2014/2252(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes in this respect the fact that the Commission verifies ex ante if its proposals are necessary and if the objectives of the action envisaged cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, and that it justifies its action in relation to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; strongly underlines the importance of impact assessments for ensuring the respect of these same two principles in the preparation of legislative proposals; equally underlines that ensuring respect of principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should also be a priority for the European Commission when evaluating existing EU policies;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Underlines the~~Positively note~~wor~~s thye growth in information exchanged by national parliaments through the IPEX system, ands wel~~come~~l as the increase in the number of reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments (+ 9 % in 2012, + 25% in ~~2013), insist~~2013); highlights that both in 2012 and 2013 national parliaments used the yellow card ing th~~at the influence of national parliaments on European law should grow, especially as many national chambers express negative opinions on particular act~~e context of the subsidiarity control mechanism; considers therefore that national parliaments improved their capacity to use the prerogatives they have in the subsidiarity control mechanism; strongly encourages national parliaments to further develop the cooperation among them in order to make fully use of the role they are given by the existing treaties;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 – point a (new)

(a) is aware that many national parliaments wish to influence the substance of legislation rather than simply comment on the relatively few cases where subsidiarity might be an issue; welcomes the contributions submitted to the Commission under the "Barroso initiative"; considers that the most effective way for national parliaments to exert such influence is by shaping the position taken by their countries minister ahead of Council meetings and that the 8 week period can also be used for this purpose.

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Maintains that the European institutions have to enable the national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals and that the Commission should accordingly provide detailed and comprehensive statements of reasons for its decisions concerning subsidiarity and proportionality;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Underlines European Parliament's commitment to ensure the respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles through assessments of its own legislative own-initiative reports, ex-ante appraisals of Commission's impact assessments and the constant evaluation of the potential EU added value and of the "cost of non-Europe";

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Notes, however, that a majority of opinions by national parliaments are submitted by only a few national chambers, encourages the other chambers to become more involved in the European debate;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that ~~the eight-week period~~, given their experience, national parliaments could bring significant contributions to the European debate and decision-making process; encourages therefore national parliaments to fully use the competences they were given by the existing treaties, including by further developing the cooperation among them; considers that a reflection on the number of weeks given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under the Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality shcould be ~~extended significantly to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent; encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the European debate~~fruitful, in order to identify possible improvements of the current legislative framework;

Amendment 16 #

Sylvie GOULARD

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality ~~should be extended significantly~~is sufficient to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent~~; encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the European debate~~, without delaying the adoption of relevant legislation;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be ~~extended significant~~interpreted flexibly to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent; encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the European debate;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be extended ~~significantly~~ to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent; encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the European debate; and appeals therefore the European Commission to pronounce itself on the question of the National Parliament "Greencard Initiative";

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be extended ~~significantly~~ to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent; encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the European debate;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point a (new)

(a) Recalls that subsidiarity is also protected by the fact that no European legislation can be adopted without the approval of a large majority of national ministries (accountable to national parliaments) in the Council.

Amendment 20 #

Jo LEINEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality shcould be extended ~~significantly to allow~~to make it easier for national parliaments to participate to a greater extent in European law-making; encourages national parliaments to ~~become more involved~~ increase the resources enabling them to contribute to European debates;

Amendment 21 #

Charles GOERENS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Believe~~Considers that if the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be extended ~~significantly~~ to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent~~; encourages national parliaments to become more involved in the European debat~~ this would imply Treaty change;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be extended significantly to allow national parliaments and, where appropriate, regional parliaments, to participate to a greater extent; encourages national and regional parliaments to become more involved in the European debate;

Amendment 23 #

Jo LEINEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Suggests that one new measure to consider might be a ‘green card’ procedure whereby national parliaments would be able to set the European legislative process in motion and in that way play a constructive role in European law-making; is of the opinion that such a procedure could be established through a voluntary undertaking by the Commission and would not require amendment of the Treaties;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points out that 2012 saw the first use of the so-called yellow card by national parliaments regarding the principle of subsidiarity in response to the Commission's proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (Monti II); notes that although the Commission concluded that the principle of subsidiarity had not been breached it did withdraw the proposal due to lack of political support; remarks that a second so-called yellow card was triggered in 2013 on the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO); notes that Commission concluded that the proposal complied with the principle of subsidiarity and decided to maintain it;

Amendment 25 #

Max ANDERSSON, Sven GIEGOLD

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Believes that an equivalent so-called yellow and red card system should be created for the European Parliament to allow it to react when Member States legislate in domains which are within the competencies of the Single Market, or alternatively if Member States do not correctly implement European directives, which fragments the Single Market and results in a lack of level playing field;

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Underlines the huge potential impact of EU level decisions that the conclusion of international trade agreements such as TTIP and CETA may have on the capacity of regional and local self- government including decisions on services of general economic interest; calls on Commission and Council to fully take the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality into account when negotiating international trade agreements and to report about their potential effects on subsidiarity to the European Parliament;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Regrets the deficit in material criteria for establishing~~Notes that reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments point out the existence of ~~a viol~~various interpretations of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; freminds that this has led to a diversity of criteria applied by national parliaments in their evaluation of proposals, and calls for the adoption of guidelines to define the principles and methods for the examination of subsidiarity and proportionality issues in a better wain this context that the subsidiarity principle as formulated in the Treaties allows European Union to act in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence only "if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at the regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the Union level; equally reminds that "under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of the Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaties"; encourages national parliaments to be faithful to the letter of the TEU when evaluating the respect of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; strongly recommends national parliaments and European institutions to engage into exchanges of views and practices of scrutinizing subsidiarity and proportionality;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Regrets the deficit in material criteria for establishing the existence of a violation of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; finds that this has led to a diversity of criteria applied by national parliaments in their evaluation of proposals, and calls for the adoption of guidelines to define the principles and methods for the examination of subsidiarity and proportionality ~~issues in a better way;~~ by drawing from the Commission's Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC(2009)92), particularly points 5.2 and 7.2 respectively;

