BETA


2012/2304(INI) European Central Bank annual report for 2011

Progress: Procedure completed

RoleCommitteeRapporteurShadows
Lead ECON GÁLL-PELCZ Ildikó (icon: PPE PPE), TREMOSA I BALCELLS Ramon (icon: ALDE ALDE), JOLY Eva (icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE)
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 142-p1

Events

2013/07/31
   EC - Commission response to text adopted in plenary
Documents
2013/04/17
   EP - Results of vote in Parliament
2013/04/17
   EP - Decision by Parliament
Details

The European Parliament adopted by 442 votes to 88, with 40 abstentions a resolution on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank.

The resolution commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably.

Parliament considers that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. It welcomes the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011.

ECB initiatives: Parliament acknowledges the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets , in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight . However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Parliament considers that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB .

The resolution points out that the results, in terms of credit growth , have been unsatisfactory and notes that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme.

Parliament highlights a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011:

transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet , which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Parliament stresses that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis ; rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Parliament points out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts; swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market; high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Parliament demands further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them; significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones.

Credit available to businesses and households: Parliament notes that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011 . It takes note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs.

Collateral: Parliament is worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. It believes that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy.

Conditionality: the resolution underlines that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy , and especially to SMEs and to households.

The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs.

The economic crisis and the ECB: Parliament calls on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications.

It points out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. It notes that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems.

Parliament points out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. It considers that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. It affirms, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union.

The resolution encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases , which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States.

Parliament points out that it has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU , in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources. It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU.

Parliament notes that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility .

Banking union: Parliament considers it urgent to create the banking union . In its view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard , the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector, and to s ecure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs .

Parliament welcomes the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. It points out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union. The resolution insists that, in the event that ECB becomes in the end single supervisor for banks in the eurozone, even on a temporary basis, Parliament should have a clear role in the nomination of the members of the supervisory board.

It calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB.

Parliament deems that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. It stresses that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts.

Institutional matters: Parliament regrets the lack of transparency of the working method, as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika . It believes that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. It stresses the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. It also stresses that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision.

In this context, Parliament considers that a Treaty revision , including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded.

Lastly, Parliament calls for its powers to impeach an ECB Governing Council member , in cases of serious misconduct, to be enhanced.

Documents
2013/04/17
   EP - End of procedure in Parliament
2013/04/16
   EP - Debate in Parliament
2013/02/25
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading
Documents
2013/02/24
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary
Documents
2013/01/22
   EP - Vote in committee
2013/01/15
   EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament
2012/11/27
   EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2012/09/28
   EP - Committee draft report
Documents

Documents

Activities

Votes

A7-0031/2013 - Marisa Matias - § 35 #

2013/04/17 Outcome: +: 517, -: 89, 0: 42
DE FR ES IT RO HU PL PT BE EL BG AT SK IE FI SI LV LU CY LT EE CZ NL MT DK GB SE
Total
88
69
48
54
31
21
43
20
21
19
13
18
12
10
12
8
9
6
6
8
5
21
26
2
13
45
19
icon: PPE PPE
242

Luxembourg PPE

3
2

Estonia PPE

For (1)

1

Czechia PPE

2

Denmark PPE

Against (1)

1
icon: S&D S&D
169

Bulgaria S&D

2

Finland S&D

2

Slovenia S&D

2

Latvia S&D

1

Luxembourg S&D

For (1)

1

Estonia S&D

For (1)

1

Netherlands S&D

3
icon: ALDE ALDE
72

Greece ALDE

1

Slovakia ALDE

For (1)

1

Ireland ALDE

Against (1)

2

Slovenia ALDE

2

Latvia ALDE

For (1)

1

Luxembourg ALDE

For (1)

1

Lithuania ALDE

1

Estonia ALDE

2

Denmark ALDE

3

Sweden ALDE

4
icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE
56

Spain Verts/ALE

2

Portugal Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Greece Verts/ALE

1

Austria Verts/ALE

2

Finland Verts/ALE

2

Latvia Verts/ALE

1

Luxembourg Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Estonia Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Netherlands Verts/ALE

3

Denmark Verts/ALE

For (1)

Abstain (1)

2

United Kingdom Verts/ALE

Against (2)

5

Sweden Verts/ALE

Abstain (1)

3
icon: GUE/NGL GUE/NGL
33

Spain GUE/NGL

For (1)

