic crisis;
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 c (new) 7c. Calls on the ECB and national competent authorities to decrease the necessary conditions to create a new bank, and demands them to publish a full list of all new bank licences given since the introduction of the Banking Union and a report on the rejected applications;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8.
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Points out that easier delegation of decision-making on some routine issues from the Supervisory Board to relevant officials could contribute to making ECB banking supervision more efficient and effective; calls on the ECB to specify the tasks and the legal framework for the delegation of decision-making;
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Takes note of the report of the European Court of Auditors on the functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism; takes the view that, while more involvement of the central level could improve the independence of supervision indeed, the use of staff from the competent authority of one Member State to supervise an institution from another Member State is already an effective way of addressing the risk of supervisory forbearance; believes that, while the separation of monetary and supervisory policy is a central principle, it should not preclude cost savings enabled by the sharing of services, provided such services are non-critical in terms of policy making and proper guarantees are established;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 22 a (new) - having regard to the Commission's supplementary analytical report of October 2016 on the effects of the proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS),
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Underlines that the creation of the SSM has been accompanied by an increase of influence for the European Union on the international stage compared to the pre-existing situation;
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Underlines that the separation of the supervisory tasks from monetary policy functions should enable the SSM to take an independent position on all relevant matters, including on potential effects of ECB interest rate targets on the financial position of supervised banks;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Takes note of the report of the European Court of Auditors on the SSM which stresses the insufficient levels of staffing;
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Re
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9.
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; respects the division of roles and competences between the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and other authorities within the European System of Financial Supervision, while underlining the importance of effective cooperation;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; considers that, in this light, the SREP process should be more balanced in its focus and should look beyond credit risk, to all material forms of banks' risk, including an in- depth analysis of the financial portfolio, especially Level 3 assets;
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; considers that, in this light, the SREP process should be more balanced in its focus and should look beyond credit risk, to all forms of banks' risk, including an in-depth analysis of the financial portfolio, especially Level 3 assets;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 22 a (new) - having regard to the final EBA report on the implementation and design of the MREL framework of 14 December 2016,
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; invites the SSM to reduce as much as possible the supervisory fees; points out that all banks should be subject to an appropriate level of supervision; reminds that an appropriate supervision is key to monitor all risks whatever the size of the banks;
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; welcomes the Commission's proposal of November 2016, which introduces more proportionality and reduces some of the regulatory costs for smaller institutions;
Amendment 232 #
9. Recalls the need to find, in regulation as well as in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; notes, in this respect, the changes put forward regarding reporting and remuneration requirements in the Commission proposal amending Directive 2013/36/EU;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; stresses that the proportionality principle, in particular, has not been sufficiently taken into account thus far in the exercise of supervision;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Reminds the neutrality of banking supervision with regard to accounting as laid down in Recital 39 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 ("SSM Regulation"); calls, therefore, on the ECB not to ask institutions to provide data which cannot be derived from their respective accounting frameworks applicable to them pursuant to other acts of Union and national law; calls on the competent authorities to refrain from exercising the option in Article 24 (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to require that institutions effect the valuation of assets and off-balance sheet items and the determination of own funds in accordance with International Accounting Standards as applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002;
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Underlines that the safety and soundness of a bank cannot be captured by a point-in-time assessment of its balance sheet alone, as they are ensured through dynamic interactions between the bank and the markets, and affected by various elements in the entire economy; underlines therefore that a sound framework for financial stability and growth should be comprehensive and balanced to cover dynamic supervisory practices and not focus merely on static regulation with mainly quantitative aspects;
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Condemns the EBA for providing special treatment to Deutsche Bank in the 2016 stress test by including the $4bn proceeds from a sale of its stake in Hua Xia before the sale had actually been made; expresses doubt that the ECB is capable of identifying a failing bank in due time; expresses concern that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between the ECB's role in defending the stability of the euro and the supervision of European megabanks;
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Supports efforts to date to streamline reporting requirements and particularly the idea behind the European Reporting Framework (ERF) and AnaCredit; calls on the institutions involved to ensure that the relevant data is produced and that this data is processed in a way that is useful to all stakeholders;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Encourages the streamlining of requirements to avoid double reporting and unnecessary additional costs of regulation; calls on the Commission to address the issue in due course in line with their conclusions from the call for evidence;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 26 Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Calls for a reflection on the possible negative impact on the real economy from the revision of the Basel rules, the introduction of MREL requirements, the introduction of TLAC and IFRS 9; calls for any solution aimed at smoothing the impacts:
