2015/2115(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

– having regard to the ECJ judgment in Case C-62/14 of 16 June 2015

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Is concerned that, in the absence of Union and Member State action to stimulate demand, continued application of unconventional monetary policy actions will further exacerbate the problems posed by sustained low interest rates and excess liquidity chasing yield leading to actual and potential distortions and instabilities in financial markets;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. Takes the view that the European Central Bank has distinguished itself as the most effective European institution in combating the crisis, at least until July 2014;

Amendment 102 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)

5c. Welcomes the European Central Bank's categorical pledge to 'do everything possible' to defend the euro in August 2012;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)

5d. Draws the conclusion that the programme to purchase public and private debt securities in secondary markets would be more effective if there were a risk-free asset in the European Union, which could be established by the Commission issuing EU bonds;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 e (new)

5e. Calls on the European Central Bank to take the legislative initiative, in accordance with Article 129(3) of the TFEU, in the reform, by ordinary legislative procedure, of Article 33(1)(a) of the ECB Statute, which would make the profits it produces into an own resource of the Union;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

~~6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers;~~deleted

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

~~6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers;~~deleted

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

~~6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers;~~deleted

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

~~6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers;~~deleted

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes~~, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers~~ within the framework of macroprudential oversight;

Amendment 11 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers; notes that the expansion of European Investment Bank activities should be backed by ECB bond buying; notes that such a joint effort would not only recycle large amounts of unused liquidity from financial markets, but also be much more targeted than the current quantitative easing programme which injects ever more liquidity into financial markets without unlocking substantive real-economy activity, therefore feeding new asset price bubbles.

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Asks the ECB to carefully monitor the risks associated with its purchase programmes, in order to avoid an unfair burden on EU taxpayers; Is of the opinion that any ABS purchase should be strictly limited to the most senior tranches of the most simple and transparent products and that purchases of mezzanine tranches should be avoided while originators should retain at least retain 20% of original risks;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap may have decreased; ~~asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;~~

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Stresses that the~~Welcomes the still modest yet noticeable, positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics ~~remains modest~~, with ~~new~~ loans to enterprises ~~stil~~benefiting from a gradual wea~~k and with significant differences across euro area economies~~sing of credit standards, a continued easing of the terms and conditions for new loans, a decrease in the rejection of applications, an increase in the demand for loans and a gradual picking-up of private investment in the first three quarters of 2015; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium- term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap have decreased; ~~asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;~~

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have ~~risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while~~begun to rise, although the risks of a deflation trap have ~~decr~~not disappeasred; asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;

Amendment 115 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap have decreased; asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, ~~without discrimination;~~and to consider extending its composition to regional and local government debt assets in order to avoid any possible preferential treatment among levels of government inside the Member States.

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap have decreased; ~~asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;~~

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap have decreased; asks the ECB to where possible apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination, while respecting the rules the ECB is bound by;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses that the ~~positive~~ impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap have decreased; asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Believes that to avoid that the ECB trespasses its own limits in the holding of certain Member States public debt assets, the ECB should change the composition of APP in order to increase the share of EIB bonds, moreover increasing the purchases of these infrastructure-related assets may have a more positive effect to achieve inflation targets.

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

Amendment 120 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Points out that the current slow recovery is determined partly by crude oil prices and economic trends in China;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Notes that global economic growth is still sluggish, with downside risk for the emerging markets; highlights the possible repercussion on the European economy; invites the ECB to adjust the size, composition and duration of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) accordingly;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Remains concerned by the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset- backed securities put forward as collateral to the eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations; reiterates its request to the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities as well as to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets; underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of supervisory tasks conferred to the ECB;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Stresses that, according to the Annual Report, take up of the September and December TLTRO operations was around half of potential and 754 of the 1223 credit institutions reached by the operation did not even have the qualifying loans to non-financial on their books and the TLTROs benefits to the real economy has been minimal despite the significant beneficial effect on cost and maturity of funding to those institutions;

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Points out that, while the effects on the real economy has been very limited, banks have been able to access funding at virtually no cost which has directly subsidised their balance sheets; deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, despite representing a clear fiscal spill- over effect of monetary, is not monitored and published and that it is free from strict conditionality in terms of how it is invested; insists that any extraordinary measures of this kind should be accompanied by measures to mitigate distortions to markets and the economy;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)

7d. Warns that prolonged non- conventional monetary policy actions can have significant distributional effects between the wealthy and poor, young and old, and also between regions with different financial structures. e.g. by decreasing savings and pension accumulation rates while propping up the value of financial assets of existing holders and that these could lead to increasing inequality; Urges the ECB to monitor the side effects of its monetary policy measures and its impact on inequality.

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 e (new)

7e. Asks the Commission to come forward with proposals to improve macroprudential oversight and the policy tools available for mitigating the risks in shadow banking, in the light of the warning by the ECB in the Annual report that, given the steady expansion over the last decade, to 22 trillion euro in assets, of non-bank credit intermediation, further initiatives are needed to monitor and assess vulnerabilities in the growing shadow banking sector;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 f (new)

7f. Urges the ECB together with other relevant Union bodies and in the light of the requirement under TFEU 127.1 that the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union to consider the possibility of using its APP strategically, by encouraging the development of safe and simple marketable asset classes, suitable for the Program, that are linked to the achievement of key EU targets particularly the transition to a sustainable and just economy and to consider drawing up a range of green and social projects for which credit created through quantitative easing could be used as direct financing;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Warn~~Is conscious that exiting from the current quantitative easing measures will be a very complex matter which will have to be carefully planned, especially the timing of the exit;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Warns that exiting from the current quantitative easing measures will be a very complex matter which will have to be carefully planned in order to prevent unintended market disruptions, especially as regards the timing of the exit;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas, again according to the same forecast, the fiscal outlook in the euro area should exhibit a ~~slight~~n improvement, with decreases expected in the public deficit (from 2.4 % in 2014 to 1.7 % in 2016) and the public debt (from 94 % at the end of 2014 to 92.5 % at the end of 2016);