Amendment 29 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

~~5. Believes that the Commission should perceive the European Citizens’ Initiative more positively and without dogmatism as it is a substantial instrument for citizens to influence EU legislation.~~deleted

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point b (new)

(b) Notes that subsidiarity is, in practice, only an issue in regard to a small minority of legislative proposals, as illustrated by the fact that the "orange card" procedure has never been triggered and the "yellow card" procedure has only been triggered twice in six years; considers that national parliaments are likely to be interested in the substance of proposals rather than only subsidiarity and notes that many national parliaments are strengthening their procedures enabling them to influence the position adopted by the Minister in the Council.

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 32 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Believes that the Commission should ~~perceive~~work on the European Citizens’ Initiative ~~more positively and without dogmatism as it is a substantial~~in order to perceive it more positively as an instrument for citizens to influence EUuropean legislation and therefore should try to facilitate the constitution of such initiatives.

Amendment 33 #

Siôn SIMON

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Believes that the Commission should perceive the European Citizens’ Initiative more positively and without dogmatism by reviewing the procedure as it is a substantial instrument for citizens to influence EU legislation. At the very minimum an ECI should prompt the Commission to start a dialogue and engagement process with citizens.

Amendment 34 #

Kostas CHRYSOGONOS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Regrets the fact that the Commission, acting within the "troika", has not observed the principle of subsidiarity as regards the measures imposed to Member- States within the context of Financial Adjustment Programmes.

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that the principle of subsidiarity, as laid down in the Treaties, allows the Union, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, to act only ‘if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level’, but can rather, ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action’, be ‘better achieved at Union level’; points out that subsidiarity, a neutral legal principle related to the concept of optimum level of action, can serve either, when the circumstances so require, to extend Union activities, albeit without exceeding its powers, or, conversely, to restrict or halt Union action when it is no longer justified;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Emphasises that the use of the European Union's competences should be guided by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as stated in the article 5 of the TEU; welcomes that in 2012 and 2013 the respect of these two principles was carefully scrutinized by the European Union's institutions, as well as by national parliaments;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Appreciates the work of the impact assessment board on the issues concerning the subsidiarity and the proportionality of legal measures and appeals for a stronger cooperation with the Committee of the Regions and AFCO Committee already at this level of the procedure on the two related issues;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Call for a generalization of the consultation of the local and regional Parliaments on a regular basis and not just on punctual issues;

Amendment 8 #

Jo LEINEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines the noteworthy growth in information exchanged by national parliaments through the IPEX system, and ~~welcom~~notes the increase in the number of reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments (+ 9% in 2012, + 25% in 2013)~~, insisting that the influence of~~; welcomes the closer involvement of the national parliaments onin the European l~~aw should grow, especially as many national chambers express negative opinions on particular acts~~egislative process, particularly as regards scrutinising legislative proposals in the light of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

source: 552.061

2015/03/30 CONT 3 amendments...

source: 554.626

2015/04/20 EMPL 55 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Takes the view that employment and social policies are mostly in the area of Member States competence and where the EU has a remit to take measures to ensure the coordination of the Member States' employment policies, by defining guidelines and in particular by normative documents for labour market; encourages therefore the European Commission and Member States to intensify discussions on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the field of this policy;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Regrets that the ‘early warning’ thresholds are difficult to meet, especially when the time frame is shortened, given the lack of vigilance on the part of some national governments;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Suggests making national parliaments better aware of their prerogatives;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Notes the importance~~Points out that the involvement of regional parliaments, – especially those with legislative powers~~, and of their territorial impact and closeness to its citizens, and calls, where appropriate, for their greater involvement in the early warning system~~ – in the early warning system, where possible, can increase the risk that legislative proposals geared towards attaining the EU’s objectives will be challenged on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Notes the importance of ~~regional~~ parliaments~~, especially those with legislative powers,~~ and of their territorial impact and closeness to its citizens, and calls, where appropriate, for their greater involvement in the early warning system;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Notes the importance of regional parliaments, especially those with legislative powers, and of their territorial impact and closeness to ~~its~~ citizens, and calls, where appropriate, for their greater involvement in the early warning system;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Encourages national parliaments to issue reasoned opinions not only to the European Commission's legislative documents but also to those non-legislative, which precede the drafting of EU legislation, in order to increase effectiveness of influencing future EU initiatives and legislation;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the EU will take action outside its areas of exclusive competence only and insofar as the objectives of a planned measure can better be achieved at Union level rather than at national, regional or local level; subsidiarity may, therefore, lead both to an extension of the activities of the Union within the framework of its powers when circumstances so require and, conversely, to the action concerned being restricted or curtailed where it is no longer justified; emphasises that subsidiarity, in this context, not only applies to the relationship between the EU and its Member States but encompasses as well the regional and local levels;

Amendment 17 #

Helga STEVENS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Underlines that the principle of subsidiarity must always be the starting point for all policy formulation;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Highlight~~Welcomes the fact that 2012 saw national parliaments show their first ‘yellow card’ in the context of the subsidiarity control mechanism, in response to the proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services;