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Draws attention to the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the European Banking Authority (EBA); stresses that the ECB should not become the de facto standard-setter for non-SSM banks;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Calls on national competent authorities and Member States to fully provide the ECB with the necessary human resources and economic data in order to do its job;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Underlines that the exercise of supervision should take into consideration the different banking systems and operational models across the EU;
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Condemns the creation of the SSM inside the ECB and is concerned about the conflict of interest entailed;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Welcomes the approval by the ECB Governing Council of principles increasing transparency in developing ECB regulations on European statistics, complementing the merits and costs procedure by public consultations on future draft ECB regulations on European statistics and publishing the results thereof; calls on the ECB to apply this enhanced transparency procedure to all fields of quasi legislative measures; shares the opinion of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) that an audit gap has emerged since the establishment of the SSM; is concerned that due to limitations imposed by the ECB on the ECA's access to documents, important areas are left unaudited; urges the ECB to fully cooperate with the ECA to exercise its mandate and thereby enhance accountability;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Believes that the SSM is not be able to conduct effective banking supervision; deplores the results of the stress test conducted by the ECB, together with EBA, as they have failed to capture the real risk associated with speculative activities and exposures in Level 3 assets and demonstrated to be not reliable and incomplete; regrets that the focus on credit risk resulted in penalising the safer commercial banking models with respect to big investment banks that pose the greatest risk to financial stability;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Notes that, on 18 May 2016, the ECB Council adopted the regulation on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data - AnaCredit; calls on the ECB to allow national central banks as much leeway as possible when implementing AnaCredit;
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Reiterates its stressing of the importance of strong and well- functioning IT systems corresponding to the needs of the supervisory functions of the SSM and security concerns, regrets recent reports about persisting weaknesses in the IT system;
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Notes that the outcome of the referendum on the UK membership to the EU makes an assessment of the whole European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), including the voting modalities inside the EBA, necessary;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 27 a (new) - having regard to the Effects Analysis (EA) of the European Commission of 11 October 2016 on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS),
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Reminds of the potential conflict of interest between supervisory tasks and responsibility for monetary policy; believes that the independence of the ECB as monetary policy authority needs to be strengthened;
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Insists on a more thorough organisational separation of the ECB's supervisory and monetary policy responsibilities;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 c (new) 9c. Is convinced that the existing review obligations in the different legal texts have to be exploited to the maximum extent to streamline the existing EU macro-prudential framework and to clarify the linkages with existing micro- prudential tools, as highlighted in its resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union and in the working documents that the Commission services have issued for consultation to the relevant stakeholders; considers that borrowing based instruments (such as LTVs and DSTIs) should be embedded in European legislation to ensure harmonisation in the use of these additional types of macro-prudential instruments; stresses that the SSM should also focus its supervisory activity on financial risks related to climate change, specifically the potential threat to financial stability posed by the so-called "stranded assets";
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 c (new) 9c. Welcomes the excellent work of the Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) which are a good example of European cooperation and knowledge building; points out that the proposed future use of a rotating system in the organisation of JSTs should guarantee objective supervision while taking into consideration the lengthy process of knowledge building in this very complex field of expertise;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 c (new) 9c. Calls on the ECB not to begin work on any further stages of AnaCredit until after a public consultation exercise has been carried out, with the full involvement of the European Parliament and with particular account being taken of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 c (new) 9c. Considers that the insufficiency of the SRF is one of the main causes of the non-credibility of the project of the Banking Union;
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 d (new) 9d. Recalls the need to dedicate more ECB personnel to the SSM to avoid over- reliance on staff from NCAs which potentially jeopardises the ECB supervisory tasks; welcomes the ECB's cooperation with the European Parliament on staff working conditions; underlines the importance of a good working environment that fosters professional cohesion in the ECB;
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 d (new) 9d. Expresses concern about the vulnerabilities in the real estate sector identified by the ESRB issuing a warning to eight Member States; calls the ESRB to explore comprehensive policy actions to address these vulnerabilities and to closely monitoring their implementation, including the recommendation to close real-estate data gaps by the end of 2020;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 e (new) 9e. Welcomes that the Banking Union has widely eliminated the home-host issue in supervision by the establishment of a single supervisor and the greatly improved exchange of relevant information between supervisory authorities, enabling a more holistic supervision of cross-border banking groups; stresses that, due to the current incomplete state of the Banking Union, the CRR review on liquidity and capital waivers needs to appropriately take into account concerns of consumer protection in host countries;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 e (new) 9e. Is concerned that fair competition in the single market might be distorted as only a small number of SSM members have activated or plan to activate general systemic risk buffers, while only two SSM members have announced the activation of a counter-cyclical capital buffer in 2017; notes that the ECB has so far not fully exercised its macroeconomic supervisory powers by fostering the adoption of macro-prudential supervisory instruments by national authorities;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 27 a (new) - having regard to the statement of the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN Ministers of 18 December 2013 on the SRM backstop,