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Warns that exiting from the current quantitative easing measures will be a very complex matter which will have to be carefully planned, especially the timing of the exit; emphasises, however, that quantitative easing does not offer long- term solutions to the problems facing the European economy and is no substitute for necessary structural reforms in the Member States;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Stresses that the ECB needs to create further incentives for the banks to transfer liquidity to the real economy;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 133 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that, according to the ECJ judgment of 16 June 2015 in Case C-62/14, ~~when~~ the ECB programme for the purchases of government bonds on secondary markets ~~it is exposed to a significant risk of losses as well as to the risk of a debt cut~~does not exceed the powers of the ECB in relation to monetary policy and does not contravene the prohibition of monetary financing of Member States;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that, according to the ECJ judgment of 16 June 2015 in Case C-62/14, wthen fact that the ECB's purchases of government bonds on secondary markets ~~it is~~might potentially exposed it to a significant risk of losses as well as to the risk of a debt cut, does not alter the conclusion that the ECB is allowed to purchase government bonds on secondary markets;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Notes that, according to~~Emphasises the concerns expressed in the ECJ judgment of 16 June 2015 in Case C-62/14, which states that when the ECB purchases government bonds on secondary markets it is exposed to a significant risk of losses as well as to the risk of a debt cut;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that, according to the ECJ judgment of 16 June 2015 in Case C-62/14, when the ECB purchases government bonds on secondary markets it is exposed to a significant risk of losses as well as to the risk of a debt cut;, stating that such risk is inherent in a purchase of bonds on the secondary market, an operation which the Court reminds was authorised by the authors in the Treaties, without conditional upon the ECB having privileged creditor status; Stresses that a de facto risk mutualisation through the ECB balance sheet is far inferior to an explicit mechanism for joint liability such as Eurobonds or a "redemption fund"

Amendment 138 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy, and that th~~e non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB is not able to change this situation~~is situation cannot be address by the ECB, but it requires coordinated political decision at European level;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy~~, and that the non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB is not able to change this situation~~;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy~~, and that~~; the non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB ~~is not able~~can help to change this situation;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy, and that the non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB is not able to change this situation; further points out that very low interest rates lead in the long-term to distortions in the business sector and will prove detrimental to private savings and pension plans;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy, and that the non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB is not able to change this situation; believes that a sustainable, political solution is still needed to ensure both the stability of state financing and addressing the millstone of high debt levels. Eurobonds could provide a remedy for this in certain circumstances.

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Stresses that the high and divergent levels of public and private indebtedness in some Member States, in addition to the as yet unresolved structural weaknesses in the banking sector, are obstacles to the correct transmission of monetary policy, and that the non-conventional monetary policy implemented by the ECB is not able to change this situation;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Underlines that the non-performing loans still remain a huge problem throughout the Union; according to the World Bank, 10 EU Member States and 6 Eurozone countries have rates of non- performing loans compared to total loans of over 10% with the highest to 45.4%; a mechanism responsible for solving the non-performing loans should be established in those problematic Member States as it was the case in Spain and in Ireland, in order to deal effectively with the problem;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Deplores the fact that the response to the crisis has resulted in structural reforms being imposed on MS but not banks;

Amendment 149 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas, again according to the same forecast, the fiscal outlook in the euro area should exhibit a slight improvement, with decreases expected in the public deficit (from 2.4 % in 2014 to 1.7 % in 2016) and the public debt (from 94 % at the end of 2014 to 92.5 % at the end of 2016); notes that deflationary fiscal policies combined with banking policies which socialised private debt and austerity policies have led to extremely high levels of public debt in many Member States;

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Urges those euro area Member States which are subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme to act pursuant to Article 7(9) of Regulation No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 to carry out a comprehensive audit of their public finances in order, inter alia, to assess the reasons that led to the build-up of excessive levels of debt, as well as to track any possible irregularities; this audit will be to achieve a better understanding of past mistakes and not in order to start an ad hoc debt restructuring process that could initiate again the debt crisis in some Member States.

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

~~12. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States;~~deleted

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

~~12. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States;~~deleted

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that ~~the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some~~budgetary limits based on numerical constraints with no economic rationale have aggravated the impact of the crisis, making recovery impossible in many Member States;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. ~~Considers that the existing~~Welcomes the Commission Communication of 13 January 2015 entitled 'Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact ~~rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States~~' (COM(2015)0012); believes that the Commission communication clarifies where room for flexibility exists under the existing legislation; welcomes the attempt to shed more clarity into this complicated field and expects the Commission to use the flexibility that is built into the existing rules in line with the communication while ensuring the predictability, transparency and effectiveness of the economic governance framework;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that ~~the existing flexibility within the~~all tools available in the enhanced Stability and Growth Pact ~~rules c~~should be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States and consolidate the overall long term growth, in particular through the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. CUnderlines that the existing economic governance framework should be properly enforced, without differentiation between big and small Member States, and considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States, but believes that the implementation of reform programmes and sustainable budget policies are preconditions;

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States; recalls that monetary policy alone cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by adequate fiscal policies;

Amendment 159 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States; Considers that austerity packages have killed investment demand altogether; Notes that the stability and growth pact (SGP), the fiscal compact (FC) and the European central bank's (ECB) initial reluctance to act as governments' last resort lender, restricted member states in their ability to absorb private slack and recycle abundant liquidity on financial markets through higher public investment.;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas low energy prices, while having a negative impact on inflation expectations, could potentially help the economic recovery;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States; considers that deflationary fiscal policies combined with banking policies which socialised private debt and austerity policies have led to extremely high levels of public debt in many Member States; notes the Commission's interpretative communication on flexibility in the SGP, aimed at clarifying the scope of the investment clause and allowing for a certain degree of temporary flexibility in the preventive arm of the SGP;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Considers that the existing flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact rules could be used to better address the weak recovery in some Member States and to carry through the necessary structural reforms; reiterates however that the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact should be respected and that these rules stipulate that deficits must be offset with surpluses in order to achieve a budget which is in balance or in surplus over the medium term;

Amendment 162 #

Krišjānis KARIŅŠ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Emphasises that strong political commitment towards implementation of growth enhancing structural reforms is key to enhancing stability and, eventually, economic growth;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Believes that the only effective solution to the excessive level of public debt in some member states is a conference aimed to agree on a definitive solution for the part of that debt that is unsustainable;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Believes that as the American example shows, it is necessary that all Member States are able to commit themselves to balanced budgets in order to create trust and confidence among partners and for the Eurozone to be able to further integrate.

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Believes that bailouts even though necessary have created tensions in the Eurozone that could have unintended consequences in the medium term and calls all actors involved to revise its design.

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 c (new)

12c. Considers that without clear political and democratic legitimacy at the Commission, the application of the economic governance framework is doomed to fail when confronted with national heads of government unwilling to comply with it.