1

Portugal GUE/NGL

4

Greece GUE/NGL

3

Ireland GUE/NGL

For (1)

1

Latvia GUE/NGL

For (1)

1

Netherlands GUE/NGL

2

Denmark GUE/NGL

1

United Kingdom GUE/NGL

1

Sweden GUE/NGL

1
icon: NI NI
25

Spain NI

1

Hungary NI

2

Belgium NI

Abstain (1)

1
5
icon: EFD EFD
24

Belgium EFD

Abstain (1)

1

Slovakia EFD

Against (1)

1

Finland EFD

Against (1)

1

Lithuania EFD

Against (1)

Abstain (1)

2

Netherlands EFD

Against (1)

1

Denmark EFD

Against (1)

1
icon: ECR ECR
26

Hungary ECR

Against (1)

1

Belgium ECR

Against (1)

1

Latvia ECR

Against (1)

1

Netherlands ECR

Against (1)

1

Denmark ECR

Against (1)

1

A7-0031/2013 - Marisa Matias - § 45 #

2013/04/17 Outcome: +: 511, -: 115, 0: 17
FR ES IT RO DE HU PT EL PL GB BE IE BG SK AT FI SI NL LT LU LV EE CZ CY DK MT SE
Total
69
47
56
30
89
21
20
19
42
43
21
11
13
12
18
12
8
25
7
6
9
5
21
5
12
2
19
icon: S&D S&D
166

Bulgaria S&D

2

Finland S&D

2

Slovenia S&D

2

Netherlands S&D

3

Luxembourg S&D

For (1)

1

Latvia S&D

1

Estonia S&D

For (1)

1
icon: PPE PPE
242

Luxembourg PPE

3

Estonia PPE

For (1)

1

Czechia PPE

2
2

Denmark PPE

Against (1)

1
icon: ALDE ALDE
74

Greece ALDE

1

Slovakia ALDE

For (1)

1

Slovenia ALDE

2

Lithuania ALDE

1

Luxembourg ALDE

For (1)

1

Latvia ALDE

For (1)

1

Estonia ALDE

2
3
icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE
56

Spain Verts/ALE

2

Portugal Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Greece Verts/ALE

1

United Kingdom Verts/ALE

5

Austria Verts/ALE

2

Finland Verts/ALE

2

Netherlands Verts/ALE

3

Luxembourg Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Latvia Verts/ALE

1

Estonia Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Denmark Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Sweden Verts/ALE

Abstain (1)

3
icon: GUE/NGL GUE/NGL
32

Spain GUE/NGL

For (1)

1

Portugal GUE/NGL

4

Greece GUE/NGL

3

United Kingdom GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1

Ireland GUE/NGL

For (1)

1

Netherlands GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1

Latvia GUE/NGL

For (1)

1

Cyprus GUE/NGL

1

Denmark GUE/NGL

1

Sweden GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1
icon: NI NI
23

Hungary NI

2

Belgium NI

Against (1)

1
5
icon: EFD EFD
23

Belgium EFD

Against (1)

1

Slovakia EFD

Against (1)

1

Finland EFD

Against (1)

1

Netherlands EFD

Against (1)

1

Lithuania EFD

For (1)

1

Denmark EFD

Against (1)

1
icon: ECR ECR
26

Hungary ECR

Against (1)

1

Belgium ECR

Against (1)

1

Netherlands ECR

Against (1)

1

Latvia ECR

Against (1)

1

Denmark ECR

Against (1)

1

A7-0031/2013 - Marisa Matias - Résolution #

2013/04/17 Outcome: +: 442, -: 88, 0: 40
FR IT DE ES RO HU PL BE GB BG PT EL IE FI SK AT NL SE SI LT LU EE LV DK MT CY CZ
Total
59
52
79
42
27
17
33
19
39
12
20
17
11
12
11
19
20
17
7
7
6
4
5
11
2
5
16
icon: PPE PPE
208

Slovenia PPE

3

Luxembourg PPE

3

Estonia PPE

For (1)

1

Cyprus PPE

1

Czechia PPE

1
icon: S&D S&D
158

Bulgaria S&D

2

Finland S&D

2

Netherlands S&D

3

Slovenia S&D

2

Luxembourg S&D

For (1)

1

Estonia S&D

For (1)

1
icon: ALDE ALDE
61

Greece ALDE

1

Slovakia ALDE

For (1)