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 f (new) 9f. Reiterates the need to enhance the ESRB's institutional and analytical capacity to assess risks and vulnerabilities beyond the banking sector, as for instance by looking carefully at the insurance sector which is becoming increasingly involved in financial services originally provided by banks; recalls that the ESRB should address the interconnectedness of financial markets and any other systemic risk affecting the stability of financial markets, including preventing large fluctuations in the financial cycle and developing tools such as the systemic risk index;
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 f (new) 9f. Welcomes the establishment of national systemic risk boards; stresses that the establishment of the Banking Union reinforces the need to strengthen macro-prudential policy at the European level in order to properly address potential cross-border spill-overs of systemic risk;
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 g (new) 9g. Encourages the Commission to propose a coherent and effective macro- prudential supervision in its overall review of the macro-prudential framework in 2017, calls on the Commission to be especially ambitious in order to enhance the current limited possibilities of the ESRB to intervene and reduce the complexity of the cooperation between ESRB, ECB/SSM and national authorities in the field of macro- prudential supervision, welcomes in this regard the progress already made on cross-border coordination by the ESRB recommendation on voluntary reciprocity;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 g (new) 9g. Considers that the institutional setting underlying the EU framework for macro-prudential supervision needs to be streamlined to reduce institutional complexity and lengthy process in the interaction between European actors and national authorities and between competent and designated national authorities;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 h (new) 9h. Deplores the ad-hoc evaluation which has been applied by the SSM in the stress test exercise in one selective case, leading to the inclusion in the starting level of capitalisation of Deutsche Bank of an asset sale which was not fully completed by 31 December 2015, therefore contradicting the Common Methodology applied for the 2016 EU stress tests;
Amendment 265 #
9h. Welcomes the ECB initiative to oblige supervised banks to report significant cyber-attacks under a real- time alert service and the SSM on-site inspections to supervise cyber-security; calls for the establishment of a legal framework which facilitates the exchange of sensitive information relevant to prevent cyber-attacks between banks;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 i (new) 9i. Considers that the opacity surrounding financial conditions of those banks which are not covered by the stress tests and the lack of transparency characterising the ECB's own stress tests for additional 56 banks under its supervision, imply uncertainty in supervisory practices and can lead to undermining market confidence; calls on the ECB to publish the results of its stress test exercise;
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 i (new) 9i. Stresses the crucial role of cyber- security for banking services and the need to incentivise financial institutions to be very ambitious in protecting consumer data and guaranteeing cyber-security;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 j (new) 9j. Points out that in the current environment non-banks are increasingly expanding their assets and, taking into account that they tend to be very sensitive to crises, encourages expanding regulation to all banking activities;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 j (new) 9j. Considers that when a NCA rejects the demand to take into accounts specific circumstances in the stress test exercise, this should be communicated to the EBA and the SSM to ensure a level playing field;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 28 a (new) - having regard to the Five Presidents' Report that asks for the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 k (new) 9k. Reiterates its call for a systematic review of comprehensive assessments of ECB-supervised institutions to take into account the lessons learned in cases where an institution is deemed sound under the assessment and subsequently runs into trouble, as well as where an institution is deemed undercapitalised on the basis of a stress test scenario which ex-post turns out to be significantly unrealistic;
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 l (new) 9l. Regrets that EBA has failed to provide RTSs on the condition of capital requirements for mortgage exposure under Articles 124(4)(b) and 164(6) CRR; stresses that the different views regarding the micro-prudential or the macro prudential dimensions of these guidelines signal that the double majority requirements in the EBA Board for SSM members and countries outside the SSM undermine the effectiveness of the decision-making process; stresses, however, the need to streamline and clarify the supervisory framework to ensure effective interaction of macro- prudential and micro-prudential policy instruments;
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 m (new) 9m. Notes that the SSM has been assigned the task of European banking supervision for the purpose of ensuring compliance with EU prudential rules and of ensuring financial stability, while other supervisory tasks having clear European spillovers have remained in the hand of domestic supervisors; stresses, in this regard, that the SSM should have monitoring powers concerning Anti- Money Laundering (AML) activities of national banking supervisors; emphasises that EBA should also be assigned additional powers in the field of AML, including the powers to carry out on-site assessments in Member States' competent authorities, to require the production of any information that is relevant to assessing compliance, to issue recommendations for remedial action, to make those recommendations public and to take measures that are necessary to ensure that the recommendations are effectively implemented;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 n (new) 9n. Reiterates its call on the ECB to redefine its role with regard to assistance programmes as one of 'silent observer' and to pursue a diligent revision of the ELA regime in the light of European bank supervision as serious doubts remain on whether the ECB's current discretion is fully consistent with a balanced doctrine of operational independence;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 o (new) 9o. Reiterates its call on EBA to enforce and enhance the consumer protection framework for banking services in line with its mandate, complementing the SSM's prudential supervision;
Amendment 275 #
9a. Takes note of the double role of the Board members, who are at the same time members of an executive body with decision-making roles and senior managers accountable in that capacity to the Chair of the Board, and considers that an evaluation of this structure should be undertaken before the end of the current mandate;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10.