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Affirms its commitment to respecting the ECB’s independence in the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties; considers that central bank independence is crucial for achieving the objective of safeguarding price stability, and that this implies that the ECB must not be threatened with the risk of fiscal or financial dominance;deleted

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Affirms its commitment to respecting the ECB’'s independence in the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties; considers that central bank independence is crucial for achieving the objective of safeguarding price stability, ~~and that this implies that the ECB must not be threatened with the risk of fiscal or financial dominance~~recalls that all governments and national public authorities should thus refrain from asking the ECB to take specific actions;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Affirms its commitment to respecting the ECB’s independence in the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties; considers that central bank independence is crucial for achieving the objective of safeguarding price stability~~, and that this implies that the ECB must not be threatened with the risk of fiscal or financial dominanc~~; reiterates that the above does not prevent the European Parliament from expressing its view on the monetary policy options it deems to be most appropriate;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas core inflation rates, that is exclusive of energy, have at best only marginally improved as a result of the quantitative easing programme that the ECB has rightly launched this year, an outcome which gives rise to concern, especially since there has been a deterioration in the performance of the Chinese economy and of emerging markets, which threatens to further compound deflationary forces;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Affirms its commitment to respecting the ECB’s independence in the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties; considers that central bank independence is crucial for achieving the objective of ~~safeguard~~maintaining price stability, and that this implies that the ECB must not be threatened with the risk of fiscal or financial dominance;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Insists that, in a properly functioning EMU, the counterpart to strong ECB independence with respect to its pursuit of monetary policy is to have strictly separated mechanisms for i) Union level coordination of fiscal policy, ii) financial supervision policy and iii) monetary policy subject to a high degree of democratic accountability; points out that, in addition to this institutional balance, it is essential to have a mechanism for resolving the inevitable conflicts between monetary, fiscal and prudential objectives in an equally democratically accountable manner;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Expresses strong reservations regarding the role assumed by the ECB in the context of the SSM as the European systemic bank watchdog body, given that this could lead to possible conflicts of interest; deplores the fact that a large part of the German banking system, comprising the national banks, has remained outside SSM supervision and control;

Amendment 173 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Regrets that the main objective of the ECB is price stability and not full employment;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)

14b. Considers that the ECB should be the lender of last resort;

Amendment 175 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Draws attention to Article 123 TFEU, Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, and Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/1993 of 13 December1993 which prohibit the direct purchase by the national central banks or the ECB of debt instruments issued by EU or national public authorities or bodies; recalls however that such purchases are allowed in secondary markets;

Amendment 176 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that ~~austerity policies in a number of~~the public over indebtedness, lack of competitiveness and subsequent necessary fiscal adjustment in some Member States have ~~contribut~~led to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’' public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion;

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. ~~Notes~~Expresses concern that austerity policies in a number of Member States have ~~contributed to~~been responsible for stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that ~~austerity~~extreme fiscal adjustment policies in a number of Member States have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that unsustainable levels of (public) debt and a lack of structural reforms forced a number of Member States into austerity policies; notes that in a number of Member States ~~have~~this has contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion;

Amendment 182 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that ~~austerity policies~~the introduction of the Euro caused an interest rate convergence among the Euro Area and induced a credit-financed boom in the countries in Europe's periphery; notes further that after the burst of the bubble austerity policies were deemed necessary in a number of Member States and have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion; states the fact that these member states cannot cope with their debt burden via austerity policy making a debt relief the only possible starting point to solve the underlying causes of the crisis;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that austerity policies in a number of Member States have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion; Notes that the architecture of the economic governance is undemocratic and rather than developing further steps towards pooling sovereignty, there is a need to reject austerity policies, prioritise public investment, democratise the governance structure and to redefine the European Monetary Union;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that austerity policies in a number of Member States have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion; observes furthermore that, after years of crisis, the gulf between the Northern and Southern EMU countries has only grown wider, and therefore advocates that the monetary union be split into Northern and Southern currency areas;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Notes that austerity policies in a number of Member States have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion, but once again draws attention to the fact that austerity policies must treat social factors with particular care;

Amendment 186 #

Alfred SANT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Notes that the ECB in its statements remains publicly insistent on the need for Eurozone countries to maintain a steady pace in the introduction of structural reforms; Calls on the ECB to evaluate and take into account when it makes its recommendations, the critique that independent economic and financial experts have been making of European structural reform programmes, namely that they have been simultaneously launched over too wide a policy spectrum, which has made them frequently counterproductive and prone to create logjams for each other, as well as that structural reforms should have been organised on a limited basis, prioritised according to what would have produced the quickest and deepest impact, and then sequenced on a stage by stage basis.

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Believes that in order to foster economic recovery and to reduce unemployment levels in the European Union greater focus should be placed on aggregate demand policies; notes that fiscal consolidation policies did not produce its intended results;

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Considers it necessary for Member States to recover their fiscal and monetary autonomy, so as to conduct the necessary expansionary economic policy and making the public investments necessary to support growth in line with their specific national requirements;

Amendment 189 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. ~~Welcom~~Notes the step forward taken by the ECB in publishing the minutes of its meetings, and look forward to the announcement of further steps to improve the transparency of its communication channels; considers that still further progress can be made, especially with regard to SSM;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by private consumption, while private investment in the euro area continues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisiCalls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise public investment; urges the Commission and Member States to do more from the economic crisis as an opportunity to promote a more equitable, socially and environmentally sustainable economic model, by, among other means, accelerating public investment and promoting social enterprise and alternative business models, such as mutuals and cooperatives;

Amendment 190 #

Sven GIEGOLD, Molly SCOTT CATO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Welcomes the step forward taken by the ECB in publishing the summary minutes of its meetings, and looks forward to the announcement of further steps to improve the transparency of its communication channels; welcomes a generalised tendency by major central banks to publicly explain monetary decisions immediately after they were taken, a practice that was spearheaded by the ECB;

Amendment 191 #

Aldo PATRICIELLO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. ~~Welcomes the step forward taken by the ECB in publishing the minutes of its meetings, and look forward to the announcement of further steps to improve the transparency of its communication channel~~Notes that the confidence of markets and of individuals in the banking system is the only way of raising the euro area out of the crisis, thereby encouraging a return of capital and investment; welcomes, therefore, the step forward taken by the ECB in publishing the minutes of its meetings, and look forward to the announcement of further steps to improve the transparency of its communication channels; welcomes the publication of clearer and more transparent emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) procedures for solvent financial institutions (mainly national banks) facing temporary liquidity problems;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Welcomes the step forward taken by the ECB in publishing the minutes of its meetings, and look forward to the announcement of further steps to improve the transparency of its communication channels; recalls its request that the annual ECB report should include a feedback to the inputs provided in the annual European Parliament report; Deems that it would be useful if along with its assessment of monetary and financial conditions the ECB could provide in its statement following the monthly ECB Council of Governors meeting its assessment of extent of the output gaps across the eurozone; (null)

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Asks the ECB to disclose to the European Parliament the secret 'Agreements on Net Financial Assets' between the National central banks and the ECB regarding inter alia the amounts of different classes of assets, including government bonds that an Euro area central bank can hold in its balance sheet;