1

Slovenia ALDE

2

Luxembourg ALDE

For (1)

1

Estonia ALDE

For (1)

1
3
icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE
50

Spain Verts/ALE

2

Belgium Verts/ALE

3

United Kingdom Verts/ALE

Against (1)

4

Portugal Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Greece Verts/ALE

1

Finland Verts/ALE

2

Austria Verts/ALE

2

Netherlands Verts/ALE

2

Sweden Verts/ALE

Abstain (1)

3

Luxembourg Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Estonia Verts/ALE

For (1)

1

Latvia Verts/ALE

1

Denmark Verts/ALE

For (1)

Abstain (1)

2
icon: EFD EFD
22

Belgium EFD

Abstain (1)

1

Finland EFD

Against (1)

1

Slovakia EFD

Against (1)

1

Netherlands EFD

Against (1)

1

Lithuania EFD

2
icon: NI NI
19

Hungary NI

Against (1)

1

Belgium NI

Against (1)

1

United Kingdom NI

Abstain (1)

3

Netherlands NI

2
icon: ECR ECR
18

Belgium ECR

Against (1)

1

Netherlands ECR

Against (1)

1

Denmark ECR

Against (1)

1
icon: GUE/NGL GUE/NGL
33

Spain GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1

United Kingdom GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1
4

Ireland GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1

Netherlands GUE/NGL

2

Sweden GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1

Latvia GUE/NGL

Against (1)

1

Denmark GUE/NGL

1

Cyprus GUE/NGL

2

History

(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)

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commission
  • body: EC dg: Economic and Financial Affairs commissioner: REHN Olli
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  • date: 2013-01-15T00:00:00 type: Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading body: EP
  • date: 2013-01-22T00:00:00 type: Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading body: EP
  • date: 2013-02-25T00:00:00 type: Committee report tabled for plenary, single reading body: EP docs: url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A7-2013-31&language=EN title: A7-0031/2013 summary: The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Marisa MATIAS (GUE/NGL, PT) on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank. The report commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably. Members consider that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. They welcome the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011. ECB initiatives: the report looks at the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets , in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight . However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Members consider that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB . The report points out that the results, in terms of credit growth , have been unsatisfactory and note that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme, hinting at the existence of a trade-off between the support of financial institutions and that of sovereign creditors . Members highlight a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011: transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet , which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Members stress that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis ; rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Members point out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts; swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market; high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Members demand further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them; significant levels of non-marketable assets andasset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. Credit available to businesses and households: Members note that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011. They take note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs. Collateral: Members are worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones . They believe that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy. Conditionality: Members underline that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy, and especially to SMEs and to households . The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs. The economic crisis and the ECB: Members call on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications. They point out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. They note that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems. Members point out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. Members consider that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. They affirm, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union. The report encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases , which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States. Members point out that Parliament has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU , in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources . It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU. Members note that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility . Banking union: Members consider it urgent to create the banking union. In their view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector , and to secure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs . Members welcome the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. They point out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union. They call on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB. Members deem that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. They stress that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts . Institutional matters: Members regret the lack of transparency of the working method as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika. They believe that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. They stress the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. Members stress that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision. In this context, Members consider that a Treaty revision , including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded.
  • date: 2013-04-16T00:00:00 type: Debate in Parliament body: EP docs: url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?secondRef=TOC&language=EN&reference=20130416&type=CRE title: Debate in Parliament
  • date: 2013-04-17T00:00:00 type: Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading body: EP docs: url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-176 title: T7-0176/2013 summary: The European Parliament adopted by 442 votes to 88, with 40 abstentions a resolution on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank. The resolution commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably. Parliament considers that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. It welcomes the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011. ECB initiatives: Parliament acknowledges the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets , in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight . However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Parliament considers that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB . The resolution points out that the results, in terms of credit growth , have been unsatisfactory and notes that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme. Parliament highlights a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011: transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet , which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Parliament stresses that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis ; rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Parliament points out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts; swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market; high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Parliament demands further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them; significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. Credit available to businesses and households: Parliament notes that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011 . It takes note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs. Collateral: Parliament is worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. It believes that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy. Conditionality: the resolution underlines that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy , and especially to SMEs and to households. The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs. The economic crisis and the ECB: Parliament calls on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications. It points out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. It notes that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems. Parliament points out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. It considers that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. It affirms, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union. The resolution encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases , which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States. Parliament points out that it has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU , in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources. It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU. Parliament notes that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility . Banking union: Parliament considers it urgent to create the banking union . In its view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard , the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector, and to s ecure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs . Parliament welcomes the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. It points out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union. The resolution insists that, in the event that ECB becomes in the end single supervisor for banks in the eurozone, even on a temporary basis, Parliament should have a clear role in the nomination of the members of the supervisory board. It calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB. Parliament deems that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. It stresses that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts. Institutional matters: Parliament regrets the lack of transparency of the working method, as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika . It believes that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. It stresses the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. It also stresses that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision. In this context, Parliament considers that a Treaty revision , including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded. Lastly, Parliament calls for its powers to impeach an ECB Governing Council member , in cases of serious misconduct, to be enhanced.
  • date: 2013-04-17T00:00:00 type: End of procedure in Parliament body: EP
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  • body: EC dg: url: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm title: Economic and Financial Affairs commissioner: REHN Olli
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 442 votes to 88, with 40 abstentions a resolution on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank.