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 29 a (new) - having regard to Protocol (No 1) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union,
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution and reminds that extraordinary public support shall only be of both precautionary and temporary nature, and cannot be used to offset losses that an institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; reminds that a report assessing the continuing need for allowing precautionary recapitalisations and the conditionality attached to such measures was due by 31 December 2015; calls on the Commission to submit such report as soon as possible;
Amendment 283 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; calls on the Commission, therefore, to reconsider its interpretation of the relevant State aid rules in an effort to guarantee that the preventive measures provided for by the European legislator in the Deposit Guarantee Directive can actually be implemented;
Amendment 284 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to
Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; calls on the European Commission to ensure the feasibility of the application of the preventive measures provided for in the DGSD;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Considers that the Banking Union does not meet its stated goal of preventing taxpayer-funded bank bailouts from occurring in future as a result of the precautionary recapitalisation clause in the BRRD/SRM by which a Member State may provide public money to an ailing bank before a bail-in of creditors is triggered on the grounds of protecting financial stability; considers that the burden-sharing requirement in the EU's State Aid legislation likewise contain a 'safeguard' clause under which bail-in can be avoided and public funds used on the grounds of protecting financial stability;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Regrets the planned use of precautionary recapitalisation contradicting the provisions of the BRRD which clearly exclude using this tool to cover present and future losses; stresses that operations aimed at cleaning the balance sheets from the burden of non- performing loans are equivalent to recognising losses on these assets;
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Calls for a reflection on the possible negative impact on the real economy from the revision of the Basel rules, the introduction of MREL requirements, the introduction of TLAC and IFRS 9; calls for any solution aimed at smoothing the impacts;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Underlines the importance to clarify practical issues which are directly affecting resolution, such as the reliance on service providers which provide critical services for example in the case of out- sourced IT services;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 29 b (new) - having regard to Protocol (No 2) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Rejects any arrangement involving a taxpayer-funded backstop;
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. After the adoption of the new packages from the Basel Committee, calls for a period of suspension of new rules in order to stabilise the supervision framework and facilitate the banks' capital and liquidity planning, essential for a sound support to the real economy;
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) 10b. Believes the bail-in of creditors of only 8 per cent will raise only a small proportion of the costs of resolution, which is totally insufficient; notes that in ordinary insolvency procedures investors would usually lose far more than 8 per cent;
Amendment 293 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 b (new) Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 c (new) 10c. Believes that bail-in still poses risks to ordinary taxpayers in a number of ways including increased premiums in pensions and health insurance and in the mis-selling of risky financial products eligible for bail-in to small retail investors; calls for the introduction of strict disclosure requirements on risk factors for securities eligible for bail-in in order to protect retail investors from being mis-sold inappropriate and high-risk bank securities;
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 297 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk-weighted assets and of avoiding cliff effects between the different categories of banks that would be subject to resolution; welcomes in this respect the proposed amendments to the CRR and the better alignment of both standards they bring; stresses that proper attention should be paid, in calibrating and/or phasing-in MREL requirements, to the need of creating a market for MREL-eligible liabilities; highlights the importance of maintaining discretion for the resolution authority when setting MREL;
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective: to make sure that banks have enough regulatory capital and loss-absorbing liabilities to make bail-in an effective instrument in resolution (without causing financial instability and without needing public money); concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk- weighted assets;
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL;
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital -A (new) -A. whereas the Banking Union has further weakened Member States’ control over their banking systems, and this situation is particularly serious in the Member States which are more peripheral and worst hit by the economic and financial crisis;
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk-weighted assets; emphasizes that market disclosure should be made in an appropriate manner in order to avoid investor misinterpretation of the MREL requirements;
Amendment 301 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective which is avoiding the socialisation of private risks; concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that a holistic approach to loss-absorption can be reached by combining the two, building on TLAC as the minimum standard; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk-weighted assets;
Amendment 303 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11.
Amendment 305 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Considers that a loss absorbency amount based on capital requirements will fail in a crisis of megabanks if the too-big-to-fail and too-interconnected-to- fail problems are not dealt with through structural separation; supports the view that the MREL floor should be supplemented with a measure to take into account a bank's exposure to the distress of other institutions in order to deal with the too-interconnected-to-fail problem;
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. calls on the Commission to carefully assess the evolution of the global standard-setting process for the prudential regulation and its effective implementation following the latest political developments, in particular the setting-up of the new American administration;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Calls for a careful calibration of MREL requirements considering that a disproportionate amount would entail unnecessarily high funding costs and could reduce the capacity of banks to finance the economy;
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Draws attention to the importance of clarifying in legislation th
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12.