Amendment 194 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Recalls that the monetary dialogue is important to ensure the transparency of monetary policy, vis-à-vis the European Parliament and the wider public;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Recalls that the quarterly monetary dialogue is a welcome gesture from the ECB towards the European Parliament and is important to ensure the transparency of monetary policy, vis-à-vis Parliament and the wider public;

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Recalls that the monetary dialogue is an important opportunity to ensure the transparency of monetary policy, vis-à-vis Parliament and the wider public and therefore urges the representatives of the ECB to give precise and detailed replies to questions by MEPs; calls on ECB officials also to provide additional information in writing where answers given during the discussions are not fully satisfactory and/or comprehensive;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. welcomes the willingness expressed by Mario Draghi during the Monetary dialogue of 23 September 2015 "to inform the European Parliament of the positions taken by the ECB" within organisations such as the Financial Stability Board or the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses that the ECB’s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must ~~not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions~~be clearly distinguished and that the combination of both functions should not generate any conflict of interest for the ECB in the performance of its main duties; recalls in this respect the guiding principle that the instrument used for policy-making, either monetary or supervisory, should be chosen depending on the objective pursued and on the issue faced;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses that the ECB’s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest ~~in its execution of its principal functions~~;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

~~A. whereas, according to the Commission’s latest spring forecast, economic recovery in the euro area is expected to expand, with real GDP predicted to rise by 1.5 % in 2015 and 1.9 % in 2016;~~deleted

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by ~~private consumption, while private investment in the euro area~~external factors such as the falling price of oil, and whereas Southern count~~inues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis~~ries still need an external devaluation of their currencies if they are to become competitive in the longer term;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses that the ECB’'s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions; underlines furthermore the need for democratic accountability in view of the new responsibilities conferred on the ECB regarding supervisory tasks, as well as its advisory role in the Troika and Quadriga programmes;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses that the ECB’s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions; Further stresses the importance of exploring future institutional independence of these two functions with a democratically accountable mechanism for resolving conflicts between them;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses that the ECB’s supervisory role and its monetary policy function must not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions; considers therefore that the best solution would be to entrust oversight to a separate body that is independent of the ECB;

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. supports the vision stated by Mario Draghi in his speech delivered in Frankfurt am Main on 16 March 2015 that "economic convergence should be reached through structural reforms that lead to an alignment of productivity levels. On the institutional side, we need to move from a system of rules and guidelines for national economic policy making to a system of further sovereignty sharing within common institutions. As part of this process, we need to strengthen the democratic accountability of Europe towards its citizens";

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Stresses that, when carrying out its supervisory duties, the ECB should take into account the need to exchange relevant information with the authorities for which access to such information is necessary to the performance of their duties, in particular with the SRB and resolution authorities;

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Supports the ECB's assertion in its Annual Report that the current CRR/CRD IV package lacks certain measures which could also effectively address specific types of systemic risk - such as (i) various asset-side measures, such as the application of limits to loan-to-value, loan-to income or debt service-to-income ratios, and (ii) the introduction of various exposure limits falling outside the current definition of large exposures - and urges the Commission to examine the need for legislative proposals in this regard.

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the Troika and Quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and reinforce its independence from political decisions, abiding by the ECJ judgment in Case C-62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263;deleted

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. ~~Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the Troika and Quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and~~Reminds that the ECB's role in the Troika and now in the Quadriga was codified in the two-pack (Regulation 472/2013 Article 7); urges the ECB to reassess, and if necessary reinforce, its independence from political decisions, abiding by the ECJ judgment in Case C-62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263;

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the Troika and Quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and reinforce its independence from political decisions, abiding byTakes note of the ECJ judgment in Case C-62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263 and calls ECB to take that into consideration when taking its actions;

Amendment 21 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by private consumption and exports, while private investment in the euro area ~~continues to stagnate~~is only gradually picking up and remains at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. ~~Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the Troika and Quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and~~Urges the ECB to reinforce its independence from political decisions, abiding by the ECJ judgment in Case C- 62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Deplores the fact that the ECB has exceeded even a broad interpretation of its Treaty-based mandate, inter alia in its role in the Troika and Quadriga; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and reinforce its independence from political decisions, abiding by the necessary preconditions for Treaty-compatible OMT as set out in ECJ judgment in Case C- 62/14 of 16 June 2015, especially its paragraph 102, as well as the opinion expressed by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón in the same case, especially its paragraphs 227 and 263;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Deplores the fact that the European Central Bank limited the access of banks based in Greece to Emergency Liquidity Assistance during the negotiations on the multilateral loan for financial assistance to this country;

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

~~21. Recalls Parliament’s resolution on the 2013 Annual Report of the ECB, especially its paragraph 9;~~deleted

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 216 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Underlines the need for democratic accountability in view of the new responsibilities conferred on the ECB regarding supervisory tasks, as well as its involvement in the Troika and Quadriga programmes, while also stressing the ECB’s independence in the field of monetary policy and the need to avoid any conflict of interest in the execution of its functions; notes with concern the rescue packages to the bailed-out countries, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as well as its predecessor the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) within the European Central Bank (ECB) have fragile legal foundations based on the EU treaties. Moreover, aside from the substantive validity of these initiatives, many of the procedures adopted in their establishment deviate from the processes as provided for in the treaties, thus undermining their democratic legitimacy.

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Underlines the need for more democratic accountability in view of the new responsibilities conferred on the ECB regarding supervisory tasks, as well as its involvement in the Troika and Quadriga programmes, while also stressing the ECB’s independence in the field of monetary policy and the need to avoid any conflict of interest in the execution of its functions;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Regrets the fact that the ECB is, through the euro, undermining the principle of self-determination of the peoples in the euro area by imposing economic policy in the name of financial market stability, regardless of the democratic will that should govern it, rather than being governed by it;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the ~~current recovery is~~se processes are mainly supported by private consumption, while private investment in the euro area continues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis;

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Calls on the ECB, when performing its supervisory role, to take greater account of the proportionality principle in the future;

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)

22b. Calls on the ECB to completely rework the proposal to set up a comprehensive Analytical Credit Dataset, Anacredit), taking particular account of the proportionality principle, and in doing so to focus on setting appropriate thresholds in an effort to minimise the administrative costs for smaller financial institutions in particular;

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;deleted

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. C~~alls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining~~ onsiders that the architecture of the economic governance is undemocratic and rather than developing further scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troikateps towards pooling sovereignty, there is a need to democratise the governance structure and to redefine the European Monetary Union;

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’'s modus operandi and of the ECB’'s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;

Amendment 225 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi ~~and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks,~~ with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; ~~invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;~~

Amendment 226 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; ~~invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in~~underlines that the economic development in those Member States which concluded adjustment programmes is evidence for the successful work of the Troika;