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Highlights the fac~~Points out that 2012 saw national parliaments show their first ‘yellow card’ in the context of the subsidiarity control mechanism, in response to the proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, and that it is possible that the proposal may be withdrawn by the Commission; expresses concern about the adverse effect that the withdrawal of that proposal, as well as many others, could have as regards building a sound European Union in the long term;

Amendment 2 #

Brando BENIFEI, Evelyn REGNER, Mercedes BRESSO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcomes~~Expresses concern at the fact that the closer participation of national parliaments in the European legislative process~~, which~~ has resulted in a ~~positive~~n increase in awareness of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the interinstitutional context; takes the view that it is vital to define appropriate criteria to assess compliance with both principles, so as to ensure that their application does not go beyond the provisions of the Treaties and jeopardise the building of a united Europe;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights the fact that 2012 saw national parliaments show their first ‘yellow card’ in the context of the subsidiarity control mechanism, in response to the proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services; points out however that according to the Commission the principle of subsidiarity had not been breached;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Regrets that in spite of the fact that 13 reasoned opinions were submitted and that the Member States managed to reach the yellow card threshold on the matter of creating a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Commission has decided to continue the project. The discrepancy between the reasons put forward by the different parliaments left the Commission unconvinced, which highlights the absence of interparliamentary coordination and the inadequacy of the procedure;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Recalls that the national parliaments represent EU citizens and asks for reasoned opinions and yellow cards to carry more weight in future and for the Commission to take the Member States’ opinions more seriously;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 25 #

Brando BENIFEI, Mercedes BRESSO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that the eventual withdrawal of this proposal by the Commission, d~~emonstrates the difficulty of finding common ground at EU level as to how best to deal with industrial conflict in situ~~ue to general political opposition and not because of any breach of the principle of subsidiarity, demonstrates the necessity of improving Union policies and efforts on the transnational aspects of industrial relations, in~~volving businesses and workers in different Member States;~~ compliance with the art. 9 TFEU and the Title X TFEU on Social Policy;

Amendment 27 #

Evelyn REGNER, Brando BENIFEI, Mercedes BRESSO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that the eventual withdrawal of this proposal by the Commission demonstrates the difficulty of finding common ground at EU level as to how best to deal with industrial conflict in situations involving businesses and workers in different Member States;(Does not affect the English version.)

Amendment 28 #

Jérôme LAVRILLEUX

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 29 #

Helga STEVENS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the ~~closer participation~~increased interest and the stronger involvement of national parliaments in the European legislative process in the recent years, which has resulted in a ~~positive~~n increase ind awareness of the basic principles ofupon which the EU is founded, such as subsidiarity and proportionality in the interinstitutional context as well as European politics and policy making in the national context;

Amendment 30 #

Evelyn REGNER, Ole CHRISTENSEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Stresses that the yellow card and the strong resistance of trade unions and other stakeholders which in the end led to the withdrawal of Monti II by the Commission, were largely based on the realisation that the proposal would not result in adequate safeguards for fundamental and social rights; criticises in this context, that the Commission has still not come forward with any new proposals to ensure fair competition, equal treatment and worker's rights;

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. regrets that the Commission proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action fell short of what is needed to create legal certainty for all actors; reminds the Commission of the importance of full stakeholder consultation on such sensitive matters;

Amendment 32 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Believes that the eventual withdrawal of this proposal by the Commission highlights the importance of a procedure through which the national parliaments can monitor the EU legislation process;

Amendment 33 #

Rina Ronja KARI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Calls on the Commission to provide prior information on its choice of legal base for legislative acts as this will facilitate the cooperation with national parliaments;

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Takes note of the fact that in 2013 national parliaments, for the second time ever, exercised the right to 'yellow card' procedure in the context of the subsidiary control mechanism which shows increasing interest, role and added value of national parliaments in development of the EU law;

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Highlights that yellow card procedure, which is an instrument of influencing the EU decision-making, could effectively be strengthened by an earlier exchange of information on positions of national parliaments, therefore encourages national parliaments to exchange views on the scope and evaluation methods used to assess the conformity with subsidiarity and proportionality principles;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 c (new)

4c. Takes the view that the meaning of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles is not clear and therefore national parliaments interpret it in various ways which causes difficulties in reaching agreements and achieving compliance of their decisions; welcomes the fact that the European Commission has established common criteria to assess compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality; encourages national parliaments and other institutions to use those criteria in order to increase compatibility assessment and coordination and effectiveness of the subsidiarity control mechanism;

Amendment 37 #

Helga STEVENS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Believes that the opinions of national, and were applicable regional parliaments should be reviewed, in particular by introducing a red card procedure allowing proposals to be rejected on grounds of lack of conformity with subsidiarity;

Amendment 38 #

Rina Ronja KARI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that the national parliaments came close to raising a "yellow card" in the context of the proposal for a European Public Prosecutors Office; Believes that in cases where the yellow card procedure is supported by a number of national parliaments, the follow-up Commission Communication should address all objections of these parliaments;

Amendment 39 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Firmly believes that the ‘Think Small First’ principle is a key element in the policy process and can play an important role in job creation and growth by reducing the costs of regulation for businesses;deleted

Amendment 4 #

Evelyn REGNER, Maria ARENA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the closer participation of national parliaments in the European legislative process, which has resulted in ~~a positive~~ increase ing awareness of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the interinstitutional context;

Amendment 40 #

Jutta STEINRUCK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 41 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Firmly believes that~~Calls on the Commission to consider that, as stated in the opinion by the European Economic and Social Committee, the ‘Think Small First’ principle is ~~a key~~not intended to elxem~~ent in the policy process and can play an important role in job creation and growth by reducing the costs of regu~~pt microenterprises and SMEs from the application of the legislation and must not be used for this purpose but rather to keep the fact that it will also apply to small enterprises should be kept in mind when drafting legislation; stresses that this approach should neither compromise the intended objective of the legislation fnor ~~businesse~~any health, safety and employment high standards;