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital -A a (new) -Aa. whereas the Banking Union, with its unique bank supervision and resolution methods, is a political way of enforcing the centralisation and capital concentration process in the European Union, and whereas it has been used to promote and carry out merger and acquisition operations in the banking sectors of a number of Member States and to concentrate deposits and investments in the hands of Europe’s financial behemoths, exacerbating the ‘too big to fail’ problem;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Draws attention to the importance of clarifying in legislation the stacking order between MREL-eligible CET1 and capital buffers; reiterates that the calibration of MREL should in all cases be closely linked to and justified by the banks resolution strategy;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Invites the Commission to assess, in the light of experience and within the framework of the review of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, whether the SRB and the national resolution authorities are equipped with sufficient early intervention powers and sufficient early intervention instruments to prevent disruptive outflows of banks' capital and loss-absorbing capacity during a crisis;
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Recalls that the BRRD in any case does not exclude the possibility of bail-out as provided by Articles 56 and 57 and that it does not break the link between the banks and sovereigns, given that State aid is still allowed, as provided by Article 32 of the BRRD; believes that this raises questions about the credibility and effectiveness of the new rules;
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective and to provide certainty to cross-border investors; welcomes therefore the Commission's proposal to go further in the harmonisation of this hierarchy; notes that better harmonisation of the regular insolvency regime and of its hierarchy of claims will also be essential, both, in the case of banks, to avoid discrepancies with the bank resolution regime, and, in the case of companies, to provide additional clarity and certainty to cross-border investors and contribute to addressing the issue of NPLs;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; calls on the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to presents the results of the resolvability assessments for G-SIB and other banks, including the proposed measures to overcome impediments to resolution; is concerned that there is no evidence to date that any major banks has been asked to remove obstacles to resolvability; calls on the Single Resolution Board to provide a comprehensive list of obstacles to resolvability in national or European legislation and to report on actions taken by banks to remove these obstacles;
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; welcomes that the BRRD brought an important change in the hierarchy of insolvency, giving priority to insured deposits, so that they rank senior to all capital instruments, loss absorbing capacity, other senior debt and uninsured deposits;
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; stresses that the legal framework already in place in some Member States should be taken into account on this issue and that legal uncertainty for the financial institutions affected should be prevented;
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States and to make sure banks hold sufficient subordinated and bail-inable debt to allow for a bail-in of debt instruments without causing general market panic in order to make the implementation of the BRRD
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; considers a common approach to bank creditor hierarchy a necessary precondition for the introduction of any deposit insurance scheme at Banking Union level;
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; is concerned by the multitude of exceptions far beyond deposits up to EUR 100 000;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital -A b (new) -Ab. whereas the Banking Union has given rise to a pan-European banking oligopoly, a development which runs counter to one of its supposed main objectives – combating the ‘too big to fail’ problem;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; welcomes the Commission's proposal on this subject;
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Warns that the numerous exceptions to the bail-in under Article 44 BRRD confer special status on the liabilities listed therein, to the detriment of all other creditors;
Amendment 322 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Calls on the Commission to produce, as a matter of urgency, a Delegated Act providing criteria for defining and ensuring the continuity of "critical functions" in accordance with Article 2(2) BRRD;
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 b (new) 13b. Stresses that market-oriented bank resolution does not recognise claims which have special status by virtue of being excluded under the law from the scope of insolvency proceedings;
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 Amendment 325 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Notes the range of legal options available to ensure the subordination of TLAC-eligible debt; points out that none is preferred by the FSB; is of the view that the approach adopted should first and foremost
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Notes the range of legal options available to ensure the subordination of TLAC-eligible debt; points out that none is preferred by the FSB; is of the view that the approach adopted should first and foremost strike a balance between flexibility
Amendment 327 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Notes the range of legal options available to ensure the subordination of TLAC-eligible debt; points out that none is preferred by the FSB; is of the view that the approach adopted should first and foremost strike a balance between effectiveness, flexibility and legal certainty;
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Warns that the BRRD requirement of contractual recognition for bail-in powers on liabilities governed by non-EU legislation proves cumbersome to implement; calls for clarification of the type of liabilities to which such requirement applies; is concerned that according to the latest Commission proposal on Article 55 BRRD, resolutions authorities shall be allowed to not require institutions to include in instruments issued by third countries a contractual term that these instruments can be written-down; calls, therefore, on the Commission to refine its proposal to ensure that the conditions for granting exemptions do not endanger banks' resolvability; recalls that the newly introduced resolution regime has resulted in some instruments offered to retail investors involving a higher risk of loss; therefore calls on the Commission to intensively scrutinise Member States' implementation of the MiFID II Directive, specifically focusing on its provisions which tackle conflicts of interests and ensuring the suitability of retail investment products to investors' needs;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital -A c (new) -Ac. whereas the Banking Union guarantees stability for big capital, ensuring that public funds continue to be channelled for purposes which serve big capital’s own interests;
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Warns that the BRRD requirement
Amendment 331 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Warns that the BRRD requirement of contractual recognition for bail-in powers on liabilities governed by non-EU legislation proves cumbersome to implement; welcomes efforts by the European Commission to address this; calls for clarification of the type of liabilities to which such requirement applies; considers this issue an immediate concern;
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 334 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16.