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; ~~invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;~~

Amendment 228 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; ~~invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;~~

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability with the involvement of the European Parliament in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Amendment 231 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Amendment 232 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Recalls the report of Parliament of 28 February 2014 on the inquiry into the role and operations of the Troika, which calls on the next Parliament to build on the work of this report, develop its key findings and investigate further; calls for a complete over-hall in the ECB mandate and statutes, putting an end to its false autonomy, assuring its political and democratic control by the States (on an equal footing) and returning to Member- States the power of decision on crucial economic options, including the control of its monetary policy;

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Calls for a thorough assessment of the ECB’s modus operandi towards Greece, especially as regards the decisions taken by it, namely: a) (on 4 February 2015) to lift the waiver affecting marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic; b) (on 28 June 2015) to limit the liquidity available to Greek banks via the European Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility, resulting in the imposition of capital controls; c) (in 2015) to withhold profits from its Greek bond portfolio acquired under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP);deleted

Amendment 234 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 236 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 – introductory part

25. ~~Calls for a thorough assessment of~~Deplores the ECB’s modus operandi and actions towards Greece, especially as regards the decisions taken by it, namely:

Amendment 237 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 – point a

~~a) (on 4 February 2015) to lift the waiver affecting marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic;~~deleted

Amendment 238 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 – point b

~~b) (on 28 June 2015) to limit the liquidity available to Greek banks via the European Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility, resulting in the imposition of capital controls;~~deleted

Amendment 239 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 – point c

~~c) (in 2015) to withhold profits from its Greek bond portfolio acquired under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP);~~deleted

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by private consumption, while private and public investment in the euro area continues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis;

Amendment 240 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 – point c

~~c) (in 2015) to withhold profits from its Greek bond portfolio acquired under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP);~~deleted

Amendment 241 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Points out, that as indicated by the ECBs role in relation to liquidity provision to Greece in June 2015 and the leaked discussions of the ECB Council of Governors on the solvency of Cypriot banks, the concept of 'insolvency' underpinning the provision of central bank liquidity to institutions in the Euro area lacks a sufficient level of clarity as the concept refers both to a situation arising in a bank after a judicial determination of insolvency or alternatively as the situation where competent supervisory authorities determine that an institution does not comply with minimum requirements defined in the CRD/CRR framework; underlines that such a lack of clarity needs to be addressed so as to guarantee legal certainty and foster financial stability;

Amendment 242 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. underlines that for Member States in financial distress, transforming Emergency Liquidity Assistance debt into long-term bonds could be an option, especially in such cases where the banks have shown good implementation record;

Amendment 243 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Urges the central banks of the Member States to pool their equities at the Bank for International Settlements within the European Central Bank;

Amendment 244 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Asks the ECB to examine the gender imbalance factor on its Council when its membership is renew~~deleted;

Amendment 245 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Asks the ECB to examine the gender imbalance factor on its Council when its membership is renew~~deleted;

Amendment 246 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

~~26. Asks the ECB to examine the gender imbalance factor on its Council when its membership is renew~~deleted;

Amendment 247 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. ~~Asks~~Calls on the ECB to ~~examine the~~aim for greater gender imbalance ~~factor on its Council when its membership is renewe~~within its decision-making bodies and to pay closer attention to this factor when renewing the members thereof, in particular these of the Executive Board;

Amendment 248 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Asks the ECB to ~~examine th~~make every effort to ensure gender imbalance ~~factor~~ on its Council when its membership is renewed;

Amendment 249 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Asks the ~~ECB~~Council to examine the gender imbalance factor on ~~its~~the ECB's Governing Council when its membership is renewed;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the current recovery is mainly supported by exports and private consumption, while private and public investment in the euro area continues to stagnate at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis;

Amendment 250 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. ~~Asks the ECB~~Reminds the ECB, the Member States, the Council and the European Parliament (Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee) to examine the gender imbalance factor on its Council ~~when its~~and Board when their membership iss are renewed;

Amendment 251 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Asks the ECB to examine and tackle the gender imbalance factor on its Council when its membership is renewed;

Amendment 252 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Asks the ECB to examine the gender imbalance factor on its Council when its membership is renewed; notes with concern that the economic crisis and fiscal consolidation policies have disproportionately affected women, particularly those from marginalised communities, young women, and women suffering from multiple discrimination;

Amendment 253 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Calls on the ECB, furthermore, to set up a working party including academic experts and the central bankers from the EMU countries with the aim of devising an orderly plan for bringing about an orderly division of the current monetary union; considers that this working party should help, by means of its well-considered analyses and orderly plan, to minimise any forward-looking speculation against Southern Member States on the financial markets;

Amendment 254 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Recalls that the role of the ECB includes the protection of financial stability and thus the need to give enough liquidity to avoid public bank runs in solvent banks connected to the Eurosystem network.

Amendment 255 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Recalls its request to improve the gender balance within the institution as well as to diversify the theoretical background of its staff; welcome the gender-quota system that has been introduced; Believes that the on-going crisis has highlighted the need to increase theoretical diversity within central banks; requests the ECB to report in its next annual report on how it intends to proceed in order to diversify the analytical background of its staff;

Amendment 256 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 257 #

Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 258 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. ~~Believe~~Considers that the ~~current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a futur~~Banking Union legislation serves only the interests of the big financial capital in the EU and infringes basic democratic principles; defends the repeal of the Banking Union legislation and the need to assure a public and democratic control over the banking ~~crisis~~system;

Amendment 259 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be coimplemented ~~in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisi~~and properly enforced, including the capitalisation of the Single Resolution Fund and the national Deposit Guarantee Schemes;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas low energy prices, particularly for oil, have been among the main contributors to the decrease in the headline inflation rates in the euro area;

Amendment 260 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union ~~should~~must be complemented ~~in the future with~~and urges for immediate establishment of a sSingle ~~mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis~~Deposit Guarantee Scheme; highlights, in this respect, even though late, the call by the ECB President towards this direction on the monetary dialogue on 23 September 2015;

Amendment 261 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented ~~in the futur~~as soon as possible with a single mechanism to fully guarantee bank deposits at European level, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis;

Amendment 262 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis. A single DGS cannot be contemplated as long as other pillars of the Banking Union have not been fully implemented and as long as legacy concerns regarding bank balance sheets have not been fully resolved;

Amendment 263 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis;. Welcomes in this regard the announcement of the Commission to launch a proposal before the end of this year.

Amendment 264 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits if and when all conditions are met, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis; and ultimately breaking the hazardous tango of sovereign-bank interdependence.