Amendment 42 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Firmly believe~~considers that the ‘Think Small First’ principle iscould be a key element in the policy process and can play an important role in job creation and growth by ~~reducing the costs of regulation for businesse~~focussing on smart regulation which can be implemented in a way that ensures a level playing field for SMEs and micro- enterprises who have less administrative capacities than big enterprises; rejects any attempts to automatically exempt micro- enterprises or SMEs from European legislation; reminds all actors that UEAPME, the European Association of craft, small- and medium-sized companies considers the exemption of SMEs or micro enterprises of European legislation as a general rule as going against SME interests;

Amendment 43 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Firmly believes that the ‘Think Small First’ principle is a key element in the policy process and can play an important role in job creation and growth by reducing the costs and red tape of regulation for businesses;

Amendment 44 #

Jutta STEINRUCK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Points out that legislation can have a different impact on large enterprises and SME's, which should be kept in mind during the drafting process; stresses that all employees have a right to the highest level of protection regarding health and safety in the workplace regardless the size of the employer, the underlying contract or the Member State of employment;

Amendment 45 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Is surprised that deregulation is proposed as the main strategy for helping SMEs. The current economic crisis has exacerbated the difficulties that SMEs encounter at national level as a result of fiscal policies and sometimes restrictive administrative requirements;

Amendment 46 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. Recalls that reforms of this kind fall within the competence of the Member States, who are aware of the changes required;

Amendment 47 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Stresses that cases of subsidiarity and proportionality must be thoroughly argued and should not be used as pre-text to prevent legislation at Union level or to undermine EU Social Dialogue;

Amendment 48 #

Jutta STEINRUCK

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Welcom~~Notes the increasing emphasis placed by the Commission on the policy cycles, and calls on the committee responsible to systematically review Commission impact assessments and to review Parliament’s ex-ante impact acrucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision- making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues~~sment analysis as early as possible in the legislative process.~~ relating to subsidiarity and proportionality;

Amendment 49 #

Ulla TØRNÆS, Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Marian HARKIN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Welcom~~Notes the increasing emphasis placed by the Commission on the policy cycles, and ~~calls on the committee responsible to systematically review Commission impact assessments and to review Parliament’s ex-ante impact assessment analysis as early as possible~~on impact assessments; nevertheless , believes that Commission and Parliament's impact assessments should be considered as a simply tool to allow a well-informed political decision and should never replace political decisions or cause delays in the legislative process.

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the closer participation of national parliaments in the European legislative process, which has resulted in a positive increase in awareness of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the interinstitutional context; notes however, that further work still needs to be done in this context; Suggests therefore that the Commission engages in a yearly debate with each of the national parliaments in the national parliament in order to strengthen the dialogue between the Commission and the national parliaments;

Amendment 50 #

Ulla TØRNÆS, Martina DLABAJOVÁ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Welcomes~~Considers appropriate the increasing emphasis placed by the Commission on the policy cycles, and calls on the committee responsible to systematically review Commission impact assessments and to review Parliament’s ex-ante impact assessment analysis as early as possible in the legislative process, with reference at all times to appropriate criteria as regards assessing compliance with both principles.

Amendment 51 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Welcomes the increasing emphasis placed by the Commission on the policy cycles, and calls on the committee responsible to systematically review Commission impact assessments and to review Parliament’s ex-ante impact assessment analysis as early as possible in the legislative process; reminds in this regard that every Commission proposal should have a European added value and a positive impact on European citizen's lives, European competitiveness and European job-creation; calls therefore for better and more ambitious impact assessments to be done throughout the political cycles and for the impact assessments to prove that a proposal have a genuine European added value and a positive impact on European citizens' live, European competitiveness and European job-creation; suggests that if this positive impact cannot be proven through impact assessments the proposal in question should be withdrawn.

Amendment 52 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Amendment 53 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Draws attention to the fact that national parliaments are given few opportunities to take part in the various stages of European policy development and that the EU institutions do not include any representatives of publicly elected bodies.

Amendment 54 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Takes the view that there needs to be a debate on the EU’s competences, and that changing the competences would enable the EU to take action in areas in which it does not yet have exclusive competence and would prevent disputes with regard to subsidiarity and proportionality; points out that the consolidation of a European project that is successful in the long term will depend on those principles being applied in the areas in which they are needed.

Amendment 55 #

Ulla TØRNÆS, Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Marian HARKIN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Welcomes the European Commission's ongoing revision of the existing legislation, which is concentrated on areas with a significant European added value in accordance with principle of subsidiarity, since overregulation might cause more harm to business and employment; express the view that the European institutions should take more frequently into account the principle of subsidiarity.