    The resolution commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably.

    Parliament considers that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. It welcomes the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011.

    ECB initiatives: Parliament acknowledges the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets, in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight. However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Parliament considers that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB.

    The resolution points out that the results, in terms of credit growth, have been unsatisfactory and notes that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme.

    Parliament highlights a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011:

    • transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet, which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Parliament stresses that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis;
    • rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Parliament points out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts;
    • swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market;
    • high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Parliament demands further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them;
    • significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones.

    Credit available to businesses and households: Parliament notes that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011. It takes note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs.

    Collateral: Parliament is worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. It believes that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy.

    Conditionality: the resolution underlines that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy, and especially to SMEs and to households.

    The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs.

    The economic crisis and the ECB: Parliament calls on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications.

    It points out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. It notes that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems.

    Parliament points out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. It considers that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. It affirms, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union.

    The resolution encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases, which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States.

    Parliament points out that it has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU, in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources. It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU.

    Parliament notes that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility.

    Banking union: Parliament considers it urgent to create the banking union. In its view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector, and to secure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs.

    Parliament welcomes the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. It points out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union. The resolution insists that, in the event that ECB becomes in the end single supervisor for banks in the eurozone, even on a temporary basis, Parliament should have a clear role in the nomination of the members of the supervisory board.

    It calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB.

    Parliament deems that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. It stresses that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts.

    Institutional matters: Parliament regrets the lack of transparency of the working method, as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika. It believes that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. It stresses the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. It also stresses that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision.

    In this context, Parliament considers that a Treaty revision, including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded.

    Lastly, Parliament calls for its powers to impeach an ECB Governing Council member, in cases of serious misconduct, to be enhanced.

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  • url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-176 type: Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading title: T7-0176/2013
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The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Marisa MATIAS (GUE/NGL, PT) on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank.

The report commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably.

Members consider that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. They welcome the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011.

ECB initiatives: the report looks at the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets, in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight. However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Members consider that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB.

The report points out that the results, in terms of credit growth, have been unsatisfactory and note that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme, hinting at the existence of a trade-off between the support of financial institutions and that of sovereign creditors.

Members highlight a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011:

  • transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet, which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Members stress that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis;
  • rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Members point out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts;
  • swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market;
  • high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Members demand further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them;
  • significant levels of non-marketable assets andasset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones.

Credit available to businesses and households: Members note that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011. They take note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs.

Collateral: Members are worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. They believe that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy.

Conditionality: Members underline that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy, and especially to SMEs and to households.

The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs.

The economic crisis and the ECB: Members call on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications.

They point out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. They note that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems.

Members point out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. Members consider that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. They affirm, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union.

The report encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases, which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States.

Members point out that Parliament has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU, in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources. It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU.

Members note that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility.

Banking union: Members consider it urgent to create the banking union. In their view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector, and to secure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs.

Members welcome the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. They point out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union.

They call on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB.

Members deem that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. They stress that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts.

Institutional matters: Members regret the lack of transparency of the working method as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika. They believe that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. They stress the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. Members stress that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision.

In this context, Members consider that a Treaty revision, including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded.