Amendment 265 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis; calls for an early agreement on a bridge financing mechanism and for concrete steps towards a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund;

Amendment 266 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis and keeping the costs of deposit protection within the banking sector with contributions by banks strictly related to their likelihood of triggering deposit protection;

Amendment 267 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis; echoes the statement made by the ECB President, at the thirty-second meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee in Lima, that completing the Banking Union is key "in order to create a truly single banking system and achieve its objectives of breaking the bank- sovereign nexus, making the financial system more resilient, and protecting the interests of taxpayers" and that in "parallel, the authorities will need to decisively deal with remaining crisis legacies to create a better foundation for bank lending to the real economy";

Amendment 268 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Believes that the current structure of the Banking Union should be complemented in the future with a single mechanism to guarantee bank deposits, aimed at avoiding capital flight in the event of a future banking crisis; stresses that such a mechanism could take the shape of an EU-level reinsurance scheme, as envisaged in the Five President's report on completing the EMU, and financed through the Single Resolution Fund;

Amendment 269 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Considers therefore that the best solution would be to entrust oversight to a separate body independent of the ECB once the SSM mechanism is established;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas, according to the E~~urosystem~~CB projection of last ~~June~~September, the average inflation rate in the euro area, after remaining close to zero in the ~~first~~second half of 2015, is expected to pick up, rising to 1.5 1 % in 2016 and 1.87 % in 2017;

Amendment 270 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)

27b. Considers it necessary to implement as soon as possible the structural reform of banks, with a clear and compulsory separation between retail and investment activities to reduce interdependencies and risks in the banking sector and increase its resilience; deplores the lack of interest shown by the European institutions in proceeding with such reform;

Amendment 271 #

Matt CARTHY, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 c (new)

27c. Regrets that the first asset quality review exercise produced uneven and non-comparable results, penalising banks that have provided funding for the real economy and rewarding, banks with greater systemic risk (for example the German DB with EUR 54 trillion in derivatives that is not considered a risk to the European economic system); regrets that the differences in derivatives reporting are resulting in different risk profiles between Member States, placing certain banks at a comparative advantage; calls for a harmonised European asset quality review framework as part of the SSM;

Amendment 272 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. ~~Welcomes~~Notes the Commission's Investment Package, including the cCapital mMarket us Union ~~project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro ar~~(CMU); stresses that an equitable and robustly regulated financial services framework which ensures financial stability is a prerequisite in order to increase (long-term) investment and to foster growth in a sustainable and socially balanced European econom~~ies on the banking system~~y; underlines the linkage between socially sustainable polices and financial stability;

Amendment 273 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. ~~Welcom~~Strongly deplores the capital market union project ~~and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economi~~because further financialisation would make the economic system more fragile, interconnected and exposed to systemic risks and to fresh crises onat the ~~banking system~~expense of growth and the real economy;

Amendment 274 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential ~~contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economie~~to boost jobs and growth by increasing and diversifying the sources of finance for businesses and long-term projects oin ~~the banking system;~~all 28 EU Member States.

Amendment 275 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital markets union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system;

Amendment 276 #

Aldo PATRICIELLO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system, while stressing that it must be targeted at more and better inclusiveness and access for SMEs and citizens to the European financial market, investment and credit;

Amendment 277 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system; draws attention to the fact that the shift away from a bank-based system, if achieved, is likely to have implications for the transmission of monetary policy and therefore for its conduct;

Amendment 278 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system and its potential capacity to channel funds towards the economy more efficiently;

Amendment 279 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system as well as its crucial role as shock absorber for the Monetary Union;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas, according to the Eurosystem projection of last ~~June~~September, the average inflation rate in the euro area, after remaining close to zero in the first half of 2015, is expected to pick up, rising to 1.51 % in 2016 and 1.87 % in 2017;

Amendment 280 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system; Warns, however, that the CMU should not discourage real economy focused relationship banking that is the most appropriate form of financing for smaller firms;

Amendment 281 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to rebalancing the funding channels and reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system;

Amendment 282 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system; makes clear that the aim is not to diminish, or to keep funding means at their current level, but rather to increase and diversify them;

Amendment 283 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Welcomes the capital market union project and its potential contribution to reducing excessive dependence of euro area economies on the banking system and stresses the necessity to create a single supervisor for capital markets as the ECB is for the banking system;

Amendment 29 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas Article 127(5) of the TFEU requires the European System of Central Banks to help maintain financial stability;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, according to the Commission’s latest predicted spring forecast, economic recovery in the euro area is expected to expand, with ~~real~~ GDP predicted to rise by 1.5 % in 2015 and 1.9 % in 2016; notes with concern, that growth rates in some Member States are masked by the impact of foreign multinationals; notes with concern that a substantial proportion of growth in specific member states, is due to low-tax financial services sectors, which do not positively impact upon domestic or real economies in the manner other sectors can; notes with concern that the foundations of any growth are fragile, mainly owing EU's policies suppressing domestic demand and increasing economic problems in China and other countries;

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Eb. whereas Article 127(2) of the TFEU requires the European System of Central Banks to 'to promote the smooth operation of payment systems';

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas, despite the overall improvement in aggregate towards a broadly neutral fiscal stance, the crisis regarding the third bailout for Greece agreed on the 12th of July 2015, again underlined that the problems arising from divergences in economic and social performance achieved in different parts of the Union, are not being well managed, and this with particular reference to the Eurozone, but also to the Union as a whole;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas in 2014 the ECB lowered its key refinancing rates to the ~~effective lower bound~~0.05% and reduced its deposit facility rate to -0.20 %; whereas lower real rates have not ~~translated into either~~proved sufficient to increased credit for households and businesses, especially SMEs, or GDP growth and job creation;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas in 2014 the ECB lowered its key refinancing rates to the effective lower bound and reduced its deposit facility rate to -0.20 %; whereas lower ~~real~~ rates ~~have~~did not translated into either increased credit for households and businesses, especially SMEs, or GDP growth and job creation, a fact which contributed to setting the ECB on the path to unconventional monetary policy measures;

Amendment 34 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas in 2014 the ECB lowered its key refinancing rates to the effective lower bound and reduced its deposit facility rate to -0.20 %; whereas lower real rates have not translated into either increased credit for households and businesses, especially SMEs, or GDP growth and job creation; stresses the need to prioritise action to tackle unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, and to give priority to sustainable employment/quality jobs, investment, and quality public services which ensure social inclusion, especially in the areas of agriculture, education, health, childcare, care of dependent persons, public transport and social services;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas in 2014 the ECB lowered its key refinancing rates to the effective lower bound and reduced its deposit facility rate to -0.20 %; whereas lower real rates have not translated into either increased credit for households and businesses, especially SMEs, or GDP growth and job creation; whereas, regrettably, because of the ECB’s low interest rate policy, many insurance funds and pension funds are finding it increasingly difficult to honour their obligations, which entails a serious risk in the medium term in view of the ageing of the European population;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas financial fragmentation is still a major problem, with Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) suffering higher borrowing costs than the bigger companies, particularly in the countries hit more by the crisis; whereas facilitating credit flow to MSMEs is fundamental as they represent 99% of all businesses in the Union and account for 80% of jobs in the Union and thus they have a key role in generating economic growth, in job creating and in narrowing social disparities;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas in 2014 the ECB implemented a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) and purchase programmes for selected private-sector assets ~~aiming~~which in theory aimed at supporting lending to the real economy, but which in practice have almost completely failed and have had extremely little impact on the real economy;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas by engaging in its programme of bond purchasing the ECB has loaded a substantial level of risk on to its balance sheet;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, according to the Commission’'s latest ~~spring~~autumn forecast, economic recovery in the euro area is expected to expand, with real GDP predicted to rise by 1.54 % in 2015, 1.7 % in 2016 and 1.9 ,8% in 20167;

Amendment 40 #

Krišjānis KARIŅŠ

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas bank lending volumes are slowly increasing;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

Ha. whereas in September 2015 inflation in the eurozone stood at -0.1%, a worrying development showing that monetary policy is failing to meet its objectives, which calls for the consideration of additional measures, including tax measures;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of the Banking Union, became fully operational on 4 November 2014 with the transfer to the ECB of direct supervision of the 13022 biggest banks of the euro area,; whereas in parallel a comprehensive assessment, consisting of a asset quality review and stress test, of these significant banks was carried out and finalised on 26 October 2014; and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second pillar of the Banking Union, entered into force at the beginning of 2015;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of the Banking Union, became fully operational on 4 November 2014 with the transfer to the ECB of supervision of the 130 biggest banks of the euro area, ~~and~~ the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second pillar of the Banking Union, entered into force at the beginning of 2015, and the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme, the third pillar of the Banking Union, has regrettably not been established yet;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of the Banking Union, became fully operational on 4 November 2014 with the transfer to the ECB of supervision of the 130 biggest banks of the euro area, and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second pillar of the Banking Union, entered into force at the beginning of 2015; stresses the need to complete the Banking Union framework with the development of the Banking Union 3rd pillar - a European Deposit Guarantee Scheme;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)

Ia. whereas hitherto, when performing its supervisory role, the ECB has not always taken sufficient account of the proportionality principle;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Recalls that the modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient~~Welcomes the ECB's bold actions in the face of a very challenging environment, and the fact that monetary policy has been focused on anchoring inflation expectations and returning to growth enhancing price stability; recalls that the recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will need to strengthen and potential economic growth will need to be increased in order to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States orand to reduce the burden of debt;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that without structural reforms the modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States or to reduce the burden of debt;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States or to reduce the burden of debt; believes that Members States have to deliver on the implementation of economic reforms, also and in particular in the labour markets, to enhance their competitiveness;

Amendment 5 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. ~~whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 11.6 % at the end of 2014 to 10.5 % at the end of 2016;~~ whereas there are major disparities between the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures ranging from 6.4 % in Germany to 26.6 % in Greece;

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States or to reduce the burden of debt; stresses that many Member States, in particular in the eurozone, are faced with similar macroeconomic challenges, including most importantly high external and public debts, high unemployment and low investment; deplores the insistence of the Eurogroup on austerity policies harming both investment and employment;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the geographically uneven and modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States or to reduce the burden of debt;

Amendment 52 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Recalls that the modest recovery expected for the coming years in the euro area will not be sufficient to reduce the high unemployment rates recorded in many euro area Member States or to reduce the burden of debt; stresses the need to improve the conditions for both public and private investment aimed at boosting growth and job creation, and calls for further efforts to ensure the financing of the real economy;

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Considers that the unconventional measures adopted by the ECB had a positive impact on the European economy, but are insufficient to guarantee economic growth if not accompanied by coordinated, expansive fiscal policies;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Although it regrets the slow reaction of the ECB on taking measures, welcomes the measures taken in 2014 and encourages further effort by the ECB aimed at reviving aggregate demand , increasing low cost lending to the real economy and facilitate growth;

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; ~~considers that this long-standing problem is not appropriately add~~particularly taking into account that SMEs employ 70% of the euro area's business labour force and have higher gross job creation rates than large companies; notes however a gradual decresase~~d by~~ in the ~~recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending~~spread between lending rates on small and large loans; recognizes the limits of what monetary policy can achieve in this respect and welcomes the mitigating exceptional measures undertaken by the ECB such as the targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs);

Amendment 56 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; considers that ~~this long-standing problem is not appropriately addressed by~~ the recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending are insufficient to resolve this long-standing problem;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies and the gap in financing rates granted to SMEs located in different countries; considers that this long-standing problem is cannot ~~appropriately~~be addressed by the recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending;

Amendment 58 #

Ivan JAKOVČIĆ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; considers that this long-standing problem is not appropriately addressed by the recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending; a bigger effort should be made through an increase in the share of SME related assets inside the APP program.

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; considers that this long-standing problem is not appropriately addressed by the recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending; underlines in this regard that reliable economic policies, effective structural reforms and achievements in the public debt and deficit reduction are prerequisites for enhancing the recovery and the growth potential of the real economy, and thus of SMEs, in the Member States and in the EU;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; considers that this long-standing problem is not appropriately addressed by the recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending; stresses the need to promote social economy by differentiating the regulatory environment between for- profit and non-for-profit financing institutions that would reduce this existing gap;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Deplores the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; considers that this long-standing problem is not appropriately addressed by the recent measures implemented by the ECB to boost bank lending; recommends to carry out studies establishing whether the enhanced regulatory practices rightly introduced as part of the banking union process, have negatively affected the access of SMEs to banking finance so that if necessary, corrective action may be taken;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Deplores the existence of the euro as single currency imposing fixed exchange rates on 19 Member States with too many differences in a suboptimal currency area;

Amendment 66 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Is concerned at the adverse effect of the euro on the balance of payments, generating excessive surpluses in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands that are not, moreover, being penalised as they should be under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Recalls that SMEs are the backbone of the European economy and that the banking system is instrumental in ensuring their competitiveness and their growth; welcomes the introduction of the SMEs Supporting Factor by the CRR; invites the ECB to adopt measures aimed at further facilitating financing to small and medium enterprises;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Underlines the federal nature of the European Central Bank, which rules out national vetoes, that enabled it to act decisively to address the crisis;