Amendment 6 #

Rina Ronja KARI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the closer participation of national parliaments in the European legislative process, which has resulted in a positive increase in awareness of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the interinstitutional context; Believes, however, that the efforts to increase the participation of national parliaments in the legislative process should be strengthened;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Reminds that according to Article 5 in the Maastricht Treaty the European Union shall only act if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States;

Amendment 8 #

Ulla TØRNÆS, Martina DLABAJOVÁ, Marian HARKIN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Stresses that the principle of subsidiarity is an important tool to balance the exercise of power and to ensure genuine European added value and thereby promoting growth and job- creation; stresses that in respecting the principle of subsidiarity it is key to consider the role of the social partners and to ensure their autonomy according to Member States' customs and traditions, believes in this regard that breaches of the principle of subsidiarity can lead to unintended consequences such as undermined faith in the European Union for European citizens and that breaches of the principle of subsidiarity should therefore be avoided;

Amendment 9 #

Brando BENIFEI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Highlights that the principle of subsidiarity is a characteristic feature of federal states, as those political entities deriving legitimacy from popular sovereignty in which no one level of government is subordinate to another but each is coordinate;

source: 554.884

2015/05/20 INTA 29 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Bernd LANGE, Jörg LEICHTFRIED

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes the importance of the common commercial policy and EU economic relations with third countries and regional organisations for EU growth and jobs; is therefore of the view that the principle of proportionality and, where applicable, subsidiarity should be duly respected also in these policy areas, particularly when trade agreements are ~~requir~~determined to be of a mixed nature;

Amendment 10 #

Marine LE PEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Calls for clarification of whether~~Notes that trade instruments, such as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), ~~could~~ jeopardise the subsidiarity principle with respect to the competences of Member States;

Amendment 11 #

Eleftherios SYNADINOS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Calls for clarification of whether trade instruments, such as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), could jeopardise the subsidiarity principle with respect to the competences of Member States, bearing in mind that the Court of Justice has sole jurisdiction in actions arising from a legislative act;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Calls on Member States to unblock the UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in order for the Commission to sign the convention on behalf of the whole Union; deplores the current situation where some EU Member States are party to the convention while others are not; considers that this example clearly demonstrates the need for clarity on all sides on the scope of the Union's exclusive competence on foreign direct investment;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Recalls that different policies carried out by Member States as regards investment protection have led to the current situation where EU countries are party to some 1,400 bilateral investment treaties with, at times, different provisions which could lead to distortions within the single market and unequal treatment of EU investors abroad;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. With respect to EU financial assistance to other countries, namely macro-financial assistance, calls for a more in-depth ex- ante impact assessment regarding the proportionality of the proposed measures in order for the assistance to be efficient and genuinely helpful to our partners in need; insists on the necessity of establishing greater conditionality for disbursement of the assistance and proper control of the use of the funds, including measures in relation to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud and corruption, audits by the Court of Auditors and checks conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office, and ensuring that the Union is entitled to full repayment of the loan where it has been established that the receiving country has engaged in fraud , corruption or other illegal activity detrimental to the Union's financial interests in the management of the Union's macro-financial assistance, and substantial scrutiny by Parliament;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 16 #

Eleftherios SYNADINOS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. With respect to EU financial assistance to other countries, namely macro-financial assistance, calls for a more in-depth ex- ante and ex post impact assessments regarding the proportionality of the proposed measures in order for the assistance to be efficient and genuinely helpful to our partners in need; insists on the necessity of establishing greater conditionality for disbursement of the assistance, including human rights conditionality clauses and proper control of the use of the funds, including substantial scrutiny by Parliament, as well a strong integration of the EU's external instruments, combining trade, development and foreign and security policy; stresses that member states have to show more commitment in this regard;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Not~~Concludes with regret that the Commission’s ex-ante impact assessments of envisaged far-reaching trade agreements very often prove to be excessively optimistic and raise false hopes about their positive impact on EU citizens and businesses, in particular on SMEs; points out that the assessment of economic, social and environmental implications is carried out only after the launch of negotiations in the form of the so-called sustainability impact assessment; is convinced that these two assessment tools should be merged so as to assess the economic, social and environmental implications before launching trade negotiations, and calls on Parliament and the Commission to fully cooperate in this regard;

Amendment 19 #

Marine LE PEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Notes with regret that the Commission’s ex-ante impact assessments of envisaged far-reaching trade agreements often prove to be excessively optimistic and raise false hopes about their positive impact on EUthe citizens and businesses of the Member States, in particular on SMEs; points out that the assessment of economic, social and environmental implications is carried out only after the launch of negotiations in the form of the so-called sustainability impact assessment; is convinced that these two assessment tools should be merged so as to assess the economic, social and environmental implications before launching trade negotiations, and calls on Parliament and the Commission to fully cooperate in this regard;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Amendment 20 #

Klaus BUCHNER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Notes with regret that the Commission's ex-ante impact assessments of envisaged far-reaching trade agreements often prove to be excessively optimistic and raise false hopes about their positive impact on EU citizens and businesses, in particular on SMEs; points out that the assessment of economic, social and environmental implications is carried out only after the launch of negotiations in the form of the so-called sustainability impact assessment; is convinced that these two assessment tools should be merged so as to assess the economic, social and environmental implications before launching trade negotiations, and calls on Parliament and the Commission to fully cooperate in this regard; points out that impact assessments must continue to incorporate qualitative assessment criteria such as environmental and social factors and should not overwhelmingly rely on quantitative elements, since qualitative factors, in form of positive and negative externalities, pose considerable local and regional costs and have substantial long-term effects;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Notes with regret that the Commission's ex-ante impact assessments of envisaged far-reaching trade agreements often prove to be excessively optimistic and raise false hopes about their positive impact on EU citizens and businesses, in particular on SMEs; points out that the assessment of economic, social and environmental implications is carried out only after the launch of negotiations in the form of the so-called sustainabilitythat existing preferential trade agreements have shown that they can be beneficial for the European economy, and lead to growth and jobs; Stresses that the effects of trade agreements depend on the outcome of negotiations and that impact projections therefore are always based on certain assumptions; Stresses that carrying out impact assessment;s is ~~convinced that these two assessment tools should be merged so as to~~not only a task for the Commission, but that the Member States should also play a key role in assessing the ~~economic, social and environmental implications b~~potential benefits and impacts of prefoere ~~launching trade negotiations, and calls on Parliament and the Commission to fully cooperate in this regard~~ntial trade agreements for their own economy;