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Calls for the ex-ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund to be calculated in a strongly transparent manner with efforts to harmonise information on calculation outcomes and improve the understanding of the calculation methodology;
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Points out that swift and effective exchange of information between supervision and resolution authorities is paramount in order to ensure smooth crisis management; welcomes the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the ECB and the SRM in respect of cooperation and information exchange; recommends that the attendance of the ECB as a permanent observer at the SRB Plenary and Executive Sessions be made fully reciprocal by allowing a representative of the SRB to attend the Supervisory Board of the ECB as a permanent observer;
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Points out that swift and effective
Amendment 339 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Points out that swift and effective exchange of information between supervision and resolution authorities is paramount in order to ensure smooth crisis management; welcomes the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the ECB and the SRM in respect of cooperation and information exchange; warns of the consequences of this information exchange, which serves to circumvent the separation of monetary policy and supervisory functions;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A Amendment 340 #
17a. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRB and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by step;
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. reminds that bail-in instruments should only be sold to appropriate investors in the first place which can absorb potential losses without being threatened in their own sound financial standing and considers it fundamental to address the mis-selling of bail-in instruments to retail investors; asks the Commission to carefully assess the EU Investor Protection Framework and to present proposals if necessary;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Calls on the Commission to carry out with the utmost care the review of the calculation of the contributions to the SRF provided for in recital 27 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 and, in so doing, to review, in particular, the appropriateness of the risk factor in order to ensure that the risk profile of less complex institutions is properly taken into account;
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did not
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal;
Amendment 349 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal;
Amendment 35 #
A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union has been a fundamental step taken towards the completion of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union; whereas further efforts are needed as the Banking Union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a fiscal backstop and the Third Pillar of a European Deposit Insurance scheme;
Amendment 350 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includes; takes note of the Commission services' non- paper of a supplementary analytical report on the effect of the proposal;
Amendment 351 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 354 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Recalls that EDIS needs a public backstop to be credible; asks for a full and unlimited ECB guarantee on European deposits, in order to make this mechanism fully effective; recalls that this is in line with the objective enshrined in its mandate to keep the stability of the financial system;
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Criticises even more strongly the fact that the EU institutions, including Parliament, have abandoned the plan to separate banking functions properly, even though the only way to guarantee deposits effectively is to isolate them from high- risk activities;
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Calls on all Member States to apply and correctly implement BRDD and DGSD before EDIS comes into force.
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Points out that the Banking Union poses the biggest threat to depositors because it provides for banks to be rescued by means of a bail-in;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas since the establishment of the Banking Union
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19.
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19.
Amendment 364 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the
Amendment 366 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing; notes that EDIS can increase public confidence in the deposit insurance by de-linking the DGS from a sovereign state and providing liquidity to enable faster payment of insured depositors of banks that will be liquidated under their resolution strategy;
Amendment 368 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS and supports the principle of an EDIS as the third pillar of a harmonised Banking Union; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the establishment of the
Amendment 370 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the
Amendment 371 #
19. Is
Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS with a full and unlimited coverage and with the public backstop provided by the ECB; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing;
Amendment 373 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the
Amendment 374 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that the work on such measures should
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS; is
Amendment 376 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the
Amendment 377 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Is aware of the potential risks and benefits of an EDIS; is
Amendment 378 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Stresses that the establishment of an EDIS must improve financial stability and depositor confidence across the eurozone; steps must also be taken to ensure that under the EDIS no participating DGS has a lower level of protection for its covered deposits than would be the case under Directive 2014/49/EU; furthermore, Member States must retain the financial leeway to take alternative and institution-protecting measures at national level;
Amendment 379 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Stresses the necessity of addressing the sovereign bank link and suggests commencing a careful and staged phasing in of large exposure rules for sovereign debt in lock-step with the introduction of EDIS;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 Amendment 381 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 Amendment 382 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20.
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20.
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20.
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Welcomes a European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the risk reduction measures;
Amendment 386 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Welcomes
Amendment 387 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Welcomes a European approach to deposit insurance based on full mutualisation and direct risk-based contributions by banks, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the risk reduction measures;
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20.
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Emphasises that an EDIS should not have a purely paybox function; an EDIS should instead make it possible for funds available for alternative measures to be used to avert compensation cases and the costs involved in repaying depositors or potential risks to financial stability and to finance those measures accordingly; stresses that these measures must be introduced within a clearly defined legal framework and that the participating DGS must be equipped with the appropriate structures and competences so that the measures can be planned and implemented effectively and potential risks recognised;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 a (new) 20a. Considers that EDIS should progressively be established starting with a reinsurance phase, to be followed by co- insurance and full insurance, thereby offering homogenous protection to depositors within the BU;
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 Amendment 393 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 Amendment 394 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 Amendment 395 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 Amendment 396 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the
Amendment 397 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment of the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insured; stresses the need to amend Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards the wording of Article 92 (2) to refer to the SRF and the DIF in order to enable the European Court of Auditors to audit each the SRF and the DIF;
Amendment 398 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment of the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insured and their proportionality;
Amendment 399 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 21.