Amendment 69 #

Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Marisa MATIAS, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Michael THEURER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Calls on the European Central Bank to step up direct involvement in operations to purchase government bonds in the secondary markets, so as not to be constrained by the breakdown derived from its capital subscription key;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, predicted unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 11.6 % at the end of 2014 to 10.5 % at the end of 2016; whereas there are major disparities between the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures ranging from 6.4 % in Germany to 26.6 % in Greece; deplores the persistently high unemployment rates across most Member States, in particular the youth and long-term unemployment rates; notes with concern that a falling unemployment rate also disguises the social epidemic of emigration; stresses the need to reform national labour markets, reduce precariousness and raise internal demand in order to increase job creation rates; Notes with concern the use of draconian and compulsory work activation schemes for young people;

Amendment 70 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that private investment in the euro area remains significantly below its levels prior to the current crisis; welcomes in this respect the setting up of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) as well as the Commission's plan to establish a genuine Capital Markets Union (CMU) which should diversify sources of financing in the EU economy, increase crossborder investment and increase access to finance for businesses, particularly SME's;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that, despite the ECB pursuing its actions in order to maintain favourable financing conditions, private investment in the euro area remains significantly below its levels prior to the current crisis;

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that private and public investment in the euro area remains significantly below its levels prior to the current crisis;

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that private and public investment in the euro area remains significantly below its levels prior to the current crisis;

Amendment 74 #

Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Points out that the sovereign bank loop has not yet been fully addressed and urges the ECB to reflect upon possibilities to address this directly or indirectly via strengthening large exposure limits.

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Calls on the European Central Bank to consider including other types of assets than government bonds in its programme of purchases on secondary markets;

Amendment 76 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Acknowledges~~Takes note that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments; is concerned about the long-term effects of these policies;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Acknowledg~~Welcomes that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments;

Amendment 78 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Sylvie GOULARD, Michael THEURER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Acknowledg~~Notes that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments; insists that monetary policy cannot resolve the fiscal and economic problems that exist in many Member States and cannot be a substitute for necessary structural reforms.

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Acknowledges that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to ~~the zero lower bound~~0%, the ECB resorted to non- conventional monetary policy instruments;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 11.6 % at the end of 2014 to 10.5 % at the end of 2016; whereas there are major disparities between the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures ranging from 6.4 % in Germany to 26.6 % in Greece; whereas, bearing in mind that in some Member States unemployment rates are distorted by their methods, and with a view to obtaining a more realistic picture, the European Parliament considers that, in addition to unemployment rates, the need to improve the Member States’ employment indicators is at least as important;

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Acknowledges that, in reaction to a complex environment of sovereign debt crisis, of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non- conventional monetary policy instruments;

Amendment 81 #

Matt CARTHY, Marisa MATIAS, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Acknowledges that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments; Notes that the ECB should address economic divergences such as regional or sectoral asset price bubbles via discretionary asset-based reserve requirements, as opposed to a concentration on interest rates; notes that raising interest rates can have secondary unintended consequences such as suffocating the euro economy.

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Acknowledges that, in reaction to a complex environment of falling inflation, contraction of credit and sluggish economic growth, and with its interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the ECB resorted to non-conventional monetary policy instruments; Emphasises that non- conventional monetary policy intervention often has an impact on both the wider economy and the financial system; insists that in a mature EMU monetary, fiscal and prudential policy need to be clearly under the responsibility of entirely independent and democratically accountable bodies and that conflicts between them must be resolved in a further democratically accountable forum.

Amendment 85 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Expresses strong concerns about the unintended consequences of the ECB´s quantitative easing measures; points to particular concerns around competitive distortions within the Single Market created by the PSPP program as well as the negative effects of artificially low interest rates and the flattening yield curve on financial stability in general and the stability of pension funds and life insurers in particular;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Stresses the importance of the organisational independence of the European Systemic Risk Board and calls on the ECB to consider ways of enhancing the ESRB´s independence;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Calls for the introduction of new unconventional monetary policy instruments, such as QE for people, that are more effective in financing the real economy;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Is concerned that the ABS market is becoming more risky and less transparent; regrets that the ECB itself is responsible for greater systemic risk, an increase in inequalities and a growing risk of speculative bubbles;

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)

4c. Notes that LTROs, TLTROs, ABSPPs and QE have been unsuccessful because the huge influx of liquidity on the markets has remained stagnant in the financial system and has been used by banks for speculative activities such as carry trade in Government bonds instead of financing and supporting the real economy;

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 11.6 % at the end of 2014 to 10.5 % at the end of 2016; whereas there are major disparities between the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures ranging from 6.4 % in Germany to 26.6 % in Greece, and whereas, particularly in Southern Europe, such economic indicators as public debt and unemployment remain at alarming levels;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Recommends, therefore, that the European Central Bank consider further cutting the interest rate, which currently stands at 0.05%;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Urges the European Central Bank to take further measures, such as increasing the amount of debt securities to be acquired in its purchase programme in secondary markets;

Amendment 92 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Draws attention to the risks resulting from protracted low interest rates; points out that the current environment has sparked a search for yield which might have detrimental effects on financial stability, in particular in the pension funds sector;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Invites the ECB to consider in its balance sheet expansion policy the purchase of EIB project bonds and the participation in projects funded by the EFSI, thus contributing to the general economic policies in the Union and to the achievement of their objectives, as per Article 282 TFEU;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Points out that, ultimately, a proper, democratically accountable system of checks and balances and coordination between monetary, fiscal and prudential objectives with clear and independent mandates can only be achieved through Treaty change;

Amendment 95 #

Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Is concerned at the~~Recognizes that long-term interest rates are a reflection of underlying macro- economic conditions rather than an explicit choice of the ECB; takes note of the modest rise in long-term domestic yields in most Member States ~~observed~~ since the second quarter of 2015~~, which could ultimately erode the expected positive impact of non-conventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB~~; acknowledges however the movement towards a more growth-friendly composition of these long-term interest rates such as increased inflation expectations and lower real interest rates; acknowledges that it could indicate a possible return to normalisation in the economy;

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Is concerned at~~Points out the dangers to financial stability posed by artificially low interest rates, notes the rise in long-term domestic yields in most Member States observed since the second quarter of 2015~~, which could ul~~ and emphasises the need for proper, prudent and timately ~~erode the expected positive impact~~management of the winding down of non-conventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB;

Amendment 97 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA, Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Is concerned at the rise in long-term domestic yields in most Member States observed since the second quarter of 2015, which could ultimately erode the expected positive impact of non-conventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB; Welcomes the readiness of the ECB to do whatever it takes to save the Euro; underlines and welcomes the fact that the ECB Governing Council considers explicitly that its mandate allows it to fight excessive borrowing costs for Euro area Member States;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Points out that the below-target level of inflation registered in past years and also expected for the coming years will have an impact on the debt reduction programmes of several Member States;

Amendment 99 #