Amendment 22 #

Fernando RUAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Notes with regret that the Commission's ex-ante impact assessments of envisaged far-reaching trade agreements often prove to be excessively optimistic and raise false hopes about their positive impact on EU citizens and businesses, in particular on SMEs; points out that the assessment of economic, social and environmental implications is carried out only after the launch of negotiations in the form of the so-called sustainability impact assessment; is convinced that these two assessment tools should be merged so as to assess the economic, social and environmental implications before launching trade negotiations, and cCalls on the Commission to carry out the sustainability impact assessments before the launch of trade agreements negotiations in a broader ex-ante impact assessment exercise to assess the economic, social and environmental impact on EU citizens and business, in particular SMEs; Calls on Parliament and the Commission to fully cooperate in this regard;

Amendment 23 #

Klaus BUCHNER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Warns against new guidelines on impact assessment as proposed in the Better Regulation proposal of the Commission putting trade and investment related cost-benefit criteria at the same level as social and environmental criteria in the methodology of impact assessment;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Points out the utmost importance of proper consultation, dialogue and involvement of citizens (starting at grass- roots level), businesses (namely SMEs) and civil society in the EU decision- making process for trade policy; stresses in this regard the fundamental importance of transparency in which trade negotiations are to be carried out.

Amendment 25 #

Eleftherios SYNADINOS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Points out the utmost importance of proper consultation, dialogue and involvement of citizens (starting at grass- roots level), businesses (namely SMEs) and civil society in the EU decision- making process for trade policy., as well as consultation with the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee;

Amendment 26 #

Jörg LEICHTFRIED, David MARTIN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Points out the utmost importance of proper consultation, dialogue and involvement of citizens ~~(starting at grass- roots level)~~, businesses (namely SMEs) and civil society in the EU decision- making process for trade policy.

Amendment 27 #

David BORRELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls on the Commission, in order to enhance the effectiveness of public consultation as a means of democratic participation and in support of impact assessment, to establish a substantial minimum criterion, in terms of the number of Member States involved and the number of people registering, for a consultation procedure to be ruled admissible.

Amendment 28 #

Klaus BUCHNER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Retains that specifications of national, regional and local standards going beyond minimum standards of Union legislation in fields indirectly related to trade, such as local content requirements or public support for consumer awareness and protection, should remain possible and not be defamed as "gold-plating" in the Better Regulation package of the Commission.

Amendment 29 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Notes the referral of the EU- Singapore Free Trade Agreement to the Court of Justice for an opinion on the potential mixed character of the agreement and hopes that this opinion will be a way of progressing towards greater clarity regarding which features of EU trade negotiations touch on Member States' responsibility.

Amendment 3 #

Marine LE PEN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes the importance ~~of the common commercial policy and EU economic relations with third countries and regional organisations for EU growth and job~~for EU growth and jobs of Community preference and trade protection arrangements benefiting the Member States; is therefore of the view that the principle of proportionality and, where applicable, subsidiarity should be duly respected also in these policy areas, particularly when trade agreements are required to be of a mixed nature;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes the importance of the common commercial policy, in which the EU can leverage its scale for maximal impact in negotiations, and EU economic relations with third countries and regional organisations for EU growth and jobs; is ~~therefore~~ of the view that the principle of proportionality and, where applicable, subsidiarity should be duly respected also in these policy areas~~, particularly when trade agreements are required to be of a mixed nature~~;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Welcomes the Commission's initiative to seek clarity on the issue of mixity of trade agreements by referring the EU Singapore Free Trade Agreement to the European Court of Justice; Stresses that clarity should lay the foundations for a more effective negotiating position for the EU and for a speedier ratification procedure of trade agreements between the EU and third countries;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Emphasises the need to ~~determine how~~clarify in relation to the principle of subsidiarity ~~should apply when trade policies include provisions on investments different from~~the division of competence when trade policies impact on different investments other thean foreign direct ones ~~covered by the EU's exclusive competence under the common commercial policy as stated in the Treaty; notes namely the most recent controversies regarding~~, namely portfolio investments, as controversies persist in current Free Trade Agreements, like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty- based Investor-State Arbitration; calls for respect for the proportionality principle to be enforced when bilateral safeguard clauses are negotiated and applied;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Emphasises the need to determine how the principle of subsidiarity should apply when trade policies include provisions on investments different from the foreign direct ones covered by the EU's exclusive competence under the common commercial policy as stated in the Treaty; notes namely the ~~most~~ recent ~~controversies regarding the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU- Singapore Free Trade Agreement and~~discussions on investor-to-state dispute settlement and the European Commission's proposals to update and reform the current model, emphasises in this regard that the member states should also take responsibility for their part in this process, given their existing commitment through bilateral agreements with third countries; calls on the Member States to sign the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty- based Investor-State Arbitration; calls for ~~respect for~~ the proportionality principle to be ~~enforc~~respected when bilateral safeguard clauses are negotiated and applied;

Amendment 8 #

Fernando RUAS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that Article 3 of the TFEU designates the common commercial policy as an integral area of exclusive Union competence which shall be based on uniform principles; notes that the principle of subsidiarity accordingly does not apply for the common commercial policy;

source: 557.252

2015/06/03 JURI 38 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)

La. whereas the subsidiarity and proportionality check as well as an impact assessment are done only at the beginning of the legislative process