New

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Marisa MATIAS (GUE/NGL, PT) on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank.

The report commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably.

Members consider that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. They welcome the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011.

ECB initiatives: the report looks at the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets, in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight. However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Members consider that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB.

The report points out that the results, in terms of credit growth, have been unsatisfactory and note that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme, hinting at the existence of a trade-off between the support of financial institutions and that of sovereign creditors.

Members highlight a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011:

  • transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet, which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Members stress that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis;
  • rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Members point out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts;
  • swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market;
  • high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Members demand further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them;
  • significant levels of non-marketable assets andasset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones.

Credit available to businesses and households: Members note that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011. They take note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs.

Collateral: Members are worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. They believe that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy.

Conditionality: Members underline that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy, and especially to SMEs and to households.

The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs.

The economic crisis and the ECB: Members call on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications.

They point out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. They note that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems.

Members point out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. Members consider that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. They affirm, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union.

The report encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases, which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States.

Members point out that Parliament has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU, in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources. It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU.

Members note that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility.

Banking union: Members consider it urgent to create the banking union. In their view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector, and to secure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs.

Members welcome the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. They point out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union.

They call on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB.

Members deem that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. They stress that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts.

Institutional matters: Members regret the lack of transparency of the working method as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika. They believe that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. They stress the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. Members stress that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision.

In this context, Members consider that a Treaty revision, including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded.

activities/4/docs/0/text
  • The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Marisa MATIAS (GUE/NGL, PT) on the 2011 Annual Report of the European Central Bank.

    The report commends the proactive stance of the ECB during 2011 and 2012 both in regard to its monetary policy and its actions to stabilise the financial markets, in a context in which risks to eurozone stability increased considerably.

    Members consider that the decisions of April and July to increase the key ECB interest rates may have contributed, among other factors, to increasing the policy-induced risk premia of financial intermediaries and, therefore, to slowing down credit growth, weakening further the already anaemic economic recovery observed in early 2011. They welcome the subsequent decision to reverse these decisions at the end of 2011.

    ECB initiatives: the report looks at the efforts taken by the ECB to help stabilise markets, in particular the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Longer-term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), but points out that a structural solution to the crisis is not yet in sight. However, while the two three-year LTROs have been effective in avoiding a credit crunch, Members consider that questions remain as to the ability of the financial sector to return the loans received by the ECB.

    The report points out that the results, in terms of credit growth, have been unsatisfactory and note that the decision to launch the first three-year LTRO in December 2011 coincided with the winding down of the SMP programme, hinting at the existence of a trade-off between the support of financial institutions and that of sovereign creditors.

    Members highlight a number of issues of concern in relation to the situation in 2011:

    • transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments to the ECB’s balance sheet, which is now worth more than 30% of the eurozone’s GDP. Members stress that the three-year LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis;
    • rising levels of excess liquidity observed through 2011 which is due to a lack of confidence between banks and a lack of lending to the real economy. Members point out that this situation, which is indicative of risks conducive to a liquidity trap, damages the efficiency of monetary policy efforts;
    • swap lines with other central banks, as well as the recourse to the main refinancing operations: this signals a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the eurozone interbank lending market;
    • high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011: Members demand further disclosure of, and complementary information on the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations, and on the conditions attached to them;
    • significant levels of non-marketable assets andasset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of the ECB’s refinancing operations: the ECB is asked to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones.

    Credit available to businesses and households: Members note that the credit available to businesses and households is still far below the pre-crisis levels and has slowed down its growth in 2011. They take note of the measures of the ECB on the lowering of collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs.

    Collateral: Members are worried about the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations and ask the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities, and to disclose detailed information on the valuation methods regarding all assets, including impaired ones. They believe that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy.

    Conditionality: Members underline that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, including the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase the levels of credit by establishing loan targets to the real economy, and especially to SMEs and to households.

    The ECB is asked to explore, in close cooperation with Member State governments, competent national supervisory authorities and the Commission, the possibility of implementing a framework, such as the MERLIN programme elaborated by the Bank of England in partnership with the UK treasury, regarding conditionalities attached to the access to central bank non-conventional facilities such as targets on loans granted to SMEs.

    The economic crisis and the ECB: Members call on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications.