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) - having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board's first EU Shadow Banking Monitor from July 2016,
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union
Amendment 400 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21 a (new) 21a. Notes that contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund should be cost- neutral for the banking sector;
Amendment 401 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 Amendment 402 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 403 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 404 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 405 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Highlights that Article 114 seems to be an inappropriate legal basis for the establishment of both the EDIS and the DIF;
Amendment 406 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Highlights that Article 114
Amendment 407 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22. Highlights that Article 114
Amendment 408 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 409 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 22.
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas, however, the Banking Union is not complete without the introduction of a common deposit insurance and a Bank Structural Reform in the spirit of the Liikanen Report to effectively address the too-big-to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;
Amendment 410 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 22 a (new) 22a. Stresses that a credible EDIS needs to be supported by a backstop mechanism;
Amendment 411 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 Amendment 412 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 Amendment 413 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 23. Stresses that the introduction of the EDIS
Amendment 414 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. Takes the view that no limits to sovereign debt exposure can be considered as far as there is no international agreement on the matter nor a risk-free asset available within the BU;
Amendment 415 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 a (new) 23a. Recalls that the role of the Commission is to guarantee a level playing field across the EU and that it should avoid any fragmentation within the internal market;
Amendment 416 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 23 b (new) 23b. Asks the Council to swiftly adopt the EDIS Regulation once it is approved by Parliament;
Amendment 419 #
Motion for a resolution Subheading 4 Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete as long as a fiscal backstop mechanism for the Single Resolution Fund and the third pillar of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme are not established;
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 Amendment 422 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 Amendment 423 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 424 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 425 #
24.
Amendment 426 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24.
Amendment 427 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle
Amendment 428 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop based on the ESM, for the SRF and EDIS, which should be fiscally neutral over the
Amendment 429 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the establishment of the SSM within the ECB creates a conflict of interest between the pursuit of an independent monetary policy and prudential supervision;
Amendment 430 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to
Amendment 431 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should
Amendment 432 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Calls for an ambitious structural reform of banks based on a true and clear separation between credit and trading activities, together with a stricter regulation of shadow banking and financial speculation, as the only way forward to prevent the accumulation of systemic risks and ensure financial stability; strongly condemns the reluctance of the European institutions to conclude these reforms;
Amendment 433 #
24a. Considers that in order to ensure full credibility of the common fiscal backstop for the SRM and EDIS, the ESM should be able to borrow from the European Central Bank;
Amendment 434 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Is of the opinion that in order to restore trust, a fiscal backstop needs to work for the Banking Union as a whole;
Amendment 435 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 a (new) 24a. Calls for the Banking Union and its mechanisms to be dissolved;
Amendment 436 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 24 b (new) 24b. Underlines that the restrictive eligibility criteria of the ESM's direct bank recapitalisation instrument limit its effectiveness; highlights that a more easily accessible mechanism for direct bank recapitalisation would boost depositor confidence, contribute to breaking the sovereign-bank link and reinforce financial stability;
Amendment 437 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the ECB
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas a completed Banking Union will be an important contribution to breaking the sovereign-risk nexus;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) A a. whereas all Member States that have adopted the euro make up the Banking Union;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas, under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, special tasks should only be conferred upon the Europe Central Bank concerning the supervision of credit institutions;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas the euro is the currency of the European Union;
Amendment 48 #
Ac. whereas, in order to function properly the BU needs a risk-free financial asset, such as Union and/or Eurozone bonds;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas overall the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) - having regard to the EU Shadow Banking Monitor from the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of July 2016,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks appear to have s
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain; whereas the current situation calls for caution when introducing regulatory changes, particularly with regard to the financing environment of the real economy;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Recital Β B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas despite the fact that the European banking sector has received more than €1.6 trillion in taxpayer support since 2008, and despite the fact that the ECB has provided €80 billion a month in life-support financing, another crisis is unfolding in the European banking sector;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas regulatory capital requirements represent the minimum amount that banks should hold while capital, in excess of this amount, is necessary to ensure the ability to meet the minimum requirement at all times;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Ba. whereas a proper clean-up of bank balance sheets after the crisis has been delayed, still hampering economic growth;
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 a (new) - having regard to the 2016 IMF Global Financial Stability Report,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B b (new) Bb. whereas internal risk models for operational risk and lending to corporates, other financial institutions, specialised finance and equities banks have persistently resulted in very different capital requirements which are often not justified by different risk sensitivity;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B b (new) Bb. whereas the EBA chairperson observed in October 2016 that as a result of the high level of non-performing loans in European banks, banking supervisors have "serious doubts [about] the long term viability of significant segments of the banking system"1a; _________________ 1a https://konferenz.fma.gv.at/media/124793 9980