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Questions ~~some of the assumptions made~~the methodology of the Commission in the 2012 and 2013 ~~Annual~~ reports, ~~such as that of~~which in its statistics classif~~ying~~ies reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments on a package of proposals as only one reasoned opinion, rather than a reasoned opinion on each one of the individual proposals; ~~believes that this is an inappropriate assumption, as objections raised on a package should be considered as an objection on each legislative proposal;~~

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Questions some of~~Notes the assumptions made in the 2012 and 2013 Annual reports, such as that of classifying reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments on a package of proposals as only one reasoned opinion, rather than a reasoned opinion on each of the individual proposals; ~~believes that this is an inappropriate assumption, as objections raised on a package should be considered as an objection on each legislative proposal;~~

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that, when taken as a whole, the proportion of reasoned opinions has increased significantly as a percentage of total submissions when compared to 2010 and 2011; notes that in 2012 reasoned opinions represented 25 % of all submissions, while in 2013 they accounted for 30 % of submissions from national parliaments under the Protocol 2 process; ~~expresses concern that an increasing proportion of the submissions made by national parliaments are raising strong reservations about compliance with subsidiarity~~notice in this view the greater inclusion of the national parliaments in the legislative process;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Consider~~Notes that, when taken as a whole, the proportion of reasoned opinions has increased ~~significantly~~ as a percentage of total submissions when compared to 2010 and 2011; notes that in 2012 reasoned opinions represented 25 % of all submissions, while in 2013 they accounted for 30 % of submissions from national parliaments under the Protocol 2 process; ~~expresses concern that an increasing proportion of the submissions made by national parliaments are raising strong reservations about compliance with subsidiarity;~~

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Points out that 2012 saw the first use of the so-called yellow card by national parliaments regarding the principle of subsidiarity in response to the Commission's proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (Monti II); notes that although the Commission concluded that the principle of subsidiarity had not been breached it did withdraw the proposal due to lack of political support; remarks that a second so-called yellow card was triggered in 2013 on the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO); notes that Commission concluded that the proposal complied with the principle of subsidiarity and decided to maintain it;

Amendment 15 #

Mady DELVAUX

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Notes that the reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments considerably vary with regard to the form and the types of arguments raised; regrets the absence of common "patterns" which makes it more difficult to evaluate on which basis national parliaments intervene; Believes therefore that it is necessary to establish more precise "criteria" to better understand how national parliaments apply and interpret the principles on subsidiarity and proportionality;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Recalls concerns raised in previous European Parliament reports regarding instances where subsidiarity had not been adequately addressed in impact assessments (IAs) prepared by the Commission; further recalls that the Annual Reports of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) have raised this issue; ~~expresses concern~~notes that the IAB considered more than 30 % of IAs reviewed by them in 2012 and 2013 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principle of subsidiarity; ~~expresses serious concern~~notes that this number rose to 50 % in 2014, and urges the Commission in its revision of the guidelines applying to IAs to address this issue ~~and reverse this trend~~;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Notes the importance of impact assessments as decision-making aids in the legislative process and stresses the need, in this connection, to give due consideration to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Stress~~Notes that ~~thorough~~ impact assessments which ~~thoroughly~~inter alia evaluate subsidiarity compliance are ~~essential~~a procedure to improve the trust of citizens, who often consider the subsidiarity principle a key aspect of the democratic process; ~~highlights, therefore, that enhanced subsidiarity checks could be considered an important tool for reducing the so- called ‘democratic deficit’;~~

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Expresses disappointment at the response of the Commission to national parliaments in instances where yellow cards have been issued; believes that it is necessary for~~Considers that the Commission tocould respond ~~comprehensively to any~~to concerns raised by national parliaments, and on an individual basis as part of a dialogue in addition to any published opinion; ~~considers that it is also necessary for the Commission to appear before the relevant committee or committees of the Parliament to explain its position in detail;~~

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcomes continued consideration of~~Observes that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality~~, which are guiding~~ are fundamental principles for the European Union ~~when it chooses to act~~;

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that political dialogue is ~~increasingly~~ important in ensuring that subsidiarity is respected; considers that political dialogue should be improved not only in instances of a yellow or orange card, but as a general rule; welcomes in this regard the Juncker Commission’s undertaking to appear before more national parliaments, and calls for the Parliament to consider undertaking similar initiatives; believes that rapporteurs could be encouraged to engage more often with national parliaments, particularly as video-conferencing and other methods of online engagement are made easier and more effective;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Stresses that the adoption of legal acts requires the agreement of a large majority within the Council, comprising the national ministers of all EU Member States, who are politically accountable to their national parliaments, and thus in that way too the principle of subsidiarity is fully respected;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Believes that the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is sufficient to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent, without delaying the adoption of relevant legislation;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Stresses that, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the ‘yellow card’ procedure has been used in two cases and the ‘orange card’ procedure not at all when national parliaments have examined the compliance of proposals with the subsidiarity principle; considers that what is of prime interest is rather the substance of proposals than the subsidiarity aspect; observes that many national parliaments are making greater use of the available scope for influencing the positions of the respective ministers within the Council;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Considers that if the eight-week period given to national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be extended to allow national parliaments to participate to a greater extent this would imply a Treaty change;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the European institutions and the national parliaments still have much to do to create a ‘subsidiarity culture’ across the European Union; recommends two particular initiatives which w~~ould~~ill aid better consideration of subsidiarity in the legislative process at present, namely facilitating greater inclusion of positions, perspectives or other suggestions made by national parliaments in the political dialogue, in particular in the course of preparatory work such as Green Papers or White Papers produced by the Commission, and undertaking to extend the period for consultation of national parliaments under the subsidiarity check contained in Protocol 2; considers that this could be achieved through a political undertaking agreed by the institutions and the national parliaments, in advance of any change to the Protocol itself;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the European institutions and the national parliaments s~~till have much to do to crea~~hould continue to work to promote a ‘subsidiarity culture’ across the European Union; recommends ~~two~~a particular initiatives which would aid better consideration of subsidiarity in the legislative process at present, namely facilitating greater inclusion of positions, perspectives or other suggestions made by national parliaments in the political dialogue, in particular in the course of preparatory work such as Green Papers or White Papers produced by the Commission, and undertaking to extend the period for consultation of national parliaments under the subsidiarity check contained in Protocol 2; considers that this could be achieved through a political undertaking agreed by the institutions and the national parliaments, in advance of any change to the Protocol itself;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Considers that the eight-week time limit for the delivery of a reasoned opinion by national parliaments has essentially proven justified;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that a stronger approach is needed to fully recognise the principle of subsidiarity; considers therefore that the introduction of a stronger ‘red card' procedure could be a positive first step; suggests that consideration should be given to what the appropriate number of national parliament responses should be in order to trigger such a procedure, whether it should be limited to subsidiarity alone or include proportionality grounds, and what its effect should be; views such a discussion as a useful stage in the evolution of the power given to national parliaments, aligning incentives to exercise scrutiny with effects at European level;deleted