    They point out that the ongoing crisis is a matter of concern as it threatens the substantial efforts made by Member States regarding their budgetary consolidation and crisis response strategies. They note that the current severe economic downturn in several eurozone Member States has negative economic and fiscal consequences, further deteriorating their public debt problems.

    Members point out that sovereign bonds and financial institutions show persistent vulnerabilities and that the negative feedback loop between sovereign bonds and banks can only be broken through fiscal consolidation and banking sector capitalisation in an economic growth environment. Members consider that a cause of public accounts unsustainability in some countries of the eurozone is the ongoing economic recession, causing rising unemployment and falling tax revenues. They affirm, therefore, that policies to foster growth and job creation must be a key priority for the Union.

    The report encourages ECB President Mario Draghi to resume a tradition initiated by his predecessor, who at the Eurogroup meetings persistently raised the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, especially the differentials between productivity and wage increases, which led to a marked divergence between competitiveness levels between the Member States.

    Members point out that Parliament has called for an increased budgetary capacity for the EMU, in the framework of the EU budget and based on specific own-resources. It considers that such a budgetary capacity would significantly improve the policy-mix in the EMU.

    Members note that the economic situation in some economies is generating severe capital flows that worsen those economies’ funding difficulties and that are unsustainable in both the short and long term. These imbalances can only be dealt with if a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to the eurozone crisis is implemented that is built on an approach combining solidarity and responsibility.

    Banking union: Members consider it urgent to create the banking union. In their view, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the EMU, and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed banking union should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector and on the strengthened economic governance, and new budgetary framework, of the European Semester to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of, and increased confidence in, the Union banking sector, and to secure enhanced capital reserves in order to prevent Member States’ public budgets from having to bear the costs of future bank bail-outs.

    Members welcome the current impetus aiming at building a single supervisory system (SSM) which should increase the credibility of the Eurozone banking system. They point out that enhanced proposals on banking recovery and a single European resolution authority, and on deposit guarantee schemes, are necessary in order to complete the broad set of legal instruments required for a banking union.

    They call on the Commission to put forward proposals for a new European resolution fund and a European deposit guarantee scheme that complement the supervisory functions of the ECB.

    Members deem that it is of the utmost importance that effective safeguards are introduced to avoid that conflicting agendas are reflected in the ECB’s monetary policy and its supervisory powers. They stress that any possible erosion of the ECB’s authority for monetary policy, as well as any erosion of its supervisory powers due to monetary policy imperatives, need to be addressed by means of a suitable mechanism set up to identify and resolve potential conflicts.

    Institutional matters: Members regret the lack of transparency of the working method as well as the lack of accountability of and democratic control over the Troika. They believe that any such body, current and future, involving the ECB and/or the Commission should be accountable both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments at their respective levels. They stress the importance of making the regular monetary dialogue between the ECB and Parliament much more effective. Members stress that Parliament will fully play its role as legislator in all matters involving a banking supervision.

    In this context, Members consider that a Treaty revision, including a revision of the ECB statutes reflecting the ECB’s new tasks, should not be excluded.

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procedure/dossier_of_the_committee
ECON/7/10268
procedure/stage_reached
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  • date: 2012-09-28T00:00:00 docs: url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE496.576 type: Committee draft report title: PE496.576 body: EP type: Committee draft report
  • date: 2012-11-27T00:00:00 docs: url: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE498.133 type: Amendments tabled in committee title: PE498.133 body: EP type: Amendments tabled in committee
  • date: 2013-01-22T00:00:00 body: EP type: Vote scheduled in committee, 1st reading/single reading
  • date: 2013-03-14T00:00:00 body: EP type: Indicative plenary sitting date, 1st reading/single reading
committees
  • body: EP shadows: group: EPP name: GÁLL-PELCZ Ildikó group: ALDE name: TREMOSA I BALCELLS Ramon group: Verts/ALE name: JOLY Eva responsible: True committee: ECON date: 2012-03-27T00:00:00 committee_full: Economic and Monetary Affairs rapporteur: group: GUE/NGL name: MATIAS Marisa
links
other
  • body: EC dg: url: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm title: Economic and Financial Affairs commissioner: REHN Olli
procedure
reference
2012/2304(INI)
title
European Central Bank annual report for 2011
legal_basis
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament EP 119-p2
stage_reached
Preparatory phase in Parliament
subtype
Annual report
type
INI - Own-initiative procedure
subject
5.20.03 European Central Bank (ECB), ESCB