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B c (new) Bc. whereas parallel to the improvement of banking regulations on capital requirements, there has been a significant rise in the largely unregulated shadow banking sector; whereas the European Systemic Risk Board noted in July 2016 that the following factors were significant sources and amplifiers of systemic risks: financial leverage in hedge funds and real estate funds; systemic interconnectedness, especially between money market funds and the banking system; and maturity and liquidity transformation; whereas the systemic risks posed by the shadow banking sector highlight the urgent need for regulation of the sector;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B c (new) Bc. whereas excessive lending and risk-taking towards the real estate sector has caused major financial crises and real estate bubbles;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B d (new) Bd. whereas the restructuring of European banks in response to the sector's lack of profitability has led to the announcement of 130 000 job losses in the second half of 2015 and a further 46 000 job losses in 2016;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B e (new) Be. whereas the low profitability of the European banking sector is being driven by the huge level of NPLs, sectoral over- capacity, and the low/negative interest rate environment caused by the low demand for credit;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B f (new) Bf. whereas it is not the role of the European institutions to ensure the profitability of the banking sector;
Amendment 67 #
Bg. whereas the ECB's conventional and unconventional expansionary monetary policies have underpinned a small amount of growth in the euro area at the cost of contributing to an excess demand for financial assets, producing overvalued and increasingly volatile financial markets;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B h (new) Bh. whereas Deutsche Bank has been found to be seriously undercapitalised in relation to the Basel standards and its own targets; whereas the US division of Deutsche Bank failed the Federal Reserve stress test this year; whereas the reason Deutsche Bank passed the EBA's stress test this year was due to special treatment; whereas the IMF described Deutsche Bank in June 2016 as probably "the most important net contributor to systemic risks";
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the new resolution regime that entered into force in January 2016 represented a change of paradigm
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 1 b (new) - having regard to the IMF's 2016 Global Financial Stability Report,
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the objective of the new resolution regime that entered into force in January 2016
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C C. whereas the new resolution regime that entered into force in January 2016
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas a common DGS or EDIS is inadequate as long as risks differ greatly from one national banking system to another;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas participation in the Banking Union is open to Member States that have not yet adopted the euro;
Amendment 74 #
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas no non-euro area country has yet expressed a willingness to join the Banking Union; having regard to the outcome of the referendum in which the British people clearly voted in favour of Brexit; whereas growing criticism of the EU cannot be ignored;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas our work on the capital market union should not move away pressure from the completion of our work on the banking union, which still is a pre- requirement for financial stability in the bank-reliant landscape of the European Union;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas the Commission and the ECB have neither addressed nor replied to a number of clarifications and calls for action made by the European Parliament in the 2015 Banking Union report of March 2016;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas the European Central Bank might in specific occasions suffer from conflict of interests due to its dual responsibilities as both a monetary policy authority and a banking supervisor;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is necessary to provide homogenous protection of depositors and for the completion of the BU;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities the European Central Bank has so far failed to take sufficient account of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas the "too big to fail" and the "too interconnected to fail" issues remain largely unaddressed;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas recent data show that the estimated NPLs in the euro area is EUR 1132 € billion1a; _________________ 1a2017 independent Annual Growth Survey 5th Report, 23 November 2016.
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D b (new) Db. whereas the Banking Union is acting on the consequences of the crisis and not on the causes;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D c (new) Dc. whereas a proper structural reform of banks based on a clear separation between trading and credit activities is the only way to prevent the risk of bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and ensure financial stability;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph -1 (new) Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph -1 (new) -1. Rejects the theory that the Banking Union will necessarily resolve the ‘too big to fail’ problem and strengthen the banking and financial sector; considers that the class-motivated nature of this project and the political- ideological approach it involves will not prevent the continued use of public money to bail out the banks’ major shareholders, nor will it stop banks engaging in financial manipulation or speculation;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph -1 (new) -1 Underlines that the completion of the Banking Union requires further convergence on many fields; in this light, recalls the importance to draw a Single Rule book on insolvency and criminal law, coupled with strong convergence on tax issues;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph -1 a (new) -1a. Stresses that, given the importance of the financial system, and in view of current and recent experiences, capital concentration policies in the banking sector must be ended, and control of the banks and the financial system must be placed in public hands; takes the view that these two measures are prerequisites for guaranteeing that financial resources used to stimulate the economy foster the development of countries and improve the living standards of their people and workers;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs)
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs)
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers th
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs; reiterates the importance of the ability to sell off NPLs in order to free up capital, especially important for bank lending to SMEs;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions, particularly in the periphery economies resulting from the 2008 financial crisis and the EU's response to it; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs;
source: 595.751
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