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that a stronger approach is needed to fully recognise the principle of subsidiarity; considers therefore that the introduction of a stronger ‘red card’ procedure could be a positive first step; suggests that consideration should be given to what the appropriate number of national parliament responses should be in order to trigger such a procedure, whether it should be limited to subsidiarity alone or include proportionality grounds, and what its effect should be; views such a discussion as a useful stage in the evolution of the power given to national parliaments, aligning incentives to exercise scrutiny with effects at European levelthe approach adopted to date is sufficient to fully recognise the principle of subsidiarity;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Believes~~Observes furthermore that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality represent the starting point for policy formulation; considers that ~~it is not always the case that European action can achi~~policy objectives can be achieved better at European level th~~e policy objectives better than~~an by means of national or regional initiatives ~~may do, or even global efforts~~ where the will for joint action exists;

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Considers that the "yellow card"- procedure ought to be made easier for parliaments to use; points out that it is worth considering whether the threshold should to be decreased and the time- period in which parliaments can use the procedure should be lengthened;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that the introduction of a ‘green card' could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests that similar consideration would be required on the number of responses required to trigger such a procedure, and the extent of its impact;deleted

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that the introduction of a ‘green card’ could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests that similar consideration would be required on the number of responses required to trigger such a procedure, and the extent of its impact;deleted

Amendment 33 #

Ivan JAKOVČIĆ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. ~~Notes~~Stresses that there is a great danger of incoherence to the extent that legislative proposals may change dramatically during the lead-up to adoption by the institutions; recalls that a check on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is only undertaken at the outset and not at the conclusion of the legislative process; further recalls that impact assessments more generally are only prepared for the initial rather than the final stages of the legislative process;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Notes that legislative proposals may change dramatically in the lead-up to adoption by the institutions; recalls that a check on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is ~~only~~ undertaken at the outset ~~and not at the conclusion of the legislative process; further recalls that impact assessments more generally are only prepared for the initial rather than the final stages of the legislative process~~of the legislative process, thus enabling national parliaments to become involved at an early stage;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Notes that legislative proposals may change dramatically in the lead-up to adoption by the institutions; recalls that a check on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is only undertaken at the outset and not at the conclusion of the legislative process; further recalls that impact assessments more generally are only prepared for the initial rather than the final stages of the legislative process; stresses the need for a mid-term evaluation after the opening of the adoption procedure, and at the end of the legislative process, making it possible in certain cases to issue a warning to Member States failing to respect the principle of subsidiarity;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Notes that legislative proposals may change ~~dramatically~~ in the lead-up to adoption ~~by the institutions; recalls~~and that a check on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity ~~is only~~might be undertaken ~~at the outset and not at the conclus~~; recalls nevertheless there should be no obligation ofn the legislat~~ive process; further recalls that impact assessments more generally are only prepared for the initial rather than the final stages of the legislative process~~or to perform an impact assessment on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity of an agreement reached on a legislative act prior to the final adoption of an agreement;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Calls therefore for a further subsidiarity check and full impact assessment to be undertaken at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of a final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made; believes that such a ‘cooling off' period would help policy-makers in assessing whether legislation complies with the principles of the Union, and would increase transparency about the results of periods of often rather intense negotiation;deleted

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. CRecalls th~~erefore for a fur~~at ther subsidiarity check and full impact assessment to be undertaken at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of a final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made; believes that such a ‘cooling off’ period would help policy-makers in assessing whether legislation complies with the principles of the Union, and would increase transparency about the results of periods of often rather intense negotiationby the Commission is absolutely essential in order to guarantee compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality before a legislative initiative is launched;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Stresses the need for the European institutions to respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the legislative process;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Notes, however, that a majority of opinions by national parliaments are submitted by only a few national chambers, encourages the other chambers to become more involved in the European debate;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Stresses the need for the European institutions to respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality embodied in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol No 2 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which are of a general nature and binding on the institutions exercising the powers of the Union, except for those areas which fall within the exclusive remit of the Union, where the subsidiarity principle does not apply;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)

2c. Considers that the mechanism for verification of the subsidiarity principle is of major importance for collaboration between European and national institutions;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Regrets therefore that the annual reports prepared by the Commission are somewhat perfunctory, and often do not delve into a more detailed consideration of how subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy- making;deleted

Amendment 9 #