25 Amendments of Marisa MATIAS related to 2016/2247(INI)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board's first EU Shadow Banking Monitor from July 2016,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
Citation 1 b (new)
- having regard to the IMF's 2016 Global Financial Stability Report,
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas since the establishment of the Banking Union has been a fundamental step taken towards the completion of a genuine Economic and Monetary Unionthere has already been an increased concentration of European megabanks; whereas the envisaged 'level playing field' and an increasingly integrated single market for financial services will contribute further to this concentration instead of addressing the too-big-to-fail problem;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union has been a fundamental step taken towards the completion of a genuine Economic and Monetary Uniondoes not deal with the too- big to fail, too-interconnected-to-fail and too-complex-to-resolve problems; whereas as a result it does not secure an end to publicly funded bank bailouts nor to the imposition of conditional austerity measures;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks appear to have steadilightly improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain; whereas the current sinternal models for capital requirement calculations have allowed some instituation calls for caution when introducing regulatory changes; s to artificially boost their level of capital; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas despite the fact that the European banking sector has received more than €1.6 trillion in taxpayer support since 2008, and despite the fact that the ECB has provided €80 billion a month in life-support financing, another crisis is unfolding in the European banking sector;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas the EBA chairperson observed in October 2016 that as a result of the high level of non-performing loans in European banks, banking supervisors have "serious doubts [about] the long term viability of significant segments of the banking system"1a; _________________ 1a https://konferenz.fma.gv.at/media/124793 9980
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas parallel to the improvement of banking regulations on capital requirements, there has been a significant rise in the largely unregulated shadow banking sector; whereas the European Systemic Risk Board noted in July 2016 that the following factors were significant sources and amplifiers of systemic risks: financial leverage in hedge funds and real estate funds; systemic interconnectedness, especially between money market funds and the banking system; and maturity and liquidity transformation; whereas the systemic risks posed by the shadow banking sector highlight the urgent need for regulation of the sector;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
Bd. whereas the restructuring of European banks in response to the sector's lack of profitability has led to the announcement of 130 000 job losses in the second half of 2015 and a further 46 000 job losses in 2016;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Recital B e (new)
Be. whereas the low profitability of the European banking sector is being driven by the huge level of NPLs, sectoral over- capacity, and the low/negative interest rate environment caused by the low demand for credit;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B f (new)
Recital B f (new)
Bf. whereas it is not the role of the European institutions to ensure the profitability of the banking sector;
Amendment 67 #
Bg. whereas the ECB's conventional and unconventional expansionary monetary policies have underpinned a small amount of growth in the euro area at the cost of contributing to an excess demand for financial assets, producing overvalued and increasingly volatile financial markets;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B h (new)
Recital B h (new)
Bh. whereas Deutsche Bank has been found to be seriously undercapitalised in relation to the Basel standards and its own targets; whereas the US division of Deutsche Bank failed the Federal Reserve stress test this year; whereas the reason Deutsche Bank passed the EBA's stress test this year was due to special treatment; whereas the IMF described Deutsche Bank in June 2016 as probably "the most important net contributor to systemic risks";
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions, particularly in the periphery economies resulting from the 2008 financial crisis and the EU's response to it; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that according to ECB data, by April 2016 banks in the euro area held EUR 1 014 billion in non-performing loans; notes that the decline of the industrial sector in Italy and Greece has been a major contributing factor to the growth in NPLs in these states; considers that the austerity policies enforced by the Troika in the memorandum countries, and through the Stability and Growth Pact, have exacerbated the NPL problem;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Considers that the lack of profitability in the European banking sector is caused by demand-side problems in addition to the stock of NPLs and the interest rate environment; notes that general economic stagnation and the record-high levels of liquid assets held by non-financial corporations in the euro area (in part due to decades of wage compression), which reduce reliance on and demand for loans by corporations, are significant factors in the chronically low level of bank profitability; considers that this situation requires an end to austerity policies and an urgent and substantial EU infrastructure investment programme that invests new funds into the real economy;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are massive risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying itsconsiders the attempts by some Member States to weaken prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be neededquirements to be counter-productive; considers that only the structural separation of trading and credit activities will effectively reduce the link between sovereigns and banks;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs; supports the introduction of regulatory capital levels of at least 15% of risk-weighted assets;
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue still needs to be addressed; , too- interconnected-to-fail and too-complex- to-resolve problems will not be resolved by the Banking Union but rather exacerbated by it; calls for serious action to finally be taken to address the too-big- to fail issue by separating banks into investment and commercial banks; believes that investment banks should be restricted in size and connectedness and allowed to fail; calls for the introduction of a maximum size of banks and a cap on exposure to derivatives in all financial institutions; calls on Member States and the Commission to promote regional public banking as a credible alternative to the current crisis-ridden banking sector;
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Condemns the EBA for providing special treatment to Deutsche Bank in the 2016 stress test by including the $4bn proceeds from a sale of its stake in Hua Xia before the sale had actually been made; expresses doubt that the ECB is capable of identifying a failing bank in due time; expresses concern that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between the ECB's role in defending the stability of the euro and the supervision of European megabanks;
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Considers that the Banking Union does not meet its stated goal of preventing taxpayer-funded bank bailouts from occurring in future as a result of the precautionary recapitalisation clause in the BRRD/SRM by which a Member State may provide public money to an ailing bank before a bail-in of creditors is triggered on the grounds of protecting financial stability; considers that the burden-sharing requirement in the EU's State Aid legislation likewise contain a 'safeguard' clause under which bail-in can be avoided and public funds used on the grounds of protecting financial stability;
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Believes the bail-in of creditors of only 8 per cent will raise only a small proportion of the costs of resolution, which is totally insufficient; notes that in ordinary insolvency procedures investors would usually lose far more than 8 per cent;
Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Believes that bail-in still poses risks to ordinary taxpayers in a number of ways including increased premiums in pensions and health insurance and in the mis-selling of risky financial products eligible for bail-in to small retail investors; calls for the introduction of strict disclosure requirements on risk factors for securities eligible for bail-in in order to protect retail investors from being mis-sold inappropriate and high-risk bank securities;
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that a holistic approach tourges the Commission to ensure the MREL standards fully meet the TLAC benchmarks; supports a loss- absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk- weighted assetbency requirement based on the leverage ratio, which is not dependent on risk weights and internal models; notes that Risk Weighted Assets are not always a reliable predictor of banking resilience; expresses concern that including the RWA in the TLAC requirement may incentivise megabanks to take on more risks;
Amendment 305 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Considers that a loss absorbency amount based on capital requirements will fail in a crisis of megabanks if the too-big-to-fail and too-interconnected-to- fail problems are not dealt with through structural separation; supports the view that the MREL floor should be supplemented with a measure to take into account a bank's exposure to the distress of other institutions in order to deal with the too-interconnected-to-fail problem;