BETA

25 Amendments of Herbert DORFMANN related to 2023/0111(COD)

Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution or entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation in turn generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Board should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. However, this should not lead to expectation that burden sharing requirements will be reduced as burden sharing by shareholders and creditors should remain primary source of funding.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as in case of resolution.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
(37) After the initial build-up period of the Single Resolution Fund referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, its available financial means may face slight decreases below its target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. The amount of the ex-ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstances is thus likely to be small. It may therefore be possible that, in some years, the amount of those ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. The Board should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions for one or more years until the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the Board to use the Single Resolution Funthe collection of ex-ante contributions ends once the target level of 1% of covered deposits has been reached.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When applying Article 12d to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 12d(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
(iiia) any risks to successful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point c – point i
(i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)
(iia) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to institutions that are designated as "small and non-complex institutions" in line with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 2
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the Board shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 12d(2a), second subparagraph, of this Regulation.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
After having received tThe notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condit shall not constrain the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement measures. Decisions referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taklating into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall communicate that assessment to the ECB or to the relevant national competent authority as early as possiblny measures by an institutional protection scheme shall remain under the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protectcovered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure, including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or the write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1), taken in respect of the entity would prevent the failure of the entity within a reasonable timeframe;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectivelyto the same extent.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
For entities designated as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 there shall be a presumption that the winding up under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 20 – paragraph 1
1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolutaking resolution action, or the conditions forexercising the power to write down or conversion oft relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to inin accordance with Article 21(1) are met, the Board shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of an entity as referred to in Article 2 is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the Board and the national resolution authority, and from the entity concerned.;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point c
(b) having regard to timing, the need to implement effectively the write down and conversion powers or the resolution strategy for the resolution group and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, other than the write- down or conversion of relevant capital instruments, and eligible liabilities as referred to in paragraph 7a, would prevent the failure of that entity or group within a reasonable timeframe.;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 79 of this Regulation and Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU where relevant;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b
(b) all liabilities ranking lower than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5,unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits have been written down or converted in full.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 79 – paragraph 1
1. Participating Member States shall ensure that when the Board takes resolution action with respect to a credit institution, provided that such action ensures that depositors continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent depositors from bearing losses, the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute for the purposes and under the conditions laid down in Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON